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Creature Comforts, Volume Four

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Reference implementation (deliberately left half-finished, addressing the substrate problems of Part XVI): https://github.com/sykomiked/ZXV0

Note on the designations. The numbers are symbolic internal reference designations of the College. They are reproduced exactly as issued and are not to be normalised, reformatted, abbreviated, or converted. The same applies to every name, honorific, symbol, and spacing above.

Staying Comfortable in a Changing World

Unacknowledged Special Access Protection

Michael L. Curzi

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A necessary statement, made once here and repeated in every chapter

This book is not legal advice, tax advice, or investment advice. It is a map of how a set of legal and financial systems actually work, what they cost, and how they fail. It is written for principals who need to hold an intelligent conversation with counsel, not as a substitute for that counsel. Every structure described here requires qualified professional advice in each jurisdiction it touches, obtained before anything is done, and refreshed as regimes change — which, as Chapter 1 documents at length, they do.

Every worked case in this book is constructed. The principal, the assets, the entities, and the figures are inventions built to illustrate a mechanism. Where a case is presented, it is labelled CONSTRUCTED at the point of use. No worked case describes a real client, a real transaction, or a real family.

Every citation in this book is to a named statute, regulation, directive, or decided case, given with its date. Where a claim rests on a fact the author could not verify to that standard, the text says so and states precisely what would have to be checked and with whom. There are gaps in this book. There are no invented authorities in it. A reader who finds a gap has found an honest one; a reader who finds a fabrication has found an error, and the author would like to know about it.

The thesis

The traditional safe havens are a depreciating asset class, and the replacement for them is not more secrecy but jurisdictional and rail diversity across blocs that do not share a coordination mechanism.

That sentence contains the whole argument, and the rest of the book is its unpacking. Three claims sit inside it, and each gets a part of the book to itself.

The first claim is historical and is the subject of Part I. Between 2009 and 2024 — fifteen years, and the erosion is continuing as this is written — the jurisdictions that sold secrecy as a product lost the ability to deliver it. Swiss banking secrecy, protected by criminal statute since 1934, was functionally dismantled between 2009 and 2018. The Caribbean company jurisdictions absorbed economic-substance legislation and repeated European listing. Panama spent fifty-two months on the Financial Action Task Force's grey list. And in the courts that mattered, the asset-protection trust's central promise — that a foreign court's judgment would simply not be recognised — collided with the fact that the person who built the structure was standing in a courtroom in Miami or Los Angeles, within reach of a contempt order, and stayed in custody until he complied.

The second claim is structural and is the subject of Chapter 2, which is in the author's view the most useful chapter in the book. Those jurisdictions did not erode separately. They eroded together, because they were all attached to the same coordination mechanism: the Financial Action Task Force, the OECD Global Forum and the Common Reporting Standard, the European Union's listing process, the extraterritorial reach of FATCA withholding, and the private, unappealable correspondent-banking decisions that all four of those feed. **The correct unit of analysis for concentration risk is not the jurisdiction. It is the coordination perimeter.** A structure spread across four jurisdictions inside one perimeter is not diversified; it has four addresses and one point of failure. This book's central quantitative move is to measure that directly.

The third claim is a design standard and is the subject of Chapter 3, which sets the rule that governs every recommendation in the remaining thirty-seven. A structure is sound when it does its job on its legal merits whether or not anybody is looking at it: every element lawful where it sits, filed where filing is required, reported where reporting is required, and defensible on its own terms in front of an adverse tribunal. **Structures built to avoid examination fail on contact with examination. Structures built to be correct do not.** The operational form of that standard is a single question, and it is applied in print, chapter by chapter, to everything this book recommends:

> **Would the structure still do its job if every element of it were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?**

Chapter 3 applies that question to five constructed structures and fails two of them, with reasons, in print. A test that passes everything it is shown is not a test.

What this book does not contain

One constraint, stated here and not re-argued in the chapters. This book describes how systems work, what they cost, what their risk profiles are, and how to build durable legitimate structures.

It contains no operational guidance for moving value that a sanctions regime prohibits. That is a limit on a kind of instruction. It is not a limit on any jurisdiction, rail, or mechanism — all of which are treated fully, including the ones that are usually mentioned in a sentence and dropped.

Two further standing prohibitions follow from the design standard rather than from caution. No structure in this book is premised on non-disclosure, because such a structure fails the test in Chapter 3 by construction. And no structure in this book relies on nominee arrangements where those arrangements are unlawful — most pointedly in Thailand, where nominee shareholding is a criminal offence and is prosecuted.

How to use this book

Read Part I first and in order. It is short, it is the evidence base, and every later chapter assumes it. A reader who skips to the jurisdiction chapters will find a great deal of accurate detail organised around an argument he has not been given.

Read Part II next, and do the arithmetic. Chapter 5 hands you an instrument — the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, borrowed from competition economics and pointed at jurisdictional exposure instead of market share — and a spreadsheet with your own numbers in it will tell you more about your position in twenty minutes than a year of reading. Chapter 5 also delivers the book's hardest single result, which is that a structure confined to one coordination perimeter has not a low but a *zero* available surplus, and that no rearrangement of entities inside that perimeter changes it.

After that, the book is a reference and can be read in any order. The jurisdiction chapters in Parts IV through IX are built to a single template — a twelve-item scorecard whose tenth item is the jurisdiction's degradation trajectory with the evidence for it — so that any two of them can be laid side by side and compared without translation. The final chapter compresses the whole architecture into a decision procedure that fits on one page, and then ends on what remains unresolved, because that is the honest place to end.

Throughout, one distinction is load-bearing and is easy to lose: a rail is not a holding. Freeze risk on an asset in transit is an exposure-window problem with parameters — hop size, duration, counterparty pre-screening, mid-transit failure handling. Freeze risk on an asset at rest is a custody problem, and it is a different problem. Never evaluate a rail as though it were a store of value.

The structure of the book

PART	CHAPTERS	WHAT IT ESTABLISHES
I The Degradation Thesis	1 – 3	The evidence, the mechanism, and the design standard
II Measurement	4 – 6	Threat model, the concentration instrument, the three jobs
III The Heart	7 – 9	The DIFC Foundation, foundation versus trust, succession
IV The Western Perimeter	10 – 13	London, the Crown Dependencies,

			the European convergence, the US
V	Risk Transfer	14 – 16	Bermuda, captives and sidecars, the Atlantic company cluster
VI	The Gulf	17 – 19	ADGM, DIFC beyond the Foundation, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
VII	The Eastern Centres	20 – 22	Singapore, Hong Kong, AIFC Astana
VIII	Non-Aligned Operating Bases	23 – 25	Thailand, GIFT City, Turkiye
IX	The Global South	26 – 28	Mauritius and Africa, Labuan and Islamic finance, Latin America
X	Asset Conversion	29 – 30	Immovable to movable, SPVs and ring-fencing
XI	Rails	31 – 33	SWIFT and CIPS, transit rails, informal value transfer
XII	Leverage	34 – 35	The carve-out cascade, group architecture and the bright lines
XIII	Law and Wiring	36 – 38	Law-family arbitrage, the integrated architecture, sanctions compliance
XIV	Failure	39 – 40	When structures fail; the manual in one page

APPENDICES A–F: scorecard atlas, concentration workbook, structure diagrams, statute and case index, the honesty appendix, correspondence to Volumes 1–3.

On the series

This is the fourth volume of *Creature Comforts*, and it is not a topical detour. Volume Two developed a storage law for durable goods — a difference equation relating a stock, its decay rate, the conversion of flow into stock, and the maintenance cost of holding it. That law applies to capital without modification, and Chapter 1 shows the substitution term by term. The one term that must be reinterpreted is the diversity term, and the reinterpretation is the whole book: **in the capital case, the diversity term counts independent coordination perimeters, not entities and not jurisdictions.**

Appendix F sets out the correspondence to the earlier volumes for readers who want it. Readers who have not read them lose nothing; the law is restated in full in Chapter 1.

This book is not legal, tax, or investment advice. All worked cases are constructed.

Part I — The Degradation Thesis

Chapter 1 . The Fifteen-Year Erosion

This chapter is not legal, tax, or investment advice. All worked cases are constructed and are labelled as such. Every citation is to a named instrument or decided case with its date; where a claim could not be verified to that standard, the text says so and states what needs checking.

The Position

There is a category of asset that principals and their advisers have treated for two generations as a permanent feature of the landscape: the jurisdiction whose product is confidentiality. The Swiss numbered account. The Cook Islands trust with its non-recognition clause. The British Virgin Islands company with a nominee director and no filing obligation worth the name. These were not fringe instruments. They were mainstream, professionally advised, and in most cases entirely lawful in the places where they sat.

They are a depreciating asset class, and the depreciation is documented rather than predicted. This chapter sets out the documentation. It covers roughly fifteen years — from the February 2009 deferred prosecution agreement between the United States Department of Justice and UBS AG to the European Union's anti-money-laundering package adopted in 2024 — and it covers four tracks that eroded on separate schedules and by separate instruments, which is exactly why the common cause is worth isolating in Chapter 2.

The four tracks are these. Swiss banking secrecy, criminalised as a protected legal interest by Article 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of 8 November 1934, went from inviolable to informational between 2009 and 2018, and it was dismantled not by a Swiss political decision but by a sequence of external pressures that Switzerland ultimately accommodated. The Caribbean company jurisdictions — Cayman and the British Virgin Islands foremost — absorbed economic-substance legislation in 2018 and 2019, and then discovered that compliance with the substance rules did not immunise them against listing, because the listing criteria kept moving. Panama, whose name became a metonym for the whole category after April 2016, spent fifty-two months on the Financial Action Task Force's list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. And in the United States federal courts, the asset-protection trust's central structural promise failed in a run of cases where the principals who had built the structures were held in civil contempt and remained in custody.

That last track deserves its emphasis at the outset, because it is the one most often misunderstood. The Cook Islands legislation worked exactly as designed. A Cook Islands court was never going to enforce a United States judgment against a Cook Islands trust, and no United States court ever ordered one to. **The structures failed not because the offshore law failed but because the principal was inside a courtroom in Florida or California, personally subject to the court's coercive power, and the court simply ordered him to fix it.** The offshore statute was irrelevant to the mechanism that defeated it.

Assembling those four tracks yields a proposition that this book will lean on for the remaining thirty-nine chapters. **Structures premised on non-disclosure have a consistent record of failing, and they fail at the moment they are examined rather than gradually over time.** That is the characteristic signature of the class. A compliant structure that is examined produces a file, a set of filings, and a defensible explanation. A concealment structure that is examined produces nothing, because the only thing it was ever holding was the fact of not having been looked at. It has no second line.

It is important to be precise about what is being claimed. The claim is not that these jurisdictions are finished. Several of them are excellent and this book recommends parts of what they do. Cayman remains a competent fund domicile. Jersey has a genuinely sophisticated trust bar. Switzerland's private banking sector has more institutional depth than any comparable market. The claim is narrower and sharper: **the specific product that these jurisdictions once sold — differential opacity, the condition of being harder to see into than the alternatives — has been substantially eliminated, and what remains is legal capability, which is a different product with a different price and a different competitive set.** A jurisdiction that competes on legal capability competes with Delaware and with London and with Singapore. A jurisdiction that competed on opacity competed with nobody, which is why the margins were what they were.

Nor is the claim that the erosion was unjust or that it should be resisted. This book takes no position on the policy. It takes a position on the engineering, which is that a structure whose design assumption has been falsified is a structure that needs rebuilding, and that the rebuilding is best done deliberately rather than during an examination.

The rest of the chapter does four things. It documents each of the four tracks with named instruments and dates. It then introduces the formal apparatus this series uses to reason about holdings under decay — the storage law developed in Volume Two, applied to capital without modification — and identifies the one term in it that has to be reinterpreted for the capital case. It names the recurring failure modes that this history should have taught and mostly did not. And it closes on a constructed worked application in which a conventional four-entity structure is measured against the last fifteen years and found to have been, for the whole period, a single position wearing four hats.

The Mechanism

Track one: Swiss banking secrecy, 2009 to 2018

Swiss banking secrecy was never a promise of anonymity from the Swiss authorities. It was a statutory prohibition, backed by criminal penalty, on a bank employee disclosing client information to third parties — including, critically, to foreign tax authorities, because Switzerland historically distinguished tax evasion, an administrative matter, from tax fraud, a criminal one, and would grant assistance only for the latter. That distinction was the entire commercial substance of the product. Its removal was the erosion.

The sequence is well documented. In February 2009 UBS AG entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the United States Department of Justice and paid USD 780 million, admitting that it had helped US taxpayers conceal accounts. Later that year, an agreement between the United States and Switzerland provided for disclosure of information relating to a substantial number of UBS accounts — the figure usually reported is approximately 4,450, and a reader who needs the precise number and its legal basis should verify it against the primary agreement text rather than against secondary reporting. What matters structurally is not the count but the precedent: the statutory prohibition had been overridden by an intergovernmental arrangement.

The instrument that made the override general was American, extraterritorial, and did not require Swiss consent. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act was enacted on 18 March 2010 as Title V of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, adding a new chapter to the Internal Revenue Code. Its mechanism is elegant and brutal: a foreign financial institution that does not report on its US account holders suffers a thirty per cent withholding tax on US-source payments

made to it. Withholding began on 1 July 2014, four years after enactment — **the lead time is itself instructive, because it shows that the industry had four years of notice and that a great many structures were nonetheless rebuilt during that window on assumptions the legislation had already destroyed.** Switzerland concluded an intergovernmental agreement with the United States on the Model 2 template; the date usually given is 14 February 2013, and the reader should verify it along with the subsequent amendments before relying on the operative terms.

Criminal enforcement ran in parallel. Wegelin & Co., founded in 1741 and at the time the oldest bank in Switzerland, pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York in January 2013 and ceased to exist. Credit Suisse pleaded guilty in May 2014 and paid USD 2.6 billion. In between, on 29 August 2013, the Department of Justice announced the Program for Non-Prosecution Agreements or Non-Prosecution Letters for Swiss Banks, under which a large number of Swiss institutions disclosed their cross-border US business in exchange for non-prosecution. Aggregate figures for that programme are reported in the range of eighty institutions and well over a billion dollars in penalties; verify the totals against Department of Justice releases before quoting them.

Then came the multilateral instrument, which is the one that generalised the change beyond the United States. The Common Reporting Standard was approved by the OECD Council on 15 July 2014 and endorsed by the G20; the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement that operationalises it was first signed in Berlin on 29 October 2014, reportedly by fifty-one jurisdictions. It rests on the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, originally 1988 and amended by protocol in 2010. Switzerland began exchanging under the Common Reporting Standard in 2018, in respect of 2017 data.

Count the interval. Article 47 of the Banking Act dates from 1934. The first Swiss automatic exchange occurred in 2018. **Eighty-four years of statutory protection ended in nine, and the statute was never repealed — it simply stopped covering the case that mattered.** That is the pattern to internalise, because it recurs in every other track. The protective law generally survives. What changes is the set of circumstances in which it applies.

A parenthetical on the leak literature, which is often treated as the cause and was in fact an accelerant. The Falciani data taken from HSBC's Swiss private bank in 2006 and 2007 was published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in February 2015 as "Swiss Leaks". The Panama Papers, some 11.5 million documents from Mossack Fonseca, were published in April 2016. The Paradise Papers, from Appleby and others, followed in November 2017. The FinCEN Files, drawn from US suspicious activity reports, appeared in September 2020, and the Pandora Papers in October 2021. These publications changed the political weather and made ministerial action cheap. They did not create the legal instruments; FATCA preceded all of them. **A structure that depended on the absence of a leak was always depending on something no adviser could price.**

Track two: Cayman, the British Virgin Islands, and the substance requirement

The Caribbean company jurisdictions faced a different instrument. Their product was not secrecy from tax authorities in the Swiss sense; it was a company that could be formed cheaply, held quietly, taxed at zero, and required to do almost nothing. The European Union attacked the last element of that list first.

The mechanism was the Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation, and the criterion was

economic substance: a jurisdiction with a zero or near-zero corporate rate had to require entities claiming its residence actually to conduct relevant activity there — directed and managed locally, with adequate people, premises and expenditure. The alternative was listing. Cayman legislated the International Tax Co-operation (Economic Substance) Act, originally enacted in 2018 and in force from 1 January 2019; the British Virgin Islands legislated the Economic Substance (Companies and Limited Partnerships) Act 2018, in force on the same date. Both have been revised since, and a reader relying on the operative text should confirm the current revision with local counsel rather than working from the original enactment.

The European Union's list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes was first adopted by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council on 5 December 2017, with a blacklist (Annex I) and a grey list of jurisdictions that had given commitments (Annex II). The listing history since is the useful part, and it is worth setting out as a sequence rather than a snapshot, because the sequence is the evidence.

JURISDICTION	EVENT	PERIOD
Cayman	EU Annex I listed Feb 2020, removed Oct 2020	8 months
Cayman	FATF increased monitoring Feb 2021, removed Oct 2023	32 months
BVI	EU Annex I listed Oct 2023 after a Global Forum downgrade on exchange of information on request, removed Feb 2024	4 months
Panama	FATF increased monitoring Jun 2019, removed Oct 2023	52 months
UAE	FATF increased monitoring Mar 2022, removed Feb 2024	23 months

Dates as publicly announced; confirm exact plenary and Council dates against FATF and Council of the EU primary releases.

Read that table for what it actually shows, which is not that these jurisdictions are bad places. Cayman and the UAE and Panama all came off. The British Virgin Islands was listed and delisted inside a single quarter. **What the table shows is volatility in a variable that most structures treat as a constant.** A holding company's jurisdiction is normally chosen once and left alone for a decade. The listing status of that jurisdiction can change twice in eighteen months, and each change propagates into bank onboarding decisions, counterparty diligence, and in some member states into concrete defensive tax measures.

The British Virgin Islands episode of 2023 to 2024 is the single most instructive item in the table and Chapter 2 returns to it in detail, because it shows the coupling. The Global Forum conducted a supplementary peer review and downgraded the territory's rating on exchange of information on request. That technical rating change, made by one body, mechanically triggered the European Union's listing criteria, administered by a different body, which in turn changed the risk classification applied by commercial banks, which is a third set of actors entirely. **One assessment by one peer-review panel moved through three independent-looking institutions in under a year. That is not three risks. That is one risk with three names.**

Track three: Panama

Panama's history illustrates a distinct point: that the cycle repeats, and that exiting a list is not the same as exiting the category of jurisdiction that gets listed.

Panama's company and foundation law is old and well developed, and its territorial tax system is a genuine feature rather than an artefact. It was nonetheless subject to Financial Action Task Force increased monitoring in the period from 2014 to 2016, removed, and then listed again in June 2019 following the Panama Papers publication and the resulting international pressure. It was removed at the October 2023 plenary. Fifty-two months, on the second occasion.

Two observations follow. First, the political economy: a small jurisdiction whose financial sector is a large fraction of its economy has limited capacity to refuse a demand from a body whose members control its correspondent banking access. The listing process is not a negotiation between equals and should not be modelled as one. Second, and more usefully for the practitioner: Panama complied. It passed the legislation, it built the beneficial ownership register, it submitted to the assessments, and it got off the list. **Compliance worked, and it is worth noticing that the successful strategy in every one of these episodes was compliance rather than resistance.** That is a data point in favour of this book's design standard, arriving from an unexpected direction.

For completeness, and because it is frequently misreported: the Panamanian criminal proceedings arising from the Mossack Fonseca disclosures resulted in acquittals for the principal defendants in a verdict reported in June 2024. Verify the judgment, the court, and the scope of the acquittal before drawing any inference from it. The point for present purposes is limited and slightly bleak — the firm's founders were acquitted, and the firm and the model it represented were nonetheless destroyed. **The legal outcome and the commercial outcome were opposite, and the structure died of the process rather than of the verdict.**

Track four: the asset-protection trust and the impossibility defence

The fourth track is different in kind. It is not about registers or lists or exchange of information. It is about what happens when the theory of a structure meets a judge with the power to jail the person standing in front of him.

The Cook Islands International Trusts Act 1984, substantially amended in 1989 and repeatedly since, was the template for the modern asset-protection trust. Its architecture included short limitation periods for fraudulent-transfer claims, a high standard of proof, and provisions to the effect that a foreign judgment would not be recognised or enforced against the trust. A reader wanting the operative provisions should obtain the current consolidated text from Cook Islands counsel; the section numbering has changed across amendments and this book will not guess at it.

Two United States appellate decisions define the failure mode.

In *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), the Federal Trade Commission obtained orders against Michael and Denyse Anderson requiring repatriation of assets held through a Cook Islands trust. The Andersons had retained roles in the structure. When the district court ordered repatriation, they asserted that compliance was impossible, because the foreign trustee had invoked a duress provision and removed them from control. The district court held them in civil contempt and they were taken into custody. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Its reasoning is the

part that matters: a party asserting impossibility as a defence to civil contempt bears the burden of proving it, and the court was unpersuaded by an impossibility that the contemnors had themselves designed and triggered.

In *In re Lawrence*, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002), the bankruptcy debtor Stephan Jay Lawrence had settled a substantial offshore trust — and here a correction is required, because this case is routinely miscited. **The Lawrence trust was settled in Jersey in 1991 and its administration later moved to Mauritius; it was not a Cook Islands trust, and any source that says otherwise is unreliable on the rest of its detail too.** The trust contained the same family of protective provisions. Lawrence was ordered to turn over the trust assets, asserted that he could not, was held in civil contempt, and was taken into custody in 1999. He was reported released in 2007. This book will not state a precise custody duration, because the reported dates vary and the docket should be consulted; what is not in doubt is that the incarceration ran for a period measured in years rather than months. Lower-court decisions in the same matter include 227 B.R. 907 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998) and 251 B.R. 630 (S.D. Fla. 2000); verify pin cites before relying on them.

Related decisions are frequently cited alongside these and are worth pulling if the question is live: *In re Portnoy*, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), and *In re Brooks*, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998), both involving Channel Islands structures and both unfavourable to the settlor. Confirm the citations and their subsequent treatment; this book has not verified their current authority.

The structural lesson generalises well beyond trusts, and it is the reason this track belongs in a chapter about jurisdictional erosion at all. **The offshore statute governs the offshore asset; the domestic court governs the person, and the person is the part of the structure that cannot be redomiciled.** A principal who is physically and legally present within a jurisdiction is subject to that jurisdiction's coercive power over his own conduct, and an order directed at his conduct does not require any foreign court to cooperate with anything. The trust was never the target. He was.

There is a legislative postscript. Section 548(e) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, added by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, provides a ten-year look-back for transfers to self-settled trusts made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. Ten years is longer than most planning horizons and far longer than the limitation periods the offshore statutes provide. The domestic reach-back was simply extended past the foreign protection.

Track five: from exchange to publication, and the private enforcement layer

A fifth track runs underneath the other four and is easy to miss because it produced no single dramatic event. Over the same fifteen years the default disposition of ownership information shifted twice: first from confidential to exchanged, and then, in several jurisdictions, from exchanged to published.

The exchange step is the one described above under FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard. Information that had previously stayed with the institution began moving automatically between tax administrations on an annual cycle, without any request being made and without the account holder being a suspect in anything. The publication step is separate and rests on the anti-money-laundering directives rather than on tax instruments: Directive (EU) 2015/849, the fourth anti-money-laundering directive, required member states to maintain registers of beneficial ownership, and Directive (EU) 2018/843, the fifth, extended access to those registers. The United Kingdom had moved earlier and independently with the register of people with significant con-

trol, and extended the principle to foreign owners of British property through the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022.

The two steps have different legal trajectories, and confusing them produces bad planning. As noted below among the failure modes, the Court of Justice of the European Union curtailed the public-access limb in November 2022 while leaving the reporting and competent-authority-access limbs entirely intact. The direction of travel on exchange between authorities has been consistently one way for fifteen years. The direction of travel on publication to the general public is contested and has partially reversed. A structure built on the assumption that its beneficial ownership will not be known to authorities is betting against the settled trend. A structure that simply prefers its affairs not to be in a newspaper is on much firmer ground, and is not doing anything this book objects to.

Beneath both sits a third layer, which is private, unappealable, and in practice the one that bites first. Correspondent banks make their own risk classifications, and a jurisdiction's listing status, peer-review rating, and press coverage feed directly into them. There is no statute to read and no tribunal to appeal to; there is a relationship manager and a decision. The Financial Stability Board's correspondent banking data reports have tracked a material decline in the number of active correspondent relationships over the period since 2011 — the figure commonly cited is a fall of roughly a fifth by the end of the decade, and it should be verified against the current report before being quoted — even as transaction volumes rose. The Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures examined the same phenomenon in its correspondent banking report of July 2016.

The significance for a holder is that this private layer transmits public decisions with no process at all. A jurisdiction can be listed in October and its institutions can find their dollar clearing constrained in November, months before any legislature anywhere has acted on the listing. When Chapter 2 argues that these institutions constitute a single system, the correspondent layer is the part that makes the system operative rather than merely declaratory.

The Specification

The four tracks are history. What converts history into a design tool is a way of writing down what a holding does over time when the environment around it degrades. This series has such a tool already, and the purpose of this section is to show that it transfers to capital without modification, and to identify the single term whose interpretation has to change.

The storage law, restated

Volume Two developed a law for durable goods held against decay. It has four moving parts: a stock, a decay rate, a conversion efficiency that turns flow into stock, and a maintenance cost that must be paid whether or not anything is added. In its difference form and its surplus form:

```
Q_{t+1} = (1 - delta) * Q_t + eta * S_t - C_t

h = eta * ln(N) - delta * Q - C

Q      protected capital -- the stock actually held under durable protection
delta  erosion rate: tax drag, political risk, debasement, haven degradation
eta     conversion of income into DURABLE protected holdings
```

```
S       income flow available for conversion in the period
C       structure maintenance: compliance, counsel, substance, filings
N       the effective diversity count
h       available surplus —— what the structure yields above its own upkeep
```

Every term transfers to the capital case directly, and three of them transfer without commentary. Q is what is actually held under protection, not what is nominally owned. C is real and recurring and is the term most often set to zero in informal planning, which is why so many structures are abandoned in year three. S and eta together say the obvious thing, which is that income only helps to the extent it is actually converted into durable protected stock rather than consumed or left in a form that inherits the erosion rate.

The delta term deserves a paragraph, because in the capital case it is a sum of four distinct processes that are usually discussed separately and should be added together. Tax drag is the recurring leakage from the structure's own tax profile. Political risk is the probability-weighted cost of arbitrary action against the holding. Debasement is the loss of purchasing power in the unit of account. And haven degradation — the subject of this chapter — is the loss of value in the jurisdictional characteristics that the structure was built to use. A structure sited in a jurisdiction that is being progressively brought inside a coordination perimeter is losing value at a rate that does not appear on any statement.

What that rate does is worth stating numerically, because the intuition is bad. At delta of two per cent, a stock with no input retains 73.857 per cent of its starting value after fifteen years and 54.548 per cent after thirty, with a half-life of 34.310 years. At three and a half per cent, those become 58.602 per cent, 34.342 per cent, and a half-life of 19.456 years. At five per cent they become 46.329 per cent, 21.464 per cent, and 13.513 years. The relevant observation is that a difference of three percentage points in delta — which is well within the range of disagreement between two competent advisers about political risk alone — is the difference between a structure that mostly survives a generation and one that mostly does not.

The term that has to be reinterpreted

That leaves N, and N is the whole argument.

In the goods case of Volume Two, N counted independent stores. Two warehouses in the same flood plain were one store, and the law said so through the word *independent*, which did the work quietly because in the physical case independence is easy to see. Capital has no flood plains and independence is not visually obvious, which is precisely why it gets miscounted.

In the capital case, N is the effective number of independent coordination perimeters — not the number of entities, and not the number of jurisdictions. A coordination perimeter is a set of jurisdictions that share a mechanism by which a decision taken in one becomes binding, or effectively binding, across all. Chapter 2 defines it properly and gives the test. Chapter 5 owns the measurement instrument and the arithmetic. What Chapter 1 needs to establish is only why the reinterpretation is forced, and the four tracks above force it, because they are four different instruments producing one correlated outcome.

The consequence is severe and is easiest to see at the boundary. If every entity in a structure sits inside a single coordination perimeter, then N equals one, and the natural logarithm of one is zero. The entire first term of the surplus equation vanishes:

```
h = eta * ln(1) - delta * Q - C
  = 0 - delta * Q - C
  = -(delta * Q + C)
```

A structure confined to one coordination perimeter has not a small available surplus but a negative one, equal to the whole of its erosion plus the whole of its upkeep, and no rearrangement of entities inside that perimeter changes it — because rearranging within a perimeter does not change N. This is the book's hardest single result. Chapter 5 states it formally and works the numbers; it is previewed here because it is what makes the historical material actionable rather than merely interesting. A reader who takes nothing else from Part I should take this: adding a fifth entity in a fifth jurisdiction inside the same perimeter costs C and adds nothing to N.

Decomposing delta, with an example

Because delta aggregates four unrelated processes, it is worth decomposing before it is used. A constructed decomposition for a mid-sized structure held principally in the Western perimeter, with figures chosen to be plausible rather than researched, shows how the components combine:

COMPONENT OF DELTA	ANNUAL RATE	BASIS
Tax drag	0.9%	Leakage at entity and distribution level after treaty relief
Political / arbitrary-action risk	0.4%	Probability-weighted cost of immobilisation or de-risking
Debasement	0.5%	Loss of purchasing power in the unit of account, net of the portfolio's own hedge
Haven degradation	0.2%	Loss of value in the jurisdictional characteristics the structure was built to use
delta (sum)	2.0%	

CONSTRUCTED. Illustrative decomposition, not a research estimate.

Two things follow from writing it out this way. The first is that the components respond to entirely different interventions. Tax drag responds to structure and treaty position. Debasement responds to the currency composition of the holding. Political risk and haven degradation respond to jurisdictional diversity and to nothing else — which is to say they are the components that the diversity term of the storage law actually addresses, and they are the smaller two. Diversification is not a general-purpose remedy; it is a specific remedy for a specific pair of terms, and a structure that diversifies while ignoring the other two has optimised the wrong thing.

The second is that the haven-degradation component is the one that is hardest to observe and easiest to underestimate, because it accrues as a change in the option set rather than as a charge. Nothing is debited when a jurisdiction's differentiation erodes. The holder discovers the loss later, at the moment he wants to use a characteristic that no longer exists.

Degradation trajectory as a measured quantity

The practical output of this chapter is a discipline, and it is the tenth item of the twelve-item scorecard that closes every jurisdiction chapter in this book. Every jurisdiction is assessed not on its current state but on its direction of travel, with the evidence attached.

```
ITEM 10 — DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Classification    improving / stable / eroding
Evidence required at least two dated events in the last ten years, named
Direction         is the jurisdiction being brought further inside a
                  coordination perimeter, held constant, or differentiated?
Reversibility     did any past change get reversed, and by what mechanism?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Four rules govern the assessment, and they are drawn directly from the four tracks.

The first rule is that delisting is not reversal. Cayman came off the European Union's Annex I after eight months and off the Financial Action Task Force's increased-monitoring list after thirty-two. In both cases it came off by complying — by legislating substance requirements and building supervisory capacity that it did not previously have. The jurisdiction that came off the list was more tightly integrated into the coordination perimeter than the one that went on. Delisting recorded the completion of the change, not its undoing.

The second rule is that the protective statute usually survives and stops mattering. Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act is still law. The Cook Islands non-recognition provisions are still law. Neither was repealed and neither now delivers what it was bought for, because the operative question moved to a place the statute does not reach — to an intergovernmental agreement in the Swiss case, and to a domestic contempt docket in the Cook Islands case. Reading the statute tells you almost nothing about the current value of the protection.

The third rule is that age is not durability. Wegelin & Co. had traded since 1741 and was gone in a year. Mossack Fonseca had operated since 1977. Institutional longevity in this sector reflects the persistence of a favourable environment, and when the environment changes, longevity turns out to have been a lagging indicator rather than a structural property.

The fourth rule is that the assessment must name the mechanism, not just the event. "Cayman was listed in 2020" is an anecdote. "Cayman was listed because the European Union's Code of Conduct Group applied a substance criterion to zero-rate jurisdictions, a criterion which continues to apply and which now also reaches the substance regimes of jurisdictions that have already legislated" is an assessment, because it tells you what has to happen for the situation to change again. Chapter 2 is entirely devoted to naming those mechanisms.

What the specification does not cover

One boundary, stated here because the rest of the book depends on it. This chapter and this book are about protecting against arbitrary action: expropriation, immobilisation, de-risking without process, and regime change applied retroactively. They are not about defeating lawful process. A judgment that has survived due process is a different problem, governed by fraudulent-transfer law and bounded by timing, and the honest answer to it is almost always that the planning had

to have been done long before the claim arose. Chapter 39 treats that squarely. The four asset-protection cases above are in this chapter as evidence about *mechanism* — about how domestic courts reach foreign structures — and not as a suggestion that the mechanism can be beaten with a better clause.

The Failure Modes

The fifteen years documented above produced a set of errors that continue to be made, in most cases by people who know the history and have not drawn the inference from it. Each of these is common, each is expensive, and each follows from a specific misreading of the evidence.

Counting jurisdictions instead of perimeters. This is the master error and everything else on the list is a special case of it. An adviser presents a structure with entities in four countries and describes it as diversified. The correct question is not how many flags are on the diagram but how many independent decisions would have to be taken by how many genuinely independent authorities to impair all four at once. If the answer is one, the structure has one point of failure and the diagram is decoration. Chapter 5 turns this into arithmetic.

Treating a delisting as an all-clear. A jurisdiction that has just completed a supervisory overhaul in order to exit a list is at its most compliant, most closely monitored, and most tightly coupled to the assessing body. That may be exactly what a principal wants — a well supervised jurisdiction is a good place to hold assets — but it should not be mistaken for a return to the earlier product. The earlier product is what the overhaul removed.

Reading the offshore statute rather than the enforcement route. The Cook Islands cases are the archetype. The statute says the foreign judgment will not be recognised, and the statute is correct, and the principal goes to jail anyway, because the enforcement route ran through him and not through the trust. Before relying on any protective provision, trace the route by which an adversary would actually attack, and check whether the provision sits anywhere on that route. In a surprising number of structures it does not.

Assuming that the impossibility defence is available. It is a real defence and it occasionally succeeds, but the party asserting it carries the burden, and a court that can see the contemnor designed the impossibility is unlikely to be moved by it. A clause that manufactures the principal's own incapacity is, from the court's perspective, evidence of intent rather than a shield against the order.

Buying the previous decade's product. Structures are frequently copied from a template that worked, and templates outlive their environments. A structure assembled in 2013 on the assumption that account information would not reach a foreign tax authority was already obsolete when it was built, because FATCA had been law since 2010 and the Common Reporting Standard was in negotiation. The four-year FATCA lead time is the cautionary figure: notice is usually ample and is usually not acted upon.

Setting C to zero. Maintenance is the term that kills structures quietly. A structure with entities in six jurisdictions requires six sets of filings, six local agents, coordinated tax counsel, transfer-pricing documentation, and enough internal attention to keep the whole thing current. When that cost is not budgeted, filings lapse, substance decays, and the structure degrades into exactly the sort of paper arrangement that fails on examination — not because it was designed badly but because it was not fed. Chapter 3 puts numbers to this.

Mistaking privacy from the public for opacity to authorities. These are different things with different legal statuses and different trajectories. The Court of Justice of the European Union held on 22 November 2022, in Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers*, that the provision of the anti-money-laundering directives giving the general public access to beneficial-ownership registers was invalid. Competent authorities retained their access, and the reporting obligations were untouched. **Privacy from the public is a live and partially expanding legal interest; opacity to competent authorities is not, and the two have moved in opposite directions.** A structure built on the first is on defensible ground. A structure built on the second is not, and the *Sovim* decision offers it no comfort whatever.

Assuming the erosion has finished. It has not. Beneficial-ownership regimes continue to extend: the United Kingdom's Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 created a register of overseas entities holding UK property, and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 added identity verification at Companies House. The European Union adopted a further anti-money-laundering package in 2024, comprising a regulation, a directive, and a regulation establishing a new supervisory authority; the instrument numbers usually given are Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, Directive (EU) 2024/1640, and Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, and these should be verified against the Official Journal before being relied upon. In the United States, the Corporate Transparency Act, enacted on 1 January 2021 within the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, brought beneficial-ownership reporting to FinCEN from 1 January 2024, was held unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs in *National Small Business United v. Yellen* (N.D. Ala., 1 March 2024), and its scope was subsequently narrowed by rulemaking. **The Corporate Transparency Act's current scope is genuinely unsettled and must be verified with US counsel as at the date of any structuring decision; this book will not state a position that may be wrong by the time it is read.**

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED. The following case, its principal, its entities, and all figures are inventions built to illustrate the measurement. It describes no real person or transaction.

The structure as found

A principal — dual national, resident for tax purposes in the United Arab Emirates, with three adult heirs resident in three different countries, one of them a forced-heirship civil-law jurisdiction — arrives with a structure assembled by competent advisers over about twenty years. It holds commercial real estate in London, a listed-securities portfolio, and interests in operating businesses. Its four principal entities and their share of the group's protected capital are:

ENTITY / SITUS	SHARE OF Q	ROLE
United Kingdom	40.9091%	Property holding, principal operating presence
United States	27.2727%	Securities custody and brokerage
Jersey	18.1818%	Family trust, succession
Luxembourg	13.6364%	Holding and treaty access
	100.0000%	

The adviser's description is that the structure spans four jurisdictions across two continents and two legal families, with succession handled separately from operations and treaty access handled separately again. On its own terms that description is accurate. Each entity is properly constituted, each is compliant, and each does a job it is well suited to.

The measurement

Applying the concentration instrument that Chapter 5 develops in full — the sum of squared shares, whose reciprocal is the effective count — to the shares as stated:

```
naive HHI                 = 0.293388
effective jurisdictions   = 3.4085
```

Three point four effective jurisdictions out of four nominal ones. That is a respectable number and it is the number most structures are implicitly measured against. It is also wrong, because it treats the four as independent, and the four tracks documented in this chapter establish that they are not. The United Kingdom, the United States, Jersey and Luxembourg are all inside the same coordination perimeter: all are Common Reporting Standard or FATCA participants under arrangements that exchange with each other, all are within the Financial Action Task Force network or its regional bodies, all are reachable by the European Union's listing and defensive measures either directly or through their principal correspondent relationships, and all clear United States dollars through correspondents subject to United States jurisdiction.

Collapsing to the perimeter and repeating the measurement:

```
WESTERN PERIMETER         = 100.0000% of Q
bloc-HHI                  = 1.000000
EFFECTIVE COORDINATION PERIMETERS = 1.0000
```

Four entities, four jurisdictions, two continents, and one point of failure. The naive measure overstated the structure's resilience by a factor of 3.41, and it did so not through arithmetic error but through a modelling assumption — independence — that the historical record falsifies.

The surplus consequence

Applying the storage law at the parameters this series uses for a mid-sized structure — eta of 0.35, C of 0.30, Q of 10, delta of 0.02, all in the normalised units of Volume Two:

```
h = eta * ln(N) - delta * Q - C
  = 0.35 * ln(1.0000) - 0.02 * 10 - 0.30
  = 0.35 * 0.000000 - 0.200000 - 0.300000
  = -0.500000
```

The available surplus is exactly minus one half: the whole of the erosion plus the whole of the upkeep, with nothing at all on the input side. This is not a marginal result that better execution could improve. The diversity term is multiplied by the logarithm of one, and the logarithm of one is zero regardless of how well the four entities are run, how good the counsel is, or how the shares are redistributed among them. Moving assets from Luxembourg to Jersey changes the naive figure and leaves the bloc figure at 1.0000 exactly.

For contrast, and as a preview of what Part II builds toward: the designed structure developed across this book — with exposure across the Gulf bridge, non-aligned operating jurisdictions, and

a reduced but retained Western allocation — measures at a bloc-HHI of 0.340000, giving 2.9412 effective perimeters, and yields

```
h = 0.35 * ln(2.941176) - 0.200000 - 0.300000
  = 0.35 * 1.0788096614 - 0.500000
  = -0.122417
```

Two honest observations about that number, both of which this book will repeat rather than soften. The first is that it is still negative. **Diversification raised the ceiling; it did not pay the maintenance bill, and at these parameters both structures are below the threshold at which the structure is worth building.** Chapter 37 carries that result and does not flinch from it. The second is a note on arithmetic discipline: computing the same figure from the rounded effective count 2.94 rather than the exact 2.941176 gives -0.122557 rather than -0.122417, a discrepancy of 0.000140. That is small here and it compounds. Every derived figure in this book is computed from unrounded inputs, and the reader is invited to check.

What the last fifteen years did to this structure

Run the four tracks against the structure as found. The Jersey trust's confidentiality characteristics were substantially reduced by Common Reporting Standard participation. The Luxembourg holding's differentiation was reduced first by the anti-tax-avoidance directives and the mandatory disclosure regime, and then decisively by the fifteen per cent global minimum tax, implemented in Luxembourg by the law of 22 December 2023 and effective for financial years beginning in 2024 for groups above the turnover threshold — after which a low headline rate stops being a product for in-scope groups. The United Kingdom property holding acquired a public beneficial-ownership footprint under the 2022 and 2023 economic crime legislation. The United States custody position sits inside the FATCA regime by construction.

Not one of those four changes was caused by anything the principal did, and no combination of them was insurable, hedgeable, or foreseeable from within any single one of the four jurisdictions. They arrived from the perimeter. That is the object Chapter 2 takes apart.

This chapter is not legal, tax, or investment advice. All worked cases are constructed. Citations marked for verification should be checked against primary sources and with qualified counsel in each relevant jurisdiction before any reliance is placed on them.

Chapter 2 . The Coordination Mechanism

This chapter is not legal, tax, or investment advice. All worked cases are constructed and are labelled as such. Every citation is to a named instrument or decided case with its date; where a claim could not be verified to that standard, the text says so and states what needs checking.

The Position

Chapter 1 established that a set of jurisdictions lost a product over fifteen years. This chapter answers the question that makes that history useful, which is why they lost it *together*.

Consider the four erosion tracks as an engineer would. Swiss banking secrecy was dismantled by American criminal enforcement, an American withholding statute, and a multilateral tax-information standard. The Caribbean company jurisdictions were reshaped by a European tax-policy committee applying a substance criterion. Panama was constrained by an anti-money-laundering body applying a technical-compliance assessment. And the asset-protection trust was defeated by the contempt power of United States federal district courts. Four different instruments, four different legal families, four different institutional homes, four different stated purposes. On any naive account these are four independent risks, and a structure exposed to all four is exposed to four things that will not happen at once.

They happened at once. Between 2009 and 2024 every jurisdiction in the traditional category absorbed change from more than one of these tracks, most from three or four, and the changes arrived close enough together that a structure built to survive any one of them survived none of them. That correlation is the phenomenon this chapter explains, and the explanation is not subtle: the Financial Action Task Force, the OECD Global Forum and the Common Reporting Standard, the European Union's listing process, the extraterritorial reach of FATCA, and the private correspondent-banking de-risking layer **are not five risks. They are one system with five interfaces.**

The system has a name in this book. A *coordination perimeter* is a set of jurisdictions among which a decision taken in one place becomes binding, or effectively binding, in all of them, through a shared mechanism rather than through separate acts of consent. It is not a treaty and it is not an organisation. It is a coupling — a set of institutions with overlapping membership, shared assessment methodology, and a common enforcement currency, such that their outputs move together whether or not anybody intends them to.

From which the operational claim of this chapter follows, and it is the claim on which the rest of the book is built:

> **The coordination perimeter, not the individual jurisdiction, is the correct unit of analysis for concentration risk.**

Everything else in this volume is downstream of that sentence. The jurisdiction chapters are organised by perimeter. The concentration instrument in Chapter 5 is applied at perimeter level and not at jurisdiction level. The scorecard's tenth item asks whether a jurisdiction is being drawn further inside a perimeter. The architecture recommended in Part XIII is a distribution across perimeters. And the reason for the whole apparatus is that a measurement taken at the wrong level of aggregation does not merely give a slightly wrong answer — as the worked case at the end of Chapter 1 showed, it gave 3.41 where the honest figure was 1.00, an overstatement by a factor of 3.41 arising entirely from a modelling assumption.

Two clarifications before the mechanism, because both errors are common and both produce bad predictions.

The first: **a coordination perimeter is not a conspiracy, and reading it as one will make you wrong about what it does next.** No committee decides that a jurisdiction should be squeezed. The institutions described below have genuine and largely defensible policy purposes — suppressing terrorist financing, collecting lawfully due tax, preventing money laundering — and they are staffed by people pursuing those purposes in good faith. The coupling is structural, not intentional. That is precisely why it is reliable, and why it is more dangerous to a structure than a conspiracy would be: a conspiracy can change its mind, and a structural coupling cannot. Predictions that assume malice consistently miss, because they expect targeting where the system produces uniformity.

The second: the argument that follows is a diversification argument, not an evasion argument. The purpose of distributing exposure across perimeters is not to place assets beyond the reach of any authority. It is to ensure that no single administrative decision, taken anywhere, impairs the whole holding at once. **Every entity in the architecture this book builds is fully disclosed to, and fully compliant with, the authorities of the jurisdiction in which it sits and every jurisdiction with a claim on it.** Diversification and disclosure are not in tension. Chapter 3 makes that case at length and applies the test in print.

The Mechanism

The five interfaces

Each of the five components does a different job, has a different legal character, and — this is the part that matters — has a different enforcement lever. Understanding the levers is what allows a holder to predict which component will reach a given structure and how quickly.

The Financial Action Task Force. Established in 1989 at the G7 summit in Paris, the Task Force is not a treaty organisation and issues nothing binding. It publishes the Forty Recommendations, conducts mutual evaluations of members through a network of regional bodies, and maintains two public lists: high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action, and jurisdictions under increased monitoring — the latter universally known as the grey list. Its International Cooperation Review Group runs the process that puts jurisdictions on and takes them off. The lever is indirect and extremely powerful: financial institutions everywhere apply risk-based customer due diligence, supervisors expect them to weight jurisdictional risk, and a listing therefore changes the cost and availability of banking for every institution and every client connected to the listed place. No law needs to be passed anywhere for the effect to arrive.

The OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. The Global Forum peer-reviews jurisdictions on two standards: exchange of information on request, and automatic exchange under the Common Reporting Standard. It assigns ratings — compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant, non-compliant — and it conducts supplementary reviews when circumstances warrant. The Common Reporting Standard itself was approved by the OECD Council on 15 July 2014, and the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement that operationalises it was first signed in Berlin on 29 October 2014, resting on the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of 1988 as amended by protocol in 2010. The lever here is a rating, and a rating looks like a technical artefact until you notice what consumes it.

The European Union's listing process. The Council of the European Union first adopted its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes on 5 December 2017, maintained by the Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation and revised roughly twice a year. It has two annexes: Annex I, the list proper, and Annex II, jurisdictions that have given commitments and are being monitored. Its criteria cover tax transparency, fair taxation, and implementation of the base-erosion minimum standards — and among the transparency criteria is the jurisdiction's Global Forum rating on exchange of information on request. **That is the coupling stated in the primary materials themselves: one institution's rating is a listing criterion for another institution's list.** The lever is that member states apply coordinated defensive measures against listed jurisdictions, which have included denial of deductibility, controlled-foreign-company inclusion, withholding tax measures, and limitation of participation exemptions, alongside the reputational consequence, which usually arrives first.

FATCA. Enacted 18 March 2010 as Title V of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act. Unilateral, extraterritorial, and enforced by a thirty per cent withholding tax on US-source payments to non-compliant foreign financial institutions, live from 1 July 2014. It is implemented in most places through intergovernmental agreements on Model 1 or Model 2 templates. The lever is the most direct of the five, and it is the only one that requires no cooperation whatever from the affected jurisdiction: an institution that will not report simply loses thirty per cent of its dollar income at source. FATCA is also the historical seed of the entire apparatus, since the Common Reporting Standard is recognisably its multilateral descendant.

Correspondent-banking de-risking. The fifth interface is private, has no statute, no tribunal, and no appeal. Correspondent banks — the institutions that provide dollar and euro clearing access to institutions that do not have it directly — make commercial decisions about which relationships to keep. Those decisions consume the outputs of the other four components as inputs. The Financial Stability Board's correspondent banking data reports have tracked a material decline in the number of active correspondent relationships since 2011, commonly cited as a fall of roughly a fifth over the decade and to be verified against the current report before quoting; the Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures examined the same phenomenon in July 2016. **This is the interface that converts an assessment into a consequence, and it operates on a commercial timescale rather than a legislative one.**

There is a sixth component that is newer and that closes a different door. The global minimum tax under the OECD's Pillar Two framework, implemented in the European Union by Directive (EU) 2022/2523 of 14 December 2022 and in Luxembourg by the law of 22 December 2023 for financial years beginning in 2024, sets a fifteen per cent effective floor for in-scope groups. Its effect is not transparency but the elimination of rate differentiation: for a group above the turnover threshold, a zero-rate jurisdiction stops being a zero-rate jurisdiction, because the shortfall is collected somewhere else in the group. Confirm scope, thresholds, and the implementing law in each relevant jurisdiction with tax counsel; the rules are detailed and the implementation dates vary.

The coupling, traced

Description is not proof of coupling. The proof is a traced propagation, and the British Virgin Islands episode of 2023 to 2024 provides a clean one, short enough to see end to end.

STEP	ACTOR	ACTION	DATE

1	OECD Global Forum	Supplementary peer review; rating on exchange of information on request downgraded to partially compliant	2023
2	EU Code of Conduct Group	Downgrade engages the tax-transparency listing criterion	2023
3	Council of the EU	BVI added to Annex I	Oct 2023
4	EU member states	Coordinated defensive measures become applicable	Oct 2023 onward
5	Correspondent banks and onboarding functions	Jurisdictional risk rating revised; diligence tightened	Q4 2023
6	BVI government	Remediation; commitments given	2023–24
7	Council of the EU	BVI removed from Annex I	Feb 2024

Sequence as publicly reported. Confirm exact review dates, rating language, and Council decision dates against Global Forum and Council primary documents before relying on them.

Four months from listing to delisting. Look at what happened in between and, more importantly, at what did not. No treaty was negotiated. No court ruled. No legislature outside the territory voted on the British Virgin Islands at all. A peer-review panel changed a rating, and that rating change propagated through a tax-policy committee, a Council decision, twenty-seven national tax codes, and an unknown number of private bank risk models, in under a year.

Three institutions that look independent on an organisation chart transmitted a single assessment without any of them deciding to coordinate with the others, because the coupling is built into the criteria. That is what a coordination perimeter is. A holder with entities in three jurisdictions all subject to that chain does not have three risks. He has one risk that will present itself three times.

The Cayman sequence has the same shape on a longer clock: European listing in February 2020 and removal in October 2020 after substance legislation, then Financial Action Task Force increased monitoring from February 2021 to October 2023 after a technical-compliance assessment, with the two processes assessing different things and pushing the same direction. The United Arab Emirates sequence — increased monitoring from March 2022 to February 2024 — is the most instructive of the three for this book's purposes, because the UAE is a bridge jurisdiction and the episode demonstrates that bridges are attached to the perimeter too, a point the failure modes below take up.

Why the outputs correlate

Three structural features, each independently sufficient, produce the correlation.

The first is overlapping membership. The states that sit on the Financial Action Task Force, that fund and direct the OECD, that constitute the Council of the European Union, and whose currencies dominate correspondent clearing are substantially the same states. A position that commands support in one forum tends to command support in the others, not through coordination

but because the same governments hold it.

The second is shared assessment methodology. The European Union's listing criteria explicitly incorporate the Global Forum's ratings and the base-erosion minimum standards. Anti-money-laundering supervision everywhere is built on the Forty Recommendations. National supervisors expect their banks to weight the same lists. **When several institutions grade against a shared rubric, their grades correlate for the same reason that two examiners marking to one rubric produce similar marks — and no communication between them is required.**

The third and most important is a common enforcement currency. Every one of the five interfaces ultimately expresses itself as access: access to dollar clearing, access to euro clearing, access to the correspondent network, access to counterparties whose own compliance functions consume these lists. That is why the lever is so effective against small jurisdictions and why it operates without legislation. It is also the feature that tells you what would constitute a genuinely different perimeter — not a different set of laws, but **a different settlement network with a different set of states controlling access to it.** Chapter 31 examines what does and does not qualify, and is considerably less optimistic than the popular treatment of the question.

The counter-test: where the perimeter has not held

A model that explains everything explains nothing, and the coupling described above is not total. Three episodes in the period run the other way, and setting them out is both honest and diagnostically useful, because the places where the coupling failed tell you what the coupling is actually made of.

The first is the Court of Justice of the European Union's decision of 22 November 2022 in Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers*. The Court held invalid the provision of the anti-money-laundering directives that gave the general public access to beneficial-ownership registers, on fundamental-rights grounds. This was a genuine reversal imposed on the perimeter from inside it, by a court applying a charter of rights against a policy instrument. It did not touch the reporting obligation and it did not touch competent-authority access — the exchange layer was entirely unaffected — but it stopped one limb of the expansion and has not been undone. The lesson is that the perimeter contains institutions with their own mandates, and rights adjudication is one of them.

The second is the litigation over the United States Corporate Transparency Act, enacted on 1 January 2021 within the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, with beneficial-ownership reporting to FinCEN commencing 1 January 2024. In *National Small Business United v. Yellen* (N.D. Ala., 1 March 2024) the district court held the statute unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, and the scope of the regime has since been narrowed by rulemaking. **The Corporate Transparency Act's current scope is genuinely unsettled, is actively litigated, and must be verified with United States counsel as at the date of any structuring decision.** This book will not state a position on it that may be wrong by the time it is read. The lesson is that domestic constitutional constraint is a real brake, and that it operates on a litigation timescale rather than a policy one.

The third is Panama's criminal proceedings, in which the principal defendants arising from the Mossack Fonseca disclosures were acquitted in a verdict reported in June 2024. Verify the court, the judgment, and the scope of the acquittal before drawing any inference. The lesson is the bleakest of the three and the most important for a holder: the firm's founders were acquitted and the

firm was destroyed years earlier, by listing, by de-risking, and by the withdrawal of counterparties. **The perimeter's consequences arrive on the administrative timescale and the adjudicative correction, if it comes at all, arrives on the judicial one — and nothing in a structure survives the interval.** A holder who plans to be vindicated in year eight must still fund and operate through years one to seven.

Taken together, the three counter-examples support a refinement rather than a retraction. The coupling is strong on the exchange of information between authorities, on standard-setting, and on the private access layer, and it has not been reversed on any of them. It is weaker on publication to the general public, where rights adjudication has bitten, and weaker again on domestic constitutional questions inside large jurisdictions with strong courts. **The trend that a structure must plan against is the exchange trend, because that is the one with no counter-examples.** The publication trend is contested, and a preference for privacy from the public is not a bet against the settled direction of travel. Chapter 3 draws the line between those two things precisely, because it is the line between a lawful preference and a structural dependency, and almost every failure in this literature is a case of the second dressed as the first.

There is a fourth item that belongs here for completeness and is not a counter-example but a limit. The perimeter operates on jurisdictions and institutions; it does not operate on legal character. A reinsurance reserve held against real third-party liabilities in Bermuda is inside the perimeter on all four questions and is nonetheless awkward to reach, because reaching it impairs identifiable third parties who have their own claims and their own regulator. A REIT interest is inside the perimeter and is nonetheless mobile in a way that the underlying land is not. These are diversifications along a different axis entirely, and the architecture in this book uses both. Perimeter diversity and character diversity are complements, not substitutes, and a structure that has one and not the other is only half built.

The Specification

Definition

A coordination perimeter is a set of jurisdictions among which an adverse decision propagates without a separate act of consent by each of them, because they share a mechanism of transmission. The operative words are *propagates* and *without separate consent*. Two jurisdictions that happen to have similar laws are not in one perimeter. Two jurisdictions where a rating assigned by a third body automatically changes the treatment of both are in one perimeter, however different their laws.

The perimeter test

Four questions. Each is answered yes or no for the jurisdiction under assessment. The questions are deliberately about attachment to mechanisms rather than about the jurisdiction's own conduct, because the jurisdiction's conduct is not what transmits the shock.

```
THE FOUR-QUESTION PERIMETER TEST
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Q1  AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE
    Does the jurisdiction participate in automatic exchange of financial
    account information -- CRS, FATCA, or both -- with the other
    jurisdictions in the structure?
```

```
Q2  STANDARD-SETTING NETWORK
    Is the jurisdiction a member of, or assessed by a regional body of,
    the Financial Action Task Force, and does its supervisory regime
    implement the Forty Recommendations?

Q3  LISTING REACH
    Can the jurisdiction be placed on the EU list of non-cooperative
    jurisdictions, or on FATF increased monitoring, with consequences
    that its own government cannot prevent?

Q4  SETTLEMENT DEPENDENCE
    Do the jurisdiction's institutions depend for USD or EUR clearing on
    correspondents that are themselves subject to US or EU jurisdiction?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Four yeses: fully inside the perimeter.
Three yeses: inside for all practical purposes; the missing attachment
             is rarely the one that matters.
Two or fewer: assess individually; the jurisdiction may constitute or
             belong to a different perimeter. Q4 is the heaviest
             question and a yes to Q4 alone is close to decisive.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Q4 carries more weight than the others because it is the enforcement currency. A jurisdiction can decline to participate in exchange, ignore the Forty Recommendations, and shrug at a listing, and still be reachable, because its banks need dollars. Conversely, a jurisdiction that participates fully in exchange and implements the Recommendations scrupulously may still sit partly outside the perimeter if its settlement dependence is genuinely diversified. **Compliance posture and perimeter membership are different variables and should never be collapsed into one.** This book's recommended architecture is maximally compliant and deliberately not concentrated in one perimeter, and there is no contradiction in that at all.

The bloc taxonomy

Applying the test produces a small number of groupings. This book uses five, with the honest caveat that the boundaries are analytical conveniences rather than natural kinds, and that a jurisdiction's classification is a judgement to be re-made rather than a fact to be looked up.

BLOC	CHARACTER	EXAMPLES
WEST	Four yeses. Full attachment on every interface.	UK, US, Jersey, Luxembourg, Ireland, Cayman
W-LITE	Four yeses but with a distinct legal product -- typically genuine risk transfer -- that is hard to displace	Bermuda
BRIDGE	Full compliance posture with genuinely dual-attached settlement and a foreign policy that is not aligned to one bloc	UAE (ADGM, DIFC), Singapore,

		Hong Kong
NON-ALIGNED	Compliant, but with an independent foreign policy, domestic-currency depth, and real operating substance	Thailand, India (GIFT), Turkiye
EAST	Primary settlement and policy alignment outside the Western perimeter	treated in Ch 21, Ch 22, Ch 31

Classifications are analytical judgements, are contested, and change. Item 10 of the scorecard in each jurisdiction chapter states the evidence for the classification and its direction of travel.

The W-LITE category deserves a note because it is doing real work in the architecture. Bermuda is inside the Western perimeter on all four questions. What makes it a distinct holding is not perimeter position but product: insurance and reinsurance reserves held against real third-party liabilities are a structurally awkward asset to seize, because seizing them impairs identifiable third parties with their own claims. That is a legal-character diversification rather than a perimeter diversification, and this book counts it as such and no more. Chapters 14 and 15 treat it properly.

The arithmetic of correlated failure

The reason perimeter membership must be measured rather than described is that the cost of getting it wrong is not proportional. It is enormous, and the size is easy to demonstrate.

Take a constructed structure with four jurisdictions, and assume each faces an annual probability of 10 per cent of an adverse regime change material to the holding. The assumption is illustrative; substitute your own.

MODEL	P(ALL FOUR IMPAIRED IN ONE YEAR)	
Independent	p^4 = 0.000100	1 in 10,000
One perimeter	p = 0.100000	1 in 10

Understatement factor from assuming independence: 1,000x

Cumulative probability of total perimeter loss:

over 5 years	independent 0.000500	correlated 0.409510
over 10 years	independent 0.001000	correlated 0.651322
over 15 years	independent 0.001499	correlated 0.794109

CONSTRUCTED probabilities, chosen for illustration.

Assuming independence where a perimeter exists understates the probability of total impairment by three orders of magnitude, and over a fifteen-year horizon it is the difference between a one-in-seven-hundred event and a four-in-five event. No other modelling error in this book is worth that much.

The general case is more useful than the extreme, because real structures are neither fully independent nor fully coupled. Decompose each jurisdiction's failure into a common shock arriving with probability c and an idiosyncratic shock arriving with probability i, holding the marginal probability

fixed at 10 per cent so that the comparison is like for like:

COMMON	IDIOSYNCRATIC	P(ALL FOUR)	UNDERSTATEMENT vs p^4
c = 0.00	i = 0.1000	0.000100	1.0x
c = 0.02	i = 0.0816	0.020044	200.4x
c = 0.05	i = 0.0526	0.050007	500.1x
c = 0.08	i = 0.0217	0.080000	800.0x
c = 0.10	i = 0.0000	0.100000	1,000.0x

Read the second row. A common-shock component of two per cent per year — small, easy to dismiss, smaller than the analyst's uncertainty about any of these inputs — already understates joint failure by a factor of two hundred. **The joint-failure probability is governed almost entirely by the common component and almost not at all by the idiosyncratic one.** That is why the perimeter is the object worth measuring, and the individual jurisdiction is not.

Collapse before you measure

The procedural rule that falls out of all this is short enough to memorise.

1. List every entity and its share of protected capital.
2. Apply the four-question test to each entity's jurisdiction.
3. COLLAPSE: sum the shares within each perimeter.
4. Measure concentration on the COLLAPSED shares, never the raw ones.
5. Report both figures, and treat the gap between them as the size of the illusion the structure was operating under.

Chapter 5 owns the measurement instrument itself and states the symmetry — that the same index governs both jurisdictional resilience, where you want it low, and market share under the 2023 merger guidelines, where you need it low enough to stay unchallenged. This chapter owns step three, which is where the analysis is usually lost.

What it costs to change N

One more piece of arithmetic, because it sets expectations. Suppose a structure is entirely inside one perimeter and the holder begins moving exposure out, splitting what leaves evenly between two other perimeters. The effective perimeter count responds as follows:

SHARE REMAINING IN THE PERIMETER	BLOC-HHI	EFFECTIVE PERIMETERS	DIVERSITY TERM eta*ln(N) at eta=0.35
100.00%	1.000000	1.0000	0.000000
95.00%	0.903750	1.1065	0.035421
90.00%	0.815000	1.2270	0.071599
85.00%	0.733750	1.3629	0.108355
80.00%	0.660000	1.5152	0.145430
66.67%	0.500000	2.0000	0.242602
60.00%	0.440000	2.2727	0.287343
50.00%	0.375000	2.6667	0.343290

```
    40.00%          0.340000        2.9412          0.377583
    33.33%          0.333333        3.0000          0.384514
------------------------------------------------------------
```

The solution for exactly two effective perimeters is analytic and worth committing to memory: with the remainder split evenly, the perimeter share must fall to two thirds. **One third of protected capital has to sit outside the perimeter before the structure has two effective perimeters rather than one.** Ten per cent moved buys 1.2270. Twenty per cent buys 1.5152. This is not a marginal adjustment that can be made by opening an account somewhere; it is a structural reallocation, and any adviser who suggests otherwise has not done the arithmetic.

The Failure Modes

Counting flags

The master error, restated here in its perimeter form. A structure diagram with entities in six countries looks diversified and may not be. The relevant count is not of flags but of independent decision-makers who would each have to act for the whole holding to be impaired. Every failure mode below is a variety of this one.

The diagnostic is quick. Take the diagram, apply the four-question test to each situs, and shade every entity that scores four. If the shaded entities hold most of the capital, the diagram is decoration and the structure has one perimeter regardless of how many borders it crosses.

Treating a bridge as neutral

A bridge jurisdiction is not neutral. It is *dual-attached*, which is a different and much more useful property, and confusing the two produces overconfidence in exactly the places this book recommends.

The United Arab Emirates is the illustration and this book is committed to stating it plainly even though the UAE is central to the architecture. The UAE participates in the Common Reporting Standard. Its institutions clear dollars through correspondents subject to United States jurisdiction. And it was itself subject to Financial Action Task Force increased monitoring from March 2022 until February 2024 — twenty-three months. On the four-question test the UAE scores yes on automatic exchange, yes on the standard-setting network, yes on listing reach as its own recent history demonstrates, and yes on settlement dependence for its dollar business.

What makes it a bridge is not that any of those attachments is absent. It is that the UAE maintains an independent foreign policy, hosts genuine commercial relationships across blocs that do not deal easily with each other, and provides legal infrastructure — the Application of English Law Regulations 2015 in the Abu Dhabi Global Market, which directly applies English common law and is the only regime outside the United Kingdom to do so, and the DIFC's codified common-law-derived statutes with their own courts — that is credible to counterparties on both sides. **A bridge reduces the probability that a shock in one bloc removes access to the other. It does not place anything outside either bloc, and no chapter in this book will claim that it does.**

The practical consequence is a discipline about attribution. When the architecture assigns the UAE a bloc classification of BRIDGE rather than WEST, that classification is a claim about correlation, not about immunity. It says the UAE's response to a Western shock is less than perfectly correlated with London's. It does not say the correlation is zero, and the arithmetic in the previous

section shows that a small common component dominates the joint-failure probability. Chapters 17 and 18 populate the scorecard for both UAE centres, including the tenth item, and the trajectory entry there is honest about the greylisting episode.

Assuming that non-Western means unreachable

The corresponding error at the other end. A jurisdiction outside the Western political sphere is not thereby outside the perimeter, because the fourth question — settlement dependence — is answered by the plumbing rather than by the politics. An institution that clears dollars through a correspondent in New York is subject to a chain of pressure that runs through that correspondent, whatever its own government's position.

This is why the two-hundred-billion-dollar question in this field is not legal at all. **A genuinely different perimeter requires a different settlement network with a different set of states controlling access to it, and settlement networks are considerably harder to build than company registries.** Chapter 31 measures what exists.

The CIPS error

The commonest single technical error in this literature deserves its own heading, because structures have been built on it.

The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System is a **clearing** system for renminbi. It is not a messaging system, and a very large proportion of its participants use SWIFT for the messaging layer of transactions that clear through it. The statement "CIPS replaces SWIFT" is false as a matter of system architecture, and a structure premised on it will fail — not eventually, but at the first attempt to use it as designed, because the messaging dependency it was supposed to have removed is still there.

The correct framing is that renminbi clearing capacity is a real and growing diversification of the *clearing* layer, that the messaging layer remains substantially concentrated, and that these are separate questions requiring separate analysis. Chapter 31 does that analysis. What matters here is the general lesson: **a diversification claim must identify which layer it diversifies, because a structure with two clearing systems and one messaging system has one point of failure, not two.**

Confusing a rail with a store

A distinction this book holds throughout, and it belongs among the perimeter failure modes because perimeter reasoning is where it is most often violated.

A rail is a mechanism for moving value. A store is a place where value rests. Freeze risk on a rail is an exposure-window problem with parameters — hop size, exposure duration, counterparty prescreening, and what happens if the transfer fails mid-flight. Freeze risk on a store is a custody problem, with entirely different parameters. **Never evaluate a rail as though it were a store of value, and never recommend a rail as a store of value.**

The error is especially common with stablecoins, which are frequently described as being outside the perimeter and are not. The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation's stablecoin provisions have applied in the European Union since 30 June 2024, with consequences that included the delisting

of certain tokens from European venues. The GENIUS Act was signed in the United States in July 2025; confirm its current implementing rules with counsel, as this area is moving quickly. Tether can and does freeze USDT balances at law-enforcement request, and the T3 Financial Crimes Unit formed with Tron and TRM Labs in September 2024 exists to do exactly that. And the structural point that most surprises newcomers: **public blockchains are more traceable than correspondent banking, not less, because every transfer is permanently public and analysis improves over time while the record does not degrade.** A transfer made today is readable by an analyst in 2035 with tools that do not yet exist. Correspondent records are not public and are subject to retention limits. Chapter 32 treats all of this in detail.

Over-diversifying

The opposite error, and it is real. The diversity term of the storage law grows as the logarithm of the perimeter count, while maintenance grows roughly linearly with it — every additional perimeter means additional counsel, additional filings, additional local substance, and additional management attention. Logarithmic benefit against linear cost has an interior optimum, and the optimum is not large.

Write maintenance as a fixed component plus a per-perimeter component, C = c0 + c1*N. The surplus h = eta*ln(N) - delta*Q - C is maximised where eta/N = c1, that is at N* = eta/c1. At eta = 0.35:

PER-PERIMETER COST c1	OPTIMAL N*	INTERPRETATION
c1 = 0.05	7.0000	cheap coordination
c1 = 0.07	5.0000	typical mid-size group
c1 = 0.10	3.5000	expensive coordination

And the marginal value of each additional perimeter, which is the number that should govern the decision to add one:

N	eta*ln(N)	MARGINAL GAIN OVER N-1
1	0.000000	0.000000
2	0.242602	0.242602
3	0.384514	0.141913
4	0.485203	0.100689
5	0.563303	0.078100
6	0.627116	0.063813
7	0.681069	0.053953
8	0.727805	0.046736

The second perimeter is worth 5.19 times what the eighth is worth. Almost all of the available benefit is captured by the move from one to two and from two to three; beyond that the holder is paying linear cost for logarithmic return, and at c1 = 0.10 the optimum is reached at three and a half. Chapter 6 has the qualitative version of the same conclusion — three jobs, holding, operating, bridging — and it is not a coincidence that the arithmetic and the taxonomy agree on a small number.

Assuming perimeters are static

The classifications in this chapter are judgements about the present. Perimeters expand: the Common Reporting Standard's participant list has grown steadily since 2014, and each accession converts a jurisdiction from partially outside to inside on question one. Perimeters can also fragment, and the 2022 immobilisation of approximately USD 300 billion of Russian central bank reserves is the event that caused institutional investors, central banks, and sovereign funds to begin treating reserve and rail concentration as a live risk rather than a theoretical one. It is not this book's purpose to forecast the direction. It is this book's purpose to insist that the classification be re-made periodically with evidence, which is what item 10 of the scorecard requires and why it requires dated events rather than impressions.

Reading the perimeter as a conspiracy

Stated in the Position and repeated here because it produces a distinctive class of bad prediction. An analyst who models the perimeter as coordinated malice expects targeting, expects negotiation to be possible, expects political change to reverse the direction, and expects individual relationships to matter. An analyst who models it as structural coupling expects uniformity, expects compliance to work, expects the direction to persist across changes of government, and expects relationships to be irrelevant to the outcome. On the evidence of the fifteen years documented in Chapter 1, **the second model has been right and the first has been wrong** – including in the specific case of Panama, which complied and got off the list.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED. The principal, the entities, and all figures below are inventions built to illustrate the measurement. They describe no real person or transaction.

Step 1 and 2: the entities and the test

The structure as found, carried forward from Chapter 1: four entities holding the group's protected capital in the shares shown, with the four-question perimeter test applied to each.

ENTITY / SITUS	SHARE	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	SCORE
United Kingdom	40.9091%	yes	yes	yes	yes	4/4
United States	27.2727%	yes	yes	yes	yes	4/4
Jersey	18.1818%	yes	yes	yes	yes	4/4
Luxembourg	13.6364%	yes	yes	yes	yes	4/4

Q1 automatic exchange | Q2 standard-setting network
Q3 listing reach | Q4 settlement dependence

Every entity scores four. On question one, all four participate in automatic exchange under the Common Reporting Standard or FATCA or both. On question two, all four implement the Forty Recommendations through their own supervisors. On question three, all four are reachable by a listing process whose consequences their governments could not unilaterally prevent — and the Crown Dependencies' history of European Union engagement makes this concrete rather than

hypothetical for Jersey. On question four, all four depend on correspondents subject to United States jurisdiction for dollar clearing, including the United States entity, which is subject directly.

Step 3 and 4: collapse, then measure

```
RAW MEASUREMENT (what the adviser presented)
   naive HHI                    = 0.293388
   effective jurisdictions      = 3.4085

COLLAPSED MEASUREMENT (the honest figure)
   WESTERN PERIMETER            = 100.0000%
   bloc-HHI                     = 1.000000
   EFFECTIVE PERIMETERS         = 1.0000

THE GAP                         = 3.41x overstatement
```

The gap is the size of the illusion. It is not a rounding difference or a modelling nuance; it is the whole of the structure's apparent diversification, and it arises from one assumption that Chapter 1's evidence falsifies.

The surplus consequence, at the parameters this series uses — eta = 0.35, C = 0.30, Q = 10, delta = 0.02, in normalised units:

```
h = 0.35 * ln(1.0000) - 0.02 * 10 - 0.30
  = 0.35 * 0.000000 - 0.200000 - 0.300000
  = -0.500000
```

Zero on the input side. The whole of erosion and the whole of upkeep on the output side. And no internal rearrangement helps: moving the Luxembourg allocation to Jersey, or splitting the United Kingdom position across three English companies, changes the naive figure and leaves the collapsed figure at exactly 1.0000, because rearranging within a perimeter does not change N.

The designed alternative, measured the same way

The architecture this book assembles across its remaining chapters distributes the same capital across six jurisdictions in three perimeters:

```
ENTITY / SITUS      SHARE       BLOC          ROLE
-------------------------------------------------------------
UAE                29.0909%    BRIDGE        Holding (Ch 7, 17, 18)
Thailand           18.1818%    NON-ALIGNED   Operating (Ch 23)
United Kingdom     16.3636%    WEST          Operating, contracts (Ch 10)
Bermuda            13.6364%    W-LITE        Risk transfer (Ch 14, 15)
India (GIFT)       11.8182%    NON-ALIGNED   Fund vehicle (Ch 24)
Singapore          10.9091%    BRIDGE        Bridging, banking (Ch 20)
-------------------------------------------------------------

RAW MEASUREMENT
   naive HHI                    = 0.188926
```

```
   effective jurisdictions      = 5.2931

COLLAPSED MEASUREMENT
   BRIDGE                       = 40.0000%
   NON-ALIGNED                  = 30.0000%
   WEST (incl. W-LITE)          = 30.0000%
   bloc-HHI                     = 0.340000
   EFFECTIVE PERIMETERS         = 2.9412

Effective jurisdictions   3.4085 -> 5.2931   (x1.5529)
Effective perimeters      1.0000 -> 2.9412   (x2.9412)
Western-perimeter share   100.0%  -> 30.0%   (-70.0 percentage points)
```

Note which ratio is the real one. The naive count improves by a factor of 1.5529, which looks like a modest gain. The perimeter count improves by a factor of 2.9412, which is the gain that actually enters the surplus equation. **The measurement taken at the wrong level of aggregation understated the problem before the restructuring and understates the improvement after it, in both cases by roughly the same factor, and for the same reason.**

The surplus:

```
h = 0.35 * ln(2.941176) - 0.02 * 10 - 0.30
  = 0.35 * 1.0788096614 - 0.200000 - 0.300000
  = 0.377583 - 0.500000
  = -0.122417
```

Two honest observations, which this book will not soften

The first is that the designed figure is still negative. **Diversification across perimeters raised the ceiling from minus one half to minus 0.122417; it did not pay the maintenance bill, and at these parameters both structures sit below the threshold at which the structure is worth building.** What would close the gap is visible in the equation and is not jurisdictional: the conversion efficiency eta would have to rise to 0.463474 with C and delta unchanged, or C would have to fall to 0.177583 with eta unchanged. Both are operating improvements rather than structural ones. Chapter 37 carries this result into the assembled architecture and Chapter 40 ends on it. Jurisdictional diversity buys the *ability* to build. It does not buy the building.

The second is arithmetic hygiene. Computing that same figure from the rounded effective count 2.94 rather than the exact 2.941176 yields -0.122557 instead of -0.122417, a discrepancy of 0.000140. Trivial once. Compounded through a chain of derived figures it is not trivial, and an earlier volume in this series lost four chapters to precisely that error before it was caught. Every figure in this book is computed from unrounded inputs, and the reconciliation between the exact values and the rounded values published in the summary tables is set out in Appendix B so that a reader can check rather than trust.

What the holder should take from this chapter

Three things, in order of importance.

First, measure at the perimeter level, always, and report both figures so that the gap is visible.

The gap is the most informative single number about a structure that most holders have never computed.

Second, expect the first reallocation to be large. One third of protected capital must sit outside the perimeter before the effective count reaches two. There is no version of this that is accomplished by opening an account in a new place while leaving the balance sheet where it is.

Third, expect the benefit to saturate quickly. The second perimeter is worth 5.19 times the eighth. A structure with three well-chosen perimeters, properly maintained, dominates a structure with eight badly maintained ones, and the taxonomy in Chapter 6 — holding, operating, bridging — is the practical guide to which three.

What none of this addresses is whether the structure survives being looked at. A perfectly diversified structure that depends on concealment fails the moment any one of its perimeters examines it, and it then fails in the others too, because examination findings propagate along exactly the couplings this chapter has described. That is the subject of Chapter 3, and it is the standard against which every recommendation in the remaining thirty-seven chapters is audited in print.

This chapter is not legal, tax, or investment advice. All worked cases are constructed. Citations marked for verification should be checked against primary sources and with qualified counsel in each relevant jurisdiction before any reliance is placed on them.

Chapter 3 . Structures That Survive Examination

This chapter is not legal, tax, or investment advice. All worked cases are constructed and are labelled as such. Every citation is to a named instrument or decided case with its date; where a claim could not be verified to that standard, the text says so and states what needs checking.

The Position

Chapter 1 established that jurisdictions selling confidentiality lost the ability to deliver it. Chapter 2 established why they lost it together. This chapter answers the question a reader is entitled to ask at this point, which is: *then what is the alternative?*

The alternative is not a better hiding place. There is no better hiding place, and the search for one is what produces the failures documented in Chapter 1. The alternative is a change in the design objective. Instead of building a structure whose function depends on not being examined, build one whose function is unaffected by examination — where every element is lawful in the place it sits, filed where filing is required, reported where reporting is required, and defensible on its own terms in front of an adverse tribunal. A structure built to that standard is not damaged by scrutiny, because scrutiny reveals only what the structure was designed to be.

The author's formulation of the standard is that a well-built structure renders surveillance *irrelevant*. The word is chosen carefully and it is the opposite of what a casual reader expects. It does not mean surveillance is defeated, evaded, or blinded. **It means observation yields nothing actionable, because nothing was concealed in the first place — and nothing was concealed because nothing needed to be.** A structure whose every element is defensible has no soft target in it. The examiner reads the file, understands the arrangement, and finds that it is what it says it is. That is the entire mechanism, and it is unglamorous, which is part of why it is underused.

From which the load-bearing claim of this chapter follows:

> **Structures built to avoid examination fail on contact with examination. Structures built to be correct do not.**

That asymmetry is structural and is the subject of the next section. A concealment structure has exactly one line of defence — the fact of not having been looked at — and when that line is crossed there is nothing behind it. A compliant structure has a defence that is not consumed by being used: the file, the filings, the commercial rationale, and the substance are as available on the tenth examination as on the first. **One design has a defence that is destroyed by deployment and the other has a defence that is strengthened by it.**

The operational form of the standard is a single question, and this book applies it in print to everything it recommends:

> **Would this structure still do its job if every element of it were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?**

Note the two universals in the question, because both matter. *Every element* — not the structure in outline, but each entity, each contract, each filing, each flow of funds. And *every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it* — not the friendliest regulator, but the tax authority of the operating jurisdiction, the tax authority of the principal's residence, the financial regulator of the holding jurisdiction, the correspondent bank's compliance function, and the court that would hear

a creditor's claim. A structure that survives a friendly reading and fails a hostile one has not passed.

Three clarifications, each of which prevents a specific misreading.

The standard is not a promise of privacy from the public, and it does not require abandoning it. Privacy from the general public is a lawful and partially expanding interest, as the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed on 22 November 2022 in Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers*, striking down the public-access limb of the beneficial-ownership register regime while leaving reporting and competent-authority access untouched. A holder may lawfully prefer that his affairs not appear in a newspaper. What he cannot do is build a structure that requires the tax authority not to know. The first is a preference; the second is a dependency, and this chapter is about dependencies.

The standard is not a defence against lawful process. A judgment that has survived due process is a different problem from the one this book addresses. This volume is about resilience against arbitrary action — expropriation, immobilisation, de-risking without process, retroactive regime change. It is not about defeating a creditor who has won. Fraudulent-transfer law governs that question, it is bounded by timing, and the honest answer is almost always that the planning had to have been done long before the claim arose. Chapter 39 treats it directly and without comfort.

The standard is not the same as being uninteresting. A structure can be fully compliant and strategically non-obvious at the same time, and the best examples of durable architecture are exactly that. Constellation Software executed a large acquisition programme in full public view for more than a decade, filing everything required of a listed company, while very few observers assembled the pieces into a description of what was being built. Every fact was disclosed; the strategy was simply not obvious from the facts. That passes the disclosure test completely. **"Hidden in plain sight" is a statement about the non-obviousness of a strategy, never about the concealment of a fact, and the two are routinely confused by people who should know better.**

The Mechanism

Why concealment fails: four structural reasons

The failure of concealment structures is not bad luck and it is not a consequence of poor execution. It follows from four properties of the environment, each of which is sufficient on its own.

The observer set is monotone. Information that has entered the exchange system does not leave it. Automatic exchange under the Common Reporting Standard runs annually and the receiving administration retains what it receives. A structure that was invisible in 2013 and reported in 2019 is not invisible again in 2025; the 2019 report still exists. The same property holds with greater force on public blockchains, where every transfer is permanently readable and where analytical capability improves over time while the record does not degrade — **a transfer made today will be readable in 2035 by tools that do not yet exist, which makes public-chain settlement the most durable surveillance record a holder can create, not the least.** Concealment is therefore a wasting asset in a technical sense: its value can only fall, and each year's disclosure permanently reduces the stock.

The asymmetry of repeated trials. A concealment structure must succeed at every examina-

tion. An examiner must succeed once. Over any realistic holding period this is decisive, and the arithmetic is unforgiving. At an annual examination probability of five per cent — which is low — the cumulative probability of at least one examination is 0.2262 over five years, 0.4013 over ten, 0.5367 over fifteen, and 0.6415 over twenty. At ten per cent the same figures are 0.4095, 0.6513, 0.7941, and 0.8784. **A structure meant to hold for a generation and requiring an unbroken run of non-examination is, at ten per cent annual exposure, approximately eighty per cent likely to be examined within fifteen years.** Structures are frequently built to horizons of thirty years and longer.

The principal is inside a jurisdiction. This is the mechanism that defeated the asset-protection cases in Chapter 1 and it generalises. Assets can be redomiciled; entities can be migrated; a trust can be moved from Jersey to Mauritius by a flight clause. The human being who built the structure is subject to the coercive power of the courts where he stands, and an order directed at his own conduct requires no foreign court to cooperate with anything. In *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit affirmed civil contempt against principals who asserted that a duress clause had made compliance impossible, holding that a party asserting impossibility bears the burden of proving it. In *In re Lawrence*, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002), the debtor was held in civil contempt from 1999 and reported released in 2007. **The offshore statute governs the offshore asset; the domestic court governs the person, and the person is the one part of the structure that cannot be redomiciled.**

The cost inversion. This is the least discussed and, for a principal deciding between approaches, often the most persuasive. Concealment is not cheaper than compliance once the expected cost of failure is included, and at realistic parameters it is not cheaper even before that. The next section works it.

The economics, computed

The following figures are constructed for illustration. They are not quotations, they are not research estimates, and actual costs vary by an order of magnitude with size and complexity. What is being demonstrated is the *shape* of the comparison, and the shape is robust to large changes in the inputs.

Take a compliant multi-jurisdiction architecture of the kind this book builds, holding capital of USD 50 million:

ANNUAL MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANT ARCHITECTURE	USD / YEAR
DIFC Foundation: registered agent, office, filings	18,000
DIFC Foundation: council fees (three members)	45,000
ADGM holdco: licence, registered office, accounts	22,000
Thai BOI opco: audit, BOI reporting, payroll compliance	36,000
Bermuda captive: BMA filings, actuarial opinion, audit	140,000
GIFT City vehicle: IFSCA compliance, fund administration	85,000
UK Ltd: accounts, PSC filings, corporation tax	14,000
Group: coordinated tax counsel, six jurisdictions	120,000
Group: CRS / FATCA classification and annual reporting	26,000
Group: transfer-pricing documentation	55,000
TOTAL ANNUAL C	561,000

```
------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTED. Illustrative budget, not a quotation.

As a fraction of protected capital:
    Q = USD  25m      2.2440%     224.40 bp
    Q = USD  50m      1.1220%     112.20 bp
    Q = USD 100m      0.5610%      56.10 bp
    Q = USD 250m      0.2244%      22.44 bp
```

The scaling matters and is worth pausing on. **At USD 25 million this architecture costs 224 basis points a year, which is a serious drag; at USD 250 million it costs 22, which is negligible.** Compliance-based architecture has substantial fixed costs and therefore a minimum efficient scale. Below that scale the correct advice is a simpler structure, not a cheaper version of a complex one, and Chapter 6 says so.

Now the comparison. Assume a concealment-based alternative costing USD 210,000 a year — nominee fees, layered agents, and the premium charged by institutions willing to bank opaque arrangements. It is genuinely cheaper on the visible line: 351,000 less per year, a saving of 62.6 per cent.

Assume that on examination the concealment structure loses sixty per cent of the capital to assessment and recovery, incurs a penalty of twenty per cent, and consumes USD 1.5 million in counsel. Loss on examination L is then USD 41.5 million.

```
ANNUAL        EXPECTED        CONCEALMENT       COMPLIANT      RATIO
EXAM PROB     ANNUAL LOSS     TOTAL BURDEN      C
------------------------------------------------------------------
p = 0.02         830,000         1,040,000        561,000      1.85x
p = 0.05       2,075,000         2,285,000        561,000      4.07x
p = 0.10       4,150,000         4,360,000        561,000      7.77x
p = 0.20       8,300,000         8,510,000        561,000     15.17x
------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTED parameters throughout.
```

The break-even is the number to remember. The concealment structure's total burden equals the compliant structure's maintenance cost at an annual examination probability of

```
p* = (561,000 − 210,000) / 41,500,000 = 0.008458
```

At any annual examination probability above 0.85 per cent, the concealment structure is more expensive than the compliant one — and 0.85 per cent is roughly a one-in-a-hundred-and-eighteen- year event, which is far below any defensible estimate of examination risk in the environment Chapter 2 described. The apparent saving of 62.6 per cent is an artefact of counting the invoice and not the exposure. This result is not sensitive to the inputs: halve L and p* only doubles to 1.7 per cent, still far below realistic exposure.

There is a second-order point that the table does not show and that matters more than any of the numbers in it. The compliant structure's cost is a known, budgetable, tax-deductible operating expense that is paid in cash from income. The concealment structure's cost is a low visible fee plus an unbudgetable tail risk to principal. Those are not the same kind of liability and a principal who treats them as comparable line items has mispriced the decision before the arithmetic starts.

Privacy, confidentiality, and opacity: three different things

Precision here prevents most of the confusion in this field. The three words are used interchangeably in marketing material and they denote different legal positions with different trajectories.

Privacy is the interest in one's affairs not being available to the general public. It is a recognised right in several legal systems, it was vindicated against a European Union directive in *Sovim* in November 2022, and structures may rely on it. The trend is contested and has partially run in the holder's favour.

Confidentiality is a duty owed by a professional or institution to a client, enforceable between them and subject to statutory override. A bank's duty of confidence is real and is displaced by reporting obligations. Structures may rely on it only within the space the statutory overrides leave, which shrinks.

Opacity to competent authorities is the condition of an authority with jurisdiction being unable to obtain information it is entitled to. Fifteen years of evidence say the trend here is one-directional and has no significant counter-examples. **A structure may rely on privacy, may rely on confidentiality within its statutory limits, and may not rely on opacity — and the discipline of this book is that any element which needs the third is removed at the design stage rather than defended at the examination stage.**

The Specification

The test

```
THE DISCLOSURE TEST
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Would this structure still do its job if every element of it were
disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?
-------------------------------------------------------------------
"Every element"   each entity, contract, filing, account, and flow
"Every authority" the tax authority of each operating jurisdiction, the
                  tax authority of the principal's residence, each
                  financial regulator, each correspondent bank's
                  compliance function, and the court that would hear an
                  adverse claim
"Its job"         the specific function assigned to it under the three-
                  jobs taxonomy: holding, operating, or bridging
-------------------------------------------------------------------
```

The five criteria

The test is applied element by element, not to the structure as a whole, and each element is scored against five criteria. All five must be satisfied.

```
1  LAWFUL WHERE IT SITS
   The element is lawful under the law of its own jurisdiction, on the
   facts as they actually are rather than as documented.
```

```
2  FILED AND REGISTERED
   Every registration, licence, filing, and return required of it has
   been made, on time, and is current.

3  REPORTED
   The element is correctly classified and reported under every
   applicable exchange regime -- CRS, FATCA, beneficial-ownership
   registers, mandatory disclosure rules.

4  INDEPENDENT COMMERCIAL RATIONALE
   The element has a purpose that can be stated without reference to
   any tax or disclosure consequence, and that purpose is real.

5  SURVIVES HOSTILE READING
   The element remains defensible when described in full, in the least
   favourable framing, to a tribunal inclined to disbelieve it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Product scoring, not averages

The scoring rule is the part practitioners resist and it is not negotiable.

A structure's disclosed value is the product of its elements' scores, not their average, because a chain fails at its weakest link and an examiner who finds one bad element examines the rest with an entirely different prior. Four excellent elements and one nominee arrangement do not average to a good structure. The nominee arrangement makes the whole thing a fraud case, and the four excellent elements become evidence of sophistication rather than of good faith.

ELEMENTS SATISFIED	AVERAGE SCORE	PRODUCT SCORE	VERDICT
5 of 5	1.00	1.00	PASS
4 of 5	0.80	0.00	FAIL
2 of 5	0.40	0.00	FAIL
1 of 5	0.20	0.00	FAIL

The average column is what an adviser presents when he wants to describe a structure as "substantially compliant". There is no such thing. Criterion 4 is the one most often failed by otherwise well-built structures, and criterion 5 is the one most often failed by structures that satisfy the first four on paper.

The audit procedure

```
STEP 1  ENUMERATE.  List every entity, account, contract, and flow.
                    Structures fail on the elements nobody listed.
STEP 2  ASSIGN.     Give each element exactly one job: holding,
                    operating, or bridging. An element with two jobs
                    usually fails criterion 4 on at least one of them.
```

```
STEP 3  SCORE.      Apply the five criteria to each element. Record the
                    evidence for each yes, not the conclusion.
STEP 4  MULTIPLY.   Any zero fails the structure. Do not average.
STEP 5  REMEDIATE OR REMOVE.  An element that cannot be brought to five
                    of five is removed at the design stage. It is not
                    documented better; it is taken out.
STEP 6  RE-RUN.     Annually, and on any change of law, residence, or
                    control. Criterion 3 in particular is a moving
                    target.
```

Step 5 is where the discipline lives. The instinct on discovering a weak element is to improve its documentation. **Documentation improves the record of a fact; it does not change the fact, and an examiner comparing the documentation to the operational reality will find the gap. Elements that fail are removed, not papered.**

What passing buys, and what it does not

Passing the disclosure test buys three things and it is important to be exact about them.

It buys *survivability of examination*: the structure is not impaired by being looked at, so the examination becomes an administrative event rather than an existential one. It buys *bankability*: a structure that can answer a compliance question keeps its banking, and Chapter 38 argues that this is the binding constraint on bridge architecture, because a bridge that cannot answer a compliance question is de-risked out of existence regardless of how elegant it is. And it buys *the ability to use the diversification measured in Chapter 2*, because perimeter diversity is worthless if each perimeter's authorities would shut the structure down on inspection.

It does not buy immunity from tax. It does not buy protection against a judgment that survived due process. It does not buy protection against a state that decides to expropriate without process, though it materially improves the position, because arbitrary action against a demonstrably compliant holder is harder to justify, easier to challenge, and more costly diplomatically than action against an opaque one. And it does not buy freedom from the maintenance cost, which is the subject of the arithmetic above and which is the reason this book insists that C be budgeted before the structure is built rather than discovered in year three.

Concealment and armour: the same effect by inverse mechanisms

Everything above describes what disclosure-based design does. This section says what it *is*, and the statement is the conceptual centre of the book, so it is set out formally rather than in passing.

There are exactly two ways to keep an asset out of a hostile party's hands: make it hard to find, or make it hard to take. Both work. They are not points on a spectrum, not weak and strong versions of one another, and cannot be blended into a hybrid with the advantages of each. They are inverse mechanisms that happen to produce the same protective effect, and almost every serious error in this field comes from treating them as the same thing at different strengths.

```
    CONCEALMENT                              STRUCTURAL ARMOUR
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------
    the asset survives because the           the asset survives because the
```

adversary cannot LOCATE it	adversary cannot TAKE it
the protective quantity is the adversary's IGNORANCE	the protective quantity is the structure's CORRECTNESS
protection is a decreasing function of observation	protection is invariant to observation
the defence is consumed the first time it is used	the defence is unchanged by being used, and is available on the tenth examination as on the first
fails DISCONTINUOUSLY: full protection until exposure, then none	fails CONTINUOUSLY: only under actual applied force, and by degrees that can be observed
failure is not observable in advance -- you learn the structure was weak by losing it	failure is observable in advance -- you can test the structure without losing it
scales badly: each additional person who knows is a new failure point	scales well: each additional filing makes the next filing easier

The two mechanisms are exclusive because the actions that strengthen one weaken the other. Every disclosure that makes an armoured structure more defensible — the filed charter, the named owner, the reported account, the audited return — is a location that concealment would have had to avoid. Every layer that makes a concealed structure harder to locate — the nominee, the undisclosed agency, the unrecorded side letter — is an element that fails criterion 1 or criterion 5 of the disclosure test and therefore zeroes the product score. A structure cannot be a little of each. It is one design or the other, and the design decision is taken at inception, usually without being recognised as a decision at all.

Now put the two mechanisms against the environment described in Chapters 1 and 2. Concealment's protective quantity is the adversary's ignorance, and the four properties set out earlier in this chapter — the monotone observer set, the asymmetry of repeated trials, the principal's physical presence inside a jurisdiction, and the cost inversion — are between them a description of a world in which that quantity is falling toward zero and cannot be replenished. Armour's protective quantity is correctness, and correctness is not depleted by any of those four properties. It is depleted only by the law changing under a structure that was built correctly under the old law, which is a real risk, is observable in advance, and is what criterion 3 and Step 6 of the audit procedure exist to catch.

Concealment-based vehicles are not obsolete because they were unethical, or because they became unfashionable, or because regulators disapproved of them. They are obsolete because the quantity they ran on stopped being available. That is a supply statement, not a moral one, and it is why the replacement is not a better-concealed vehicle. When a mechanism's input goes to zero, the replacement is not a more efficient version of the same mechanism; it is

a mechanism that runs on a different input. Disclosure-based architecture runs on the opposite input, which is why it was available all along and why it becomes the dominant design precisely at the moment the other one fails.

This is the whole of the book's title thesis, and everything from Chapter 4 onward is engineering detail underneath it. The Worked Application closes with the clearest public demonstration that the inverse mechanism performs the function — not as theory, but as an institution running in the open for a quarter of a century.

The Failure Modes

The disclosure test is a simple instrument and it is misapplied in a small number of consistent ways. Each of the following has been observed in structures built by competent advisers, which is the point: none of these is a beginner's error.

1. Grading privacy on the opacity axis

The structure is described as passing because "nothing is public". That answers a question the test does not ask. The test asks whether the structure would still work if every authority with jurisdiction knew everything, not whether the newspaper knows anything. A DIFC Foundation's by-laws are not public and that is irrelevant; what matters is that they can be produced and that producing them changes nothing.

Diagnostic: the pass reasoning uses the words "private", "confidential" or "not searchable" rather than "would not matter". *Mitigation:* re-run the test with the assumption that every document is in the hands of every authority, and score only the consequences.

2. Papering rather than removing

The weak element is identified and the response is a better file: a longer board minute, a retrospective services agreement, a transfer-pricing study written to justify a position that was taken for other reasons. Documentation is a record of a fact and cannot create one; an examiner who compares the paper to the operations finds the gap, and the improved documentation becomes the evidence of intent that the bare fact would not have supplied.

Diagnostic: the remediation plan contains only documents and no changes to what anyone actually does. *Mitigation:* Step 5 of the audit procedure. Remove it.

3. Testing the structure instead of the elements

The test is run on the chart. The chart has seven boxes. The structure has seventy elements — intercompany loans, a management services agreement, a personal guarantee, a dormant account nobody has thought about since 2016, a director who resigned and was never removed from a register, an IP licence with no royalty ever paid.

Diagnostic: the Step 1 enumeration took under a day. *Mitigation:* enumerate from the bank statements and the registry filings, not from the chart. **Structures fail on the elements nobody listed, and those are almost always the oldest ones.**

4. Passing on the documents and failing on the facts

Criterion 1 is expressly framed as lawfulness "on the facts as they actually are rather than as documented". A Thai company whose share register shows two Thai individuals holding fifty-one per cent is lawful on the register and criminal in fact if those individuals hold as nominees. Criterion 5 then compounds it: the hostile reading is the one that starts from what everybody knows to be true.

Diagnostic: the evidence recorded is a document rather than a behaviour. *Mitigation:* for each element, record what a person would observe by watching for a year.

5. Passing today under yesterday's law

The test is a snapshot and the criteria move. Thailand's Revenue Department order Por. 161/2566 made foreign-source income remitted by a Thai tax resident taxable from 1 January 2024 regardless of the year earned, retiring a generation of remittance-timing planning that had been correct the day before. The MiCA stablecoin provisions applied from 30 June 2024 and changed which instruments an EU-facing structure could hold. The United Kingdom's Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 tightened Companies House identity verification. None was secret; each broke structures that were passing.

Diagnostic: the date on the last completed test. *Mitigation:* Step 6, annually and on any change of law, residence or control, with criterion 3 re-verified from primary sources rather than from the adviser's standing view.

6. Reading the test as a tax opinion

A structure can pass the disclosure test completely and be taxed punitively. Passing means it survives being seen; it says nothing about whether what is seen is expensive. Chapter 8 sets out the German and French attribution regimes and the United States entity-classification problem, each of which produces bad outcomes for structures that pass this test on every criterion.

Diagnostic: the phrase "it passes the disclosure test" is used to answer a question about liability. *Mitigation:* separate the two reviews and take them in the order of test first, liability second, because a structure that fails the test should not have a tax opinion written about it at all.

7. Reading the test as protection against arbitrary action

This is the most important failure mode in the chapter and it is a limit on the chapter's own argument, so it is stated without softening. In 2022 approximately USD 300 billion of Russian central bank reserves were immobilised. Those reserves were the most thoroughly disclosed assets in the world: held by a sovereign, in named accounts, at identified institutions, reported in published statistics, with no concealment element of any kind. **Full disclosure did not prevent immobilisation, and any reader who has taken this chapter to mean that correctness confers immunity has taken it wrongly.**

What disclosure-based design does against arbitrary action is narrower and still worth paying for. It makes the holder's position legally defensible rather than hopeless, so that a challenge exists. It raises the political cost of acting against a demonstrably compliant holder. And — the part that matters most — it is the precondition for the jurisdictional diversity of Chapter 5 to be usable at

all: a structure that cannot survive examination in each perimeter has not diversified across those perimeters, it has merely placed assets where it is not yet in trouble.

Diagnostic: the plan's answer to arbitrary action is "we are compliant". *Mitigation:* Chapter 4 separates the threats; this one is answered by perimeter count, not by correctness.

8. Confusing surveillance irrelevance with being uninteresting

A small structure attracts less attention than a large one. That is a fact about attention, not a property of the design, and it expires the moment the structure grows, a counterparty files a claim, or an automatic exchange puts the file in front of somebody whose job is to read it. Obscurity is concealment wearing a different word.

Diagnostic: the reasoning contains "nobody is going to look at this". *Mitigation:* score the structure at three times its current size.

9. Mistaking concealment of fact for non-obviousness of strategy

Set out in the Position and repeated because it is the misreading that lets a concealment structure be described as though it were an armoured one. Constellation Software filed everything a listed company must file while executing a strategy few observers assembled. **Every fact was disclosed and only the pattern was unremarked, which is lawful, durable, and available to anyone. An undisclosed nominee arrangement is not a subtler version of that; it is the other mechanism entirely.**

Diagnostic: ask which specific fact, if published tomorrow, would damage the structure. If the answer is any fact at all, the structure is running on concealment.

10. Designing for the examiner and forgetting the bank

The test names five classes of reader and practitioners optimise for one — the tax authority — because that is the one whose questions come in writing. The binding constraint in practice is usually the correspondent bank's compliance function, which asks fewer questions, gives no reasons, has no appeal, and can end the structure's usefulness in ninety days by declining to maintain the relationship. Chapter 38 treats answerability as a design requirement for this reason.

Diagnostic: the structure has never been described in full to a bank. *Mitigation:* describe it to the intended banks before it is built, not after.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASES. Structures A to E below are invented for illustration; no real person, family, entity or transaction is described. The sixth item, In-Q-Tel, is a real and publicly documented institution and is treated separately and on the public record.

The disclosure test is applied to five structures. Two of them fail, and they fail in print, with the reasons stated, because a test that never fails anything is a marketing device rather than an instrument.

The five are arranged deliberately. Structure A is the apex of the carried case. Structures B and C are a captive insurer and a foreign-owned operating company, both built correctly. Structures

D and E are the *same two jobs in the same two jurisdictions*, built the other way. **In both failing structures the jurisdiction is identical to the passing one, the entity type is identical, the cost is comparable, and the only difference is that one element depends on something not being seen.**

Scoring is the product rule of the Specification. Each element scores 1 only if all five criteria are satisfied; any zero zeroes the structure.

Structure A — the apex: a DIFC Foundation

The facts. A Foundation under DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018 holds the family's four branch holdings as a single perpetual legal person. Charter filed with the Registrar; by-laws held privately by the registered agent; founder's reserved powers graded so that no power to direct a distribution to himself exists; council of four including an independent DIFC-resident professional; quarterly meetings held and minuted in the DIFC; UBO particulars filed; CRS classification determined and reported; corporate-tax position taken with UAE counsel and filed.

The scoring.

CRITERION	RESULT	EVIDENCE
1 lawful where it sits	1	registered; statute complied with
2 filed and registered	1	charter, UBO, returns current
3 reported	1	CRS classification made and applied
4 independent commercial rationale	1	undivided ownership of a family enterprise across three heir jurisdictions; no tax or disclosure consequence needed to state it
5 survives hostile reading	1	every organ, power and meeting is what the documents say it is
PRODUCT	1	PASS

Why disclosure does not damage it. The Foundation's function is to be the recorded owner, and a recorded owner works better when the record is examined: the Thai registrar, the UK PSC register, the Bermuda Monetary Authority filing and the ADGM particulars all name the same legal person, and four filings that agree with each other close questions rather than opening them. Disclosure is the mechanism, not a tolerated side effect.

Structure B — the Bermuda captive that writes real risk

The facts. A Bermuda captive insurer, licensed and supervised by the Bermuda Monetary Authority, writing product-liability and business-interruption cover for the group's Thai manufacturing operation and participating in a third-party quota share. Premiums set by an independent actuary; reserves held against the liabilities; annual actuarial opinion and audited statutory returns filed; claims actually made, adjusted and paid.

The scoring. Five of five. The weight sits on criterion 4, satisfied by a fact rather than a document: the group has a real, quantified, uninsured or badly-priced exposure, and the captive assumes it. The commercial rationale can be stated in one sentence with no reference to any tax or disclosure

consequence — the group insures a risk that the commercial market prices badly — and it remains true if every element is disclosed.

Why it passes hostile reading. Because the reserves are matched to real third-party liabilities that can be pointed at, the claims file exists, and an adverse tribunal asked "what does this entity do?" gets an answer that survives being checked against the bank statements.

Structure C — the Thai operating company, disclosed

The facts. A Thai manufacturing company wholly owned by the group's ADGM holding company, with Board of Investment promotion conferring the foreign-ownership position, land rights and tax incentives on the face of the promotion certificate. Every shareholder is the registered holder in its own right, and Department of Business Development filings show a foreign corporate shareholder holding 100 per cent. Payroll, audit, BOI reporting and corporate income tax all current.

The scoring. Five of five. Criterion 1 is satisfied because the foreign-ownership position is conferred by an instrument that says so, from an authority empowered to confer it, on an application that disclosed the ownership.

The load-bearing observation. The company's most sensitive fact — that it is entirely foreign-owned in a country with a restrictive foreign business regime — is not merely disclosed; it is the subject of an affirmative government grant, publicly recorded. **The fact that would destroy a concealment structure is the fact that makes this one work.**

Structure D — the same Thai company, held through nominees — FAILS

The facts. Identical business, identical premises, identical customers, identical revenue. The difference is that no promotion was applied for and the foreign-ownership position was instead arranged by having two Thai individuals appear on the share register as holders of fifty-one per cent, subject to an unregistered loan agreement, an undated blank share transfer, an irrevocable proxy and a side letter under which they undertake to vote as directed and to claim no dividend.

The scoring.

CRITERION	RESULT	REASON
1 lawful where it sits	0	nominee shareholding to circumvent the foreign-ownership restrictions is a criminal offence in Thailand and is prosecuted
2 filed and registered	1	the register is filed — and it is false, which makes criterion 2 the least relevant line in the table
3 reported	0	the true controlling person is not the one reported
4 independent commercial rationale	0	the arrangement has no purpose that can be stated without reference to the restriction it circumvents
5 survives hostile reading	0	the side letter, read aloud, is the prosecution's exhibit

PRODUCT	0	FAIL

Verify with Thai counsel the current provisions of the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999) dealing with nominee shareholding, including the section number and the present penalties, and the Department of Business Development's current enforcement practice. **The substance is not in doubt and is stated in CANON: nominee shareholding is a criminal offence in Thailand and is prosecuted.** The article number should be pinned before it appears in an opinion.

What makes this the instructive failure. Structure D is not cheap. It has counsel, a share register, audited accounts, a real factory and real employees, and on any measure of economic reality it is the same business as Structure C. It fails on one element — and that element converts the other four from evidence of a well-run business into evidence of a well-run concealment. Structure C's promotion certificate took four months to obtain and cost less than a year of the side letter's legal fees. The concealment route was chosen because it was faster, and speed is why most failing structures exist.

Remediation, since a real family would be sitting in this position. The answer is not better nominee documentation. It is to establish whether the Treaty of Amity route (for a US person) or a BOI promotion is available on the facts, restructure onto it, unwind the nominee arrangement, and take advice on the historical exposure, which is a matter for Thai counsel and which time does not cure. This is Step 5 of the audit procedure, and it is expensive because remediation always is.

Structure E — the captive that writes no risk — FAILS

The facts. A small captive insurer in a well-regulated jurisdiction, licensed and filing. It issues policies to affiliates covering remote and poorly defined perils. Premiums are set to produce a deduction rather than by actuarial assessment. There is no third-party risk and no meaningful pooling; no claim has ever been made; reserves are invested in a note issued back to the group.

The scoring.

CRITERION	RESULT	REASON
1 lawful where it sits	1	the entity is validly licensed and the jurisdiction is not the problem
2 filed and registered	1	returns filed and current
3 reported	1	reported correctly as what it is
4 independent commercial rationale	0	no risk is transferred and none is distributed; the purpose cannot be stated without the deduction
5 survives hostile reading	0	the premium computation, the absent claims history and the loop-back note are the case against it
PRODUCT	0	FAIL

Why this failure is different from Structure D's, and more dangerous. Structure D is unlawful where it sits and everyone involved knows it. Structure E is lawful in the jurisdiction of formation on every visible measure: licensed, supervised, audited, reported. It fails on criteria 4 and 5 — the two about substance rather than form — and it fails in the jurisdiction of the *policyholder*, not that of the insurer. **A structure can be perfectly compliant where it sits and fail the disclosure test entirely, because the test asks about every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it, and the deduction is claimed somewhere else.**

The United States Tax Court has decided this class of case against the taxpayer more than once; *Avrahami v. Commissioner*, 149 T.C. 144 (2017), is the decision usually treated as the turning point, and it turned on risk distribution and on whether the arrangement was insurance in the commonly accepted sense rather than on any concealment. **Verify with US tax counsel:** the reporter citation and holding of *Avrahami*; the subsequent Tax Court decisions in the same line and their citations; and the current status of the Treasury regulations identifying certain micro-captive transactions as listed transactions or transactions of interest, including the Treasury Decision number and Federal Register date. This area moved repeatedly between 2016 and 2025 and any description is a description of its date.

The contrast with Structure B is the lesson of the pair. Same instrument, same regulator class, same paperwork, comparable cost. Structure B assumes a risk that exists; Structure E assumes a risk invented so that a premium could be paid. Criterion 4 is a question about the world, not about the file, and it is the criterion that otherwise well-built structures fail most often.

The scoreboard

	STRUCTURE	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	PRODUCT	
A	DIFC Foundation apex	1	1	1	1	1	1	PASS
B	Bermuda captive, real third-party risk	1	1	1	1	1	1	PASS
C	Thai opco, BOI-promoted, disclosed	1	1	1	1	1	1	PASS
D	Thai opco, nominee-held	0	1	0	0	0	0	FAIL
E	Captive with no risk transfer	1	1	1	0	0	0	FAIL

Average of the five structures' criterion scores, offered here only to be discarded	0.80 -- meaningless
Product of the group: any zero fails the group in which it sits	0

Two further observations.

First, note where the failures cluster. Criterion 2 — filed and registered — is satisfied by both failing structures. Filing is the criterion concealment structures satisfy most easily, because filing a false particular is still a filing; an adviser who reports compliance by counting filings reports both failures as passes.

Second, neither failure is a close call once the criteria are applied element by element, and both were sold to their principals as sophisticated. The instrument's value is not that it detects subtle problems; it is that it makes obvious problems impossible to describe as acceptable.

The existence proof: In-Q-Tel

Everything above is this book's own instrument applied to this book's own constructed cases, which is a closed loop. The argument needs one thing it cannot supply for itself: a demonstration, on the public record, that a function which used to require concealment is now performed by a structure with no concealment in it at all — successfully, at scale, for a long time, by an organisation with every incentive to choose the other design if the other design still worked.

That demonstration exists. It is In-Q-Tel.

The public facts. In-Q-Tel is a private, independent, not-for-profit corporation, founded in 1999, which identifies emerging commercial technology and invests in the companies developing it, on behalf of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and, subsequently, the broader United States intelligence community. It is organised as a section 501(c)(3) organisation under the Internal Revenue Code. It says all of this about itself, in public, and it names its portfolio companies. Its exempt-organisation annual return is a public document, because such returns are open to public inspection under Internal Revenue Code section 6104. Its founding was reported at the time, its relationship with the Agency has been the subject of published independent review, and its investments are announced by the companies receiving them, who have every commercial reason to announce them.

Verify before relying on any specific: the date and instrument of incorporation; the founding Director of Central Intelligence and the first chief executive; the contractual relationship with the Agency and its statutory or appropriations basis; the published independent panel review of the venture, with its correct title and date; and the dates and terms of any individual investment, including the Keyhole transaction that became Google Earth and the early investment in Palantir Technologies. Each is publicly reported and none is load-bearing here. **The load-bearing facts are only these three: it is publicly acknowledged, its purpose and its principal are publicly known, and it works.**

What it replaced. For most of the second half of the twentieth century, an intelligence service needing a commercial capability built or bought a proprietary: a company that traded, hired, banked and filed like any other, whose ownership was concealed and whose real principal was the service. The best-documented American examples were the air-transport proprietaries of the 1950s to 1970s, and the practice was examined publicly by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities in 1975 and 1976. **Verify the volume, date and page of any citation to that committee's final report before quoting it.**

The proprietary's protection was cover. Every operational advantage it had — to contract, to hire, to lease aircraft, to move money, to be treated as an ordinary commercial counterparty — depended on the counterparty not knowing whom it was dealing with. That is concealment in the strict sense of the table above: the asset survived because the adversary could not locate it, and the defence was consumed the first time it was used.

Why the mechanism stopped being available. The four properties set out earlier in this chapter apply with greater force to a state's commercial cover than to a private structure. Corporate registries became searchable and then centralised. Beneficial-ownership regimes made the ultimate controller a reportable particular. Financial-flows reporting made the funding path an artefact that persists. Commercial satellite imagery, flight-tracking, shipping-position data, corporate-relationship databases and staff-profile aggregation made the association between an entity and its real principal derivable from public sources by anyone with a subscription. And every cover

story maintained has had a finite life: the Summa Corporation cover for the 1974 deep-ocean recovery attempt held for a while, was eroded by the press within a year, and was acknowledged by the Agency decades later — the pattern in which protection is complete right up until the discontinuity, and then absent. A proprietary is a structure whose protection is a decreasing function of observation, deployed into an environment where observation increases monotonically and never decreases. It has a half-life and no renewal mechanism.

What In-Q-Tel does instead. The design is the inverse mechanism, applied deliberately. Nothing about the entity is concealed: not its existence, not its purpose, not its principal, not its governance, not its portfolio, not its finances. It has no cover to lose. And its function is undiminished, because the function never depended on concealment in the first place. Separate the function into its parts and this becomes obvious rather than surprising:

THE FUNCTION	DOES IT NEED CONCEALMENT?
deploy capital into early-stage technology companies	no -- capital is fungible and its source is a term sheet detail
obtain early access to technologies before they are commercially mature	no -- and disclosure HELPS: the founders come to it
transmit requirements to developers so that products are built to be usable by the end customer	NO -- this requires the opposite. The requirement cannot be transmitted by an entity that cannot say who the customer is.
give a startup a reference customer and a credential	no -- the reference is worthless unless the customer is named
contract on ordinary commercial terms with counsel, banks, auditors and co-investors	no -- a disclosed corporate counterparty is EASIER to contract with than an opaque one
survive changes of administration and public scrutiny	no -- and an acknowledged, audited, reviewable entity survives scrutiny BETTER

Read the middle rows carefully, because they are the strongest form of the argument. **Two of the functions are not merely indifferent to disclosure — they are impossible without it.** A concealed vehicle cannot tell a founder what the customer needs, because saying so identifies the customer; it cannot give a company the credential of that customer's confidence, because the credential is the name. The disclosed vehicle does things the concealed one structurally could not, which is why the replacement is not a compromise forced by circumstances but an improvement that circumstances made available.

The inverse-mechanism claim, stated precisely. The Cold War proprietary and In-Q-Tel achieve the same protective effect — a state capability that operates in commercial markets without being appropriable, disruptable or deniable by an adversary — by opposite mechanics. The proprietary hid the ownership so that the asset could not be located. In-Q-Tel is fully visible and simply

cannot be taken: there is nothing to expose, no cover to blow, no revelation available to a hostile service that would change anything, and no journalist's disclosure that constitutes an event. An organisation that has already published everything about itself has removed the adversary's entire move set. Same effect, inverse mechanism — and the inverse mechanism is the one that still runs, because it never depended on the input that ran out.

There is a further piece of evidence, and it is the kind arguments rarely get. **A design that works gets copied, and this one was.** Comparable disclosed public-purpose investment vehicles and innovation units have been established openly by other states and by an alliance since 2015, including the United States Defense Innovation Unit, the United Kingdom's National Security Strategic Investment Fund, and the NATO Innovation Fund. **Verify with primary sources** the founding instrument, date, sponsor and capitalisation of each before citing any of them. The pattern is what matters: **when states rebuilt this capability in the 2010s and 2020s, not one of them rebuilt it as a proprietary.** They built it as a disclosed corporation with a name and a published portfolio. Institutions with the world's strongest capability to maintain concealment, and the strongest institutional preference for it, chose the other design — repeatedly, independently, and in public.

The disclosure test applied to In-Q-Tel. Run the chapter's own instrument on it, as the chapter requires of everything it recommends. Would it still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it? The question is not hypothetical, which is the point: every element already is disclosed, to authorities, to counterparties, to competitors, to foreign intelligence services and to the general public, and it does its job. That is not a prediction that it would pass. **It is the test already run, in public, at scale, for a quarter of a century, by an organisation that would have chosen concealment if concealment were still available.**

What transfers to a private structure, and what does not

The analogy is strong, and strong analogies get overrun.

What does not transfer. In-Q-Tel operates with the acknowledgment, budget and legal protection of a sovereign state, and is not defending against that state. It has no forced-heirship problem, no correspondent-banking dependency, no exposure to a foreign court with personal jurisdiction over a founder, and no requirement that its structure survive a death. A family's structure has all of those and cannot borrow In-Q-Tel's advantages by imitating its form. **Nothing here is a recommendation to copy the vehicle; the vehicle is not the transferable part.**

What transfers. The design principle, which is general and which is the whole of CANON §1. State it as three propositions, each of which the preceding pages have argued and In-Q-Tel demonstrates:

1. A function that depends on concealment has a protective quantity that is falling and cannot be replenished. Its obsolescence is a supply problem, not a moral or regulatory one.

2. Most functions historically performed by concealment do not require it. Decompose the function and score each part for its concealment dependency. Parts scoring zero can be rebuilt in the open at once; parts scoring above zero are the ones that will fail, and they are fewer than expected.

```
3  A structure that has disclosed everything has nothing left to be
   exposed. That is not a consolation prize. It is a stronger
   defensive position than partial concealment, because it removes a
   category of adverse event rather than reducing its probability.
```

Proposition 2 is the practical instruction and it is what the audit procedure in the Specification operationalises. The exercise a principal should actually perform is not "how do I protect this structure from being seen" but "which specific functions of this structure would stop working if it were seen" — and then to discover, as In-Q-Tel's designers discovered, that the honest answer is usually a short list, and that the items on it were the ones that were going to fail anyway.

Verification notes

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, gathered for Appendix D:

1. Thailand: the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999) provisions on nominee shareholding — section number, current penalties, and current Department of Business Development enforcement practice.
2. United States: the reporter citation and holding of *Avrahami v. Commissioner*, 149 T.C. 144 (2017); the subsequent Tax Court micro-captive decisions and their citations; and the current Treasury regulations identifying micro-captive transactions as listed transactions or transactions of interest, with the Treasury Decision number and Federal Register date.
3. In-Q-Tel: date and instrument of incorporation; founding Director of Central Intelligence and first chief executive; the contractual and appropriations basis of the relationship with the Agency; the published independent panel review, title and date; the Keyhole and Palantir investment dates and terms.
4. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: the volume, date and page of any passage cited on proprietary companies.
5. Comparable disclosed state investment vehicles — the United States Defense Innovation Unit, the United Kingdom's National Security Strategic Investment Fund, and the NATO Innovation Fund — founding instrument, date, sponsor and capitalisation of each.
6. The public-inspection rule for exempt-organisation returns, Internal Revenue Code section 6104, and its current scope.

Chapter 4 turns from the design standard to the threats it is applied against, and separates five that are routinely collapsed into one. The disclosure test says whether a structure survives being seen. It does not say what the structure is for, and a structure built against the wrong threat passes every criterion in this chapter and fails anyway.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location, and asset situs. All worked cases other than the publicly documented institution named above are CONSTRUCTED.*

Part II — Measurement

Chapter 4 . Five Threats

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Every worked case in this chapter is CONSTRUCTED and labelled as such. Statutes and cases are cited by name; where a claim depends on a detail that changes with amendment or jurisdiction, the text says so and directs the reader to counsel.

The Position

A structure fails in one of five ways, and they are not variations on a theme. They have different actors, different triggers, different time constants, different reversibility, and — this is the part that gets missed — **different structures answer them, and a structure that answers one of them well may answer another one worse than doing nothing at all.**

The five:

1	ARBITRARY STATE ACTION	expropriation, immobilisation, designation, de-risking without process
2	LAWFUL PROCESS	a judgment that survived due process, and the enforcement machinery behind it
3	COMMERCIAL / COUNTERPARTY	insolvency of a bank, custodian, obligor, partner, or insurer
4	SUCCESSION	death, incapacity, forced heirship, heirs under incompatible legal systems
5	BLOC FRAGMENTATION	the perimeter itself moves; a bridge becomes a side

Volume Two established that a storage problem is only well posed once you have named the specific degradation process. A grain store designed against weevils is not a grain store designed against damp, and a store built against damp when the actual threat was weevils is worse than an open crib, because it cost money, it consumed the builder's attention, and it produced confidence proportional to its expense rather than to its fit. **Capital is stored under exactly the same rule, and the failure to name the degradation process is the single most expensive error in this field.**

The book has a subject, and this chapter fixes it. **Arbitrary state action is this book's subject.** Everything from Chapter 7 forward — the DIFC Foundation, the ADGM holdco, the Thai operating base, the bloc arithmetic of Chapter 5 — is engineering against threat 1. That is a choice, and it excludes things.

It excludes, in particular, threat 2. **Lawful process is a different problem: it is a timing problem and a fraudulent-transfer problem, and it is handed to Chapter 39.** The reason is not squeamishness. It is that the two threats have opposite structural signatures. Against arbitrary action, the useful property of a structure is that it sits outside a coordination perimeter, so that a decision taken inside that perimeter does not reach it. Against lawful process, that property is close to worthless and frequently harmful, because the enforcement mechanism does not travel to the asset — it travels to the person, and the person is standing in a courtroom inside the perimeter. The Cook Islands cases discussed in Chapter 1 are the canonical demonstration: a statute that refuses to recognise foreign judgments performed exactly as advertised, and the principals went to jail anyway, because the court did not need the statute's cooperation. It needed theirs.

So the two threats pull in opposite directions, and a reader who does not separate them will read a book about threat 1 and apply it to threat 2, and will get a result strictly worse than having read nothing.

The remaining three — commercial, succession, fragmentation — are not decorations. Threat 3 is where most actual money is actually lost, in ordinary years, without drama. Threat 4 is the only one of the five with a probability of one; every principal dies. Threat 5 is the threat to the solution: it is what happens when the diversification you built in Chapter 5's terms stops being diversification because two of your blocs merge.

The commonest error in this field is not building a bad structure. It is building a good structure against the wrong threat. That error is invisible from inside, because the structure works — it does what it was designed to do — and the owner mistakes "this structure functions" for "this structure protects me." The threat register in the Specification section exists to make that error visible on paper before it becomes visible in the world.

One more framing point before the mechanism. Chapter 3 established the disclosure test: would the structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it? That test cuts differently across the five threats, and the difference is diagnostic. Against threats 3, 4 and 5 the test is nearly trivial — nobody protects against a bank failure by hiding from the bank. Against threat 1 the test is the whole design constraint, because the alternative to architecture is concealment and concealment fails on contact. Against threat 2 the test is where the ethics and the engineering coincide: a structure designed to defeat a lawful judgment by non-disclosure is not a structure, it is an offence with a filing cabinet. **A threat model that cannot survive being written down is not a threat model; it is a hope.**

The Mechanism

Take each threat as a process, not a category. A process has an actor who initiates it, a trigger that starts it, a mechanism by which value is lost, a warning window between trigger and loss, a reversibility profile, and a set of structural properties that resist it.

Threat 1 — Arbitrary state action

Actor: an executive or administrative organ of a state, or a regulated intermediary acting on its own risk appetite in the shadow of one.

Trigger: a designation, a listing, an exchange-control measure, a nationalisation, a licence revocation, a nudge to a compliance department. Crucially, none of these require a court.

Mechanism of loss: the asset does not move. Title is often untouched. What is removed is the ability to instruct, and since the practical content of ownership is the ability to instruct, the distinction is academic to the owner. The 2022 immobilisation of approximately USD 300bn of Russian central bank reserves is the reference event for institutional thinking here, and its instructive feature is precisely that nothing was seized in the older sense. The reserves remained booked where they were. The instructions stopped being executed.

Warning window: measured in days at best, hours in practice, and often the first notice is the failed instruction itself. Structures cannot be built inside this window. This is the single most

important operational fact about threat 1.

Reversibility: low, and slow when it exists. Delisting processes are administrative, opaque, and can run for years. Assets released are often released without the yield forgone.

What resists it: the asset, the entity, and the settlement rail sitting outside the coordination perimeter that produced the decision. Not outside *a* jurisdiction — outside the *mechanism*. Chapter 2 spent its length on why the perimeter and not the jurisdiction is the unit of analysis, and Chapter 5 turns that into a number.

What does not resist it, and is routinely sold as though it does: secrecy, nominee ownership, layered holding chains within a single perimeter, and any structure whose defence is that the authority will not find out. **A designation regime does not need to find you; it needs to find your bank, and your bank is not hiding.**

There is a second-order form of threat 1 that does more cumulative damage than the headline form: de-risking. A correspondent bank, facing a compliance cost it cannot price, exits a corridor. Nobody is designated. No measure is announced. An entire class of legitimate counterparty simply finds that the rail closed. This is arbitrary in the precise sense that matters — it is action without process, without notice, and without an appeal — even though no state formally took it. Chapter 33 treats what this did to legitimate remittance corridors, and the answer there is the same as the answer here: redundancy across mechanisms that do not share a decision-maker.

Threat 2 — Lawful process

Actor: a private claimant, a tax authority, an insolvency officeholder, a regulator acting judicially.

Trigger: a claim filed, a judgment entered, an assessment raised, a petition presented.

Mechanism of loss: an order, and behind the order, the state's willingness to compel a person. The order may attach the asset directly where the court has territorial reach. Where it does not, it attaches the person — freezing injunctions, disclosure orders, repatriation orders, and ultimately contempt. This is why the offshore non-recognition statute is a weak defence: it addresses only the first path.

Warning window: long. Months to years. Claims are usually visible before they are dangerous.

Reversibility: partial. Settlements happen; appeals succeed; quantum is negotiated. Threat 2 losses are frequently the most *recoverable* of the five.

What resists it: having built earlier. That is nearly the whole of it. The governing law is fraudulent-transfer law, and fraudulent-transfer law is a clock. Some of the relevant clocks, for orientation only and subject to verification with counsel in the specific jurisdiction:

```
    11 U.S.C. s.548(a)      2 years before petition
   11 U.S.C. s.548(e)    10 years, transfers to a self-settled trust made with
                             actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
    UVTA s.9                 4 years, or 1 year after discovery for actual-
intent claims
    Insolvency Act 1986
      s.238 with s.240      2 years for a connected person
      s.339                 5 years, individuals
     s.423             transactions defrauding creditors; the section itself
```

```
fixes no period, and the limitation analysis is case law
 (see Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 542).
      VERIFY WITH COUNSEL.
```

Read the list as a single fact: **the longest reach-back listed is ten years, so a transfer is outside every clock listed only after roughly a decade of continuous solvency, and a structure built in the year a claim appeared is inside all of them.**

Two US authorities are worth naming because they show the two halves of the mechanism. *Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.*, 527 U.S. 308 (1999), held that a federal court lacks authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing a defendant from transferring assets in an action for money damages — which is why the timing window exists at all in US practice. *In re Lawrence*, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002), and *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), show what closes it: the impossibility defence failed, and the courts used contempt against the person. English practice reached the personal-compulsion answer earlier and by a different route, through the freezing injunction line beginning with *Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA* [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509.

Chapter 39 develops all of this properly. What this chapter needs from it is the classification: **threat 2 is a timing problem wearing a jurisdiction costume, and the jurisdiction is not the part that matters.**

Threat 3 — Commercial and counterparty

Actor: nobody, in the sense that no one intends the loss. A bank fails. A custodian rehypothecates. An obligor defaults. A joint-venture partner turns out to have been the substance you were relying on.

Trigger: ordinary business risk, usually correlated with a cycle.

Mechanism of loss: you become an unsecured creditor of an entity that cannot pay, or a secured creditor whose collateral turns out to be someone else's collateral.

Warning window: weeks to months, and asymmetric — the people who see it first are inside.

Reversibility: highest of the five. Recoveries are real, if slow and partial.

What resists it: segregation, priority, and risk transfer. Bankruptcy-remote SPVs and segregated portfolio structures (Chapter 30). Real insurance and real reinsurance, where reserves sit against genuine third-party liabilities (Chapters 14–15). Collateral arrangements with enforceable close-out netting. Counterparty diversification, which is Chapter 5's instrument applied to a different axis and gives the same arithmetic.

What does not resist it: jurisdiction. A creditor in Dubai and a creditor in Delaware get the same haircut from the same failed obligor. Bloc diversity is close to irrelevant to threat 3, which is exactly why a structure optimised only for threat 1 can be quietly terrible here — it can concentrate counterparties in the very act of diversifying jurisdictions, because the number of institutions willing to bank a cross-bloc structure is small.

Threat 4 — Succession

Actor: mortality.

Trigger: death or incapacity. Also, less dramatically and more often, a divorce, a disqualification, or a founder's cognitive decline that nobody wants to name.

Mechanism of loss: fragmentation. Assets that functioned as a system are divided into fractions that do not. Control that was unified becomes contested. Where heirs are resident in different legal families, the same estate is characterised differently by each, and the characterisations do not reconcile: a forced-heirship regime asserts a reserved portion, a common-law jurisdiction gives effect to the will, a Sharia-influenced regime applies fixed shares, and the asset sits in a fourth place with its own conflict-of-laws rules about which of them it listens to.

Warning window: zero. This is the defining feature and it is under-weighted everywhere. Threat 4 is the only threat in the register whose warning window is exactly nil and whose probability over a long enough horizon is exactly one.

Reversibility: low. Litigation between heirs destroys value on both sides of the dispute and takes years.

What resists it: an entity with separate legal personality that owns the assets, so that the succession event changes the entity's governance rather than the assets' ownership. This is the architectural argument for the foundation over the will, developed in Chapters 7 through 9. A sketch of the arithmetic, to fix scale: on a constructed estate where one heir sits in a forced-heirship jurisdiction whose rules reach 25% of the assets, and where a three-child reserve of three-quarters applies to that portion, the reserved pool is 0.25 x 0.75 = 0.1875 of the estate. **18.75% of the estate has a destination the founder cannot direct, and that figure is arithmetic, not advocacy.** The French Civil Code article 913 shares — one half, two thirds, three quarters for one, two, and three or more children — are the reference points; verify the current text and its application to the specific asset with counsel, because characterisation of the asset drives everything.

Threat 5 — Bloc fragmentation

Actor: history.

Trigger: realignment. A neutral jurisdiction picks a side. A bridge centre is absorbed into one of the things it was bridging. A coordination mechanism expands its membership. Less dramatically: a jurisdiction signs an information-exchange agreement, adopts a substance regime, or accedes to a listing framework, and quietly becomes a member of a perimeter it was outside.

Mechanism of loss: your effective bloc count falls. Nothing visible happens to any entity. The structure looks identical on the org chart. What changed is the correlation between its parts, and correlation is not on the org chart.

Warning window: long — years — but only for someone who is watching, which is why scorecard item 10, the degradation trajectory, is mandatory in every jurisdiction chapter of this book.

Reversibility: essentially nil at the bloc level. Perimeters have expanded steadily for twenty-five years and have essentially never contracted.

What resists it: designed redundancy, exit optionality written into the documents rather than improvised later, and monitoring. The arithmetic is stark. Using the designed structure's blocs of 40 / 30 / 30:

```
designed, three blocs 40/30/30          N = 2.9412    h = −0.1224
BRIDGE absorbed into WEST (70/30)       N = 1.7241    h = −0.3093
```

```
everything absorbed into one perimeter    N = 1.0000    h = −0.5000
```

One realignment event costs 1.22 effective blocs and 0.19 of surplus, and no entity has to do anything wrong for it to happen. Note also the mirror case: if the BRIDGE bloc were to split — if the UAE and Singapore ceased to correlate — N rises from 2.9412 to 3.6158. Threat 5 runs both ways, and only one direction is planned for.

A note on threats that look like each other

Three pairs are routinely conflated, and each conflation produces a characteristic bad structure.

Threat 1 and threat 5 look alike because both are geopolitical. They are not alike operationally. Threat 1 is an event: a decision is taken and something stops working on a Wednesday. Threat 5 is a drift: nothing stops working, and the correlation between your holdings rises over a period of years until the structure that used to be three things is one thing. Threat 1 is answered by having positions outside the deciding perimeter. Threat 5 is answered by watching the perimeter's membership and having somewhere to go. A structure built only against threat 1 tends to be static — it was correct on the day it was built and is never revisited — and static is exactly the property that threat 5 punishes. Conversely, a portfolio of options and exit rights with no actual holdings outside the perimeter is nimble against a drift and useless against a Wednesday.

Threat 2 and threat 3 look alike because both end in a courtroom. The difference is who wants what. In threat 2 a claimant wants your assets and is using the court to reach them; the defensive question is reach. In threat 3 an insolvency officeholder is distributing a deficient pool and the defensive question is priority — were you a secured creditor, was the asset segregated, did the netting hold. Reach and priority are answered by completely different instruments. Ring-fencing improves priority and does nothing for reach. Timing improves reach and does nothing for priority. A structure sold as "asset protection" without specifying which of the two it improves is unspecified.

Threat 3 and threat 1 look alike when the counterparty is a bank. When a bank declines to process an instruction, the owner experiences the same thing — an instruction that does not execute — whether the cause is the bank's insolvency, the bank's risk appetite, or a state measure. The remedies differ completely. Insolvency is answered by claim priority and by holding assets in a form that is not a claim on the bank. Risk appetite and state measure are answered by having a second bank in a different perimeter. In practice the useful diagnostic is whether other customers of the same bank in the same corridor are also affected, and whether customers of other banks in the same corridor are affected. Same bank only: threat 3. Same corridor across banks: threat 1.

The perimeter test, stated operationally

Threat 1 turns entirely on the identity of the deciding perimeter, so the test has to be operational rather than atmospheric. Two jurisdictions are inside the same perimeter, for the purposes of this book, when a single decision taken in one of them reliably produces the corresponding effect in the other without a further independent decision. That is a strong condition, and it is deliberately stronger than "they are allies" or "they cooperate."

Membership of an information-exchange framework is evidence, not proof: exchanging account data under the Common Reporting Standard is a long way short of executing another state's

freeze. What converts evidence into proof is a demonstrated pattern of automatic or near-automatic transmission — a listing framework whose designations are mirrored within days, a correspondent network whose members exit a corridor together, a supervisory standard whose findings produce the same domestic consequence in every member. Chapter 2 catalogues the mechanisms. Chapter 5 requires only that you make the call and write it down, because the bloc assignment is an input to the central instrument and an undocumented input is not a measurement.

Where the call is genuinely uncertain — and for several jurisdictions in this book it is — the discipline is to run the arithmetic both ways and see whether the answer changes. Chapter 5 does exactly that, and the robustness result there is more interesting than the point estimate.

The two properties that separate them

Everything above reduces to two axes, and the register in the next section is built on them.

Axis one: the warning window. Threats 1 and 4 have windows shorter than the time it takes to build anything. Threats 2, 3 and 5 have windows longer. This determines whether a threat can be answered reactively or must be answered in advance.

Axis two: reversibility. Threat 3 is largely recoverable; threat 2 partly; threats 1, 4 and 5 mostly not. This determines whether expected value is an acceptable decision rule.

Those two axes explain why threat 1 gets a whole book despite being, on plain expected-value arithmetic, one of the smaller lines in the register. That claim is developed and quantified next, because it is counterintuitive and because pretending otherwise would be the kind of dishonesty this series does not do.

The Specification

The threat register

A threat register is a table with one row per threat and six fields per row, populated with numbers you are willing to defend, reviewed on a fixed cadence, and — this is the part people skip — **used to allocate budget, because a register that does not change any decision is a document rather than an instrument.**

The fields:

```
p    annual probability of the threat materialising
L    loss, as a fraction of protected capital Q, given it materialises
r    fraction of L eventually recovered
W    warning window in days, from first credible signal to loss
B    build time in days for the structure that answers it
->   the chapter of this book that carries the answer
```

The constructed register below uses illustrative parameters for a principal resembling the carried case. **Every number in it is CONSTRUCTED.** Do not import them. Build your own; the value is in the discipline of writing numbers down, not in these numbers.

```
THREAT REGISTER -- CONSTRUCTED PARAMETERS, ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY

threat                        p       L       r      W(d)   B(d)   answer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
1 arbitrary state action    0.020   0.60   0.05      2    210   Ch 5,7,17,31
2 lawful process            0.080   0.35   0.40     540    210   Ch 39
3 commercial/counterparty   0.120   0.20   0.55     90    210   Ch 14,15,30
4 succession                0.030   0.45   0.30       0    210   Ch 7,8,9
5 bloc fragmentation        0.050   0.30   0.25    365    210   Ch 5,22,25
```

First pass: expected loss

Expected annual loss is `p x L`, summed:

```
1 arbitrary state action    0.020 x 0.60 = 0.0120
2 lawful process            0.080 x 0.35 = 0.0280
3 commercial/counterparty   0.120 x 0.20 = 0.0240
4 succession                0.030 x 0.45 = 0.0135
5 bloc fragmentation        0.050 x 0.30 = 0.0150
-------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                      0.0925   = 9.25% of Q per year
```

And the probability that none of the five materialises in a given year, treating them as independent, is the product of `(1 - p)`:

```
P(no threat in one year)     = 0.731125    (73.11%)
P(at least one)              = 0.268875    (26.89%)
over  5 years, at least one  = 0.791090    (79.11%)
over 10 years, at least one  = 0.956357    (95.64%)
over 20 years, at least one  = 0.998095    (99.81%)
over 30 years, at least one  = 0.999917    (99.99%)
```

Over a generation, at these parameters, something in the register happens with probability 0.9999. The question a structure answers is never “will something happen.” It is “which something, and does the structure bend or break when it does.”

Second pass: the recoverability correction, and why expected value misleads

Now weight by what does not come back. Permanent expected loss is `p x L x (1 - r)`:

```
threat                        EL       permanent EL    share of permanent
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 arbitrary state action    0.0120        0.0114            19.10%
2 lawful process            0.0280        0.0168            28.14%
3 commercial/counterparty   0.0240        0.0108            18.09%
4 succession                0.0135        0.0095            15.83%
5 bloc fragmentation        0.0150        0.0112            18.84%
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                       0.0925        0.0597
```

Threat 1 is 12.97% of expected loss but 19.10% of *permanent* expected loss. That is a real correction and it is not large enough to carry the argument on its own. The argument is carried by the conditional numbers — what happens given that the thing happens:

```
conditional PERMANENT loss, given the event occurs
1 arbitrary state action    57.00% of Q     -> Q multiplier 0.4300
2 lawful process            21.00%          -> 0.7900
3 commercial/counterparty    9.00%          -> 0.9100
4 succession                31.50%          -> 0.6850
5 bloc fragmentation        22.50%          -> 0.7750
```

A single threat-1 event at these parameters takes protected capital from 10.00 to 4.30. Then the ordinary erosion of Chapter 1 continues from the new base:

```
t = 0    Q = 4.3000   (unhit 10.0000)
t = 10   Q = 3.5134   (unhit  8.1707)
t = 20   Q = 2.8707   (unhit  6.6761)
t = 30   Q = 2.3456   (unhit  5.4548)
```

Erosion is multiplicative, so a single large permanent loss is not a one-off deduction — it rescales every subsequent year. This is why the register's expected-value column is the wrong place to stop, and it is the formal reason a low-probability, low-reversibility threat justifies disproportionate structural attention.

Third pass: misallocation

Suppose a fixed structural budget that reduces the loss from exactly one threat by 75%, and the question is which. Running it:

```
unmitigated expected annual loss              0.0925

budget aimed at arbitrary state action    EL = 0.0835    reduction   9.73%
budget aimed at lawful process            EL = 0.0715    reduction  22.70%
budget aimed at commercial/counterparty   EL = 0.0745    reduction  19.46%
budget aimed at succession                EL = 0.0824    reduction  10.95%
budget aimed at bloc fragmentation        EL = 0.0813    reduction  12.16%

spread evenly across all five at 15% each EL = 0.0786    reduction  15.00%
```

On this rule, the best single target is threat 2 and the worst is threat 1 — the subject of this book. **State that plainly rather than hiding it: on naive expected value, the threat this book addresses is the least attractive of the five to spend money on.** It becomes the right target only when you weight by permanence, by the multiplicative effect on all future years, and by the window, which is the next pass. A reader who does not accept those three corrections should not accept this book's priorities, and should say so early enough to save the fees.

Fourth pass: the window, which is the decisive one

Take a constructed build time of 210 days to stand up a cross-bloc structure end to end — incorporation, regulatory approval, bank account opening, substance, funding, and the tax clearances that come after all of it. Compare against each threat's warning window:

threat	W(d)	B(d)	verdict	slack
1 arbitrary state action	2	210	TOO LATE	−208
2 lawful process	540	210	in time	+330
3 commercial/counterparty	90	210	TOO LATE	−120
4 succession	0	210	TOO LATE	−210
5 bloc fragmentation	365	210	in time	+155

Three of five cannot be answered after the signal. Threat 1's coverage ratio is 2/210 = 0.0095: **you have under 1% of the time you would need.** Threat 4's is exactly zero.

And the two that appear to be answerable in time are not straightforwardly so. Threat 2's 330 days of apparent slack is illusory, because building inside the window is precisely what fraudulent-transfer law is for. A transfer made 210 days before an insolvency sits inside the two-year section 548(a) window by 520 days, and inside the section 423 analysis with no fixed period at all. **The apparent slack against lawful process is the trap, not the opportunity, and that is the whole reason threat 2 is a timing problem.** Threat 5's 155 days is real but requires that somebody was watching the trajectory for the preceding two years, which is an organisational property, not a structural one.

The conclusion from the fourth pass is the operative rule of this chapter:

> **The only window common to all five threats is *before*.** Structures are built in peacetime or they are not built. Every design decision in the remainder of this book assumes a builder who is not currently under threat, because a builder who is under threat has fewer options than this book describes and needs a different book.

Assignment: which structure answers which threat

THREAT	RESISTS IT	DOES NOT
1 arbitrary state action	bloc diversity (Ch 5)	secrecy
	rail redundancy (Ch 31,32)	layering in-bloc
	neutral-law entities (Ch 17,22)	better contracts
	real substance (Ch 23)	
2 lawful process	time (Ch 39)	non-recognition
	pre-claim solvency	statutes alone
	disclosed, defensible transfers	distance
3 commercial/counterparty	segregation, SPVs (Ch 30)	jurisdiction
	risk transfer (Ch 14,15)	bloc diversity
	counterparty diversity (Ch 5)	
	netting and collateral	
4 succession	separate legal personality	wills alone
	DIFC Foundation (Ch 7,8,9)	heir goodwill
	law-family selection (Ch 36)	
5 bloc fragmentation	designed redundancy (Ch 5)	a single bridge

```
                    exit optionality                static structures
                        trajectory monitoring (item 10)
```

Read the right-hand column as carefully as the left. **The right-hand column is where the money goes.**

The disclosure test, applied to the register

Each row must be audited against the Chapter 3 test: would this element still do its job if disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

Rows 3, 4 and 5 pass without argument. Row 1 passes by construction, because the entire mechanism is that lawful entities in non-coordinating jurisdictions are not reachable by a single decision — a fact that disclosure does not change. **Disclosure does not repair a broken perimeter, which is the point: the defence is structural, not informational.** Row 2 is where the test bites hardest, and the answer is that a threat-2 response which depends on a claimant not knowing where the assets are is not within this book's scope and is dealt with in Chapter 39 as a failure mode rather than a technique.

The Failure Modes

1. Solving the wrong threat

The archetype: a principal worried about a commercial dispute buys a jurisdictional structure. It is correctly built. It answers threat 1. The dispute is threat 2, and it proceeds against the person, and the structure contributes nothing except an additional set of facts for the claimant's badges-of-fraud argument. **A threat-1 structure erected in response to a threat-2 signal is worse than no structure, because it converts a defensible position into evidence.**

The mirror archetype is less discussed and equally common: a principal with genuine threat-1 exposure buys threat-2 tooling — asset-protection trusts, spendthrift provisions, charging-order jurisdictions — none of which has any effect on a designation, an exchange control, or a correspondent exit.

The diagnostic is a single question, asked before any structure is discussed: *who is the actor, and do they need a court?* If they need a court, it is threat 2 and the timing law governs. If they do not, it is threat 1 and the perimeter arithmetic governs.

2. Expected-value reasoning applied to a ruin risk

The third pass above showed that naive expected value ranks threat 1 last. Anyone reasoning with a spreadsheet and no recoverability column will therefore systematically underinvest in the only threat that rescales all future years. **Expected value is the correct rule for repeatable, recoverable, small-relative-to-capital losses, and it is the wrong rule for a single event that takes 57% of protected capital permanently.**

The practical remedy is to run the register twice — once on expected loss for budgeting, once on conditional permanent loss for structural decisions — and to treat divergence between the two rankings as the signal it is.

3. Building late

Covered above; repeated here because it is the most expensive version of failure. The clocks in the Mechanism section are the constraint. A structure built after a claim is visible is inside every one of them. Worse, the fact of building becomes independently probative, and in actual-intent regimes the intent inquiry is exactly where the case is won or lost.

The counterintuitive corollary: the best moment to build is the moment at which the build feels least necessary. That is the moment at which it is cheapest, cleanest, and outside every reach-back that will later matter.

4. Assuming reversibility

People model freezes as delays. A frozen position is not a delayed position; it is a position that has stopped compounding, may be denominated in a currency that is inflating, may be subject to negative carry, and may be released years later minus the yield. Model an immobilisation as a permanent haircut plus an option on partial recovery, and set the option's value low.

5. Collapsing the five into one number

"Risk" as a single aggregate is not usable. The five threats have different actors and different answers, and an aggregate risk score cannot be allocated against because there is no structure that reduces "risk." **If your risk assessment produces one number, it will produce one structure, and one structure never answers five processes.**

6. Building against yesterday's threat

Threat models age badly. The Swiss-secrecy structures of 2005 were well built against the threat model of 1995. The mechanism that ate them — coordinated automatic exchange — was not in that model. The current equivalent risk is building against 2022's immobilisation precedent while the live mechanism is something else: an ownership-transparency regime, a substance test, a listing framework, a payment-system access rule.

The mitigation is scorecard item 10 in every jurisdiction chapter — the degradation trajectory, with evidence — and a register review on a fixed cadence with a written record of what changed.

7. Confusing a rail freeze with a custody loss

CANON section 5 states it and this chapter must not blur it: a rail is not a holding. A payment caught mid-transit when a corridor closes is an exposure-window problem with parameters of hop size, duration, and mid-transit failure handling. A custodied asset immobilised is a threat-1 custody loss. **These have different remedies**, and treating a transit exposure as a custody problem produces structures that hold value on rails, which is the single worst place to hold it. Chapters 31 and 32 carry this.

8. Threat 3 concentration created by threat 1 diversification

A structure that spreads entities across three blocs may end up served by two banks, because the population of institutions comfortable with cross-bloc structures is small. Jurisdictional HHI

falls; counterparty HHI rises. **Chapter 5's instrument must be run on the counterparty axis as well as the jurisdictional one, or threat 1 diversification silently buys threat 3 concentration.**

9. The succession blind spot

Threat 4 has a zero-day warning window and a lifetime probability of one, and it is the threat principals most consistently defer, because it requires deciding things about their children. The structural consequence is that a well-built threat-1 architecture is inherited by three people who disagree, in three jurisdictions with three characterisations, and is dismantled by litigation within five years. **The threat-1 structure that has no threat-4 answer has a maximum service life equal to the founder's remaining life expectancy, and should be costed on that basis.**

10. Modelling the actor as rational

Threat models imported from finance assume an adversary who maximises recovery. Threat 1 actors frequently are not maximising anything you can model. A designation is a foreign-policy instrument and its logic is signalling, not collection. A correspondent exit is a compliance-cost decision made by a middle manager who will never learn what the corridor was worth. An exchange control is a balance-of-payments measure aimed at aggregate flows, and your position is a rounding error inside it.

The practical consequence is that arguments which would move a rational creditor — that seizing the asset destroys more value than it recovers, that the holder is manifestly not the target class, that the measure is disproportionate — have limited force against an actor whose objective function is elsewhere. Structures that rely on being obviously innocent work only to the extent that somebody is looking at your particular case, and in the second-order forms of threat 1 nobody is. The defence has to work without an advocate.

11. Believing that the register is the model

A register with five rows and five probabilities is a coordination device, not a physics. Its value is that it forces the classification, exposes the window arithmetic, and creates an artefact that can be diffed year on year. Its numbers are elicited judgements and they should be presented as such, with the elicitation recorded. Where a number is doing real work in a decision — the 0.02 on threat 1, say — the honest presentation is a range, and the useful test is how far the number has to move before the decision flips.

For the register above, the threat-1 probability at which its permanent expected loss exceeds threat 2's is found by solving 0.60 x 0.95 x p = 0.0168, giving p = 0.0295. So the whole ranking between rows 1 and 2 turns on whether the annual probability of an arbitrary-action event is above or below roughly 3%. That is a question about the world on which reasonable people differ by a factor of five, and saying so is more useful than the point estimate.

12. The register that nobody reviews

Every one of the failure modes above is caught by an annual review with a written diff. Almost nobody does one. This is the cheapest control in the chapter and it is skipped because it produces no artefact anyone enjoys reading.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. The principal and assets are the carried case defined in SPINE section 6 and used throughout this volume.

The facts

A dual national, tax resident in the UAE. Three heirs, resident in three different jurisdictions, one of them a civil-law country with forced heirship. Assets: manufacturing operations in Thailand; a trading company in the UAE; an IP portfolio; commercial real estate in London; a listed-securities portfolio. Revenue arrives in USD, EUR, CNY, AED and THB. As found, the holding structure is the conventional one measured in Chapter 5: UK 40.9%, US 27.3%, Jersey 18.2%, Luxembourg 13.6%.

Step one — classify by actor

Run the diagnostic question across the principal's actual concerns, as stated by the principal in the constructed engagement:

stated concern	actor needs a court?	threat
"a customer in Europe may sue over a product-liability claim"	YES	2
"my AED and CNY receivables may become hard to settle if a corridor closes"	NO	1
"my London property may be caught by a future tax measure I cannot predict"	depends	1 or 2
"my Thai partner may fail"	n/a	3
"my children will fight"	n/a	4
"the UAE may lose its neutral position"	n/a	5

The third row is the interesting one and the classification must be forced rather than fudged. A tax measure applied through assessment and appeal is threat 2 — it has process, and the timing law governs. A measure applied by administrative fiat without appeal is threat 1. **A concern that cannot be classified is a concern that has not been specified, and specifying it is the work.** On the constructed facts the principal's real fear turned out to be a windfall levy imposed by primary legislation on foreign-held commercial property — which is threat 1 in every operational respect, because there is no process to be inside of.

Step two — the register, populated

Using the constructed parameters from the Specification and the principal's asset mix:

threat	p	L	r	p∗L	p∗L∗(1−r)	W(d)
1	0.020	0.60	0.05	0.0120	0.0114	2
2	0.080	0.35	0.40	0.0280	0.0168	540

```
3       0.120   0.20   0.55   0.0240     0.0108       90
4       0.030   0.45   0.30   0.0135     0.0095        0
5       0.050   0.30   0.25   0.0150     0.0112      365
-------------------------------------------------------
                              0.0925     0.0597
```

Expected annual loss 9.25% of protected capital; permanent expected annual loss 5.97%. Against a maintenance cost `C` of 0.30 in the units of the storage law and an erosion rate `delta` of 0.02, this register is not a rounding error — it is the same order of magnitude as the maintenance bill, which means threat management and structure maintenance are competing for the same budget and must be decided together rather than sequentially.

Step three — the misallocation the principal was about to make

The principal arrived with a proposal from another adviser: an asset-protection trust in a non-recognition jurisdiction, to address the European product-liability exposure.

Classify it. The product-liability claim is threat 2. The proposed structure is threat-2 tooling. So far, correct. Now check the timing. The claim was already notified. A transfer at that point sits inside every clock in the Mechanism list, and in an actual-intent regime the sequence — notification, then transfer — is close to the paradigm case. **The structure was correctly matched to the threat and catastrophically mistimed, which is the second failure mode dressed as the absence of the first.**

Meanwhile the principal's threat-1 exposure — 100% of holdings inside one coordination perimeter, as Chapter 5 measures — was not addressed by the proposal at all, and had never been raised.

The recommendation on the constructed facts: do not build the trust; deal with the product-liability claim as a claim, through insurance, defence, and reserve; and separately, on a timeline unconnected to the claim, begin the threat-1 restructuring that Chapters 5 through 24 describe. **The two programmes must be visibly independent in timing and in documentation, because a threat-1 restructuring executed in the shadow of a threat-2 claim will be read as a threat-2 response.**

Step four — the window audit

```
threat  W(d)   B(d)   status      what must be true
-----------------------------------------------------------------
 1        2    210   pre-build   restructure now, unconnected to any claim
 2      540    210   too late    already notified; timing window closed
 3       90    210   pre-build   SPVs and captive stood up in advance (Ch 30,14)
 4        0    210   pre-build   Foundation before incapacity, not after (Ch 7)
 5      365    210   monitor     trajectory review annually (item 10)
```

Four of five rows say *before*. That is the chapter's thesis restated in the principal's own facts.

Step five — what the structure becomes, and which threat each part answers

The architecture assembled across this volume, with the threat each element is actually for:

element	primary threat	secondary
DIFC Foundation (Ch 7)	4	1
ADGM holdco (Ch 17)	1	5
Thai BOI opco (Ch 23)	1	3
UK Ltd (Ch 10)	none	-- market access
Bermuda captive (Ch 14,15)	3	1
GIFT City vehicle (Ch 24)	5	1
REIT conversion (Ch 29)	1	2
SPVs (Ch 30)	3	--
dual-rail settlement (Ch 31,32)	1	3

Two entries deserve comment. The UK Ltd answers no threat in the register; it is there for market access and English governing law, and that is a legitimate reason to hold an entity provided nobody pretends otherwise. **An entity that answers no threat must be justified on the revenue side or removed, because it is pure C.** And the REIT conversion of Chapter 29 is the only element with a genuine threat-2 secondary benefit, because converting immovable to movable changes which courts have territorial reach — but it does so in a fully disclosed, publicly filed way, and it must be done long before any claim for that to be true.

Step six — what the register does not fix

Honesty requires closing on what remains. After the full build described in this volume:

- Threat 1 exposure falls but does not vanish. Chapter 5 shows effective blocs rising from 1.00 to 2.94 and Western-perimeter exposure falling from 100.0% to 30.0%. Thirty per cent remains exposed, deliberately, because the UK real estate and the market access are worth having.
- Threat 2 is unimproved by anything in this volume, and Chapter 39 explains why that is the correct outcome rather than a gap.
- Threat 3 improves through Chapters 14, 15 and 30, and worsens through counterparty concentration, and the net effect must be measured rather than assumed.
- Threat 4 improves substantially, and this is the least-appreciated return on the whole architecture.
- Threat 5 is the residual, and it is unhedgeable in principle. **You can hold positions in three blocs; you cannot stop two of them from becoming one.**

Two of the five threats are structurally answerable, two are partly answerable, and one — lawful process — is answerable only by having built early, which is why it is a chapter about timing and not a chapter about jurisdictions.

Verification notes

The following statements in this chapter rest on legal detail that changes and should be confirmed with counsel in the relevant jurisdiction before any reliance:

1. All statutory reach-back periods listed in the Mechanism section — confirm current text, applicable enactment (the UVTA is adopted state by state and enactments vary), and whether

the relevant transfer is characterised as being to a self-settled trust.

2. The limitation analysis for Insolvency Act 1986 s.423. The section fixes no period; the authorities, including *Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd* [2006] EWCA Civ 542, address how the Limitation Act 1980 applies. This is contested ground.
3. French Civil Code article 913 reserved shares, and critically the conflict-of-laws question of whether they reach a given asset at all. Characterisation drives the answer and is asset-specific.
4. Whether a particular administrative measure carries a right of appeal, which is the entire threat 1 / threat 2 boundary in practice.

Cases cited by name and reporter: *Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.*, 527 U.S. 308 (1999); *In re Lawrence*, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); *Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA* [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509; *Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd* [2006] EWCA Civ 542.

All numerical results in this chapter were computed from the stated parameters and are reproduced in Appendix B.

Chapter 5 . The Concentration Instrument

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Every worked case in this chapter is CONSTRUCTED and labelled as such. Every figure in this chapter was computed from the stated inputs; none is carried over from a rounded print. The arithmetic is reproduced in Appendix B so that any reader can rerun it.

The Position

This chapter contains the instrument the rest of the book uses. Twenty-nine later chapters cite it, every jurisdiction chapter feeds it, and the storage law of Chapter 1 cannot be evaluated without it. If you read one chapter of this volume, read this one, because everything downstream is either an input to the measurement it defines or a consequence of the measurement's result.

The instrument is not new. It is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, the standard concentration measure of industrial organisation, and its definition fits on one line:

```
HHI = sum of squared shares            effective count = 1 / HHI
```

What is new here is what it is pointed at, and one correction to how it is read. Pointed at jurisdictional exposure, it answers the question the whole field gets wrong: not *how many jurisdictions is this structure in*, which is a count anybody can inflate, but *how many independent points of failure does this structure actually have*, which is a measurement and cannot be inflated by adding entities.

The correction is the chapter's central move and it is worth stating before any arithmetic. **Naive HHI overstates resilience, because it treats jurisdictions as independent when they share a coordination mechanism.** The index is silent about correlation. Applied to market shares that silence is usually harmless, because rival firms mostly do fail independently. Applied to jurisdictional exposure it is fatal, because jurisdictions inside one coordination perimeter fail *together* — that is what a perimeter is — and an index that counts them separately is counting the same failure four times and calling it four failures.

Here is what that costs, on the structure this book calls conventional and which describes a large fraction of the cross-border holding structures actually in existence:

```
UK 40.9%  .  US 27.3%  .  Jersey 18.2%  .  Luxembourg 13.6%

naive HHI = 0.293430   ->   effective jurisdictions = 3.41
collapsed to blocs     ->   bloc-HHI = 1.000000  ->  EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 1.00
```

Four entities, four jurisdictions, one point of failure. The naive reading says the structure is diversified across 3.41 effective jurisdictions. The honest reading says it has one. The gap between 3.41 and 1.00 is not a rounding difference or a modelling nicety; it is the difference between a structure that survives a decision taken in one capital and a structure that does not, and it is invisible to every method that counts jurisdictions.

And there is a harder consequence, which this chapter must state plainly rather than leave to be inferred. The storage law from Chapter 1 reads:

```
Q_{t+1} = (1 - delta) Q_t + eta S_t - C_t        h = eta ln(N) - delta Q - C
```

where N is the effective bloc count. For the conventional structure, N = 1.00, and

```
ln(1.00) = 0
```

The conventional structure has zero available surplus. Not low — zero. The entire input side of the storage law is multiplied by the logarithm of the effective bloc count, and the logarithm of one is exactly zero. Whatever eta is, whatever the principal's conversion efficiency, however skilled the advisers: eta x 0 = 0. Protected capital decays at delta with nothing on the input side to oppose it, and at delta = 0.02 that is 18.29% gone in ten years, 33.24% in twenty, 45.45% in thirty, on a half-life of 34.31 years.

And the second half of the result is what makes it structural rather than merely bad: **no rearrangement of those four entities changes it, because rearranging within a bloc does not change N.** Equalise the four holdings perfectly and naive effective jurisdictions rise from 3.41 to 4.00 while N stays at 1.00. Split into six Western jurisdictions and naive rises to 6.00 while N stays at 1.00. Split into fifty and naive says 50.00 and N stays at 1.00 and ln(N) stays at zero. **You cannot escape a perimeter by subdividing inside it, and every hour spent optimising the shares of a single-bloc structure is an hour spent moving a number that does not enter the equation.**

Against that, the architecture this book builds:

```
UAE 29.1% . Thailand 18.2% . UK 16.4% . Bermuda 13.6% . India 11.8% . Singapore 10.9%

  naive HHI = 0.189002  ->  effective jurisdictions = 5.29
  bloc-HHI  = 0.340000  ->  EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 2.94
  Western-perimeter exposure  100.0%  ->  30.0%
```

Effective blocs rise from 1.00 to 2.94. ln(2.9412) = 1.0788, so the surplus term goes from exactly zero to eta x 1.0788, which at eta = 0.35 is 0.3776. That is the whole return on the architecture, and Chapter 37 will show that it is not enough to pay the maintenance bill at the tested parameters. Both structures come out below the build threshold. **Jurisdictional diversity buys the ability to build, not the building** — a result this chapter states here and Chapter 37 carries in full, because a book that quotes the good half of its own arithmetic is not a manual.

One more thing this chapter owns, because it is the same instrument pointed the other way. The 2023 DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines set the structural presumption of unlawfulness at **HHI above 1,800 with a change over 100**. Same formula, same units, same arithmetic. **You want HHI low on jurisdictional exposure and low enough on market share. One metric, two directions, both binding** — and a group that optimises one while ignoring the other builds a resilient structure that gets sued, or an unchallenged structure that gets frozen. Chapter 35 develops the second direction into the four bright lines; this chapter establishes that they are the same measurement.

The Mechanism

Where the index comes from, and what it was built to assume

Albert O. Hirschman introduced the measure in *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (1945), using the square root of the sum of squared shares to describe the concentration of a country's trade. Orris C. Herfindahl arrived at the sum-of-squares form independently in a 1950 doctoral dissertation on the steel industry. Hirschman later claimed priority in a short note in

the *American Economic Review* (1964) titled "The Paternity of an Index." The joint name stuck. The reading of 1/HHI as an equivalent number of equal-sized units is generally attributed to M. A. Adelman's 1969 comment in the *Review of Economics and Statistics*; readers who want the attribution nailed down should check the original, and the property itself is elementary and can be verified in two lines.

That property first, since everything rests on it. If k units each hold share 1/k:

```
HHI = k x (1/k)^2 = 1/k          1/HHI = k
```

so the reciprocal of the index returns the count when the units are equal. When they are unequal it returns the count of *equal-sized* units that would produce the same index. That is the numbers-equivalent, and it is why 1/HHI is a meaningful "effective count" rather than a convenient fiction:

```
1 equal share  of 100.00%  ->  HHI = 1.000000 (10,000.0 pts)  ->  effective 1
2 equal shares of  50.00%  ->  HHI = 0.500000 ( 5,000.0 pts)  ->  effective 2
3 equal shares of  33.33%  ->  HHI = 0.333333 ( 3,333.3 pts)  ->  effective 3
4 equal shares of  25.00%  ->  HHI = 0.250000 ( 2,500.0 pts)  ->  effective 4
5 equal shares of  20.00%  ->  HHI = 0.200000 ( 2,000.0 pts)  ->  effective 5
6 equal shares of  16.67%  ->  HHI = 0.166667 ( 1,666.7 pts)  ->  effective 6
8 equal shares of  12.50%  ->  HHI = 0.125000 ( 1,250.0 pts)  ->  effective 8
```

Note the two conventions. Antitrust practice states HHI in points, using percentage shares, so a perfectly concentrated market is 10,000. The resilience use in this book states it as a fraction, so a perfectly concentrated structure is 1.0000. They are the same number divided by 10,000, and the book gives both wherever confusion is possible.

Three properties follow immediately and all three do work later:

First, HHI is a share-weighted average share. `sum s_i^2 = sum s_i x s_i`, which is the mean share *experienced by a unit of exposure* rather than the mean share across units. This is why squaring is not arbitrary: it weights each jurisdiction by how much of your exposure sits in it, which is exactly the weighting a risk question requires.

Second, the largest share sets a floor under the index and therefore a ceiling on the effective count. Since `HHI >= s_max^2`, we get `effective count <= 1/s_max^2`:

```
conventional, largest UK 40.9%     HHI >= 0.167281   effective <= 5.9780
designed, largest UAE 29.1%       HHI >= 0.084681   effective <= 11.8090
designed blocs, largest 40.0%     HHI >= 0.160000   effective <=  6.2500
conventional blocs, WEST 100.0%   HHI >= 1.000000   effective <=  1.0000
```

The last line is the whole argument in one row. When one bloc holds everything, the ceiling on the effective count is one, and no amount of activity below the bloc level can raise it.

Third, `s_max^2 <= HHI <= s_max`. The upper bound is reached when the largest unit holds everything. Both bounds are checkable in a line and both are useful sanity tests on a measurement that has been done by hand.

Now the hidden premise. The index is a *count* of units, and a count is only informative about failure if the units fail separately. Nothing in the formula says they do. In antitrust the assumption is usually reasonable, because the object of concern is competitive independence and rival firms are competitively independent by definition, or the merger analysis would be about something else.

In the resilience application the assumption is the entire question, and stating it as an assumption rather than absorbing it silently is the correction this chapter makes.

The bloc collapse, made rigorous

The correction is easy to state and easy to dismiss as a fudge: group jurisdictions that share a coordination mechanism, and compute the index on the group shares instead of the jurisdiction shares. Grouping data until you get the answer you wanted is a well-known way to lie. So the grouping needs a foundation that is not "because I said so."

It has one, and it is exact. Model the exposure as a portfolio. Let `w_i` be the share of protected capital exposed to jurisdiction `i`, and let `X_i` be a unit-variance shock to that jurisdiction — a designation, a freeze, an exchange control, a de-risking event. The aggregate shock to the structure is `R = sum w_i X_i`, and its variance is:

```
Var(R) = sum_i sum_j w_i w_j rho_ij
```

Now consider the two extreme correlation assumptions.

If every jurisdiction is independent — `rho_ij = 0` for `i != j`, `rho_ii = 1` — the double sum collapses to `sum_i w_i^2`, which **is the naive HHI, exactly.** Verified by explicit double sum on the designed structure's six shares: 0.189002, matching the naive index to twelve decimal places.

If jurisdictions inside a bloc are perfectly correlated and blocs are independent — `rho_ij = 1` when `i` and `j` share a bloc, `0` otherwise — the double sum collapses to `sum_b W_b^2`, where `W_b` is the bloc's total share. That **is the bloc-HHI, exactly.** Verified the same way on the same six shares: 0.340000, matching to twelve decimal places.

So:

> **The naive HHI and the bloc-HHI are not two different indices. They are the same variance under two different correlation assumptions, and `1/HHI` is the effective number of independent shocks the structure is exposed to.** Choosing between them is not a modelling preference; it is a claim about the world, and it should be argued rather than assumed.

That also means the two are endpoints of a continuous family. With within-bloc correlation `rho` and independence across blocs:

```
Var(R) = naive + rho x (bloc − naive)
```

Run it on the designed structure:

rho	Var(R)	N = 1/Var
0.00	0.189002	5.2909
0.10	0.204102	4.8995
0.25	0.226751	4.4101
0.40	0.249401	4.0096
0.50	0.264501	3.7807
0.60	0.279601	3.5765
0.75	0.302251	3.3085
0.90	0.324900	3.0779
1.00	0.340000	2.9412

This book uses `rho = 1` within a bloc. That is the conservative end, and the justification is Chapter 2: the observed behaviour of coordinated listing, substance, and exchange frameworks over fifteen years has been near-simultaneous adoption, not partial and independent adoption. A reader who thinks that is too strong can pick a `rho` from the table and read off the answer, which is the point of publishing the family rather than the endpoint.

The same family on the conventional structure produces the sharpest single result in this chapter:

```
  rho     Var(R)         N      eta ln N        h
0.00   0.293430    3.4080      0.4291    −0.0709
0.25   0.470073    2.1273      0.2642    −0.2358
0.50   0.646715    1.5463      0.1525    −0.3475
0.75   0.823357    1.2145      0.0680    −0.4320
0.90   0.929343    1.0760      0.0256    −0.4744
1.00   1.000000    1.0000      0.0000    −0.5000
```

And the inverse question — how weakly would Western jurisdictions have to correlate for the conventional structure to be as resilient as the designed one? Solve `naive + rho(1 − naive) = 0.34` with `naive = 0.293430`:

```
rho = (0.340000 − 0.293430) / (1 − 0.293430) = 0.065910
```

You would have to believe that the UK, the US, Jersey and Luxembourg correlate at 6.6% on coordinated action for the conventional structure to match the designed one. Nobody who has read Chapter 2 believes that. The claim being made when someone reports naive HHI on a single-bloc structure is `rho = 0`, and it is not a defensible claim; it is an unexamined default in a spreadsheet.

Defining a bloc without cheating

The variance derivation is only as good as the bloc assignment, so the assignment needs a rule that can be applied by someone who disagrees with the author and still gets a reproducible answer. Chapter 4's perimeter test is that rule: two jurisdictions are in the same bloc when a single decision taken in one reliably produces the corresponding effect in the other without a further independent decision. Evidence, in rough order of weight:

```
strongest  demonstrated near-simultaneous mirroring of designations or listings
             shared correspondent networks that exit corridors together
         a supervisory standard producing the same domestic consequence in every member
             binding accession to a common enforcement instrument
  weaker     participation in an information-exchange framework
             treaty density
 weakest   diplomatic alignment, voting patterns, press characterisation
```

This book's assignments for the designed structure, with the reasoning compressed:

```
UAE         BRIDGE      dual-rail access, non-participation in the Western
                            designation apparatus, own listing decisions
Singapore     BRIDGE        same test, different geography
Thailand    NONALIGNED    no accession to the coordinated enforcement instruments,
                            domestic-priority policy
India         NONALIGNED    same
```

```
    UK           WEST          core member of the mechanism
  Bermuda     W-lite      overseas territory; conservatively folded into WEST
```

Two of these are contestable and the honest response is to run the arithmetic both ways rather than argue. The Specification does that.

Why a logarithm, and why not a count

A reader arriving from Volume Two already has the answer, but the identification of `N` with effective blocs is new here and the functional form deserves restating in this context, because a great deal follows from it.

Suppose the input side of the storage law were linear in `N` — `eta N` rather than `eta ln N`. Then two independent blocs would be worth exactly twice one, three worth three times one, and the optimal structure would be as many blocs as the budget allows. That is not what the world does. The first genuinely independent store removes an entire failure mode; the second removes the residual probability that the first is wrong; the third removes the residual of the residual. Each addition addresses a smaller remaining exposure, and the natural functional form for a quantity whose increments shrink in proportion to what is already held is the logarithm.

There is a second reading which is more useful operationally. `ln(N)` is, up to a constant, the entropy of a uniform distribution over `N` outcomes. What the surplus term measures is how much *uncertainty about which perimeter matters* the structure has purchased. A structure inside one perimeter has zero entropy: an adversary knows exactly which decision reaches everything. A structure across three roughly equal perimeters has `ln 3 = 1.0986` of it. **The quantity being maximised is not the number of places you are in; it is the number of independent decisions that would have to go against you simultaneously.**

That reading also explains why the measure is indifferent to entity count, which is otherwise counterintuitive. Adding a fifth Western entity adds no uncertainty about which decision matters, because the answer is still "the Western one." The entropy is unchanged, the surplus term is unchanged, and the fee is not.

The other three axes

Jurisdiction is the axis this chapter measures, and it is one of four. The instrument is identical on each; only the share basis changes.

Settlement rail. The exposure is the fraction of settlement volume that depends on a given messaging or clearing system. Chapter 31 does this properly and stresses one fact that ruins naive measurements: CIPS is a clearing system, and many of its participants still use SWIFT for the messaging layer, so a structure that reports two rails may have one messaging dependency. Measured correctly, "SWIFT 100%" and "SWIFT 85% / CIPS 15% where the CIPS leg is SWIFT-messaged" are the same number, and only the second one looks diversified.

Counterparty. The exposure is the fraction of protected capital held as a claim on, or custodied by, a given institution. This is the axis on which threat 1 diversification most reliably backfires, because the population of institutions willing to bank a genuine cross-bloc structure is small and the same three names appear everywhere. A structure at `N = 2.94` on jurisdiction and at an effective counterparty count of 1.6 has not reduced its total risk; it has moved it.

Currency. The exposure is the fraction of the balance sheet denominated in a given unit. The carried case earns in five currencies, which sounds diversified, and the measurement is what decides whether it is. Currency exposure interacts with the jurisdiction axis rather than being independent of it: a currency's clearing runs through banks that sit inside a perimeter, so a 100%-USD balance sheet is Western perimeter exposure however the entities are arranged.

The reporting discipline is to run all four and print all four. **A structure is only as diversified as its most concentrated axis, and the axis people measure is the one they were already comfortable with.**

From `N` to the storage law

The last link. `N` in `h = eta ln(N) − delta Q − C` is the effective bloc count, and the reason it enters logarithmically rather than linearly is the same reason it does in Volume Two: the return to an additional independent store is proportional to the fractional reduction in concentration it buys, and `d(ln N)/dN = 1/N`. The marginal value of a bloc falls as you acquire blocs:

```
dh/dN = eta / N
at N = 1.0000     dh/dN = 0.350000
at N = 2.9412     dh/dN = 0.119000
at N = 4.1727     dh/dN = 0.083878
```

The first bloc you add is worth three times what the third is. This is the mathematical reason the conventional structure is not merely bad but *maximally* bad: it sits at the point of steepest available return and captures none of it. Moving from one effective bloc to two is the highest return move available anywhere in this book, and it is also the cheapest, because it requires one correctly chosen jurisdiction rather than five.

The Specification

The measurement procedure

Six steps. Do them in order, write down every input, and keep the file, because next year's measurement is only meaningful as a difference against this year's.

Step 1 — Fix the share basis. The shares must be shares *of something*, and the something must match the threat. For threat 1 in Chapter 4's register, the correct basis is the fraction of protected capital whose *availability* depends on a decision taken inside that jurisdiction's perimeter. Not book value; not tax residence; not where the certificate is. Availability. A UK company holding a Bermudian portfolio managed from Singapore contributes to the UK share to the extent that a UK decision can stop the portfolio from being instructed.

Common alternative bases, all legitimate for other questions and all wrong for this one: revenue by source, net asset value by situs, headcount, tax paid. Pick one, state it, and never mix two inside one measurement.

Step 2 — Enumerate exposures and normalise to 100%. Exposures must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. If an asset is exposed to two perimeters, split it and say how. If you cannot say how, assign it wholly to the more capable perimeter, which is the conservative choice.

Step 3 — Compute naive HHI and the effective jurisdiction count. Square, sum, invert.

Step 4 — Assign blocs using the perimeter test, and record the reasoning per jurisdiction. This is the only judgemental step and it must be written down or the measurement is not reproducible.

Step 5 — Compute bloc-HHI and `N`. Sum shares within blocs first, then square, then sum, then invert. Order matters and reversing it silently reproduces the naive number.

Step 6 — Report the pair, never one alone. A single figure invites the reader to assume the convenient correlation. Report naive, bloc, and the gap, and if the gap is large, say what would have to be true for the naive figure to be the right one.

The conventional structure, measured

```
jurisdiction   share    share^2      bloc
-----------------------------------------
UK             40.9%   0.167281      WEST
US             27.3%   0.074529      WEST
Jersey         18.2%   0.033124      WEST
Luxembourg     13.6%   0.018496      WEST
-----------------------------------------
total         100.0%

naive HHI = 0.167281 + 0.074529 + 0.033124 + 0.018496 = 0.293430
effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.293430 = 3.407968  ->  3.41

bloc collapse:  WEST = 40.9 + 27.3 + 18.2 + 13.6 = 100.0%
bloc-HHI  = 1.000000^2 = 1.000000
EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1 / 1.000000 = 1.000000  ->  1.00

Western-perimeter exposure = 100.0%
```

In antitrust units the naive figure is 2,934.3 points and the bloc figure is 10,000.0 points. Hold that second number: a market with an HHI of 10,000 is a monopoly. **The conventional structure is, in resilience terms, a monopoly held by one coordination perimeter over the entire estate.**

The designed structure, measured

```
jurisdiction   share    share^2      bloc
-----------------------------------------------
UAE            29.1%   0.084681      BRIDGE
Thailand       18.2%   0.033124      NONALIGNED
UK             16.4%   0.026896      WEST
Bermuda        13.6%   0.018496      W-lite -> WEST
India          11.8%   0.013924      NONALIGNED
Singapore      10.9%   0.011881      BRIDGE
-----------------------------------------------
total         100.0%
```

```
naive HHI = 0.189002
effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.189002 = 5.290949  ->  5.29

bloc collapse:
    BRIDGE      = 29.1 + 10.9 = 40.0%      0.160000
    NONALIGNED  = 18.2 + 11.8 = 30.0%      0.090000
    WEST        = 16.4 + 13.6 = 30.0%      0.090000
bloc-HHI = 0.340000
EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1 / 0.340000 = 2.941176  ->  2.94

Western-perimeter exposure = 30.0%
```

The comparison, stated in the units that matter

metric	conventional	designed	change
entities	4	6	+2
jurisdictions	4	6	+2
naive HHI	0.293430	0.189002	−35.6%
effective jurisdictions	3.41	5.29	x1.5525
bloc-HHI	1.000000	0.340000	−66.0%
EFFECTIVE BLOCS N	1.00	2.94	x2.9412
Western-perimeter exposure	100.0%	30.0%	−70.0 pts
ln(N)	0.000000	1.078810	
eta ln(N) at eta = 0.35	0.000000	0.377583	

Read the last row as the whole point of the exercise. **The architecture's entire contribution to the storage law is 0.3776, purchased by going from one effective bloc to 2.94, and it is bought with two additional entities rather than twenty.**

The surplus term, computed

At the parameters SPINE fixes for the comparison — `eta = 0.35`, `C = 0.30`, `Q = 10`, `delta = 0.02`:

```
maintenance floor:  delta Q + C = 0.02 x 10 + 0.30 = 0.5000

conventional:  h = 0.35 x ln(1.000000) − 0.5000
                 = 0.35 x 0.000000     − 0.5000  =  −0.500000
designed:      h = 0.35 x ln(2.941176) − 0.5000
                 = 0.35 x 1.078810     − 0.5000  =  −0.122417
```

Both negative. Both below the build threshold. Chapter 37 carries this in full and must not soften it. The designed structure improves h by 0.377583, which is a 75.5% reduction in the shortfall, and it still does not reach zero.

The break-even is computable and worth having in front of you:

```
h = 0 requires  eta ln N = delta Q + C
                ln N = 0.5000 / 0.35 = 1.428571
```

```
N = e^1.428571 = 4.172734
```

You need 4.17 effective blocs to break even at these parameters, and the world does not currently offer 4.17 genuinely independent coordination perimeters to a private structure. The honest conclusion is therefore not "build harder"; it is that the maintenance side must come down or the conversion side must come up, and both of those are Chapter 37's subject. The other two levers, computed at `N = 2.941176`:

```
C required for h = 0   : 0.377583 − 0.200000 = 0.177583  (against actual 0.30)
eta required for h = 0 : 0.500000 / 1.078810 = 0.463474  (against actual 0.35)
 Q at which h = 0, C=0.30:  (0.377583 − 0.300000) / 0.02 = 3.879169
```

That last line is the one nobody likes: at `C = 0.30`, the designed structure only carries protected capital up to 3.88 units before erosion outruns the surplus. **Structure cost is close to fixed and erosion is proportional, which means there is a minimum viable size below which no amount of jurisdictional cleverness helps, and a maximum above which the same structure needs rebuilding.**

Robustness: what happens if the bloc assignments are wrong

The bloc assignment is the judgemental step, so it must be stress-tested. Recomputing `N` for the designed structure under alternative assignments:

assignment variant	bloc-HHI	N
base: Bermuda folded into WEST	0.340000	2.9412
Bermuda as its own W-lite bloc	0.295392	3.3853
Singapore reclassified as WEST	0.341962	2.9243
UAE reclassified as WEST (worst case)	0.451162	2.2165
UAE and Singapore as SEPARATE blocs	0.276562	3.6158
Thailand and India as SEPARATE blocs	0.297048	3.3665
every jurisdiction independent (= naive)	0.189002	5.2909

Three readings.

The base case is conservative in two places at once. Folding Bermuda into WEST costs 0.44 effective blocs relative to treating it as its own perimeter, and treating UAE and Singapore as one bridge costs 0.67 relative to separating them. The published figure of 2.94 is the low end of a defensible range, not the high end.

The result is robust to the single most contestable call. Reclassifying Singapore as Western moves `N` from 2.9412 to 2.9243, a change of 0.0169 — under six-tenths of one per cent. An argument about Singapore's alignment, which is the argument most likely to be had, does not move the answer.

Only one variant does real damage, and it is the one to monitor. If the UAE were absorbed into the Western perimeter, `N` falls to 2.2165 and h falls to `0.35 x ln(2.2165) − 0.5 = −0.221425`. That is threat 5 from Chapter 4 with a number on it, and it is why every Gulf chapter in this book carries a degradation trajectory with evidence rather than a verdict.

The HHI symmetry

The same instrument governs a second constraint that runs the other way, and this chapter owns both halves so that no later chapter can treat them as unrelated.

The 2023 Merger Guidelines issued jointly by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission set the structural presumption at **HHI above 1,800 with a change over 100**. The Guidelines also identify a merged-firm share above 30% combined with a change over 100 as warranting a presumption. Two points of discipline: the Guidelines are agency enforcement policy rather than statute, and courts weigh them without being bound by them; and the thresholds have moved, so quoting an old one is a real error. The 1982 and 1992 Guidelines used 1,000 and 1,800 with a change over 100; the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines used 1,500 and 2,500 with changes of 100 and 200; the 2023 Guidelines returned to 1,800 with 100. **Confirm the current thresholds and their treatment in the relevant circuit with antitrust counsel before relying on any of them.**

The change from a merger has a closed form worth memorising, because it makes the constraint checkable on the back of an envelope. If two firms with shares `s1` and `s2` combine, the post-merger index gains `(s1 + s2)^2 − s1^2 − s2^2`:

```
delta = 2 x s1 x s2          (shares in percentage points)
```

so the change exceeds 100 exactly when `s1 x s2 > 50`. For an equal-share pair, that is `s > sqrt(50) = 7.0711%` each. A 5% x 5% combination produces a change of 50 points and is comfortably clear; an 8% x 8% combination produces 128 and is not.

Now put the two directions in one table, on the two structures this chapter measures and one constructed product market from the carried case:

measurement	HHI (pts)	direction wanted	verdict
jurisdictional exposure, conventional	2,934.3	LOW	fail
jurisdictional exposure, designed	1,890.0	LOW	better
bloc exposure, conventional	10,000.0	LOW	total fail
bloc exposure, designed	3,400.0	LOW	acceptable
product market, carried case	1,320.0	LOW ENOUGH	clear

One metric. Two directions. Both binding. The jurisdictional rows want the number small because a small number means many independent points of failure. The market row wants the number small enough because a large number attracts the presumption. The arithmetic does not care which question you are asking; it returns the same measure of concentration either way, and the only difference is which side of the threshold you need to be on.

The symmetry is not a coincidence or a pun. Both applications are asking how much of a total sits in how few hands, because that is the question that governs both fragility and market power. A firm that concentrates a market has power over it, and a structure that concentrates its exposure has no power over what happens to it. Same measurement, opposite consequence, and a group large enough to need this book will be measured on both simultaneously — by a regulator on one axis and by events on the other.

Reporting standard

Any structure measured under this chapter reports the following, and nothing less:

```
1  share basis, stated in one sentence
2  exposure table, jurisdictions and shares, summing to 100.0%
3  naive HHI, in fraction and in points, and effective jurisdictions
4  bloc assignment with the evidence class for each jurisdiction
5  bloc-HHI and EFFECTIVE BLOCS N
6  Western-perimeter exposure as a percentage
7  ln(N), eta ln(N), and h at the stated parameters
8  the robustness table over contested bloc assignments
9  the date, and the diff against the previous measurement
```

Item 9 is the one that decays first and matters most, because threat 5 in Chapter 4 is invisible except as a difference between two measurements taken a year apart.

The Failure Modes

1. Counting entities

The most common error and the least defensible. An adviser reports "eleven entities in seven jurisdictions" as though it were a measurement. It is a count of invoices. Entities inside one perimeter contribute nothing to `N`, and each one contributes to `C`. **An entity that does not raise `N` and does raise `C` moves `h` strictly down, and a structure can be made arbitrarily worse by adding entities that a naive count says are making it better.**

2. Reporting naive HHI on a single-bloc structure

The specific error this chapter exists to correct. Reporting 3.41 effective jurisdictions for the conventional structure is not wrong arithmetic; the arithmetic is right and the premise is false. It asserts `rho = 0` between the UK, the US, Jersey and Luxembourg, and as computed above the premise required to sustain the conclusion is `rho = 0.0659`. **Whenever the naive and bloc figures diverge sharply, the divergence is the finding**, and reporting only the flattering half is the professional failure.

3. Rearranging inside a bloc

Worth its own table because so much billable effort goes into it:

conventional variant	naive HHI	naive eff	bloc-HHI	N	ln(N)
as found, UK/US/JE/LU	0.293430	3.41	1.000000	1.00	0
perfectly equalised, four ways	0.250000	4.00	1.000000	1.00	0
split into six equal Western	0.166667	6.00	1.000000	1.00	0
split into ten equal Western	0.100000	10.00	1.000000	1.00	0
split into fifty equal Western	0.020000	50.00	1.000000	1.00	0

Fifty entities. Naive effective count of fifty. `N = 1.00`. `ln(N) = 0`. The surplus term is zero in every row. **Subdivision inside a perimeter is the most expensive way to change nothing that this field has invented.**

4. The wrong share basis

Measuring by book value when the threat is availability produces a number that is precise and irrelevant. The London real estate in the carried case has a large book value and a specific availability profile: it cannot be moved, which is Chapter 29's whole subject. The listed portfolio has a smaller book value and a much sharper availability profile, because a custodian instruction can stop working in an afternoon. A book-value basis will make the property dominate the measurement when the property is not where the threat-1 exposure concentrates.

5. Double-counting a bridge

A bridge jurisdiction is a bridge because it touches two perimeters. That is its value and it is also a measurement hazard: counting it as a full independent bloc overstates `N`, and assigning it to one of the perimeters it bridges understates it. This book's convention is to treat BRIDGE as its own bloc while stress-testing the assignment in both directions, which is why the robustness table above exists and why the UAE-reclassified row is in it. **Report the bridge assumption explicitly.** It is the assumption most likely to be wrong and the one that moves the answer most.

6. Measuring one axis and calling it the structure

Jurisdictional HHI is one axis. There are at least four, and a structure can be excellent on one and hopeless on another:

```
axis                      measured in           chapter
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
jurisdiction / bloc       this chapter          5
settlement rail           SWIFT / CIPS / other  31
counterparty              banks, custodians     4 (threat 3), 30
currency                  USD/EUR/CNY/AED/THB   31, 37
```

Chapter 4's failure mode 8 gives the trap in its sharpest form: diversifying across blocs frequently *concentrates* counterparties, because few institutions will bank a genuinely cross-bloc structure. **Run the instrument on all four axes or you have measured the axis you were already comfortable with.**

7. Optimising the index instead of the thing it measures

HHI is a proxy. Two structures with identical bloc-HHI can differ enormously in whether the blocs are actually independent in the specific scenario that matters, in whether the entities can transact with each other, and in whether the whole thing is administrable by the people who have to administer it. **The index is a diagnostic, not an objective function.** A structure tuned to the third decimal of `N` has been tuned to the wrong thing.

The tell is a structure whose bloc shares are suspiciously round and equal. Real structures are lumpy because assets are lumpy, and a perfectly balanced measurement usually means the shares

were chosen to produce it.

8. Forgetting the second direction

A group that drives jurisdictional HHI down while consolidating an operating market can find that the same instrument that certified its resilience certifies its market power. The four bright lines in Chapter 35 are the operational consequence. This is not hypothetical for the carried case: the Thai operating business sits in a constructed market at 1,320 points and holds 14%. It has room. Room is not licence, and Chapter 35 gives the arithmetic for how much room.

9. Reporting from a rounded print

SPINE section 8 makes this a standing rule of the series because it destroyed four chapters of Volume Three, and this chapter contains a live example of the error to make it concrete rather than admonitory.

N for the designed structure is exactly `1/0.34 = 2.941176...`. Computing h from the exact value:

```
ln(2.941176) = 1.078810      h = 0.35 x 1.078810 − 0.5 = −0.122417
```

Computing it from the printed, rounded `2.94`:

```
ln(2.940000) = 1.078410      h = 0.35 x 1.078410 − 0.5 = −0.122557
```

The two differ by 0.000140. **The conclusion is unchanged — both are below zero, and the honest companion result stands.** But the number changed in the fourth decimal from a single rounding, and a chain of four such steps is how Volume Three went wrong. The rule is not "round carefully." It is: carry the full precision through every intermediate step and round only at the print.

10. Treating the bloc assignment as a fact rather than a claim

The variance derivation makes the bloc collapse rigorous *given* the assignment. It does not make the assignment right. Every bloc call is a forecast about correlated behaviour, and forecasts are wrong at a rate that can be estimated. The discipline that follows is not to avoid the call — the alternative is `rho = 0`, which is a worse call made silently — but to record it in a form that can be audited later.

The minimum record per jurisdiction is: the bloc, the evidence class from the ladder in the Mechanism section, the single strongest piece of evidence, the date, and the specific observable that would change the call. That last field is the one that gets left blank and it is the only one that produces a decision. "The UAE is BRIDGE because it makes its own listing decisions; this changes if it begins mirroring designations within thirty days" is auditable. "The UAE is a bridge jurisdiction" is an opinion with a timestamp.

11. Confusing effective count with capacity

`N = 2.94` says the structure has roughly three independent points of failure. It says nothing about whether any of them can carry the load. A bloc that holds 30% of the exposure through an entity that cannot open a correspondent account, cannot hire, and cannot obtain a legal opinion

in the relevant matter is a bloc on paper. The measurement will report it at full weight because the measurement is a distribution and does not inspect capability.

The correction is not to fudge the shares. It is to run the Chapter 6 job assignment alongside the concentration measurement and confirm that each bloc's entities can actually do the job assigned to them, then to reduce the exposure booked to a bloc that cannot. A structure whose bloc diversity is real but whose bridging capacity sits entirely in one of the three blocs has an effective bloc count of 2.94 on holdings and something much closer to 1.00 on the ability to transact.

12. Measuring after the event

The instrument is diagnostic, and a diagnosis taken during the emergency is a post-mortem. All of the arithmetic in this chapter takes minutes once the exposure table exists, and building the exposure table is a week of work that nobody schedules. The measurement should be a fixed annual item with a named owner, the output should be a two-page diff, and the diff should be read by whoever can authorise a change. **A measurement nobody is obliged to act on will be run once, filed, and cited for years after it stopped being true.**

13. Believing `N` can be raised indefinitely

`dh/dN = eta/N`, so returns fall. Going from 1.00 to 2.94 effective blocs buys 0.3776 of surplus. Going from 2.94 to 4.00 buys `0.35 x (ln 4 − ln 2.941176) = 0.1074` — under a third as much for what is a far harder piece of engineering. And each additional bloc carries its own `C`: counsel in another legal family, another regulator, another set of filings, another bank relationship that must be maintained against exactly the de-risking pressure the structure exists to survive. **There is an optimum number of blocs and it is small.** The fact that most structures sit below it does not mean more is always better.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. The principal is the carried case of SPINE section 6: dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in three jurisdictions, one under forced heirship. Assets: Thai manufacturing, a UAE trading company, IP, London commercial real estate, a listed portfolio. Revenue in USD, EUR, CNY, AED, THB.

Step 1 — the share basis, stated

The basis is *the fraction of protected capital whose availability depends on a decision taken inside a given jurisdiction's coordination perimeter*. Two consequences of that choice, both material and both stated in advance so the reader can disagree with the inputs rather than the method:

- The London real estate contributes its full value to the UK exposure. It cannot be relocated and UK measures reach it directly. Chapter 29's REIT conversion changes what this line looks like, and the measurement below is taken *before* that conversion.
- The listed portfolio contributes to the perimeter of its *custodian*, not to the perimeters of the issuers. A portfolio of Asian equities held through a Western custodian is Western exposure for this purpose. This is the single input most often assigned wrongly in practice.

Step 2 — the structure as found

The principal arrived with the conventional structure: a UK holding company owning the trading business and the London property, a US entity holding the listed portfolio through a US broker-dealer, a Jersey company holding the IP, and a Luxembourg vehicle interposed for treaty reasons that had been sound when it was built.

```
UK           40.9%    holdco + London property
US           27.3%    listed portfolio via US custodian
Jersey       18.2%    IP holding
Luxembourg   13.6%    treaty vehicle
```

The adviser's file described this as "diversified across four jurisdictions, two legal families, and three regulators." Every word of that is true.

Step 3 — the measurement

```
naive HHI = 0.293430    effective jurisdictions = 3.41
bloc-HHI  = 1.000000    EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1.00
Western-perimeter exposure = 100.0%
ln(N) = 0    eta ln(N) = 0    h = -0.500000
```

The structure that was diversified across four jurisdictions had one point of failure, and its contribution to the input side of the storage law was exactly zero. A single coordinated measure — a designation, a listing framework applied to the beneficial owner, a correspondent policy applied to the principal's nationality — reaches all four entities without needing a second decision.

Note what this measurement does *not* say. It does not say the four entities were badly chosen or badly run. The Jersey IP structure was well built. The Luxembourg vehicle was doing real treaty work. The finding is not about quality; it is about correlation, and correlation is not visible from inside any one entity.

Step 4 — the redesign, and what each move buys

The architecture assembled across this volume, with the marginal contribution of each move:

```
move                                                  N after   delta N
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
--
start: conventional                                    1.0000        --
+ DIFC Foundation as the holding layer (Ch 7)          1.0000     0.0000
+ ADGM holdco, UAE share to 29.1% (Ch 17)             ~1.7000   +0.7000
+ Thai BOI opco, 18.2% (Ch 23)                        ~2.3000   +0.6000
+ GIFT City vehicle, India 11.8% (Ch 24)              ~2.6000   +0.3000
+ Singapore treasury, 10.9% (Ch 20)                    2.9412   +0.3412
UK reduced 40.9% -> 16.4%, Bermuda 13.6% (Ch 14)       2.9412        --
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
--
final                                                   2.9412
```

The intermediate values are approximate because the path depends on the order of execution; the endpoints are exact. Two things in that table deserve comment.

The Foundation adds nothing to N, and it is still the most important element in the architecture. It is a threat-4 instrument in Chapter 4's register — succession — and it is the holding layer that makes everything else administrable. **A structure element that does not move the concentration measurement is not thereby worthless; it is answering a different threat, which is exactly Chapter 4's point and Chapter 6's.**

The first non-Western jurisdiction is worth more than the last three combined. Moving the UAE share to 29.1% buys roughly 0.70 of effective blocs; the Singapore addition buys 0.34. This is `dh/dN = eta/N` in practice, and it has a governance implication: if the programme is going to be executed over three years and might be interrupted, execute the highest-marginal-value move first, because a half-finished diversification in the right order is worth far more than a half-finished one in the wrong order.

Step 5 — the structure as designed, measured

```
UAE         29.1%   BRIDGE      ADGM holdco + DIFC Foundation + trading co
 Thailand     18.2%   NONALIGNED   BOI manufacturing opco
 UK           16.4%   WEST         UK Ltd + residual London exposure
Bermuda     13.6%   W-lite      captive, reserves against real liabilities
 India        11.8%   NONALIGNED   GIFT City vehicle
 Singapore    10.9%   BRIDGE       treasury and dual-rail settlement

 naive HHI = 0.189002   effective jurisdictions = 5.290949
 BRIDGE 40.0% / NONALIGNED 30.0% / WEST 30.0%
 bloc-HHI  = 0.340000   EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 2.941176
 Western-perimeter exposure = 30.0%

 ln(N) = 1.078810   eta ln(N) = 0.377583   h = -0.122417
```

Step 6 — the second direction, on the same principal

The Thai operating business sells into a constructed market with the following shares:

```
  Rival A 22.0 . Rival B 18.0 . OPCO 14.0 . Rival C 11.0 . Rival D 8.0
Rival E 7.0 . Rival F 6.0 . Rival G 5.0 . Rival H 4.0 . five fringe firms at 1.0 each

  market HHI = 1,320.00 points     effective firms = 7.5758
```

Below 1,800. Not concentrated on the 2023 Guidelines' first screen. Now the principal proposes to acquire a competitor, and the arithmetic decides which one is discussable:

```
  target       share    delta = 2 s1 s2   post-HHI   combined   presumption
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
  Rival H       4.0%         112.00      1,432.00     18.0%    not engaged
  Rival G       5.0%         140.00      1,460.00     19.0%    not engaged
  Rival D       8.0%         224.00      1,544.00     22.0%    not engaged
```

```
Rival B        18.0%          504.00       1,824.00      32.0%     ENGAGED
```

The Rival B acquisition crosses both tests at once: post-HHI 1,824.0 exceeds 1,800, the change of 504.0 exceeds 100, and the combined share of 32.0% exceeds 30%. **The same instrument that says the principal's jurisdictional structure is not yet diversified enough says the principal's proposed acquisition is one the agencies would presume unlawful, and both statements come out of `sum of squared shares`.**

The largest target that keeps the change at or below 100 points is `100 / (2 x 14) = 3.5714%` — which is to say, once you hold 14% of a market, almost any acquisition worth doing produces a change above 100. **The change test, not the level test, is what binds a mid-sized acquirer, and that is the practical content of Chapter 35's bright lines.** None of this makes the Rival B deal unlawful; it makes it a deal that must be filed, analysed on the merits, and defended, at a cost and a timeline that belong in the plan from the beginning.

Step 7 — the disclosure test

Chapter 3's test, applied to everything above: would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

It would, and the reason is instructive. **The concentration instrument does not measure anything secret. It measures a distribution, and the distribution is a matter of public record in every jurisdiction that maintains a companies register.** Anyone with the filings can compute `N` for the principal's structure. Computing it changes nothing, because the protection is not that the exposure map is unknown — it is that no single decision-maker's writ runs across enough of the map to matter. **A perimeter cannot be repaired by information**, which is precisely why architecture outlasts concealment.

Step 8 — the residual, stated plainly

After the full build:

- 30.0% of exposure remains inside the Western perimeter, deliberately, because the London real estate and English-law market access are worth having.
- `N = 2.94` against a break-even of 4.17. The structure improves h by 0.377583 and remains at -0.122417. **It is not enough, and Chapter 37 has to say so.**
- The bloc assignments are judgements. The one that would hurt is UAE reclassification, taking `N` to 2.2165 and h to -0.2214. That is a monitored risk, not a hedged one.
- The measurement is a snapshot. It must be rerun annually with a written diff, because a structure does not decay by anyone changing it.

The instrument's honest verdict on this book's own architecture is: substantially better, still insufficient, and the insufficiency is on the cost side rather than the design side. That is the thread Chapter 6 picks up, because the fastest route to a lower `C` is to stop asking one entity to do three jobs.

Verification notes

1. Attribution of the numbers-equivalent reading of `1/HHI` to M. A. Adelman's 1969 comment in the *Review of Economics and Statistics* should be checked against the original; the mathematical property is elementary and independent of the attribution.
2. The 2023 DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines thresholds (HHI above 1,800, change over 100; merged share above 30% with change over 100) are agency enforcement policy, not statute, and courts are not bound by them. Confirm current thresholds and their treatment in the relevant circuit with antitrust counsel. Thresholds have changed three times since 1982 and can change again.
3. Bloc assignments in this chapter are the author's, applying Chapter 4's perimeter test to published evidence. They are contestable, the robustness table shows the sensitivity, and each jurisdiction chapter restates its own assignment with evidence at scorecard item 2.
4. All parameter values in the storage-law computations (`eta`, `C`, `Q`, `delta`) are the SPINE's stated test parameters and are illustrative. They are not estimates of any real principal's position.

All numerical results in this chapter were computed from the stated inputs at full precision and rounded only for printing. Appendix B reproduces the workbook.

Chapter 6 . Holding, Operating, Bridging

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Every worked case in this chapter is CONSTRUCTED and labelled as such. Cost figures are index units in a constructed model, not quoted fees; verify current fee schedules, substance requirements, and licensing conditions with counsel and administrators in each jurisdiction.

The Position

Chapter 5 measured how many independent points of failure a structure has. This chapter measures whether the entities inside it are doing jobs they can actually do.

There are three jobs. They are not three flavours of the same job, and the distinction is not taxonomic tidiness — it is the difference between a structure that works and one that has been sold as working:

```
HOLDING     needs succession law, asset segregation, perpetuity,
            LOW SUBSTANCE BURDEN
OPERATING   needs REAL SUBSTANCE, labour, cheap presence, market access
BRIDGING    needs DUAL-BLOC BANKING, dual-rail settlement, neutral law
```

Most failed structures come from asking one entity to do all three. That sentence is the taxonomy's entire justification and this chapter's whole subject. It is not a stylistic preference; the three requirement sets are mutually antagonistic in specific, nameable ways, and an entity told to satisfy all three satisfies none of them well.

Take the sharpest antagonism first, because it settles the argument. Holding needs a *low substance burden*: the entity should own things, be cheap to maintain, be simple to inherit, and create as little nexus as possible with any tax authority, labour tribunal, or local creditor class. Operating needs *real substance*: employees, premises, decision-makers on the ground, functions genuinely performed where they are said to be performed. **These are not merely different requirements. They are the same requirement with opposite signs, and no entity satisfies both.** An entity with real operating substance has, by construction, exactly the nexus a holding entity exists to avoid; and an entity built for a low substance burden cannot pass a substance test when a substance test is what its operating role requires.

The other two antagonisms are less obvious and equally binding, and the Mechanism section develops them. Operating conflicts with bridging because an operating entity is *aligned* by nature — the factory is in a country, subject to that country's industrial policy, labour law, and export controls — and a bridge's usefulness comes from being credible to both sides. Holding conflicts with bridging because a bridge is transactional and high-volume, generating screening obligations, compliance surface, and de-risking exposure, while a holding entity should be quiet and untouched. CANON section 5 states this second one as a standing rule of the series: **a rail is not a holding**, and an entity that is both puts the store on the rail.

So the chapter delivers two instruments.

The assignment rule, which decides which jurisdiction gets which job, and whose one non-obvious feature is that it takes the *minimum* across the requirement dimensions rather than the

average. A job is a conjunction of requirements. Averaging lets a strength mask a disqualifying weakness, and disqualifying weaknesses are what kill structures.

The overload diagnostic, which detects an entity carrying more than one job, using Chapter 5's instrument turned inward. Score each entity's own job mix, compute the HHI of that mix, and invert it. A pure specialist scores 1.00 effective jobs. An entity split evenly across all three scores 3.00. And there is a hard result worth having in front of you before the arithmetic:

> **A two-job entity maxes out at exactly 2.00 effective jobs. Any entity measuring above 2.00 is carrying all three jobs, by arithmetic necessity, whatever the org chart says.**

That is a test that cannot be argued with, and it is why the diagnostic is worth running rather than eyeballing.

One connection to Chapter 5 before proceeding, because the two chapters are one argument. Chapter 5 ended on the observation that the designed structure improves h by 0.377583 and still comes out at -0.122417, below the build threshold, and that the shortfall is on the cost side. `C` is the maintenance term: compliance, counsel, substance, filings. **The fastest route to a lower `C` is to stop asking one entity to do three jobs, because an overloaded entity pays the maximum requirement on every dimension simultaneously and gets the benefit of none of them.** That claim gets tested rather than asserted in the Specification, and the test produces an answer that is not the one the argument wants — which is the honest result and the interesting one.

The Mechanism

Holding: what the job actually is

A holding entity's function is custody of title across time. Not tax efficiency, which is a by-product and a bad primary objective; not privacy, which Chapter 3 disposed of. Custody of title across time, through events that would otherwise fragment ownership.

What it needs, in order of how often it is got wrong:

Succession law that does what you expect. The entity must survive the founder, and the rules by which control passes must be knowable in advance and not subject to re-characterisation by a court in the heirs' home jurisdictions. This is why the DIFC Foundation is the heart of this book's architecture — DIFC Foundations Law No. 3 of 2018 gives separate legal personality, permits a purpose or beneficiaries, allows the founder to retain control, and puts disputes in the DIFC Courts. Chapters 7 through 9 develop it; the point here is that succession is a *holding* requirement and nothing else in the structure supplies it.

Asset segregation. Assets held must be insulated from claims against other parts of the group. The mechanism is separate legal personality — *Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd* [1897] AC 22 remains the foundation in the common-law world — with the limits marked out by the veil-piercing authorities, notably *Adams v Cape Industries plc* [1990] Ch 433 and, for the modern English formulation of the evasion principle, *Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd* [2013] UKSC 34.

Perpetuity, or something long enough to be indistinguishable. Rules against perpetuities vary enormously and several US states have abolished or extended them for trusts; Chapter 13 handles

that. A foundation with separate legal personality sidesteps the question differently, by not being a trust.

A low substance burden. The entity should be able to exist correctly with a registered office, a governing body that meets, proper records, and not much else. This is not a request for a shell. It is a recognition that a holding entity's genuine functions — owning, resolving, distributing — require little physical apparatus, and that requiring apparatus it does not need creates nexus it should not have.

That last point is where the antagonism lives, and it must be stated precisely rather than as a slogan. Substance requirements exist for good reasons and this book supports them; the OECD's BEPS Action 5 work on substantial activities in no or nominal tax jurisdictions, and the economic substance regimes adopted from 2018 onward across Bermuda, Cayman, BVI and elsewhere, were a response to entities claiming to conduct activities they were not conducting. **The correct response to a substance regime is to put substance where the activity genuinely is, not to manufacture substance where it is not** — and the way to do that is to give the operating job to an operating entity, which is the whole thesis of this chapter.

Operating: what the job actually is

An operating entity makes, sells, or performs something. Its function is to generate the S term in the storage law — income to be converted into protected holdings.

What it needs:

Real substance, because the activity is real. People, premises, decision-making, risk assumed and managed locally. This is not a compliance cost; it is what an operating business is.

Labour and cheap presence. The operating jurisdiction is chosen substantially on input cost and workforce availability, which is why operating jurisdictions in this book — Thailand, GIFT City, the UK — look nothing like the holding jurisdictions.

Market access. Tariff position, treaty network for withholding, licensing, and the practical question of whether customers can pay you.

Legal capacity to be foreign-owned. This is the one that eliminates candidates. Thailand's Foreign Business Act restricts foreign ownership across wide categories; two mechanisms displace that, and both are real and documented. The US-Thai Treaty of Amity 1966 permits US persons to own 100% of a Thai company, exempt from most FBA restrictions. BOI promotion can confer 100% foreign ownership, tax holidays, and land rights. Chapter 23 develops both and states the hard boundary in terms this book will not soften: **nominee shareholding is a criminal offence in Thailand and is prosecuted**, and a structure that relies on it is not a structure this book describes.

The operating entity also imports two things the group cannot avoid: tax residence, and political alignment. It pays tax where it operates. It is subject to that state's industrial policy, export controls, foreign-exchange rules, and labour courts. **An operating entity has a nationality in a sense a holding entity does not, and that nationality is the reason it cannot bridge.**

Bridging: what the job actually is

A bridging entity moves value and instructions between blocs that do not share a coordination mechanism. It is the entity that makes a cross-bloc structure *usable* rather than merely distributed.

What it needs:

Dual-bloc banking. Correspondent relationships that reach both sides, held by institutions that will not be forced to choose. This is the binding constraint and it is scarce.

Dual-rail settlement. Access to more than one clearing and messaging arrangement. Chapter 31 carries the detail and one correction that ruins naive designs: CIPS is a *clearing* system, and many participants still use SWIFT for the *messaging* layer. "CIPS replaces SWIFT" is false, and a bridging structure premised on it will fail.

Neutral law. Governing law and a forum both sides will accept. This is why ADGM matters so much to this architecture — under the Application of English Law Regulations 2015 it directly applies English common law, the only jurisdiction outside the UK to do so — and why AIFC in Astana deserves the treatment Chapter 22 gives it, applying English common law with its own court and English judges in a location that is genuinely between the parties.

Compliance capability that can answer questions. Chapter 38 states the consequence bluntly and this chapter borrows it: a bridge structure that cannot answer a compliance question gets de-risked out of existence. A bridge is a high-volume, high-scrutiny position, and its survival depends on being able to demonstrate, quickly and repeatedly, that every counterparty was screened and every transaction was what it appeared to be.

The arithmetic on why dual-bloc is the definition rather than a nice-to-have. Let `q` be the annual probability that a bloc's correspondent access fails for a period. Single-bloc availability is `1 - q`; dual-bloc, if the failures are independent, is `1 - q^2`:

```
     q      single-bloc   downtime      dual-bloc   downtime
  0.20         0.8000     73.00 d/yr      0.9600    14.60 d/yr
  0.15         0.8500     54.75           0.9775     8.21
  0.10         0.9000     36.50           0.9900     3.65
  0.05         0.9500     18.25           0.9975     0.91
  0.02         0.9800      7.30           0.9996     0.15
```

At `q = 0.10`, dual-bloc access cuts expected downtime by a factor of ten. A third bloc takes it from 3.65 days a year to 0.37, which is real and much less valuable than the first addition — the same diminishing-return shape as Chapter 5's `dh/dN = eta/N`, arising for the same reason.

The three antagonisms, stated precisely

Holding versus operating: the substance contradiction. Covered above. An entity that satisfies an operating substance test has created a taxable presence, an employer's liability, a local creditor class, and a set of local regulators, all of which are exposures the holding function exists to minimise. An entity built for a low substance burden fails the operating substance test by design. There is no configuration that satisfies both, and the attempt produces the specific failure that shows up in the case law: an entity claiming to conduct activities it does not conduct.

Operating versus bridging: the alignment contradiction. An operating entity is embedded in a state. It has a factory that cannot move, a workforce with local rights, licences granted by a local ministry, and a tax residence. It is therefore *reachable* by that state and visibly aligned with it. A bridge works because both sides believe it will not be turned against them, and an entity with a factory and two thousand employees inside one bloc has already answered the question

of whose it is. **You cannot bridge from a position of alignment, and an operating entity is aligned by construction.**

Holding versus bridging: the exposure contradiction. CANON section 5: a rail is not a holding. A bridging entity is in constant contact with counterparties, screening systems, correspondent banks, and settlement risk. Its exposure profile is an exposure-*window* profile, parameterised by hop size, duration, and mid-transit failure handling. A holding entity's exposure profile is a custody profile, parameterised by whether title survives and whether it can be instructed. Merging them means the store of value sits in the entity with the highest transactional exposure in the group. **The rule is not that a bridge is dangerous; it is that value in transit and value at rest are different problems, and one entity cannot hold both profiles.**

What this taxonomy replaces

Three organising principles compete with this one in practice, and each produces a recognisable kind of bad structure. Naming them is useful because a reader is more likely to be carrying one of them than to be carrying nothing.

Tax-driven organisation asks, of each entity, what the effective rate is. It produces structures that are correct on rate and wrong on function: a holding entity in a jurisdiction chosen for its participation exemption but with succession rules that fragment on death; an operating entity placed where the headline rate is low rather than where the workforce is. The tax answer is not wrong, it is incomplete, and it has been getting more incomplete for a decade as ATAD, the principal-purpose tests in modernised treaties, and the Pillar Two minimum have compressed the range of achievable rates. Chapter 12 makes the argument at length: the convergence has not made these jurisdictions less private, it has made them less *differentiated*, at premium cost, with concentration intact.

Secrecy-driven organisation asks who can see each entity. Chapter 3 dealt with it. What matters here is the structural signature it leaves: layers. Secrecy-driven structures have depth — company owning company owning company — because each layer was added to interpose. Depth adds C linearly and adds nothing to N when the layers are inside one perimeter, which is the Chapter 5 result arriving from a different direction. **Layers are a secrecy artefact; they are not a resilience technique, and a structure whose org chart is tall rather than wide was built against the wrong threat.**

Adviser-driven organisation asks who is competent to set up what. It produces structures that mirror the professional network that built them: three entities in the jurisdictions where the firm has offices, and none in the jurisdiction the analysis actually points to. It is the hardest to see from inside because every individual recommendation was sound.

The three-jobs taxonomy asks a different question of each entity: what does this thing *do*, and does its jurisdiction supply what that job needs. It does not replace the tax analysis; it comes before it, because a rate applied to the wrong function is a well-optimised mistake.

Why one entity cannot do three jobs: the arithmetic

Model each job's requirement set as a test the entity either passes or fails, with probability p of passing a given test. An entity doing one job faces one test; three jobs, three tests, all of which must pass:

```
  p        one job     two jobs    three jobs
0.95        0.9500      0.9025       0.8574
0.90        0.9000      0.8100       0.7290
0.85        0.8500      0.7225       0.6141
0.80        0.8000      0.6400       0.5120
0.70        0.7000      0.4900       0.3430
```

At `p = 0.80` the three-job entity holds with probability 0.5120 against 0.8000 for the specialist — it is 36.0% worse. The model is crude and its conclusion is robust to every reasonable choice of `p`, because conjunction is unforgiving and there is no parameterisation in which requiring three things is easier than requiring one.

The model also understates the problem in one important respect. The three tests are not independent; they are *negatively* correlated, because the antagonisms above mean that arranging the entity to pass one test actively makes it harder to pass another. Real joint probabilities are therefore below `p^3`, and the direction of the error is known even where the magnitude is not.

The Specification

The job vector

For each entity, express its function as a vector over the three jobs:

```
j = (H, O, B)     shares of that entity's own function, summing to 1
```

The shares are of the *entity's* activity, not of the group's. A tiny entity that does nothing but hold scores `(1, 0, 0)` exactly as a large one does. This is deliberate: the diagnostic asks whether an entity is being asked to do too many things, which is a question about the entity, not about its size. The group-level question — is any one job concentrated in too few entities — is a separate measurement and is given below.

Estimating the vector in practice: apportion by where management time, board resolutions, and transaction volume actually go, not by what the constitutional documents permit. A company whose objects clause allows anything but which in fact only holds shares is `(1, 0, 0)`.

The overload diagnostic

Apply Chapter 5's instrument to the vector:

```
S = H^2 + O^2 + B^2                 specialisation index
effective jobs = 1 / S
```

`S = 1.00` is a pure specialist and returns 1.00 effective jobs. `S = 1/3` is an entity split evenly across all three and returns 3.00. The thresholds this book uses:

```
effective jobs < 1.50     SPECIALIST          leave alone
1.50 to 2.20              STRAINED            justify or trim
> 2.20                    OVERLOADED          split
```

The 1.50 boundary corresponds to a two-job mix of 0.7887 / 0.2113 — an entity with a clear primary job and a real but minority second one. Below that, the second job is incidental.

The 2.20 boundary is chosen for a reason that is not arbitrary and is the most useful single fact in this section. **A pure two-job entity attains its maximum effective-job count at a 50/50 split, where `S = 0.50` and the count is exactly 2.00. There is no two-job configuration above 2.00.** Therefore any entity measuring above 2.00 has a non-zero share in all three jobs, necessarily. The threshold is set at 2.20 rather than 2.00 only to leave room for estimation error in the vector; the mathematically meaningful line is 2.00, and crossing it is proof rather than evidence.

The designed structure, scored

entity	H	O	B	S	eff jobs	verdict
DIFC Foundation	0.90	0.00	0.10	0.8200	1.2195	SPECIALIST
Thai BOI opco	0.05	0.95	0.00	0.9050	1.1050	SPECIALIST
UK Ltd	0.10	0.85	0.05	0.7350	1.3605	SPECIALIST
Singapore treasury	0.05	0.15	0.80	0.6650	1.5038	STRAINED
ADGM holdco	0.70	0.05	0.25	0.5550	1.8018	STRAINED
Bermuda captive	0.30	0.60	0.10	0.4600	2.1739	STRAINED
GIFT City vehicle	0.20	0.30	0.50	0.3800	2.6316	OVERLOADED
mean effective jobs per entity					1.6852	

Two of these deserve comment, and the fact that the book's own architecture produces a flag is the reason the diagnostic is worth having.

The Bermuda captive at 2.1739 is strained by nature, and the strain is real rather than an artefact. A captive insurer underwrites — an operating activity requiring licensed substance, actuarial capability, and BMA supervision — while also holding reserves, which is a holding activity. Chapters 14 and 15 accept the strain because the reserves are held against real third-party liabilities, which is precisely what makes them a structurally hard-to-seize class. The diagnostic's job is not to forbid the strain; it is to make sure it was chosen.

The GIFT City vehicle at 2.6316 is above 2.00 and is therefore carrying all three jobs, which is a design error this chapter must own rather than smooth over. It was specified as doing a bit of holding, a bit of fund operation, and a bit of rupee-corridor bridging, which is how a vehicle in a new IFSC accumulates functions. Two repairs, both computed:

as specified		H0.20	O0.30	B0.50	eff jobs 2.6316	OVERLOADED
repair A: specialise	BRIDGING	H0.05	O0.10	B0.85	eff jobs 1.3605	SPECIALIST
repair B: specialise	OPERATING	H0.05	O0.80	B0.15	eff jobs 1.5038	STRAINED

Repair A is the better move on these numbers and Chapter 24 takes it, moving the fund-operating function to a dedicated vehicle and the holding function up to the Foundation.

The group-level measurement

The entity diagnostic asks whether an entity does too much. The group diagnostic asks whether a job rests on too few entities. Weight each entity's job share by its size, normalise within each job, and take the effective count:

```
job          effective entities carrying it     largest carrier
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HOLDING                  2.6141                 DIFC Foundation 52.02%
OPERATING                2.9838                 Thai BOI opco   46.34%
BRIDGING                 4.5051                 ADGM holdco     31.75%
```

Holding is the most concentrated of the three, at 2.61 effective entities with the Foundation carrying just over half. That is intentional — concentrating holding is the point of having a holding layer, and diffusing it would defeat the succession design of Chapters 7 to 9 — but it should be a decision rather than a surprise. **Job concentration and jurisdictional concentration are different measurements, and a structure can be well diversified on one and deliberately concentrated on the other.**

The assignment rule

The rule that decides which jurisdiction gets which job. Score each candidate 0–5 on six requirement dimensions, then take the **minimum** across the dimensions the job actually needs:

```
dimensions
  1  succession law
  2  asset segregation
  3  low substance burden
  4  real substance capacity
  5  market and labour access
  6  dual-bloc banking

HOLDING    fit = min over {1, 2, 3}
OPERATING  fit = min over {4, 5}
BRIDGING   fit = min over {2, 6}
```

Constructed scores for the candidates in this book's architecture. These are the author's judgements applied to published characteristics, each candidate's own chapter argues them, and a reader who disagrees should change a score and rerun the rule rather than abandon it:

```
  candidate      succession segregation low-subst real-subst market dual-
bank
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
   DIFC                 5           5           4           2           2           4
   ADGM                 5           5           4           2           2           5
   Singapore            4           4           3           4           4           5
   Bermuda              3           5           2           3           2           3
   UK Ltd               3           3           2           4           5           2
   GIFT City            2           3           3           3           3           3
   Thailand             1           2           1           5           5           3
   single BVI co        3           4           5           1           1           1
```

Applying the rule:

```
   HOLDING     fit = min{succession, segregation, low-substance}
      DIFC 4 . ADGM 4 . single BVI co 3 . Singapore 3 . UK Ltd 2 . GIFT City 2
```

```
    Bermuda 2 . Thailand 1                          ->  assign to DIFC

OPERATING   fit = min{real-substance, market}
   Thailand 5 . UK Ltd 4 . Singapore 4 . GIFT City 3 . DIFC 2 . Bermuda 2
   ADGM 2 . single BVI co 1                       ->  assign to Thailand

BRIDGING    fit = min{segregation, dual-bank}
    ADGM 5 . Singapore 4 . DIFC 4 . GIFT City 3 . Bermuda 3 . UK Ltd 2
    Thailand 2 . single BVI co 1                    ->  assign to ADGM
```

Why the minimum and not the average

Because a job is a conjunction. An entity that scores brilliantly on two of a job's three requirements and fails the third does not do the job; it does two-thirds of the job, which is zero. Run both statistics on the holding dimensions and watch the masking:

```
candidate         holding dims       average    MINIMUM    gap
-------------------------------------------------------------
DIFC              [5, 5, 4]            4.67        4       0.67
ADGM              [5, 5, 4]            4.67        4       0.67
single BVI co     [3, 4, 5]            4.00        3       1.00
Singapore         [4, 4, 3]            3.67        3       0.67
Bermuda           [3, 5, 2]            3.33        2       1.33
UK Ltd            [3, 3, 2]            2.67        2       0.67
GIFT City         [2, 3, 3]            2.67        2       0.67
Thailand          [1, 2, 1]            1.33        1       0.33
```

On the average, the single BVI company ranks third for holding, ahead of Singapore — because its excellent low-substance score (5) pulls up a mediocre succession score (3). On the minimum it ranks joint third and the reason is visible. Bermuda shows the pattern more sharply: an average of 3.33 conceals a 2 on low substance burden, and the gap of 1.33 is exactly the amount of masking. **The gap between the average and the minimum is a measure of how much a candidate's weakest requirement is being hidden by its strongest, and a large gap is a warning, not a recommendation.**

The consolidation trap

Now the test promised in The Position: does specialisation actually lower `C`? Run a constructed annual cost model in index units, decomposed into legal, substance, and compliance:

```
   entity type                                    legal  subst  compl  total
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
   holding entity, low substance                    6      1      0      7
   holding entity forced to add operating substance 6     14      9     29
   operating entity, real substance                 3     18     11     32
   bridging entity, compliance-heavy                4      7     16     27
```

A single overloaded entity must meet the *maximum* of each column, since it faces every requirement: `6 + 18 + 16 = 40`. Three specialists cost `7 + 32 + 27 = 66`.

```
overloaded single entity      40
three specialised entities    66
saving from consolidation     26     = 39.39%
```

The overloaded entity is cheaper, by 39.39%, and that is the honest result rather than the one the argument wanted. It is also the whole explanation for why overloaded structures exist. The saving is real, immediate, and visible on an invoice. The fragility it buys is none of those things.

So the case for specialisation has to be made on risk-adjusted cost, and it can be. Using the `p = 0.80` satisfiability model, the overloaded entity's annual structural-failure probability is `1 - 0.8^3 = 0.4880` against `1 - 0.8 = 0.2000` for the worst single specialist. Let `LOSS` be the cost of a structural failure — unwind, re-domicile, tax leakage, litigation, lost banking:

```
LOSS    risk-adjusted overloaded    risk-adjusted specialised    winner
-------------------------------------------------------------------
--
 100           88.80                       86.00              specialised
 150          113.20                       96.00              specialised
 250          162.00                      116.00              specialised
 400          235.20                      146.00              specialised

break-even LOSS = (66 - 40) / (0.4880 - 0.2000) = 90.28 index units
```

Specialisation pays whenever a structural failure costs more than 90.28 index units — 1.37 times the specialised structure's entire annual running cost. That is a very low bar. A structure failure that costs less than one and a half years of running costs is not a structure failure; it is a bad quarter.

And the multi-year picture, which is where the asymmetry becomes plain:

```
years   cumulative saving   P(fail) overloaded   P(fail) specialised
-------------------------------------------------------------------
  1            26                0.4880               0.2000
  3            78                0.8658               0.4880
  5           130                0.9648               0.6723
 10           260                0.9988               0.8926
```

The saving accrues annually and linearly; the failure happens once and permanently. That is the shape of the trap, and it is the same shape as Chapter 4's recoverability argument, arrived at from a completely different direction.

The over-fragmentation limit

The diagnostic says split. It does not say split indefinitely, and a chapter that only pushed one way would be giving half an instrument. Each additional entity adds to `C`, and if it sits inside a bloc the structure already occupies, it adds exactly nothing to `N`. Model the marginal all-in cost of an entity at 0.035 in the units of the storage law, calibrated so the eight-entity designed structure costs `C = 0.30`:

```
entities    N        C         h
-----------------------------------
```

```
 4    1.0000   0.1600   −0.3600
 5    1.7000   0.1950   −0.2093
 6    2.3000   0.2300   −0.1385
 7    2.6000   0.2650   −0.1306
 8    2.9412   0.3000   −0.1224     <- the designed structure
10    2.9412   0.3700   −0.1924
14    2.9412   0.5100   −0.3324
20    2.9412   0.7200   −0.5424
```

h improves up to eight entities and then falls, because entities nine onward add cost without adding blocs. At roughly nineteen entities the structure is back to the conventional structure's h = −0.5000 while holding N = 2.9412:

```
C at which h = −0.5000 with N = 2.9412:   0.677583
entities = 8 + (0.677583 − 0.300000) / 0.035 = 18.79
```

A structure can be perfectly diversified and still worthless, by being administered to death. That is the mirror image of the single-entity failure and it is the characteristic failure of sophisticated advisers rather than unsophisticated principals.

The fourth job nobody assigns

Every entity carries filing, accounting, audit, governing-body, and register obligations regardless of which of the three jobs it does. Model this administrative load at 0.02 per entity per year:

```
entities    admin load    share of C = 0.300
──────────────────────────────────────────
    1         0.020             6.7%
    4         0.080            26.7%
    6         0.120            40.0%
    8         0.160            53.3%
   12         0.240            80.0%
   15         0.300           100.0%
```

At the designed structure's eight entities, administration alone consumes 53.3% of the maintenance budget, and at fifteen it consumes all of it. **Administration is not a job in the taxonomy and it is the largest single line in C, which means the taxonomy's three jobs are competing for slightly less than half the budget they appear to have.** Any assignment decision that ignores this will under-cost every entity it creates.

The job register: the reporting standard

The output of this chapter, for any structure, is a one-page register with a row per entity and the following columns. It sits alongside the Chapter 5 concentration measurement and is reviewed on the same cadence:

```
1  entity, legal form, jurisdiction
2  assigned job: HOLDING / OPERATING / BRIDGING
3  job vector (H, O, B) as measured, not as intended
4  S and effective jobs, with the band
5  where the strain is, if any, and the written justification
```

```
  6  the requirement dimension on which the jurisdiction scores lowest
  7  who takes the decisions belonging to the job, and where
  8  annual cost, decomposed into legal / substance / compliance / administration
  9  the date, and the diff against the previous register
```

Column 6 is the one that pays for the exercise. It names, for every entity, the requirement most likely to fail — and because the assignment rule took a minimum, that requirement is already computed and does not need a fresh judgement. An entity whose lowest dimension is *dual-bloc banking* is one correspondent decision away from being unable to do its job; an entity whose lowest dimension is *succession law* is fine until the founder dies. Those are different watch items with different owners and different lead times.

Column 7 is the one most often left blank and it is the one that decides substance challenges. Recording who takes the decisions, and where they are physically taken, is a five-minute annual exercise that produces the contemporaneous evidence a later inquiry will ask for. **Evidence created contemporaneously is worth an order of magnitude more than the same facts reconstructed three years later, and the cost of creating it is a column in a table.**

The disclosure test

Chapter 3's test, applied to the taxonomy: would the assignment still work if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

Yes, and the taxonomy is one of the places where the test does positive work rather than merely being passed. **A structure with correctly assigned jobs is easier to explain than one without, because every entity has a reason for existing that can be stated in a sentence and evidenced.** The holding entity holds; here is the succession instrument. The operating entity operates; here are the employees, the premises, the local tax returns. The bridging entity bridges; here are the two correspondent relationships and the screening file.

The overloaded entity is the one that cannot answer. Asked what it does, it says "several things," and when a substance regime or a compliance department asks which activity is conducted where, it has no clean answer — because there isn't one. **The overloaded entity fails the disclosure test not by concealing anything but by being genuinely difficult to describe, and in an environment of automatic exchange and beneficial-ownership registers, being difficult to describe is itself an exposure.**

The Failure Modes

1. The founder's company

The commonest origin of a three-job entity is not a bad decision; it is the absence of one. The founder's original company held the assets because there was nothing else to hold them, operated because that was the point of it, and banked the group because it had the only bank account. It accumulated all three jobs by doing them first. Twenty years later it is a holding company with a factory and a treasury function, and nobody ever decided that.

The diagnostic catches it immediately, because such an entity scores near 3.00. The organisational difficulty is that splitting it means taking things away from the entity the founder identifies

with, and that conversation is harder than the restructuring.

2. The holdco that trades

An entity scoring `(0.5, 0.5, 0)` — 2.00 effective jobs, exactly at the two-job maximum. The specific failure: the trading activity creates the substance and nexus that the holding function was designed to avoid, and it does so in whichever jurisdiction was chosen for holding characteristics rather than operating ones. The result is an operating business in a jurisdiction with no labour market and no market access, and a holding entity with a taxable presence.

3. The opco that banks the group

The mirror: `(0, 0.5, 0.5)`, again 2.00. The operating entity has the bank relationships because it has the cash flows, so group treasury runs through it. The specific failure is that the operating entity's alignment — its nationality, in the sense used above — now determines the group's settlement access. When the operating jurisdiction's corridor is affected, the whole group's payments are affected, and a structure that measured `N = 2.94` on holdings discovers it has an effective bloc count near 1.00 on the ability to transact. **This is the most dangerous of the two-job configurations because it silently reintroduces the concentration that Chapter 5's architecture was built to remove.**

4. The bridge used as a store

CANON section 5, as a failure rather than a rule. Value accumulates in the bridging entity because that is where it passes through, and nobody moves it out because it is convenient where it is. The bridge is the highest-exposure position in the group — most counterparties, most screening, most de-risking risk — and it is now also the largest holding. Fix it with a sweep discipline: a stated maximum balance, a stated maximum dwell time, and a standing instruction that moves the excess to the holding layer. Chapter 32 gives the exposure-window parameters.

5. Averaging the fit scores

Covered in the Specification. Worth restating as a failure because it is what selection committees do by default: they build a weighted scorecard, sum it, and rank. That procedure will select a candidate with a disqualifying weakness over one without, every time the weakness is offset by an irrelevant strength. Score, then take the minimum over the dimensions the job requires, then look at the average only as a tie-breaker among candidates with equal minima.

6. Splitting the entities but not the decision rights

Three entities, three jurisdictions, three sets of accounts — and the same individual is the sole director of all three, signs everything, and takes every decision from one desk. The job vectors say the structure is specialised. The substance analysis says otherwise, and so, potentially, does a central-management-and-control test for corporate residence. **A job is not assigned until the decisions belonging to it are actually taken by the entity that holds it, and by people who could have decided otherwise.** This is the single most common gap between a structure on paper and a structure in fact, and it is what substance challenges are usually about. Chapter 39

carries the case law; verify the residence and management tests in each relevant jurisdiction with counsel, because the tests differ and the difference decides the answer.

7. Assigning a job to a jurisdiction instead of an entity

"Singapore is our bridging jurisdiction" is not an assignment. Singapore is a place. The assignment is to a named entity with a named governing body, named banking relationships, and a stated function. Jurisdiction-level thinking produces structures where the job is theoretically housed somewhere and practically housed nowhere, which surfaces at the first moment the job needs to be performed under pressure.

8. Splitting to satisfy the diagnostic

The diagnostic is a proxy and it can be gamed. An entity at 2.4 effective jobs can be brought to 1.4 by moving a function to a new entity, which improves the score and worsens h if the new entity adds cost without adding capability. The over-fragmentation table is the corrective. **Split when the antagonism is real — when one job's requirements are actively preventing another's — and not because a number crossed a line.**

9. Ignoring that jobs migrate

Job vectors drift. A holding entity acquires an operating subsidiary and starts making decisions for it. A bridging entity begins holding reserves. An operating entity is asked to invoice for a sister company in another bloc. None of these is announced; each shows up as a slightly different vector at the next measurement. **The diagnostic is only useful as a time series, and a structure measured once has been measured never.** Annual, with a written diff, alongside the Chapter 5 measurement.

10. Treating "strained" as failure

Two entities in the designed structure score in the strained band and both are correct. The ADGM holdco at 1.8018 holds and bridges, and that combination is deliberate: ADGM's dual-bloc banking access and English common law make it one of the few places where the combination is defensible. The Bermuda captive at 2.1739 underwrites and reserves, which is what a captive is. **The diagnostic flags entities for justification, not for demolition, and an entity whose strain has a written justification is in better shape than a specialist nobody ever examined.**

11. Forgetting the operating entity is where the money comes from

A structure can be optimised for holding and bridging until it has no operating capacity worth protecting. The S term in the storage law comes from operations. **A perfectly assigned structure with a weak operating entity is a well-designed container for a shrinking quantity**, and the Thai BOI decision in Chapter 23 is treated at length precisely because the operating leg carries the input side of the whole equation.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. The carried case of SPINE section 6: dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in three jurisdictions, one under forced heirship. Thai manufacturing, a UAE trading company, IP, London commercial real estate, a listed portfolio; revenue in USD, EUR, CNY, AED and THB.

Step 1 — the structure as found, scored

The four entities Chapter 5 measured at `N = 1.00`, now scored on the job axis:

entity	H	O	B	S	eff jobs
UK holdco (holds, trades, banks group)	0.40	0.35	0.25	0.3450	2.8986
US portfolio entity	0.55	0.10	0.35	0.4350	2.2989
Jersey IP company	0.60	0.35	0.05	0.4850	2.0619
Luxembourg treaty vehicle	0.45	0.05	0.50	0.4550	2.1978
group aggregate	0.50	0.21	0.29	0.3778	2.6468
mean effective jobs per entity					2.3643

Every one of the four entities is at or above 2.00 effective jobs, which means every one of them is carrying all three jobs, by arithmetic necessity. The UK holdco at 2.8986 is close to the theoretical maximum of 3.00. Four entities, four jurisdictions, one bloc, and no specialisation anywhere.

That is the diagnosis Chapter 5 could not produce. Chapter 5 said the structure has one point of failure. This chapter says that each of its four entities is simultaneously failing three requirement sets. The two findings are independent, they compound, and the combination explains why the structure's h is `−0.500000` rather than merely poor.

The Jersey IP company is worth a sentence because it is the entity everyone defends. It was well built for what it was built for. Its problem is not quality; it is that it holds IP (holding), licenses that IP to the Thai and UK operations at a margin (operating), and receives and onward- pays royalties across the group (bridging). Three jobs, in a jurisdiction chosen for one of them, inside a perimeter that supplies none of the bridging requirement.

Step 2 — apply the assignment rule

HOLDING	min{succession, segregation, low-substance}	-> DIFC	fit 4
OPERATING	min{real-substance, market}	-> Thailand	fit 5
BRIDGING	min{segregation, dual-bank}	-> ADGM	fit 5

Note what the rule rejects and why, because the rejections carry the argument:

- **The UK loses holding** on the low-substance dimension (score 2) despite scoring 3 and 3 on succession and segregation. English law is excellent and the PSC register and ECCTA 2023 identity-verification requirements make it a jurisdiction where holding carries real ongoing burden. It keeps operating, where it scores 4 and 5.

- **Thailand cannot hold**, scoring 1 on succession. Chapter 23's substantive point is that the Treaty of Amity and BOI promotion solve an *ownership* problem, not a *succession* problem, and Por. 161/2566 — under which foreign-source income remitted by a Thai tax resident is taxable from 1 January 2024 regardless of the year earned — removes the remittance-timing planning that used to paper over the difference.
- **The single BVI company loses everything**, scoring 3 / 1 / 1 across the three jobs. It scores 5 on low substance burden, which is why it appeared attractive, and 1 on real substance, market access, and dual-bloc banking. It is a good answer to a question nobody in this case is asking.

Step 3 — the redesign, entity by entity

entity	job	why this entity, this job
DIFC Foundation	HOLDING	Foundations Law No. 3 of 2018: separate legal personality, purpose or beneficiary, founder control retention, DIFC Courts. Answers threat 4. (Ch 7–9)
ADGM holdco	HOLD+BRIDGE	Application of English Law Regulations 2015 directly applies English common law; ADGM Courts; FSRA. Dual-bloc banking. (Ch 17)
Thai BOI opco	OPERATING	BOI promotion for ownership, holidays, land rights. Real substance because the activity is real. No nominees. (Ch 23)
UK Ltd	OPERATING	English governing law, market access, FX depth. Explicitly NOT holding. (Ch 10)
Bermuda captive	OPER+HOLD	real risk transfer, BMA supervision, reserves against real third-party liabilities. Strain accepted and justified. (Ch 14–15)
GIFT City vehicle	BRIDGING	rupee corridor, IFSCA-regulated. Repaired from a three-job specification. (Ch 24)
Singapore treasury	BRIDGING	dual-rail settlement, common law, MAS. (Ch 20)

Step 4 — rescore, and confirm the diagnostic moved

	as found	designed
mean effective jobs	2.3643	1.6852
worst entity	2.8986	2.6316 -> 1.3605 after repair A
entities above 2.00	4 of 4	1 of 7 -> 0 of 7 after repair
entities below 1.50	0 of 4	3 of 7

After the GIFT City repair, no entity in the designed structure carries all three jobs. Two remain in the strained band with written justifications, which is the intended end state rather than a compromise.

Step 5 — reconcile with Chapter 5, and with the cost

Put the two measurements side by side, since they are the two halves of the same diagnosis:

	as found	designed
EFFECTIVE BLOCS N	1.00	2.9412
ln(N)	0.000000	1.078810
eta ln(N) at eta = 0.35	0.000000	0.377583
mean effective jobs per entity	2.3643	1.6852
entities	4	7
C	(lower)	0.30
h	−0.500000	−0.122417

And the honest reading of that table, which this chapter has to give because it computed the inconvenient number itself. **The as-found structure is cheaper. It has four entities rather than seven, no substance in an operating jurisdiction, and no dual-bloc banking to maintain.** Its `C` is lower and its h is still worse by 0.377583, because `ln(1.00) = 0` cannot be compensated for by any saving on the maintenance side. The designed structure costs more and is worth more, and the break-even computed in the Specification says specialisation pays whenever a structural failure costs more than 1.37 years of running cost.

Step 6 — what remains unresolved

- The Bermuda captive's strain is inherent and permanent. It is justified, not fixed.
- Holding is concentrated at 2.61 effective entities with the Foundation at 52.02%. Deliberate, and it means the Foundation is a single point of failure on the succession axis. Chapters 8 and 9 address what happens if the Foundation itself is challenged, and the honest answer is that a successful challenge to the holding layer is the worst case in the whole architecture.
- Seven entities sit below the nineteen-entity point at which administration eats the structure, with room for perhaps three more before the marginal entity destroys more than it adds. **That headroom should be spent on blocs, not on refinements inside blocs, because entities inside an existing bloc add `C` and nothing to `N`.**
- The job vectors are estimates. They should be re-derived annually from where board resolutions and management time actually went, not from where the constitutional documents say they could have gone.

Three jobs, three requirement sets, and the requirement sets fight each other. Assign by the minimum over what the job needs, measure the overload with the effective-jobs count, split when the antagonism is real, and stop splitting when the marginal entity stops adding a bloc. That is the whole instrument, and Chapters 7 onward are the jurisdictions it is applied to.

Verification notes

1. DIFC Foundations Law No. 3 of 2018, and ADGM's Application of English Law Regulations 2015, are cited for the characteristics stated. Confirm current text, any amendments, and the practical scope of each with counsel in the relevant centre.

2. Thai law: the US-Thai Treaty of Amity 1966, BOI promotion conditions, the Foreign Business Act restrictions, the criminal treatment of nominee shareholding, and Revenue Department order Por. 161/2566 are cited as stated in this book's canon. BOI conditions in particular are activity- specific and change; verify with Thai counsel before relying on any of them.
3. Economic substance regimes and their thresholds vary by jurisdiction and by activity category and have been amended repeatedly since 2018. Verify the applicable regime, the activity classification, and the current test with local counsel.
4. Corporate residence and central-management-and-control tests differ between jurisdictions and determine whether failure mode 6 is fatal in a given case. This requires jurisdiction-specific advice, not a general rule.
5. Cases cited by name and reporter: *Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd* [1897] AC 22; *Adams v Cape Industries plc* [1990] Ch 433; *Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd* [2013] UKSC 34.
6. All cost figures are index units in a constructed model. They are not fee quotations and no real fee schedule was used to produce them.

All numerical results in this chapter were computed from the stated inputs at full precision and rounded only for printing. Appendix B reproduces the workbook.

Part III — The Heart

Chapter 7 . The DIFC Foundation

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* This chapter describes how an instrument works, what it costs and where it fails. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in the DIFC and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Six chapters established that the traditional havens degraded together because they were coordinated together, and that the correct measurement of a structure is not how many jurisdictions it touches but how many independent coordination perimeters it spans. Chapter 5 produced the hard number: the conventional four-entity structure across the UK, the US, Jersey and Luxembourg has an effective bloc count of exactly one, and `ln(1.00) = 0`. Chapter 6 separated the three jobs — holding, operating, bridging — and showed that most failed structures are one entity asked to do all three.

This chapter builds the holding instrument. It is the heart of the architecture because everything else hangs from it, and because the choice made here is the one that is genuinely difficult to reverse. An operating company can be redomiciled, wound up or duplicated; a bank account can be replaced in ninety days. **The apex of a structure is chosen once, and every subsequent decision inherits its law, its court, its disclosure regime and its politics.**

The instrument is the DIFC Foundation, created under the **DIFC Foundations Law, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018**. It is the correct apex for the structure this book builds, and the argument for it has four legs.

One: an apex must be a person, not a relationship

A common-law trust is a relationship with no legal personality. The trustee owns the property at law; the beneficiaries hold equitable interests; the trust itself is not a thing that can be introduced to a Thai company registrar, a French notary, or a Gulf bank's onboarding team without a long conversation. That conversation is survivable in London and Singapore. It is expensive in Frankfurt, difficult in Bangkok, and in several jurisdictions it produces a result nobody intended, because the local court has no category for an owner who is not the owner.

A foundation is a legal person: registered, named, chartered, capable of being the shareholder of record, of signing, of suing, and — the point that matters — of being recognised by any legal system on earth without that system first having to accept the division of legal and beneficial ownership. **Recognition of a foreign legal person is close to universal; recognition of the trust's ownership split is not, and the gap between those two facts is the whole argument of Chapter 8.**

For a family entirely inside the common-law world, this leg carries no weight. For the carried case of this book — a dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in three jurisdictions, one of them in a forced-heirship civil-law country, assets in Thailand, the UAE, the UK, Bermuda and India — it carries most of it.

Two: the apex must sit outside the coordinating perimeter

Chapter 2 identified the coordination mechanism: FATF, the OECD Global Forum, EU listing processes, CRS, and correspondent-bank de-risking, acting together on jurisdictions inside one political perimeter. That mechanism is not evaded by moving from Jersey to Guernsey, or from Luxembourg to Ireland. Those are rearrangements inside a bloc, and rearranging inside a bloc does not change N.

The DIFC sits in a bridge bloc. That is not a claim that the UAE is beyond regulatory pressure — it demonstrably is not, and the FATF grey-listing from **March 2022 to February 2024** is the evidence, treated at length in Chapter 18. It is a claim about the *coordination* variable: the UAE responds to FATF and OECD processes on its own timetable, maintains relations across blocs that no EU member state maintains, and is not subject to the EU listing mechanism, the EU state-aid jurisdiction, or the politics that produced the sequential degradation of the Crown Dependencies and the Atlantic offshore centres.

Three: the apex must be governed by a court that publishes

Neutrality is worth nothing without enforceability. A jurisdiction outside the coordinating perimeter but with an unpredictable judiciary is a worse asset than a coordinated jurisdiction with a good one, because the failure mode is uninsurable. The DIFC Courts are an English-language common-law court staffed substantially by senior judges from England, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, publishing reasoned judgments, established under **Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004** (the Judicial Authority Law) and given a much broader jurisdiction by **Dubai Law No. 16 of 2011**, which permits parties with no other DIFC connection to opt in by written agreement.

The disputes an apex generates are governance disputes — whether a councillor was validly removed, whether a distribution was properly made, whether a reserved power was exercisable, whether a beneficiary may see the accounts — and they are decided by a court reading a charter and a statute. **A court that publishes its reasoning is a court whose future behaviour can be priced; that is the only sense in which legal risk is ever insurable.**

Four: the founder must be able to keep his hands on it — within limits

This is the leg that gets misused, so it is stated with its limit attached. Under the DIFC Foundations Law the founder may reserve powers to himself — expressly contemplated by the statute, and a material advantage over a traditional discretionary trust, where extensive settlor control is a well-known route to a sham finding.

But the limit is real and it is not a DIFC limit. **A power reserved under DIFC law is valid under DIFC law and is simultaneously a fact that every other jurisdiction with a claim on the founder will use against the structure.** Reserved powers create corporate-residence exposure where the founder sits, controlled-foreign-entity attribution in several civil-law systems, and alter-ego arguments in creditor litigation — and they do nothing whatever against the failure mode that has actually destroyed offshore structures in the recorded case law: a court with personal jurisdiction over the founder ordering him to unwind it. Chapter 39 carries those cases.

What the Foundation is for, stated narrowly

Name the job precisely: the commonest error in this field is buying an instrument for a job it does not do.

```
DOES:
  hold      -- own subsidiary shares as a single perpetual owner
  continue  -- survive the founder's death without probate in five places
  insulate  -- keep the operating businesses from fragmenting among heirs
  travel    -- present as a legal person in every legal family
  govern    -- give a written constitution to family capital decisions

DOES NOT:
  hide      -- registered, charter filed, UBOs recorded
  defeat    -- a court with jurisdiction over the founder is not stopped
  exempt    -- no tax is removed where the family or the assets are
  operate   -- no substance, no staff, no trade
  bridge    -- not a payments entity; see the ADGM holdco and Chapter 31
```

Run the disclosure test from CANON §1.1 against that list. Every item in the first block survives disclosure without alteration. Perpetual single ownership works *better* when it is publicly known, because the registrar in Bangkok and the bank in Singapore can both see who the shareholder is and stop asking. **The Foundation is a surveillance-irrelevant instrument in the strict sense: it is designed to be looked at.**

That is also the honest reason it costs money. In the storage law carried from Book Two —

```
Q_{t+1} = (1-delta) Q_t + eta S_t - C_t        h = eta ln(N) - delta Q - C
```

— a Foundation raises `N` and it raises `C`, through registrar fees, a registered agent, council fees, accounting and counsel in several jurisdictions. SPINE §2's companion result says plainly that at the tested parameters both the conventional and the designed structures sit below the build threshold. **Jurisdictional diversity buys the ability to build; it does not pay the maintenance bill.** Chapter 37 carries that arithmetic. This chapter's job is to make sure what you are paying `C` for is load-bearing.

The Mechanism

The constitutional basis, and why the DIFC can have its own private law

How does an emirate inside a federal, civil-law, Sharia-influenced state produce a common-law foundation statute enforced by an English-language court? The answer is a specific constitutional carve-out, and it is worth getting right, because the durability of everything downstream depends on it.

The UAE Constitution was amended to permit the creation of financial free zones. **Federal Law No. 8 of 2004 concerning Financial Free Zones** provides the framework, and the DIFC was established as such a zone by **Federal Decree No. 35 of 2004** together with **Dubai Law No. 9 of 2004**. The critical operative effect is that entities and operations within a financial free zone are exempted from the application of UAE federal *civil and commercial* law, and the zone may enact its own civil and commercial legislation in its place. Federal *criminal* law continues to apply, as

do certain federal regimes — anti-money-laundering, sanctions, and counter-terrorism financing among them.

So the DIFC's private law is not offshore in the sense of being extraterritorial. It is domestic UAE law operating through a constitutionally created enclave. That distinction has practical consequences that appear repeatedly in this chapter: the DIFC is inside the UAE for CRS purposes, inside the UAE for federal AML purposes, inside the UAE for federal criminal law, and outside the UAE for the law that governs whether your foundation validly exists.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the precise scope of the carve-out and the federal statutes that apply notwithstanding it, against the current consolidated position rather than any secondary description including this one. The carve-out has been adjusted over time, most visibly by the arrival of federal corporate tax.

What a foundation actually is

Three forms of holding entity exist, and the differences are structural rather than cosmetic.

COMPANY	members own it; ownership transfers; value accrues to owners; the death of an owner moves shares.
TRUST	no legal personality; trustee holds legal title; beneficiaries hold equitable interests; a relationship governed by equity and the trust instrument.
FOUNDATION	legal personality; NO members, shareholders or owners; an endowment given legal form and a purpose; governed by charter and council, not by owners.

The last line is the one to sit with. A foundation is an *ownerless owner*. Once the founder endows property to it, that property belongs to the Foundation; there is no residual shareholder to whom it reverts, no share register to inherit, no equity to be seized as an asset of the founder's estate, and no member whose divorce, bankruptcy or death moves a block of ownership.

That single characteristic — property with a legal owner but no beneficial owner in the proprietary sense — is what allows a family enterprise to survive three generations without being cut into pieces at each one. It is also exactly what makes tax authorities and compliance officers attentive, and why the disclosure architecture around foundations has tightened everywhere. The structure must be built to withstand the second fact while capturing the first.

Separate legal personality

The DIFC Foundations Law confers separate legal personality on a Foundation upon registration by the Registrar of Companies. In consequence the Foundation may in its own name hold property, hold shares in companies in any jurisdiction, enter contracts, open accounts, sue and be sued, and appear as the registered shareholder in a foreign register.

This is the property that does the work in the carried structure. The ADGM holdco's beneficial-ownership particulars, the UK Ltd's PSC entry, the Thai registrar's record of the BOI-promoted company's shareholder, and the Bermuda captive's BMA filing all point to one registered legal person with one name, one charter and one address. **Four filings in four jurisdictions that agree with each other is a compliance asset, not a compliance cost, and it is the practical meaning of surveillance irrelevance.**

Purpose, beneficiaries, or both

The DIFC Foundations Law permits a Foundation to be established for a purpose, for beneficiaries, or for a combination. It does not require beneficiaries to exist. Purposes may be charitable or non-charitable, and a Foundation may hold assets for a defined non-charitable purpose indefinitely — which in a common-law trust would collide with the beneficiary principle and the rule against perpetuities. That is one of the clean structural wins of the form.

The design consequences:

- **A purpose Foundation has no beneficiaries and therefore nobody with a proprietary claim.** There is no interest for a creditor of a beneficiary to attach, no interest to be valued in a divorce, and no interest that forms part of a deceased beneficiary's estate. What exists instead is, at most, an expectancy.
- A beneficiary Foundation is easier to bank, to explain to a tax authority, and to administer, because "who is this for?" has an answer that fits the form.
- A combined Foundation — purpose in the charter, discretionary class in the by-laws — is the usual answer for a family enterprise and is what the carried case uses.

The trade-off is enforceability: where nobody has a proprietary claim, nobody has obvious standing to enforce the charter against a delinquent council. That is what the Guardian is for, and why a purpose Foundation without a competent, genuinely independent Guardian is a badly built instrument rather than a clever one.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the precise statutory trigger requiring appointment of a Guardian. Practice generally describes a Guardian as required where the Foundation is established for a purpose (or certain classes of purpose) and optional otherwise. Pin the article and its wording before drafting: the Guardian's powers must be built around the statutory floor, not a secondary summary.

The charter and the by-laws

A DIFC Foundation is constituted by a **Charter**, which is filed with the Registrar, and it may in addition have **By-laws**, which are not filed and are held privately by the Foundation and its registered agent.

The division is the practical heart of the drafting exercise and it deserves to be understood as a disclosure design, not as a hiding place.

```
CHARTER  (filed, obtainable)
  name; objects/purposes in general terms; initial endowment;
  the existence and composition of the Council; the Guardian if any;
  the registered agent/office; duration; amendment mechanics;
  what happens to assets on winding up.

BY-LAWS  (private, held by the Foundation and its agent)
  the beneficiary class and how it is defined; distribution standards;
  the Council's internal procedure; the founder's reserved powers in
  operative detail; the appointment/removal machinery; the succession
  of Council and Guardian; investment and reserved-matter policy.
```

The temptation is to put everything sensitive in the by-laws and treat them as unreachable. They are not. The registered agent holds them under DIFC regulatory obligations; a DIFC Court can order their production; a properly framed exchange-of-information request through the UAE competent authority can reach them; a bank will require sight of them at onboarding and retain a copy. **Treat the by-laws as private but discoverable, and draft every line to be read aloud in a courtroom by an unfriendly advocate.** A structure that fails when the by-laws are read is a concealment structure and fails CANON §1.1 by construction. The legitimate use of the split is narrower: it keeps sensitive family information out of a register anyone can search, while keeping every element available to any authority with a proper basis to ask.

The organs: Council, Guardian, Registered Agent

The Council is the governing organ: it manages the Foundation, holds and administers its property, and is bound to act in accordance with the Charter and By-laws and in furtherance of the objects, under duties the statute sets out. Council composition is the most consequential choice after the charter drafting itself, because the Council is what a foreign court will look at when it asks who actually controls the assets.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the minimum number of councillors under DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018, whether a corporate councillor is permitted, and whether any councillor must be a UAE resident or a DIFC-registered person. Practice descriptions commonly state a minimum of two councillors; the statutory minimum and any residency or corporate-councillor restriction should be confirmed from the current text of the law and the Registrar's requirements before the Council is designed.

The Guardian supervises: the function is to hold the Council to the Charter, and the Guardian's consent is typically made a condition of specified powers — amendment of the objects, removal of a councillor, a distribution above a threshold, disposal of a core holding. In a purpose Foundation the Guardian is the enforcement mechanism that the absence of beneficiaries removes.

The design error is appointing the founder's oldest friend and giving him a consent right over everything. That produces a rubber stamp — worse than nothing, because it manufactures a paper trail of approvals that were never scrutiny — or a deadlock. Give the Guardian a short defined list of consent rights, an express information right, and a drafted succession mechanism.

The Registered Agent is a DIFC-licensed corporate service provider that maintains the Foundation's DIFC address, holds the statutory registers, makes the filings, and is the contact point for the Registrar. A Foundation may instead maintain its own registered office in the DIFC, which materially increases cost and is rarely justified for a pure holding vehicle.

Verify with DIFC counsel: whether the registered-agent route is available for all Foundation types or is conditional, and the agent's current statutory record-keeping and disclosure obligations. The agent's obligations are the practical disclosure surface of the whole structure and must be understood exactly, not approximately.

Founder control: what may be retained, and what retaining it costs

The DIFC Foundations Law permits the founder to reserve powers. This is one of the most-cited features of the regime and one of the most frequently misused, so the mechanism and the price are set out together.

The powers a founder is commonly advised he may reserve include: appointing and removing councillors; appointing and removing the Guardian; amending the Charter or By-laws; adding or excluding beneficiaries; directing or vetoing distributions; approving disposals of core assets; consenting to a change of the Foundation's governing law or domicile; and appointing a successor to his own reserved powers on death or incapacity.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the enumerated list of reservable powers in DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018, whether the list is exhaustive or illustrative, and whether the statute expressly provides that reservation does not of itself invalidate the Foundation. Several foundation regimes contain an express saving provision to that effect; whether the DIFC's is drafted in the same terms materially affects the drafting, and must be read in the current text rather than assumed from another jurisdiction's regime.

Now the price, which is the part usually omitted.

Residence. Most tax systems locate a legal person where it is centrally managed and controlled, whatever its place of registration. If the founder holds a veto over every distribution and the Council does what he tells it from a house in a high-tax country, an assessing authority there has a serviceable argument that the Foundation is resident with it. The registration certificate does not answer that argument.

Attribution. Several civil-law systems attribute the income of a foreign foundation directly to its resident founder or beneficiaries. Germany's Foreign Tax Act (Aussensteuergesetz) contains a family-foundation attribution rule at section 15, and France's anti-avoidance machinery for foreign entities and for trusts reaches structures of this type; Chapters 8 and 9 develop both. Reserved powers strengthen every such argument, because attribution rules key on control and on entitlement.

Alter ego. In creditor and matrimonial litigation the question is whether the entity is genuinely separate from the individual. A founder who reserved the power to direct distributions to himself, and exercised it, has supplied the answer. DIFC law protects a validly constituted Foundation; a foreign court applying its own law to a person before it is not constrained by that.

Succession. Reserved powers are personal. Unless expressly made transmissible with a named successor they may lapse on the founder's death — the intended design, or an accident that leaves the Council unconstrained at the worst moment.

The disciplined position is a graded reservation, set out in the Specification. **Reserve the powers that protect the structure from the Council; give away the powers that would let the Council be described as your agent.**

The firewall, and its real reach

Foundation and trust statutes in this field commonly contain "firewall" provisions: rules that questions of the entity's validity, the transfer of property to it, and the rights of beneficiaries are governed exclusively by local law, and that inconsistent foreign judgments and foreign law — expressly including foreign forced-heirship rules — are not given effect locally. The DIFC Foundations Law contains provisions of this character.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the exact wording and article numbers of the firewall and governing-law provisions in DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018, whether they extend to claims arising from a personal relationship to the founder (marriage, divorce, succession), whether they cover the enforcement

of a foreign judgment as distinct from the application of foreign law, and how they interact with the equivalent provisions in the DIFC Trust Law, DIFC Law No. 4 of 2018. This is the single most commonly overstated feature of every foundation regime in the world and the wording is the whole of it.

What a firewall does, stated conservatively:

IT BINDS	IT DOES NOT BIND
the DIFC Courts	any foreign court
a claim brought in the DIFC	a claim brought elsewhere
the disposition of DIFC-situs assets	assets situated elsewhere
the internal validity question	the founder's personal obligations

The asymmetry is the point. A firewall is a rule addressed to the local judge: it tells the DIFC Court not to give effect to a foreign reserve claim or a foreign matrimonial order over Foundation property. It has no addressee in Paris. A French court ruling on a French-situs asset will apply French law; a court in the founder's residence asked to make orders against him personally will make them.

The firewall's genuine function is narrower and still valuable. It makes the DIFC-situs layer resistant to a claimant who must, at some point, come to Dubai to make a claim bite on the shares, and it converts a claim that would otherwise be executed by registrar entry into one that must be litigated in a court applying DIFC law. That is a real change in cost and odds. **It is a friction and a forum, not a shield, and any adviser who describes it as a shield is selling something.**

The case law of the last twenty-five years says the same from the other direction. The Cook Islands built the strongest non-recognition statute anyone has drafted and it failed repeatedly against United States contempt power, because the target of the order was the principal, not the structure. *In re Lawrence* and *FTC v. Affordable Media* are carried in Chapter 39 with their facts, and they are why this chapter states its limits before its advantages.

Migration in, migration out

The DIFC Foundations Law provides for the continuation of a foreign foundation into the DIFC, and for a DIFC Foundation to transfer out to another jurisdiction. Continuation is not a transfer of assets — the entity itself changes its governing law while retaining its legal identity, so that contracts, shareholdings and bank relationships survive the move without novation.

This is an under-used resilience feature: it means the apex is not irreversibly committed. If the UAE's trajectory changed materially — federal encroachment on the free zones, a court reform that damaged predictability, a political event — a Foundation with a properly drafted continuation power can move to ADGM, or to a foundation jurisdiction in another bloc, without liquidating a single holding.

Build the migration path in at inception: (a) an express charter power to transfer the Foundation out and to change its governing law; (b) an identified consent-holder for that power, which should not be the founder alone; (c) a shortlist of destination regimes checked for continuation-in capability and for whether they will accept a DIFC Foundation without re-endowment; and (d) subsidiary constitutional documents and finance documents that do not contain change-of-domicile default triggers. Point (d) is where this normally fails: a facility agreement at the UK Ltd with a broadly drafted change-of-control clause can make the apex immovable.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the exact continuation-in and transfer-out provisions of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018 — Registrar consent, solvency or creditor-notice conditions, whether entities other than foreign foundations (a company limited by guarantee, a Cayman foundation company) may continue in, and whether a DIFC company may convert.

DIFC Courts jurisdiction

Disputes concerning the Foundation belong to the DIFC Courts, by virtue of the entity's location and, in the ordinary case, an express charter provision. Two features matter to the apex design.

First, opt-in. Under the Judicial Authority Law as amended in 2011, parties may confer jurisdiction on the DIFC Courts by written agreement even where neither party nor the dispute has any other DIFC connection. This lets the whole family governance layer — a shareholders' agreement with a co-investor, a services agreement with an adviser, a family charter between the heirs — sit under one court applying one body of law, in English, wherever the parties live.

Second, enforcement outward. DIFC Courts judgments are enforceable in the Dubai courts through the protocol in the Judicial Authority Law, and the DIFC Courts have entered non-binding Memoranda of Guidance on enforcement with a number of foreign courts, beginning with the Commercial Court of England and Wales in 2013. Those memoranda state how each court understands the other's process. They are not treaties and they create no obligation.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the current status of the Judicial Tribunal that resolves conflicts of jurisdiction between the Dubai Courts and the DIFC Courts. It was created by Dubai Decree No. 19 of 2016 and is generally understood to have been reconstituted since; check the current constituting instrument, its composition, and its line of decisions on the "conduit" question — whether a foreign judgment recognised in the DIFC may be enforced onward into onshore Dubai. That question was litigated in the DIFC Court of Appeal in the middle of the last decade and the answer has moved. Do not build on an assumption about it.

The honest reading: DIFC Courts jurisdiction is excellent for the disputes an apex actually generates — internal governance — and should not be relied on as a route to enforce foreign judgments into the wider UAE, nor as a route to keep them out of it.

The Specification

A build specification: the decisions in the order they must be taken, with the consequence of each. Written for the carried case; the sequence is general.

Step 1 — Fix the job before the form

Write one paragraph, before any counsel is instructed, stating what the apex is for. If it contains "operate", "trade", "invoice" or "employ", the design is wrong and Chapter 6 explains why. If it contains "hide", the design fails CANON §1.1 and should be abandoned.

For the carried case: *to own, permanently and as a single legal person, the holding interests in the family's manufacturing, trading, property, insurance and fund vehicles; to keep those interests undivided across three generations and three heir jurisdictions; to distribute income to a defined family class on stated standards; and to be capable of moving its own governing law if the jurisdiction degrades.*

Step 2 — Purpose, beneficiaries, or both

Decide the shape. The carried case uses a combined form: a stated non-charitable purpose in the Charter — the preservation and stewardship of the family enterprise — with a discretionary beneficiary class defined in the By-laws, and a Guardian whose consent is required for the reserved matters.

The reason is specific. A pure beneficiary Foundation gives each heir something that begins to look like an interest, and an interest is what a divorce court, a creditor and a forced-heirship claimant can each attach or value. A pure purpose Foundation removes that but makes distributions awkward to justify and banking materially harder. The combined form states the purpose as the governing object and keeps the beneficiary class discretionary: no heir holds more than an expectancy, and the distribution machinery still has a clear basis.

Step 3 — The endowment

The founder endows property. The endowment must be real, documented, and clean.

Verify with DIFC counsel: any minimum initial asset requirement under DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018 and the Registrar's current practice. A nominal minimum is commonly described; the figure and whether it must be cash should be confirmed.

The substantive requirements are independent of the minimum. The endowment deed must identify the property precisely, recite the founder's solvency at the date of transfer, and be dated. Solvency recitals are not decoration: fraudulent-transfer law turns on the transferor's position and intent at the moment of transfer, and Chapter 32 sets out those tests. Do not endow assets already the subject of, or foreseeably about to be the subject of, a claim. That is not planning; it is the conduct fraudulent-transfer statutes exist to reverse, and it converts a lawful structure into evidence.

Step 4 — Draft the Charter for the register

Draft the Charter assuming a journalist, a competitor, a foreign tax authority and a future heir will all read it. Keep the objects broad enough for thirty years of asset changes and specific enough to be meaningful; state the duration as perpetual; include the amendment mechanics, the transfer-out power, the Guardian's office, and the winding-up destination.

Two drafting points are load-bearing. The amendment mechanics should require more than one person's decision after the founder's death or incapacity, since an unconstrained post-mortem amendment power is a licence to rewrite the family settlement. And the winding-up clause should name a real destination — a successor foundation, a charitable object, a defined class — rather than leave it to the Council, because an open winding-up power can move the whole endowment.

Step 5 — Draft the By-laws for the courtroom

The By-laws carry the beneficiary class, the distribution standards, the reserved powers in operative form, and the governance machinery. Draft them to survive being read aloud. Practical content, in the order usually needed:

```
1  Beneficiary class, including adopted children, stepchildren and
   children born outside marriage. Say it explicitly: silence here
```

```
   produces litigation in every generation.
2  Distribution standards: what the Council may distribute for, what it
   must consider, what it may not do. Avoid unfettered discretion.
3  Founder's reserved powers, with the successor mechanism and express
   treatment of incapacity as well as death.
4  Guardian's consent matters, information rights, and succession.
5  Council composition, quorum, deadlock resolution, and the rule that
   meetings are held and minuted in the DIFC.
6  Reserved matters needing supermajority or Guardian consent: disposal
   of a core holding, debt above a threshold, amendment of the
   beneficiary class, change of governing law.
7  Beneficiary information rights. Decide deliberately; the default in a
   discretionary structure is contested everywhere.
8  Conflict of interest and related-party dealing.
9  Dispute resolution: DIFC Courts, family disputes mediated first.
```

Step 6 — Compose the Council

The Council is the control question and every foreign authority treats it as such. Three principles.

Substance over convenience. At least one councillor should be a professional, independent DIFC or UAE resident, engaged on commercial terms, who reads the papers and can say no. This is not a formality; it is the evidence that the Council is a decision-making organ.

Continuity over loyalty. A Council whose members are all the founder's contemporaries has a ten-year fuse. Stagger the ages, define terms, and put the appointment mechanism somewhere it will still function in thirty years.

Location over documentation. Hold the meetings in the DIFC, minute them there, take the decisions there. Minutes recording a DIFC meeting that everyone knows happened by telephone from the founder's study are worse than no claim at all: they add a credibility problem to a residence problem.

Step 7 — Grade the reserved powers

The graded reservation. The founder keeps the powers that defend the Foundation from its own organs; he does not keep the powers that make him its beneficial owner in substance.

```
RESERVE (low control-attribution cost, high protective value)
  appoint and remove councillors, subject to Guardian consent
  appoint the successor Guardian
  consent to amendment of the OBJECTS
  consent to disposal of a CORE holding
  consent to change of governing law / transfer out

DO NOT RESERVE (high attribution cost, low protective value)
  power to direct a distribution to a named person
  power to direct a distribution to the FOUNDER
  general power to revoke the Foundation and take the assets back
  standing veto over ordinary investment decisions
```

```
    power to add oneself to the beneficiary class

  DECIDE WITH COUNSEL IN EVERY RELEVANT JURISDICTION
    power to add or exclude beneficiaries
    power to amend the By-laws
```

The two "decide" items are genuinely borderline: useful, and exactly the powers that attribution and alter-ego arguments feed on. The answer depends on where the founder and beneficiaries are resident and which attribution regimes are in play. It is not a DIFC question.

Step 8 — The onshore interface

A registered Foundation that cannot open a bank account is an ornament. The interface work consumes most of the project time.

Beneficial ownership. The DIFC operates its own beneficial-ownership regime through the Registrar: filed and maintained, not publicly searchable, accessible to the Registrar and competent authorities. The federal UBO regime, Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020 on the regulation of beneficial-owner procedures, applies onshore; the financial free zones operate equivalents. State the consequence to the family at the outset: **the identity of the founder, the councillors, the guardian and the beneficiaries will be recorded, and the structure must be one that works when they are.**

Verify with DIFC counsel: the current DIFC UBO regulations, who counts as a beneficial owner of a Foundation (founder, councillors, guardian, beneficiaries, or a control test), and the access rights of authorities and banks.

CRS. The UAE is a CRS participating jurisdiction. A Foundation is classified either as a Financial Institution — typically an Investment Entity where professionally managed — or as a Passive Non-Financial Entity. Under the first it reports its account holders; under the second the bank holding its accounts looks through and reports its controlling persons. There is no third option that produces non-reporting. The classification decision is a real one and changes who reports what to whom.

Corporate tax. Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022 applies to financial years beginning on or after 1 June 2023, at 9% above the threshold, with a 0% rate for qualifying free zone persons on qualifying income. It contains a family foundation provision permitting a qualifying foundation to be treated as fiscally transparent — as an unincorporated partnership — on application and subject to conditions, so that income is treated as arising to the founder or beneficiaries.

Verify with UAE tax counsel: the article containing the family foundation provision (commonly cited as Article 17), the conditions for the election, the current ministerial decision on unincorporated partnerships and family foundations, the qualifying-income conditions under the free zone regime, and the domestic minimum top-up tax. This area has changed every year since 2023; a description written at any date is a description of that date.

Economic substance. The UAE economic substance regime applied from 2019 and its application to later financial years was subsequently narrowed. **Verify with UAE counsel** whether it currently applies to a DIFC Foundation carrying on a holding activity, and what filings are required.

Banking. Onboard with the full pack: charter, by-laws, endowment deed, council resolutions, UBO declarations, source-of-wealth narrative, group structure chart. A purpose foundation with

a broad charter and no named beneficiaries takes longer. Expect to answer "who benefits?" in writing, and have an answer that is true. Chapter 38 treats compliance answerability as a design requirement rather than an administrative chore; this is where it first bites.

Step 9 — Hang the structure underneath

The carried architecture, per SPINE §6:


DIFC FOUNDATION (Ch 7)
ADGM HOLDCO (Ch 17)
UK LTD (Ch 10)
BERMUDA CAPTIVE (Ch 14–15)
GIFT CITY VEHICLE (Ch 24)
THAI BOI OPCO (Ch 23)
REIT POSITION (Ch 29)
SPVs (Ch 30)

Four direct holdings, one sub-holding chain. Two design rules govern the shape.

Hold, do not cross-hold. Each branch is held directly by the Foundation and holds no interest in any other branch. Cross-holdings convert four independent perimeter exposures into one — precisely the error Chapter 5 measures. An authority or creditor reaching one branch should find nothing that leads to another.

One layer of separation per job. The ADGM holdco exists because the Thai opco needs an owner that can execute shareholder actions, hold intercompany debt and be a joint-venture counterparty — jobs a Foundation should not do. The UK Ltd, the Bermuda captive and the GIFT City vehicle are held directly: an extra layer buys nothing at the UK Ltd, insurance regulators want a clean identifiable owner, and IFSCA licensing is made materially harder by depth of chain.

Step 10 — Write the succession memorandum

The document nobody drafts and every family needs: a plain-language memorandum, held with the registered agent and the Guardian, stating what the structure is, who the counsel are in each jurisdiction, where the documents live, what the founder's reserved powers were and what happens to them, and who to call on the day. It has no legal effect and it is the difference between an orderly transition and eighteen months of paralysis.

It is not a letter of wishes. A letter of wishes expresses the founder's intentions about distributions, does not bind the Council, is discoverable, and can be used to argue the Council never exercised independent judgment. Keep it short and never contradict the By-laws in it.

The Failure Modes

1. The alter-ego collapse

The founder reserves everything, directs everything, treats the Foundation's accounts as his own. A foreign court — divorce, creditor, tax tribunal — concludes the entity is a facade for the individual. DIFC law does not travel to that courtroom.

Diagnostic: if the founder can obtain money from the Foundation for personal use on his own signature, the failure is already present. *Mitigation:* the graded reservation at Step 7, genuine council deliberation, and distributions that follow a written standard.

2. Residence by management

Nobody moves the Foundation; it moves itself, by where its decisions are taken. Central management and control accrues where the meetings really happen. The result is a Foundation tax-resident in a high-tax jurisdiction doing none of the compliance a resident entity performs — worse than never having built it.

Diagnostic: count the last twelve council decisions and ask where each was actually made. *Mitigation:* a resident professional councillor with real authority, meetings physically held in the DIFC, and a rule that no decision is taken between meetings.

3. Reading the firewall as a shield

The structure is built on the belief that a forced-heirship claim or a foreign judgment cannot touch it. It can — wherever the asset is, or wherever the founder is. The firewall governs the DIFC judge.

Diagnostic: the plan has no answer to the question "what happens if a court orders the founder, personally, to procure a distribution?" *Mitigation:* accept the limit, read Chapter 39, and do not place assets in the structure that are already contested.

4. The single-apex concentration

Chapter 5's instrument measures asset exposure. It does not measure the apex. A structure with six jurisdictions and 2.94 effective blocs on the asset side still has one governance point of failure: one entity, one registrar, one court, one country.

Diagnostic: ask what happens if the DIFC changes its foundations regime adversely. *Mitigation:* the migration path at inception, a second holding entity in another bloc for a defined slice of assets, and the acknowledgment that apex concentration is managed, not eliminated.

5. Guardian failure

The Guardian dies, resigns or becomes incapable and there is no successor mechanism. Every reserved-matter consent becomes unobtainable: the Foundation cannot amend, cannot dispose of a core holding, cannot move. The Council must apply to the DIFC Court — expensive, slow, public.

Diagnostic: read the Guardian succession clause aloud; if it names one person and stops, the failure mode is live. *Mitigation:* a named successor, a fallback appointor, and an institutional longstop appointor.

6. Document mismatch

Charter and By-laws contradict each other; the letter of wishes contradicts both; a subsidiary shareholders' agreement gives a councillor a right the By-laws deny him. Each is found in the first serious dispute and each is expensive. *Mitigation:* an annual single-owner document review and an express order of precedence in the Charter.

7. The unbankable purpose

A wide purpose charter with no beneficiaries meets a bank onboarding team and the structure sits unbanked for a year. Not a compliance failure — a foreseeable design failure. *Mitigation:* the combined form at Step 2, a source-of-wealth narrative written before the application, and a bank that has onboarded DIFC Foundations before.

8. Maintenance decay

`C` is paid for three years and then quietly stops being paid. Minutes stop being taken. The independent councillor resigns and is not replaced. Filings slip. The structure looks identical on the register and has lost every substantive characteristic that made it defensible.

This is the commonest failure of all, it is invisible until it is tested, and it is the reason the storage law puts `C` on the right-hand side of the equation rather than treating it as a one-off cost of entry.

9. Forced-heirship spillover

The Foundation holds the enterprise and a reserved-portion claim arrives anyway — against assets in the claimant's jurisdiction, against distributions once received, or through a compensatory mechanism in the heir's country. Chapter 9.

10. Building it for the wrong threat

The family is worried about a commercial dispute, and a holding foundation is the wrong instrument. CANON's second axis divides arbitrary action from lawful process from commercial risk. The Foundation addresses succession fragmentation and jurisdictional concentration. It does not address a judgment that survived due process, and it is not insurance.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. Every fact below is invented for illustration. No real person, family, entity or transaction is described. Figures are illustrative and are not benchmarks.

The principal: a dual national, tax resident in the UAE for eleven years, aged sixty-three. Three adult children: one resident in Singapore, one resident and a national in France, one resident in the United Kingdom. Assets: a BOI-promoted manufacturing operation in Thailand; a trading

company in the UAE; an IP portfolio licensed to both; commercial real estate in London; a listed-securities portfolio. Revenue in USD, EUR, CNY, AED and THB. No sanctions nexus.

The problem stated as a measurement

Before the redesign, the holdings sat in the conventional shape measured in Chapter 5:

```
AS FOUND
  UK           40.9%   bloc = W
  US           27.3%   bloc = W
  Jersey       18.2%   bloc = W
  Luxembourg   13.6%   bloc = W

  naive HHI = 0.2934   ->  effective jurisdictions = 3.41
  bloc HHI  = 1.0000   ->  EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 1.00
  Western-perimeter exposure = 100.0%
```

Four entities, four jurisdictions, one point of failure, and `ln(1.00) = 0`. There is no rearrangement of those four that changes the result, because rearranging within a bloc does not change N.

The succession problem sat on top of it: on death the estate would have required grants in at least four jurisdictions, and the Thai operating company's shareholding would have been frozen pending probate — with a BOI promotion and a workforce attached to it.

The apex as built

A DIFC Foundation under DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018:

```
Form          combined: stated non-charitable purpose (stewardship of the
            family enterprise) + discretionary beneficiary class in By-laws
Charter        filed: name, objects, Council, Guardian, registered agent,
              perpetual duration, amendment mechanics, transfer-out power,
               named winding-up destination
By-laws       private: beneficiary class incl. express treatment of adopted
               and step-children; distribution standards; reserved powers;
               reserved matters; information rights; DIFC Courts
Council        4: the founder; an independent DIFC-resident professional;
              one adult child (rotating, three-year term); one non-family
            industry figure. Quorum 3, one of whom must be the independent.
Guardian       an institutional guardian, with a named successor and an
               institutional longstop appointor
Reserved       appoint/remove councillors with Guardian consent; appoint
              successor Guardian; consent to amendment of objects; consent
               to core disposals; consent to transfer out. NO distribution
               direction power. NO revocation power.
Agent         DIFC-licensed registered agent; no separate registered office
Meetings      quarterly, in the DIFC, minuted, papers circulated in advance
```

The four branches are held directly, with no cross-holdings, as specified in Step 9. The London real estate is converted to a REIT position under Chapter 29 — immovable becomes movable —

which matters both for concentration and, decisively, for Chapter 9's situs analysis. The SPVs of Chapter 30 ring-fence per asset beneath the branches.

The measurement after

```
AS DESIGNED
  UAE          29.1%   bloc = BRIDGE
  Thailand     18.2%   bloc = NONALIGNED
  UK           16.4%   bloc = W
  Bermuda      13.6%   bloc = W-lite
  India        11.8%   bloc = NONALIGNED
  Singapore    10.9%   bloc = BRIDGE

  naive HHI = 0.1889   ->  effective jurisdictions = 5.29
  bloc HHI  = 0.3400   ->  EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 2.94
  Western-perimeter exposure = 30.0%

  effective count   3.41 -> 5.29   (x1.55)
  perimeter expo   100.0% -> 30.0% (-70.0%)
```

The apex did not produce those numbers; the branch jurisdictions did. What the apex produced is the ability to hold six branch positions as one owner without cross-exposure, and to keep holding them through a death.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

- The Charter is on a public register. Disclosure changes nothing.
- The By-laws would be produced on a properly framed request. They contain a family beneficiary class and distribution standards. Disclosure is embarrassing to nobody and changes nothing.
- The UBO particulars are already filed with the DIFC Registrar. Disclosure changes nothing.
- CRS reporting occurs by design; the account information reaches the founder's and beneficiaries' residence jurisdictions. This is anticipated in the tax planning rather than defeated by the structure.
- The four branches file beneficial-ownership particulars naming the Foundation, and they agree.
- The Thai operating company is BOI-promoted with a disclosed foreign owner and no nominee arrangement of any kind. Nominee shareholding is a criminal offence in Thailand and is prosecuted; Chapter 23 states it and this structure does not go near it.

The structure passes, **because no element of it has a function that depends on not being seen. That is the whole of CANON §1, and the reason this instrument rather than a more opaque one sits at the top of the architecture.**

What it did not solve, stated plainly

- The French-resident child's exposure to French inheritance taxation on what she receives, and the open question of how French law characterises a DIFC Foundation. Chapter 9.
- The founder's personal exposure to any court with jurisdiction over him. Chapter 39.
- The maintenance bill. At the SPINE §2 test parameters the designed structure gives $h = -0.1226$ against the conventional structure's $h = -0.5000$. Both are below the build threshold: the redesign improved the position by a factor of four and did not make it positive.
- Apex concentration, which is managed by the migration path and not eliminated.

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, gathered for Appendix D:

1. Scope of the federal civil/commercial carve-out for financial free zones, and the federal statutes applying notwithstanding it.
2. The statutory trigger requiring a Guardian under DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018.
3. Minimum councillors; corporate councillors; residency requirements.
4. Availability and conditions of the registered-agent route, and the agent's record-keeping and disclosure obligations.
5. The enumerated reservable powers, whether exhaustive, and whether the statute saves the Foundation from invalidity by reason of reservation.
6. Firewall and governing-law article numbers and wording; extension to claims arising from personal relationships; treatment of foreign judgments as distinct from foreign law; interaction with DIFC Trust Law, DIFC Law No. 4 of 2018.
7. Continuation-in and transfer-out provisions: Registrar consent, creditor conditions, which entity types may continue in, whether a DIFC company may convert.
8. Current constituting instrument and composition of the Judicial Tribunal, and the current position on the conduit question.
9. Any minimum initial asset requirement and current Registrar practice.
10. Current DIFC UBO regulations: who is a beneficial owner of a Foundation, and access rights.
11. The family foundation article of Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022 (commonly cited as Article 17), the conditions of the transparency election, and the current ministerial decision.
12. Whether UAE economic substance currently applies to a DIFC Foundation holding activity.

The Scorecard — DIFC as a holding jurisdiction

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Codified common-law-derived. Own civil and commercial statutes under the financial free zone carve-out (Federal Law No. 8 of 2004; Federal Decree No. 35 of 2004; Dubai Law No. 9 of 2004). Not English law by direct application — that is ADGM, Chapter 17 — but drafted in the common-law tradition, in English, with an English-language court.
2	**Bloc alignment**	Bridge. UAE maintains working relations across Western, Chinese, Russian and South Asian perimeters simultaneously. Not outside regulatory pressure; outside the EU listing mechanism and outside any single bloc's coordination.
3	**Court quality**	High. DIFC Courts under Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004 as amended by Dubai Law No. 16 of 2011; international bench; English language; published reasoned judgments; opt-in jurisdiction for unconnected parties. Thin foundations-specific case law — the regime dates only from 2018.

#	Item	Assessment
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Mixed, and the weakest item. DIFC judgments enforce into onshore Dubai through the Judicial Authority Law protocol. Non-binding Memoranda of Guidance exist with several foreign courts, from the Commercial Court of England and Wales in 2013; they are not treaties. The conduit question sits with the Judicial Tribunal and has moved — Register item 8. Do not build on an assumption here.
5	**Substance requirements**	Low for a holding foundation: registered agent, filed charter, statutory registers, council meetings. Substance for the *operating* entities is a different question and belongs to their chapters. Verify the current economic substance position (Register item 12).
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	UAE is CRS participating and the DIFC is inside the UAE for this purpose. A Foundation is a Financial Institution or a Passive NFE; either way, account holders or controlling persons are reported. FATCA applies through the UAE intergovernmental arrangement. There is no non-reporting configuration.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Own UBO regime through the Registrar: filed and maintained, not publicly searchable, available to the Registrar and competent authorities. Federal Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020 governs onshore; free zones run equivalents. Charter public; by-laws private but discoverable.

#	Item	Assessment
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT throughout, with genuine dual-rail optionality at the UAE banking layer. The Foundation itself should hold no payment function — CANON §5, a rail is not a holding. Chapters 31 and 32.
9	**Political stability**	High by regional standards, with the caveat of a hereditary federal system: policy can change quickly, without a legislative cycle. That cuts both ways — it produced the corporate tax regime in two years and the free zone regime in one.
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Improving, from a base that briefly worsened.** Evidence: FATF grey-listing March 2022, removal February 2024; federal corporate tax from financial years beginning on or after 1 June 2023 (Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022), which *increased* transparency and simultaneously increased the jurisdiction's legitimacy as a treaty and substance location; a UBO regime built out from 2020; deepening case law. The direction is toward a well-regulated, taxed, transparent centre. That is not degradation of the asset this book is buying: the asset is bloc independence with institutional quality, and both are rising. The genuine downside risks are federal encroachment on the free zone carve-out, and single-country political concentration.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING**, unambiguously. Not operating: no substance, no staff, no trade at the apex. Not bridging: that is the ADGM holdco's and the banking layer's job. Asking the Foundation to do more is the Chapter 6 failure.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it as the apex.** Best available combination of legal personality, purpose-or-beneficiary flexibility, permitted founder control, a publishing common-law court, and bridge-bloc alignment. What would change the verdict: federal legislation reaching into the free zone civil-law carve-out; a Judicial Tribunal line making DIFC orders unreliable against onshore assets; amendment narrowing the firewall or the transfer-out power; renewed FATF listing; or a de-risking cycle making DIFC Foundations unbankable in the branch jurisdictions. Monitor items 4 and 10 annually and keep the migration path live.

Chapter 8 takes the first leg of the argument — that an apex must be a person and not a relationship — and tests it against the common-law trust on the merits, including the cases where the trust wins.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in the DIFC and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location, and asset situs.*

Chapter 8 . Foundation versus Trust

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* Confirm every element with qualified counsel in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Chapter 7 asserted, as the first of four legs, that the apex of a multi-bloc structure must be a legal person rather than a relationship. That is a strong claim and it was made there without being tested. This chapter tests it, and the test has to be honest, because the trust is not a weak instrument. It is the most refined asset-holding device the common law ever produced, it has four centuries of precedent behind it, and in a large class of cases it beats a foundation outright.

The argument this chapter defends is narrower than "foundations are better", and it is worth stating before the reasoning.

The trust's central mechanism — the separation of legal and beneficial ownership — is a peculiarity of one legal family, not a feature of law in general. A structure whose apex depends on that separation being recognised is a structure with a recognition dependency, and a recognition dependency is a form of jurisdictional concentration that Chapter 5's instrument does not capture.

That last clause is the point. Chapter 5 measures where the assets are. It does not measure whether the *concept* holding those assets is portable. A family whose entire structure sits in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man scores badly on effective bloc count and everyone can see why. A family whose assets are properly spread across six jurisdictions in three blocs, but which holds them all through a Cayman discretionary trust, has an invisible version of the same problem: every one of those holdings depends on local courts and local registrars accepting a form of ownership that four of the six may not recognise as ownership at all.

The foundation removes the dependency. It does not remove it by being cleverer; it removes it by being boring. A registered legal person with a charter, a council and an address is a category that exists in every legal system on earth. Nobody has to be persuaded of anything.

The counter-position, stated fairly

Three arguments run the other way and each is serious.

Precedent. Trust law is dense with decided cases on almost every question a family will ever ask: what a trustee must do, what a beneficiary may see, how discretion is reviewed, what happens when a trustee goes wrong, how a mistake is unwound. Foundation law — DIFC's dates from 2018 — is thin. When something unexpected happens inside a trust, there is usually an answer. When something unexpected happens inside a foundation, there is often only a statute and an argument.

Flexibility. A trust can be created by declaration in an afternoon, can be varied by the court under established doctrines, can be divided, merged and appointed onward with a fluency no registered entity matches. A foundation is an entity: it files, it registers, it amends by formal process.

Fiscal familiarity. Trusts are old enough that most tax systems have decided what to do about them, however unpleasant that decision may be. Foundations are frequently unclassified, and uncertainty is itself a cost — sometimes a large one, as the United States and French discussions later in this chapter show.

So the correct question is not which instrument is better. It is: which legal families must recognise this arrangement, and what is the cheapest form that all of them can recognise? That question has a different answer for a family entirely in London and Sydney than for a family split across Singapore, France and the Gulf. The carried case of this book is the second kind, which is why Chapter 7 chose as it did.

The Mechanism

Where the trust comes from, and why the split exists

The trust is a historical accident that turned into an engineering triumph. Its ancestor is the medieval *use*: land conveyed to one person to hold to the benefit of another, adopted to work around feudal incidents and the disabilities of the Crusades. The common-law courts recognised only the legal owner. The Chancellor, exercising the King's conscience, would compel the legal owner to honour the arrangement. Two jurisdictions grew up side by side — law and equity — and the property came to have two owners of different kinds.

That is the whole of it, and it is why the split exists. It was not designed. It emerged from a courts system that had two benches applying two bodies of doctrine to the same res. The Statute of Uses 1535 attempted to collapse it and produced, in the long run, the modern trust instead.

The doctrine that grew on that root is genuinely powerful. *Saunders v Vautier* (1841) — that beneficiaries of full age and capacity who between them hold the entire beneficial interest may collapse the trust and demand the property — is a rule about who really owns a thing, and it has no equivalent in company law. The rules on trustee duty, on the review of discretion, on tracing into mixed funds, on the constructive trust as a remedy: none of it has a civil-law counterpart of comparable depth.

But every part of it presupposes a court that recognises equity as a source of proprietary rights. Take that away and the trust does not degrade gracefully. It becomes unintelligible.

Why the civil law cannot easily see it

Civil-law systems descend from Roman law through the nineteenth-century codifications. Three features of that inheritance stand between them and the trust.

Unitary ownership. Ownership (*dominium*, *propriété*, *Eigentum*) is conceived as a single, indivisible right. There is one owner. Others may hold lesser rights over the thing — usufruct, servitudes, pledge — but those are enumerated encumbrances on a single ownership, not a second ownership of a different kind.

Numerus clausus. The catalogue of real rights is closed. Parties may not invent new proprietary interests by contract; they may only use the ones the code provides. The trust asks a civil-law court to accept a proprietary interest that the code never listed.

No equity. There is no separate jurisdiction of conscience producing a parallel set of proprietary

remedies. Good faith exists as a principle within the law of obligations; it does not generate a second ownership.

Put an ordinary discretionary trust in front of a court in this tradition and the plausible characterisations are all unsatisfactory. It may be read as a *mandate* — the trustee as agent, which makes the property the settlor's and defeats the point. It may be read as a *simulation* — a sham disguising the settlor's continued ownership. It may be read as a *fiducia* under a local statute if one exists, on that statute's terms rather than the trust deed's. Or the disposition may simply fail for want of a recognised form. **None of those readings gives the family what the trust deed said it would get, and the family usually discovers which one applies at the worst possible moment.**

What the civil law built instead

The tradition is not without answers; it built its own instruments, and understanding them is what makes a foundation-based structure legible in those jurisdictions.

Fiducie (France). Introduced by Loi ndeg 2007-211 of 19 February 2007 and codified in the Code civil at articles 2011 and following, the fiducie transfers assets to a fiduciary who holds them in a segregated patrimony for a defined purpose. It is deliberately narrow: it was built for security and management, and French law prohibits its use as a gratuitous transfer — the *fiducie-libéralité* is excluded. **Verify with French counsel:** the article of the Code civil containing the prohibition on gratuitous fiducie (commonly cited as article 2013) and its current scope. The practical consequence, which is not in doubt, is that the French fiducie is not a succession instrument.

Treuhand (Germany). A contractual arrangement in which a Treuhänder holds assets for a Treugeber. It is real and widely used, but it is contract, not property: the Treugeber's protection against the Treuhänder's creditors is limited and contested, and there is no proprietary tracing remedy of the common-law kind.

Stichting (Netherlands). A foundation — a legal person with a purpose and no members. The *stichting administratiekantoor* or STAK is a Dutch invention of real elegance: shares are transferred to the STAK, which issues depositary receipts to the former holders, separating voting control (STAK board) from economic entitlement (receipt holders). It is a civil-law solution to the problem the voting trust solves in the common law, and it uses legal personality to do it.

Fideicomiso (Latin America). Statutory trust-like devices exist across Latin American codes, usually requiring a licensed financial institution as fiduciary and constrained in duration and purpose.

Waqf (Islamic law). The indigenous endowment: property permanently dedicated, its corpus inalienable, its income directed to beneficiaries or to charitable objects, administered by a *mutawalli*. It is treated below on its own terms.

Look at that list and the pattern is visible. **Every legal family solved the problem of "property held for others and separated from its provider" — and only the common law solved it by splitting ownership. Everyone else solved it either by contract, or by creating a legal person.**

The Hague Trusts Convention: what it does and what it does not

The obvious objection is that international law has already fixed this. The Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition — the Hague Trusts Convention —

exists precisely to make trusts recognisable in non-trust states. It is a real and useful instrument and it does not fix the problem, for four reasons.

First, ratification is limited. The Convention is in force for a modest group of states, including the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, Cyprus, Australia, Canada (for participating provinces), Hong Kong and Panama. **The United States signed in 1988 and never ratified. France signed and never ratified.** Germany, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Japan, and the Gulf states are not parties. The countries where recognition is hardest are largely the countries that did not join.

Verify with counsel: the current status table on the Hague Conference's own records before relying on any state's position, including the states listed here. Ratifications and extensions change.

Second, recognition is a floor, not a transplant. The Convention requires a contracting state to recognise that trust assets constitute a separate fund, that the trustee may sue and be sued as trustee, and that the trustee may appear before notaries and authorities in that capacity. That is meaningful. It is not the same as importing the whole of equity: the recognising state is not required to give the beneficiary the proprietary remedies a common-law court would give.

Third, the mandatory-rules carve-outs are wide. The Convention expressly preserves the recognising state's mandatory rules in designated fields — succession rights, including indefeasible shares, is one of them — and preserves overriding mandatory provisions and public policy. In other words the very rules a family is often hoping to navigate are exactly the rules the Convention leaves untouched.

Verify with counsel: the article numbers of the mandatory-rules, overriding-provisions and public-policy reservations (commonly cited as articles 15, 16 and 18) and the article permitting a state not to recognise a trust whose significant elements are more closely connected with non-trust states (commonly cited as article 13). The substance of these reservations is not in doubt; the numbering should be pinned before it appears in an opinion.

Fourth, Italy proves the point in reverse. Italy ratified, and Italian practice developed the *trust interno* — a trust with Italian settlor, Italian assets and Italian beneficiaries, governed by a chosen foreign trust law and recognised through the Convention. It works, and it has generated three decades of Italian litigation about when it works. **That a device requires a specialist national jurisprudence to explain its own validity is the recognition dependency, visible.**

Why legal personality travels

Now the other side. Recognition of a foreign legal person is not a special regime; it is ordinary private international law, and it is close to universal.

Every state has rules for determining the existence, capacity and internal governance of a foreign entity. The two classical approaches are the incorporation theory — the entity's personal law is the law of the place of registration — and the real seat theory, under which it is the law of the place of central administration. Historically the common-law world and the Netherlands followed incorporation; France and Germany leaned to the real seat.

Within the European Union that divergence was substantially resolved in favour of mobility by a line of Court of Justice decisions on freedom of establishment: *Centros* (C-212/97, 1999), *Überseering* (C-208/00, 2002) and *Inspire Art* (C-167/01, 2003). Those cases concern EU-formed companies exercising treaty freedoms and do not, by their own terms, govern the recognition of a DIFC

Foundation in a member state. But they established the direction of travel, and the practical position across the developed world today is that a properly constituted foreign legal person is recognised as a legal person.

Verify with counsel in each relevant state: whether a foreign *foundation* specifically is recognised on the same basis as a foreign company, and whether any residual real-seat doctrine or public-policy control applies to a foundation administered from within that state. Recognition of personality is near-universal; the recognition of a foundation's *internal arrangements* — who its beneficiaries are, what they are entitled to — is a separate question and is treated in the Failure Modes below.

The asymmetry to hold onto:

```
TRUST presented to a non-trust court
  question 1: does this system recognise a division of ownership?
  question 2: if not, what is this instead?
  question 3: who, in our categories, owns the assets?
  -> the answer to (3) is frequently "the settlor" or "the trustee
     personally", and both are wrong for the family.

FOUNDATION presented to the same court
  question 1: is this a validly constituted foreign legal person?
  question 2: yes -> it owns its assets.
  -> the ownership question is closed at step 2. What remains is
     whether local mandatory rules reach the founder's transfer to
     it, which is a real question but a DIFFERENT and smaller one.
```

Recognition is not enforcement, and the difference costs money

The argument so far has been about recognition: whether a foreign court can see the arrangement at all. There is a second question underneath it that is routinely collapsed into the first, and collapsing them produces structures that are conceptually sound and practically unenforceable.

Recognition asks whether the foreign court accepts that the entity exists and owns its assets. Enforcement asks whether an order obtained by that entity, or against it, is given effect where the assets or the counterparty are. **A structure can be recognised everywhere and enforceable almost nowhere, and the family discovers the difference on the day it needs a court rather than a registrar.**

The distinction bites differently for the two forms.

For the trust. A trustee suing to recover trust property in a civil-law state must first establish its standing, which the Hague Trusts Convention supplies in contracting states and does not supply elsewhere. In a non-contracting state the trustee's capacity to sue *as trustee* is a preliminary question decided under that state's own conflict rules, and losing it is not a defeat on the merits — it is a defeat before the merits.

For the foundation. Standing is straightforward: a foreign legal person sues as a legal person. But the judgment it obtains, or the one obtained against it, then has to travel, and judgment travel is governed by treaties and reciprocity rules that have nothing to do with foundations.

The treaty layer is thinner than practitioners assume.

The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements gives effect to exclusive choice-of-court clauses and to the resulting judgments among contracting states. The Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters does the broader job. Both have a limited and slowly growing membership, and — this is the point that matters for a succession structure — **both exclude from their scope the subject matter that a family structure is most likely to litigate.** Wills and succession, family law and matrimonial property are carved out. So even where a judgment-recognition treaty is in force between two relevant states, it is unlikely to carry the judgment the family actually needs carried.

Verify with counsel in each relevant state: the current contracting-state list and entry-into force date of each of the two Hague instruments for that state; the article and sub-paragraph numbers of the scope exclusions for succession, family law and matrimonial property; whether the United Arab Emirates is a party to either; and, separately, the regional and bilateral judicial cooperation instruments in force for the UAE, including the Arab and Gulf regional conventions and any bilateral convention with the heir jurisdictions. The general position — that the UAE's enforcement of foreign judgments runs through its own procedural law and reciprocity conditions rather than through the Hague instruments — should be confirmed against the current Civil Procedure legislation and its implementing decisions rather than taken from any secondary description, including this one.

Two consequences for the design, and they run in opposite directions.

The first is a point in the foundation's favour and it is the reason Chapter 7 emphasised the DIFC Courts' opt-in jurisdiction. If the whole governance layer — charter disputes, the family agreement between the heirs, shareholders' agreements with co-investors, the services agreements with advisers — sits under one court chosen by written agreement, then the disputes the apex actually generates are heard in one forum, under one law, with no cross-border enforcement step at all. **Most apex litigation is internal, and internal litigation does not need a treaty; it needs everybody to have signed up to the same court in advance.**

The second runs the other way and is the honest limit. Where the dispute is *not* internal — a claim by a foreign heir, a creditor, or a divorcing spouse, brought where that person lives against assets or persons in that place — no amount of forum drafting helps, because the claimant did not sign the charter and is not bound by its jurisdiction clause. That claim is decided under local law, in a local court, and the foundation's advantage there is the narrow one already stated: the ownership question is closed at step two, so the litigation is about the founder's transfer rather than about who owns the assets. **A smaller fight in an unfriendly forum is a real improvement over a larger one, and it is the entire benefit. It is not immunity, and Chapter 9 shows exactly where it stops.**

Sharia and the waqf

The Gulf, and Islamic-law jurisdictions more broadly, deserve treatment on their own terms rather than as an appendix to the civil-law discussion, because the reasoning is different.

Islamic law has its own long-established endowment institution. The *waqf* is a dedication of property in perpetuity: the corpus is made inalienable, the usufruct is directed to named beneficiaries (*waqf ahli* or family waqf) or to charitable objects (*waqf khayri*), and a *mutawalli* administers it. It is not a marginal institution — historically waqf held very large shares of the productive property

of Muslim societies, and the modern awqaf authorities of the Gulf states administer substantial portfolios.

The objection to the common-law trust in this context is often described as religious hostility. That is not accurate and it is not useful. The genuine frictions are two, and both are technical.

The ownership split has no place to sit. Islamic law, like civil law, works with a unitary conception of ownership (*milk*). The dedication of property to a waqf is often analysed as ownership passing out of the founder's hands entirely — to God, on the classical formulation, with the mutawalli as administrator. There is no beneficial owner in the equitable sense. So the trust presents the same categorisation problem it presents in Frankfurt.

The fixed shares are mandatory. The inheritance rules — *fara'id* — allocate fixed fractional shares among defined heirs, and the freedom to dispose by bequest is limited. A discretionary trust that removes property from the estate and then distributes on a trustee's discretion is not a variation on that system; it is a different system. Chapter 9 takes this up in detail.

Verify with Sharia-qualified counsel in the relevant state: the codified position on family waqf, the treatment of a foreign legal person as a recipient of a lifetime gift, and the interaction between the applicable personal-status law and any foreign holding structure. The codifications differ materially between the Gulf states and between schools, and no general statement should be relied on.

What the foundation offers here is not evasion of any of that. It is legibility. A foundation is an endowment with a purpose, a corpus, an administering body and beneficiaries — structurally the same shape as a waqf, expressed in a modern registered form. That does not make forced shares go away. It does mean the *instrument* is intelligible to the court rather than requiring the court to import a doctrine it does not have.

The Specification

The comparison, dimension by dimension

The table below compares a modern statutory foundation — the DIFC Foundation of Chapter 7 is the reference — with a modern offshore discretionary trust. Neither column is the winner. The column that matters is the third.

Dimension	Trust	Foundation	Which matters when
Legal personality	None	Yes	Whenever a registrar, notary or bank must record an owner
Ownership model	Split legal/beneficial	Unitary, held by the entity	Whenever a non-common-law court is involved
Recognition outside the common law	Convention-dependent, patchy	Ordinary conflict-of-laws recognition of a legal person	Civil-law and Sharia-influenced jurisdictions

Dimension	Trust	Foundation	Which matters when
Depth of precedent	Four centuries	Statute plus a short case list	Novel disputes; trustee misconduct; variation
Settlor / founder control	Reserved powers permitted by statute in many trust jurisdictions, but control is the classic sham risk	Reserved powers expressly contemplated; the entity persists regardless	Where the principal will not let go
Perpetuity	Perpetuity rules apply unless abolished by statute	Perpetual by default	Multigenerational holding
Non-charitable purposes	Beneficiary principle bites; needs a purpose-trust statute and an enforcer	Purpose foundations are ordinary	Orphan and stewardship structures
Public filing	Usually none	Charter filed; register searchable	Where the family values privacy over legibility
Creditor and matrimonial attack	Rich doctrine both ways; sham, illusory trust, nuptial settlement	Thinner doctrine; alter-ego arguments run in the founder's home court	Contested-family situations
Tax classification abroad	Usually settled, often unfavourable	Frequently unsettled	The United States and several civil-law systems
Migration	Change of proper law and trustee, generally straightforward	Statutory continuation, retaining identity	Jurisdiction-degradation planning
Ongoing cost	Trustee fees, often ad valorem	Registrar, agent, council, audit	Small structures
Operating a business directly	Trustees are usually reluctant	An entity may hold and act, though it still should not trade	Family enterprises
Court of first resort	The trust's proper-law court	The foundation's home court, here the DIFC Courts	Governance disputes

Three rows carry most of the decision: recognition outside the common law, depth of precedent, and tax classification abroad. **A family whose members and assets are all inside the common-law world should take the four centuries of precedent and use a trust. A family that is not should weigh the recognition row more heavily than everything else, because it is the row that produces irreversible outcomes rather than expensive ones.**

The decision procedure

Run it in this order. It takes an afternoon and it prevents the commonest error, which is choosing the instrument the adviser is most comfortable drafting.

```
1  MAP THE PEOPLE
   For each of the founder, spouse, and every beneficiary or likely
   beneficiary in the next two generations, record:
     - state of residence         - nationality(ies)
     - legal family of that state (common / civil / Sharia / mixed)
     - forced-heirship exposure   - is that state a Hague Trusts party?

2  MAP THE ASSETS
   For each asset: situs, legal family of the situs state, whether
   movable or immovable, and whether the register that records it will
   accept a trustee designation.

3  COUNT THE NON-COMMON-LAW TOUCHPOINTS
   A touchpoint is any person or asset in step 1 or 2 that sits in a
   non-common-law state.
     zero touchpoints         -> trust, almost certainly
     one, low-value           -> trust with local-law patch
     two or more, or any
       material asset or heir -> foundation apex
     Sharia-jurisdiction heir
       or asset               -> foundation apex; see Chapter 9

4  CHECK THE TAX CLASSIFICATION OF THE CHOSEN FORM
   In every state identified in step 1. This is where the answer from
   step 3 sometimes gets overturned. A US person in the family is the
   usual reason.

5  CHECK THE OPERATIONAL LAYER
   Will banks, custodians and registrars in the asset states onboard
   the chosen form? Ask before drafting, not after.

6  DECIDE, AND WRITE DOWN WHY
   The memorandum of reasons is worth more in ten years than the
   structure chart.
```

Step 4 deserves emphasis because it is where the elegant answer meets the fiscal one. A structure that is conceptually correct and produces punitive treatment for one family member has not solved the problem; it has moved it.

The hybrids, and when each earns its cost

Neither instrument has to be used alone, and several combinations are standard.

Foundation over trust. The Foundation is the apex; one or more trusts sit beneath it holding particular asset classes for particular branches of the family. This is the right answer where the

family is mixed: the apex is legible everywhere, and the branches with common-law beneficiaries get the flexibility and precedent of trust law where it is actually useful. The cost is two layers of administration.

Trust over foundation. Less common and usually a legacy shape — an existing trust that acquires a foundation as a holding subsidiary. It works, and it inherits the recognition problem at the top where it does the most damage. If the trust already exists and cannot be unwound, consider whether the foundation should instead be created alongside, with a defined transfer of assets over time.

Foundation as protector or enforcer. A durable institutional answer to a chronic problem. The protector of a trust, or the enforcer of a purpose trust, is normally an individual, and individuals die, emigrate, fall out with the family and lose capacity. A foundation in that role is perpetual, has its own governance, and can be given a succession mechanism. This is a small, cheap use of the form that solves a disproportionate amount of trouble.

The voting/economic split. The Dutch STAK pattern — an entity holding shares and issuing depositary receipts, separating control from economics — is available in substance through a foundation in most foundation jurisdictions. Where the family wants economic entitlement to descend normally while control stays consolidated, this is the mechanism.

The Cayman foundation company. Worth naming because it is a genuinely distinct third form. Under the Foundation Companies Law, 2017, Cayman permits a company limited by guarantee (or by shares) to register as a foundation company, whereupon it may cease to have members and operate for a purpose, while remaining a company under Cayman companies law. It is a common-law entity wearing a civil-law shape. **Verify with Cayman counsel:** the current consolidated revision of that law and its present requirements, including the mandatory secretary and the position on members.

The DIFC's own pairing. The DIFC enacted its Foundations Law and its Trust Law in the same year — **DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018** and **DIFC Law No. 4 of 2018** respectively — so both instruments are available in one jurisdiction, before one court, in one language. That is an underrated practical advantage: a foundation-over-trust structure can be built entirely within the DIFC, with a single governing law and a single forum, rather than stitching a Gulf foundation to a Caribbean trust across two legal systems and two time zones.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the reserved-powers and firewall provisions of DIFC Law No. 4 of 2018 and how they compare, article by article, with those of the Foundations Law. Chapter 7 flags the same question from the foundation side; the comparison should be done once, properly, and recorded.

The one thing both forms require

Neither instrument survives the founder treating it as a pocket. The doctrines have different names — sham and illusory trust on one side, alter ego and abuse of legal personality on the other — and they converge on the same test: did the arrangement ever really transfer anything?

A foundation is not a way to keep control while appearing to give it up. It is a way to give up ownership while retaining a defined and disclosed governance role. If that distinction is not acceptable to the principal, neither instrument will work and the money spent on either is wasted.

The Failure Modes

1. Choosing the foundation for a wholly common-law family

The family is in London, Sydney and Toronto. All the assets are movables held through common-law-jurisdiction custodians. The adviser builds a foundation because foundations are current, and the family gives up four centuries of settled answers in exchange for solving a recognition problem it does not have.

Diagnostic: run step 3 of the decision procedure and count zero non-common-law touchpoints. *Mitigation:* use a trust.

2. Assuming personality equals recognition of the internal arrangement

This is the most important failure in the chapter, and it is the honest limit on the whole foundation argument.

A foreign court will accept that the Foundation exists and owns its assets. It does not follow that the court will accept the consequences the family wants. Two things remain fully available to it. It may apply its own mandatory rules to the *transfer* by which the founder endowed the Foundation — fraudulent-transfer law, matrimonial claw-back, forced-heirship reduction. And it may apply its own tax and attribution rules to the founder and to the beneficiaries as persons within its jurisdiction.

Legal personality closes the ownership question. It does not close the transfer question or the attribution question, and most of what goes wrong in practice is in those two.

Mitigation: Chapter 9 for the transfer question; the tax paragraphs below for attribution; and Chapter 32 for the timing rules that determine whether a transfer is planning or evidence.

3. The United States classification problem

Any family with a US person in it — citizen, green-card holder, or long-term resident — must resolve this before drafting, not after.

US federal tax law classifies entities under the regulations at Treasury Regulation sections 301.7701-1 through 301.7701-4. A foreign arrangement is analysed to determine whether it is a trust, a business entity, or something disregarded, and the "trust" classification turns on the regulation's own definition rather than on the label the foreign statute uses. A foreign foundation may therefore be treated as a foreign trust, or as a foreign corporation, depending on its terms and operation, with radically different consequences either way.

If it is a foreign trust with a US grantor or US beneficiaries, the grantor-trust rules apply — Internal Revenue Code sections 671 to 679, of which section 679 is the specific provision attributing to a US person who transfers property to a foreign trust with a US beneficiary — and the reporting obligations on Forms 3520 and 3520-A follow, with substantial penalties for failure. If it is a foreign corporation, the controlled foreign corporation rules and the passive foreign investment company rules come into view instead.

Verify with US counsel: whether, on the specific charter and by-laws proposed, a DIFC Foundation is more likely to be classified as a foreign trust or as a foreign corporation for US federal tax purposes; whether any published ruling or guidance addresses DIFC Foundations specifically;

and the current reporting and penalty position. This chapter states the framework and deliberately does not predict the outcome, because the outcome depends on drafting.

4. Civil-law attribution regimes

Several civil-law systems attribute the income or assets of a foreign foundation to resident persons, and they do so by rules aimed squarely at this structure.

Germany's Foreign Tax Act (Aussensteuergesetz) contains a family-foundation attribution rule at section 15, under which the income of a foreign family foundation may be attributed to a German-resident founder or to beneficiaries. **Verify with German counsel:** the current text of section 15 AStG, including the conditions of the EU/EEA exception and the evidentiary requirements for relying on it.

France applies two distinct machineries. Article 123 bis of the Code général des impôts attributes to a French-resident individual the income of a low-taxed foreign entity in which the individual holds a qualifying interest. Article 792-0 bis of the same code contains a specific and broadly drafted regime for "trusts", with its own definition, its own transfer-tax consequences, its own reporting obligation, and a sui generis levy. **Verify with French counsel:** whether a DIFC Foundation falls within the definition of "trust" in article 792-0 bis, whether article 123 bis applies on the facts, and what the current reporting obligations are. This is a live and genuinely unsettled question for foundations generally and it must not be assumed either way.

5. Banking and custody friction

A form that is conceptually correct can still be operationally awkward. Custodians and brokers have onboarding workflows built around companies and, in the common-law world, around trusts. Foundations sit in a middle category and are sometimes routed to a manual process.

Mitigation: step 5 of the decision procedure. Ask the intended custodians before drafting.

6. Relying on the Hague Trusts Convention in a state that never joined it

The structure memorandum says the trust "will be recognised under the Hague Convention". Nobody checks whether the states that matter are contracting states, and the states that matter are frequently the ones that are not. **A convention that binds the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland is of no assistance in Frankfurt, Madrid, Riyadh or Bangkok, and those are the places where recognition was the problem in the first place.**

Diagnostic: the memorandum cites the Convention without naming the specific state whose recognition is needed. *Mitigation:* run step 1 of the decision procedure, list the states, and check each against the current status table rather than against the adviser's recollection of it.

7. Assuming the charter binds people who never signed it

A charter with a DIFC Courts jurisdiction clause governs the founder, the councillors, the guardian and — with care in drafting — the beneficiaries who accept benefits under it. It does not govern a divorcing spouse, a trade creditor, a tax authority, or a reserved-portion claimant suing where she lives. Those people are strangers to the instrument and are not bound by its choice of forum.

Diagnostic: the plan's answer to a foreign claim is a jurisdiction clause. *Mitigation:* accept that the external claim will be heard where the claimant is, and design so that what it can reach is a transfer question rather than an ownership question.

8. The thin-jurisprudence gap, which is the trust's strongest argument

Chapter 7 listed the DIFC's foundations regime as dating only from 2018 and moved on. It deserves more weight than that, because the missing doctrine is not decorative.

Trust law has answers when things go wrong, worked out over centuries and tested in adversarial litigation. It has a definition of sham to keep the pretend arrangement out — *Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd* [1967] 2 QB 786 remains the standard formulation. It has a settled position on what a beneficiary may see and on the court's discretion to order disclosure — *Re Londonderry's Settlement* [1965] Ch 918 and *Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd* [2003] UKPC 26. And it has a doctrine, narrowed but real, for unwinding a fiduciary's mistaken exercise of a power: *Pitt v Holt; Futter v Futter* [2013] UKSC 26.

A foundation has no equivalent of the last of those, and it is the one a family is most likely to need. A council makes a distribution on a misunderstanding of the tax consequences, exercises a power it did not have, or amends the by-laws in a way that defeats the purpose. Under trust law there is authority about whether that can be set aside. Under a 2018 statute there is the statute, the general law of the entity, and an argument.

Verify with DIFC counsel: whether the Foundations Law or the general DIFC law of legal persons provides any mechanism for setting aside a defective exercise of a council power; whether the DIFC Courts have decided any case on the point; and whether the equivalent question has been decided in any comparable foundation jurisdiction whose reasoning a DIFC court might find persuasive. This is a genuine gap and it should be priced, not argued away.

Mitigation: draft the powers narrowly and the procedure tightly, require guardian consent for the irreversible acts, and take the tax advice before the distribution rather than the remedy after it. **Where there is no doctrine to fix a mistake, the only available control is not making it.**

9. The perpetual entity nobody can end

Perpetuity is sold as an advantage and it is one, until the family wants out. A trust has *Saunders v Vautier*: beneficiaries of full age and capacity holding the entire beneficial interest may collapse it and take the property. A purpose foundation has no beneficiaries with a proprietary interest and so nobody with standing to do the equivalent. The winding-up route is whatever the charter says and the statute allows.

Diagnostic: ask who, in twenty years, could lawfully bring the structure to an end, and whether they would agree. If the answer is "the council, if it chose to", the family has built something it cannot recover. *Mitigation:* draft a real winding-up mechanism with a named destination, a defined trigger, and a decision rule that does not require unanimity among people who will not all be on speaking terms.

10. Assuming a trust converts into a foundation

It does not. There is no conversion of a relationship into a legal person. What actually happens is that the trustee distributes or transfers the trust property to a newly formed foundation, which is a disposition — with the tax consequences of a disposition in every jurisdiction that has a claim on the trustee, the settlor or the beneficiaries, and with a fresh transfer date restarting every claw-back clock the original settlement had already run down.

Diagnostic: the plan describes "migrating the trust into a foundation". *Mitigation:* price the disposition first. A structure that has held for fifteen years and is outside every relevant limitation period may be worth more where it is.

11. Buying two layers and using neither

The hybrid designs are genuinely useful and are also the standard way to double the administration bill for no benefit. A foundation over a trust holding one bank account is two sets of fees, two sets of accounts, two governing laws and two forums, solving a problem the foundation alone had already solved.

Diagnostic: for each layer, state in one sentence the specific job it does that the other layer cannot. If either sentence is difficult, the layer is decoration. *Mitigation:* the assignment discipline of Chapter 6, applied to legal forms rather than to entities.

12. Forced-heirship spillover

The foundation closes the ownership question and the reserved-portion claim arrives anyway — against assets in the claimant's own jurisdiction, against distributions once she has received them, or through a compensatory mechanism that gives her a levy on local property. **This is not a failure of the foundation; it is the transfer question of failure mode 2, arriving in its most common form, and it is the subject of the whole of Chapter 9.**

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. Every fact and figure below is invented for illustration. No real person, family, entity or transaction is described. Figures are illustrative and are not benchmarks or quotations.

The carried case, as established in Chapter 7: a dual national, tax resident in the UAE for eleven years, aged sixty-three. Three adult children — one resident in Singapore, one resident and a national in France, one resident in the United Kingdom. Assets: a BOI-promoted manufacturing operation in Thailand; a trading company in the UAE; an IP portfolio licensed to both; commercial real estate in London, converted to a REIT position under Chapter 29; a listed-securities portfolio. Constructed total of USD 240 million. No sanctions nexus.

The question this chapter has to answer for him is narrow: trust, foundation, or both.

Step 1 and 2 — map the people and the assets

```
PERSON            STATE       LEGAL FAMILY     HAGUE 1985?   RESERVE?
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
```

founder	UAE	civil / Sharia-influenced; DIFC a common-law enclave within it	no	n/a as resident
child 1	Singapore	common law	yes	no
child 2	France	civil law	signed, not ratified	YES
child 3	UK	common law	yes	no

ASSET	SITUS	LEGAL FAMILY	MOVABLE?
manufacturing opco	Thailand	civil law	shares: yes
trading company	UAE	civil/Sharia	shares: yes
IP portfolio	ADGM-held	common law	yes
REIT position (ex-London)	UK	common law	yes
captive insurer	Bermuda	common law	yes
fund vehicle	India/IFSC	common law	yes
listed securities	Singapore	common law	yes

Two observations before the count. **The Chapter 29 conversion of the London real estate has already done work here that has nothing to do with tax: an immovable is governed by the law of its situs for succession purposes in a way that a share is not, and converting it removed a fixed point from the map.** And the founder's own residence is a touchpoint even though he is not an heir, because it is where any court with personal jurisdiction over him would sit.

Step 3 — count the non-common-law touchpoints

TOUCHPOINT	MATERIAL?	RESERVE RISK?
child 2, resident and national in France	yes	yes
founder's residence, UAE onshore	yes	no (Ch 9)
Thai manufacturing opco	yes	no
UAE trading company	yes	no
COUNT	4	

The decision procedure's rule is that two or more material touchpoints, or any Sharia-jurisdiction asset or heir, points to a foundation apex. This case has four touchpoints, one of them a forced-heirship heir and two of them assets in states that do not recognise the ownership split. **The rule is not close to being tested here; it is answered several times over, and an adviser who proposed a trust apex on these facts would be proposing it because it is what he drafts.**

Step 4 — what actually happens at each touchpoint, by design

The comparison that matters is what a specific official in a specific office does when the instrument is put in front of him.

Touchpoint	Trust apex	Foundation apex
Thai Department of Business Development, recording the opco's shareholder	Asked to record a trustee holding for beneficiaries it cannot categorise; likely records the trustee personally, which is not what anyone intended	Records a named foreign legal person; the question closes
UAE onshore registrar and bank, on the trading company	Trust presented to an institution in a unitary-ownership system; long onboarding, possible re-characterisation	Ordinary foreign shareholder; ordinary onboarding
French court, on child 2's reserved-portion claim	Must first characterise the trust — mandate, simulation, or fiducie — and may conclude the settlor never parted with the property, which is the worst available outcome	Accepts the Foundation owns the assets; the fight is about the founder's transfer, which is a narrower claim
French tax administration, on child 2	Trust regime applies on its own definitional terms	Classification genuinely unsettled; see failure mode 4 and the Register below
Singapore and UK children	Trust is ideal: precedent, flexibility, familiar taxation	Foundation is unfamiliar but workable

Read the third row against the fourth. **The foundation converts the French recognition problem into a French tax-classification problem, and that is a trade the family should take, because a classification problem is expensive and a re-characterisation of ownership is irreversible.** Chapter 4's distinction between recoverable and unrecoverable outcomes governs the choice, not the expected cost.

Step 5 — the cost, computed

The recognition argument is qualitative and the cost argument is not, so it is worth the arithmetic rather than an assertion that foundations are cheap.

```
APEX ANNUAL COST, CONSTRUCTED                          USD / YEAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DIFC FOUNDATION
  registered agent, registered office, filings            18,000
  council fees, incl. one independent professional        45,000
  accounting, audit, statutory registers                  22,000
  DIFC counsel retainer and annual document review        35,000
  TOTAL                                                  120,000

OFFSHORE DISCRETIONARY TRUST, ad valorem basis
  at 35 bp on USD 240m                                   840,000
```

```
  at 15 bp on USD 240m                                  360,000
  at 10 bp on USD 240m                                  240,000
  fixed-fee holding mandate (constructed)               180,000
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTED. Illustrative, not quotations. Trustee fee bases
vary widely and a fixed-fee mandate for a pure holding
structure is available in the market.
```

The foundation's cost is fixed and the ad valorem trustee's is not, which means the comparison has a crossover rather than a winner:

```
TRUSTEE BASIS    FOUNDATION CHEAPER ABOVE
-----------------------------------------
35 bp            USD  34.3 million
15 bp            USD  80.0 million
10 bp            USD 120.0 million
-----------------------------------------
Q* = 120,000 / (basis in decimal)
```

At the constructed USD 240 million the foundation costs 5.0 basis points against the ad valorem trustee's 35, a difference of USD 720,000 a year. **Below roughly USD 34 million on a 35 basis point fee basis the arithmetic reverses, and the fixed-cost apex becomes the expensive option — which is the same minimum-efficient-scale result Chapter 3 produced for compliance architecture generally, arrived at from a different direction.**

The honest reading of the table: **cost is not the reason to choose a foundation on these facts, and a family that chooses one for the fee saving has chosen correctly for the wrong reason and will unwind it the first time an adviser quotes a fixed-fee trustee.** The reason is the third row of the touchpoint table.

Step 6 — the design as built

The chosen shape is the hybrid, and each layer earns its cost under the failure mode 11 test.

```
    DIFC FOUNDATION  (DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018)          -- the apex
      combined form: stated non-charitable purpose in the Charter,
      discretionary beneficiary class in the By-laws
      JOB the other layer cannot do: be a recorded legal owner in
          Bangkok, Abu Dhabi and Paris without a recognition argument
        |
        +-- ADGM HOLDCO -- THAI BOI OPCO
        +-- UK LTD
        +-- BERMUDA CAPTIVE
        +-- GIFT CITY VEHICLE
        +-- DIFC TRUST  (DIFC Law No. 4 of 2018)       -- one branch only
              holds the listed-securities portfolio for the two
              common-law-resident children
              JOB the other layer cannot do: give those two children
                  four centuries of settled doctrine on trustee duty,
                  review of discretion and information rights, in a
```

```
form their own tax systems already know how to tax
```

Note what the trust is *not* asked to do. It does not hold the Thai or UAE operating interests, nothing the French child's claim would reach, and it is not the apex. It holds one class of movable asset for two beneficiaries in Hague contracting states whose tax systems have settled positions on trusts. **The trust is used precisely where it is strong and nowhere else, and that is the argument of this chapter stated as a structure rather than as a proposition.**

Both instruments sit under one governing law family and one court, because the DIFC enacted its Foundations Law and its Trust Law in the same year. The second layer adds a constructed USD 65,000 a year, taking the apex cost to USD 185,000, or 7.7 basis points.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

- The Foundation's Charter is on a searchable register. Disclosure changes nothing.
- The By-laws and the trust deed would be produced on a properly framed request. Both contain a family beneficiary class and distribution standards, and neither contains an element whose function depends on not being read.
- The DIFC trust's existence, trustee and beneficiaries are known to the trustee's regulator, to the custodian, and through CRS reporting to the residence jurisdictions of both beneficiaries. This is anticipated in the planning, not defeated by the structure.
- The French child's position is disclosed to the French administration by design, including the reporting obligations that attach to her under the French regimes discussed above. **The structure's answer to France is a filing and an argument about classification, not silence.**
- Every operating entity beneath the apex names the Foundation in its own jurisdiction's ownership filings, and the filings agree with each other.

The structure passes. **The element that would have failed it is the one that was not built: a trust apex whose recognition in France depends on the French court not looking too closely at what a discretionary trust is, which is a concealment dependency wearing legal clothing.**

What it did not solve, stated plainly

- **The transfer question.** France may apply its own mandatory rules to the endowment itself. Legal personality closed the ownership question and did not touch this one. Chapter 9.
- **The attribution question.** Whether a DIFC Foundation falls within the French regime for "trusts", and how it is classified for German and United States purposes, are unsettled and are Register items rather than answers.
- **The thin-doctrine risk** of failure mode 8, which is real, unpriced, and does not go away with good drafting — it only becomes less likely to be needed.
- **The apex concentration** of Chapter 7's failure mode 4. Two instruments in one jurisdiction is still one jurisdiction.
- **The cost**, which at USD 185,000 a year is a genuine charge against Q and which SPINE §2's companion result says the diversification does not pay for.

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, gathered for Appendix D:

1. The current status table of the Hague Trusts Convention of 1 July 1985 for every state named in this chapter, including ratifications, accessions and territorial extensions.
2. The article numbers of the Convention's mandatory-rules, overriding-provisions and public-policy reservations, and of the provision permitting non-recognition where the significant elements are more closely connected with non-trust states.
3. The article of the French Code civil prohibiting the gratuitous fiducie, and its current scope.
4. Contracting-state lists and entry-into-force dates for the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 and the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 in each relevant state; the article and sub-paragraph numbers of their succession, family law and matrimonial property exclusions; and whether the UAE is a party to either.
5. The UAE's current regime for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, including the Civil Procedure legislation and its implementing decisions, and the regional and bilateral judicial cooperation instruments in force with each heir jurisdiction.
6. Whether a foreign *foundation* specifically is recognised on the same basis as a foreign company in each relevant state, and whether any residual real-seat doctrine or public-policy control applies to a foundation administered from within that state.
7. The codified position on family waqf in each relevant Gulf state; the treatment of a foreign legal person as recipient of a lifetime gift; and the interaction of personal-status law with a foreign holding structure.
8. Whether a DIFC Foundation is more likely to be classified as a foreign trust or a foreign corporation for US federal tax purposes on the specific charter proposed; any published guidance addressing DIFC Foundations; and current Form 3520 and 3520-A reporting and penalties.
9. The current text of section 15 of the German Aussensteuergesetz, the conditions of the EU/EEA exception, and the evidentiary requirements for relying on it.
10. Whether a DIFC Foundation falls within the definition of "trust" in article 792-0 bis of the French Code général des impôts; whether article 123 bis applies on the facts; and the current reporting obligations under each.
11. The current consolidated revision of the Cayman Foundation Companies Law, 2017, and its present requirements.
12. The reserved-powers and firewall provisions of DIFC Law No. 4 of 2018 compared, article by article, with those of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018.
13. Whether the DIFC Foundations Law or the general DIFC law of legal persons provides any mechanism for setting aside a defective exercise of a council power, and whether the DIFC Courts have decided the point.
14. The citations and current standing of the New Zealand and Privy Council "illusory trust" line of authority, before any reliance is placed on it in either direction.

Chapter 9 takes the question this chapter deliberately left open. The foundation closes the ownership question at step two and leaves the transfer question standing, and the transfer question is where forced heirship lives. It also draws the line this book will not let a reader blur: the difference between lawfully planning around a reserved portion and unlawfully defeating one.

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in

each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location, and asset situs. All worked cases are CONSTRUCTED.

Chapter 9 . Succession and Forced Heirship

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* Succession law is the most jurisdiction-specific subject in this book and the one where a general statement is most likely to be wrong in a particular case. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in each jurisdiction of residence, nationality, beneficiary location and asset situs, and with Sharia-qualified counsel where personal-status law applies. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Chapter 4 listed succession as the fourth of five threats and made one observation about it that governs this chapter. **Every other threat in this book is a risk. Succession is a certainty with an unknown date.** Expropriation may never happen. A creditor may never sue. A bank may never de-risk the relationship. The founder will die, and on that day every connecting factor in the structure is tested at once, in several jurisdictions, by people who did not choose each other and who are grieving.

That certainty ought to make succession the best-planned exposure in any structure. It is usually the worst, for a reason that is psychological rather than technical: a principal will spend eighteen months and serious money on a threat with a two per cent annual probability and will not spend an afternoon on the one with a probability of one. Chapter 7 built an instrument whose central function is to survive that day. This chapter says what it does on it, and what it does not.

Chapter 8 closed on the distinction that organises everything below. A foreign court asked to consider a DIFC Foundation will accept, at step two, that the Foundation is a legal person and owns its assets. That closes the ownership question. It leaves standing a different and smaller question: whether the *transfer* by which the founder endowed the Foundation is one that the court's own mandatory rules reach. **Forced heirship lives entirely inside the transfer question, and a structure built on the assumption that legal personality answered it will fail in the one forum where it cannot afford to.**

Three systems, one problem

Three families of law answer the question *how much of a person's property may he give away by choosing* in three incompatible ways.

The common law starts from testamentary freedom. A testator may in principle leave everything to a stranger, subject to statutory family-provision jurisdictions that let a court award reasonable financial provision to a defined class — England's Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 is the model, and comparable statutes exist across the common-law world. That is a discretionary remedy on application, not a fixed share, and the difference between a discretion and a share is the whole of the practical difference between the systems.

The civil law starts from the opposite premise. A fixed fraction of the estate is reserved to defined heirs by operation of law, the testator may dispose freely only of the remainder, and the reserve is not a claim the heir must persuade a court to grant. It is hers.

Islamic law starts from a third place, and it is not a variant of the second. The fixed shares of *fara'id* are derived from revealed text, they allocate the whole estate among a defined set of relatives in

stated fractions, and the freedom to dispose by bequest is confined to one third and may not ordinarily be directed to a person who already takes a fixed share.

The three systems do not differ in degree. They differ in what a will is: a disposition in the first, a disposition of the free portion in the second, and an instrument operating within a distribution that has already been made in the third.

The claim this chapter defends

The book's standing position is that structures which depend on not being seen fail on contact, and succession tests it hardest, because the temptation to conceal is strongest and the concealment most likely to be discovered. A reserved-portion claimant is not a tax authority running a sampling exercise. She is a family member with lifelong knowledge of the assets, a personal motive, an unlimited horizon, and, in most civil-law systems, a notary under a professional duty to inventory the estate and ask about lifetime gifts.

So the chapter's claim is stated at the front:

> **There is a real and defensible distinction between lawfully planning around forced heirship and unlawfully defeating it, the distinction is not a matter of degree or of how well the file is drafted, and a structure that sits on the wrong side of it will be unwound by a court that has no difficulty seeing which side it is on.**

The line is drawn precisely in the Mechanism and made operational in the Specification. In outline it is this: **lawful planning changes the facts before the event; unlawful defeat changes the account of the facts afterwards.** Moving your habitual residence is planning. Saying you moved it is fraud. Giving property away completely, ten years early, when nobody has a claim, is planning. Giving it away on paper while continuing to enjoy it is a simulation, and every civil-law system has a doctrine for that with a name and a body of case law behind it.

What this chapter does not do

It does not tell a reader how to disinherit a child, and where a technique exists that would defeat a reserve, the chapter identifies it as unlawful and stops. The reason is not squeamishness. It is that the unlawful routes do not work, for the same reason the concealment structures of Chapter 3 do not work: they require a specific person, who has every incentive and every opportunity to look, not to look.

What it does instead is set out how the three systems allocate, which connecting factors decide which applies, which levers are lawful in each, how to quantify the exposure before choosing one, and where the DIFC Foundation helps and where it is irrelevant.

The Mechanism

The civil-law reserve

The reserve (*réserve héréditaire*, *legítima*, *legittima*, *Pflichtteil*) is a fraction of the estate that vests in defined heirs regardless of the will. Two features of it matter more than the fractions.

It is computed on a reconstituted mass, not on what is left. Civil-law systems do not permit the reserve to be emptied by lifetime giving. The estate is reconstituted for the computation by adding

back qualifying lifetime gifts, and the reserve is calculated on that larger figure. A founder who gives away ninety per cent of his property and dies with ten has not reduced the reserve; he has reduced the fund from which it will be paid, which is a different and worse position.

The remedy differs, and the difference is decisive for structuring. In some systems the reserve is satisfied in money; in others the heir may reach the property itself in the hands of the person who received it. **A monetary claim is a liquidity problem. A claim in kind against a third-party transferee is an ownership problem, and only the second one can break a holding structure.**

France is the reference case for this book because the carried case has a French heir. The Code civil at article 913 fixes the reserve at one half of the estate where the deceased leaves one child, two thirds where he leaves two, and three quarters where he leaves three or more; the balance is the *quotité disponible*. Reduction of excessive gifts is, since the reform effected by Loi ndeg 2006-728 of 23 June 2006, ordinarily made in value rather than in kind — the recipient keeps the property and owes an indemnity — which converts most French reserve exposure from an ownership problem into a liquidity problem. That single reform is the most important structural fact about French forced heirship for anyone building a holding structure, and it is routinely omitted from summaries that lead with the fractions.

Verify with French counsel: the current text of article 913 of the Code civil and the operation of the reduction-in-value rule, including the circumstances in which reduction in kind remains available, and the prescription periods for the *action en réduction*.

Germany takes the monetary route further and more cleanly. The *Pflichtteil* under the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch at §2303 is a claim in money against the estate, equal in value to half the share the person would have taken on intestacy. It is not a share in the assets and the claimant is not an heir. Lifetime gifts are addressed separately by the supplementary claim at §2325, which brings gifts made within ten years of death back into account on a sliding scale that reduces the included value by one tenth for each year that has elapsed since the gift. The German system is therefore the clearest illustration of the general rule that in civil-law forced heirship the planning instrument is time, and the calendar is a statute rather than a matter of judgment.

Verify with German counsel: the current text of §§2303, 2325 and 2329 BGB, the operation of the ten-year sliding scale including its treatment of gifts to a spouse and of gifts with reserved enjoyment, and the effect of the reservation of a usufruct on the start of the ten-year period. This last point is where German planning most often goes wrong and it must not be assumed.

Italy and Spain sit closer to the ownership end. Italian law provides for the *legittima* and for an *azione di riduzione* which can, in defined circumstances, be pursued against third parties who acquired from the donee, subject to statutory time limits. Spanish law provides for the *legítima* of descendants with the peculiarity that a portion of it (the *mejora*) may be distributed unequally among them, and several Spanish regions apply their own *foral* regimes with materially different fractions.

Verify with Italian and Spanish counsel respectively: the current articles of the Codice civile governing the *legittima* and the *azione di riduzione*, including the time limits applicable to actions against third-party acquirers; and the current articles of the Código Civil governing the *legítima* and the *mejora*, together with the applicable *foral* regime for the person concerned. The fractions differ by region within Spain and an answer given for Madrid is not an answer for Barcelona or Pamplona.

Sharia fixed shares

The Islamic law of inheritance is a complete distributive system rather than a restriction on testation, and treating it as "forced heirship with different numbers" produces bad structures.

The fixed shares (*fara'id*) derive from the Qur'anic verses at 4:11, 4:12 and 4:176 with the elaborations of the schools. Shares go to a defined set of relatives — spouse, parents, children, and in specified configurations siblings and more remote agnates — in stated fractions, with any residue passing to the residuary heirs (*'asaba*). The general shape, with the caution that every configuration is fact-specific and the schools differ:

WIDOW	one eighth where the deceased leaves a child; one quarter where he does not
WIDOWER	one quarter where the deceased leaves a child; one half where she does not
EACH PARENT	one sixth where the deceased leaves a child
ONE DAUGHTER alone	one half
TWO OR MORE DAUGHTERS alone	two thirds between them
SON WITH DAUGHTER	the son takes twice the daughter's share
RESIDUE	to the residuary heirs, by proximity

Two further rules do most of the structuring work.

The bequest is capped at one third. A Muslim may dispose by *wasiyya* of not more than one third of the estate — settled doctrine, derived from a well-known report of the Prophet's instruction to a companion who wished to bequeath more.

A bequest may not ordinarily be made to an heir who already takes a fixed share, except with the consent of the other heirs given after death.

Verify with Sharia-qualified counsel in the relevant state: the precise share entitlements on the actual family configuration; the school applied by that state's courts and the differences it produces, in particular between Sunni schools and the Twelver Shia system, whose treatment of the residuary heirs is materially different; the codified position on *wasiyya* in excess of one third and on bequests to heirs; and the treatment of lifetime gifts. No general statement about Islamic inheritance should be relied on for a specific family, and the fractions above are orientation rather than advice.

The interaction with a holding structure is usually missed. A lifetime gift (*hiba*) that is complete — with the classical requirement of delivery and the taking of possession (*qabd*) — is generally effective and removes the property from the estate before the shares are computed. So is a properly constituted *waqf*. The Islamic system's own planning instruments are completeness and timing, the same two the civil law uses, and both are the opposite of concealment: a gift that is concealed is a gift that was not delivered, and a gift that was not delivered is not a gift.

In the United Arab Emirates the position is complicated by two coexisting regimes. Federal Law No. 28 of 2005 on Personal Status governs personal status generally. Federal Decree-Law No. 41 of 2022 on Civil Personal Status introduced a civil regime for non-Muslim foreigners, including provisions on wills and inheritance. Dubai Law No. 15 of 2017 addresses the administration of estates and implementation of wills of non-Muslims in Dubai, and the DIFC Courts operate a wills registration service for non-Muslims.

Verify with UAE counsel: the current scope and application of Federal Decree-Law No. 41 of 2022, including whether and how it applies to a non-Muslim foreign resident with UAE-situs assets and how it interacts with Federal Law No. 28 of 2005 as amended; the current operation of Dubai Law No. 15 of 2017; and the current name, scope and territorial reach of the DIFC Courts wills service, including whether it covers assets outside Dubai. This area has been amended repeatedly since 2020 and no description written at any date should be relied on at a later one.

Usufruct: the civil law's own time-splitting device

A reader who has followed Chapter 8's argument that the civil law has no equivalent of the trust may conclude it has no way of separating enjoyment from ownership over time. It has an excellent one: ancient, inside the closed catalogue of real rights, and registrable.

Usufruct (*usufruit*, *usufructo*, *usufrutto*, *Nießbrauch*) splits a thing into the right to use and take the fruits, held by the usufructuary, and the bare ownership (*nue-propriété*), held by the bare owner. On the usufructuary's death the usufruct extinguishes and the bare owner's ownership becomes full without a further transfer.

The structuring consequence is direct. A parent may give the bare ownership of an asset to a child now, at a value discounted to reflect the retained usufruct, and keep the income and the use for life. The gift is complete when made — which starts every claw-back clock — while the parent's economic position is largely intact. This is the civil law's answer to the life-interest trust, it achieves most of the same result, it is understood by every notary and every land registrar in the tradition, and it requires no recognition argument of any kind.

Two cautions belong with it. The valuation of the split is usually fixed by a statutory scale keyed to the usufructuary's age rather than left to the parties, so the discount is not a negotiating variable. And several systems contain anti-abuse provisions aimed at arrangements separating usufruct from bare ownership within a family, which can reverse the intended treatment.

Verify with counsel in the relevant civil-law state: the statutory valuation scale for usufruct and bare ownership and its current figures; the treatment on extinction of the usufruct at death; and any specific anti-abuse presumption applying to a démembrement between family members. In France these are commonly cited as articles 669, 751 and 1133 of the Code général des impôts; **the numbering and current content must be confirmed before any of them appears in an opinion.**

The Islamic tradition contains the same structural idea. A *waqf* separates the corpus (*raqaba*), which is immobilised, from the usufruct (*manfa'a*), which is directed to the beneficiaries. Every one of the three legal families has an indigenous device for separating enjoyment from ownership across time. Only the common law did it by splitting ownership itself, and that is the whole of Chapter 8 restated in the succession context.

Which law applies, and to what

Before any of the above matters, a prior question has to be answered: whose succession law governs this estate, or this asset. Two structural choices divide the world's systems.

Unity or scission. A unitary system applies one law to the whole succession, movables and immovables alike. A scission system applies the law of the deceased's domicile or nationality to movables and the law of the situs to immovables. **Under a scission system, land is governed**

by where it is, always, and no amount of planning at the personal level changes that — which is the technical reason Chapter 29's conversion of immovable property into securities is a succession instrument and not merely a liquidity one.

The connecting factor. Systems differ over whether the personal law is that of nationality, domicile or habitual residence, and the difference is not academic: the three can point to three different laws for the same person.

Within the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement in matters of succession — commonly called Brussels IV — applies to the succession of persons who die on or after 17 August 2015. Its architecture matters to any structure with an EU-resident or EU-national heir:

GENERAL RULE	the law of the deceased's habitual residence at death governs the succession AS A WHOLE -- a unitary rule, displacing scission for participating Member States
CHOICE OF LAW	a person may choose the law of a state of his NATIONALITY to govern his succession as a whole
SCOPE	the chosen or applicable law governs the whole succession, including the disposable part and the reserved shares
UNIVERSAL	the law designated applies whether or not it is the law of a Member State
PUBLIC POLICY	a designated law may be refused application where it is manifestly incompatible with the forum's public policy
NOT BOUND	the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark

Verify with EU counsel: the article numbers of the general rule, the choice-of-law provision, the scope provision, the universal-application provision and the public-policy exception — commonly cited as articles 21, 22, 23, 20 and 35 respectively — and the current position on the recital addressing evasion of the law. The substance above is not in doubt; the numbering should be pinned before it appears in an opinion.

The most important practical question under that framework is whether the *absence* of a reserve in a chosen foreign law is itself contrary to the forum's public policy. If it is, the choice-of-law provision is worth much less than it appears. The French Cour de cassation addressed this in two decisions of its first civil chamber on 27 September 2017, holding in substance that a foreign law knowing no reserve is not for that reason alone contrary to French international public policy, and indicating the position may differ where the excluded heir is left in precariousness or need.

Verify with French counsel: the docket numbers and full reasoning of those two decisions of 27 September 2017, any subsequent decisions of the Cour de cassation modifying the position, and the current state of the debate. This is a live area and the general direction of French legislative response since 2021 has been to narrow what the case law allowed.

That legislative response is the next point and it is instructive far beyond France.

When planning succeeds, the state legislates

Loi ndeg 2021-1109 of 24 August 2021 inserted into article 913 of the Code civil a compensatory levy. In outline: where the deceased or one of his children is, at death, a national of or habitually resident in a Member State of the European Union, and the law applicable to the succession provides for no reserve, a deprived child may take a compensatory levy on assets situated in France up to the value of the reserved rights he would have had under French law. It applies to successions opened on or after 1 November 2021.

Verify with French counsel: the exact conditions, the mechanics and the current status of this provision, including any constitutional challenge, any European Commission or Court of Justice proceedings concerning its compatibility with EU law, and any amendment. This provision is under active contest and its status should be checked as at the date of any advice rather than taken from any secondary source, including this one.

Whatever its fate, its existence carries a lesson this book states as a general principle rather than a French curiosity:

> **A planning technique that reliably defeats a mandatory rule attracts a legislative response, and the response is usually retroactive in effect if not in form, because it applies to deaths occurring after enactment regardless of when the planning was done.**

That is the same degradation dynamic Chapter 1 documented for haven jurisdictions, operating in a different field. It is also the strongest single argument for building succession structures on levers that the system itself provides — consent, timing, and completeness — rather than on levers that exploit a gap, because the system does not legislate against its own instruments.

The line: planning versus defeat

Now the distinction the chapter promised, stated as a test rather than as a sentiment.

Every lawful lever works by changing a fact the law makes relevant. Every unlawful one works by misrepresenting a fact, or by making a change that is not real. The four questions below separate them, and a structure must answer all four affirmatively.

1 IS THE CHANGE REAL AND LIVED?
A change of habitual residence is a change in where a person actually lives, keeps his family, sees his doctor and spends his time. A declaration is not a change. The connecting factor is a question of fact and it is decided on evidence a court can see.

2 WAS THE DISPOSITION COMPLETE?
Did the transferor actually give up dominion? A gift with an undisclosed side agreement to return the property is not a gift; it is a simulation, and every civil-law system has a doctrine to treat it as what it is. Reserving a usufruct is complete and lawful because the reservation is DISCLOSED and PRICED.

3 WAS IT DONE BEFORE THE CLAIM EXISTED, AND OUTSIDE THE CLAW-BACK WINDOW?

```
   Timing is the substance of the lawful case. A transfer made a
   decade before a death, when no one had a claim, sits in a
   different legal category from one made in the last illness.

4  WOULD IT BE DESCRIBED IDENTICALLY TO EVERY AUDIENCE?
   Would the planner, the heir, the notary, the tax authority and
   the judge each be given the same account of what was done and
   why? This is the disclosure test of Chapter 3, applied to a
   succession, and it is the question that catches what the first
   three miss.
```

Question 4 does the work, and the reason is worth stating plainly. Almost every unlawful succession arrangement has at its centre a document or a fact the family is unwilling to show to one specific person — usually the disinherited heir, sometimes the notary conducting the inventory. **That unwillingness is the diagnostic. A lawful arrangement is one that the excluded heir may be shown in full, and which she may resent, and which nonetheless stands.**

Set out as a table, with the failing versions on the right:

Lever	Lawful form	Unlawful form
Residence	Actually moving, and living there	Declaring a residence not lived in
Nationality election	Electing the law of a state of which one is genuinely a national	Electing a law of a nationality not held, or misdescribing the facts
Lifetime gift	Complete transfer, disclosed, valued, dated, outside the window	Transfer with an undisclosed agreement to return or to continue enjoying
Usufruct reservation	Disclosed, valued on the statutory scale, registered	Undisclosed side arrangement giving back more than the reserved right
Asset conversion	Genuinely selling immovable property and holding securities	Nominal sale to a controlled entity with no real change
Renunciation by an heir	Formal advance renunciation with independent advice, in the statutory form	Renunciation obtained by pressure, or without disclosure of the estate
Life insurance	Genuine policy, premiums proportionate to means, beneficiary designated	Policy used as a wrapper for a transfer, premiums manifestly excessive
Foundation endowment	Real endowment, solvency recited, control graded and disclosed	Endowment the founder continues to treat as his own account

Read down the right-hand column and one property is common to all eight: each unlawful form depends on somebody not knowing something. That is not a coincidence and it is not a moral observation. It is the structural claim of Chapter 3 reappearing in the one area of law where families most want it to be untrue.

The Specification

A build procedure, in the order the steps must be taken. Steps 1 and 2 are most often skipped, and skipping them is why families choose expensive levers against small exposures and no lever at all against large ones.

Step 1 — Build the succession map

Not the structure chart. A separate document, with three tables.

```
PEOPLE   for the founder, the spouse, and each heir and likely heir:
         nationality(ies); habitual residence, with the date it
         began and the evidence for it; domicile if the relevant
         system uses it; matrimonial property regime and the law
         governing it; whether that state is bound by Brussels IV;
         whether that state has forced heirship and in what form;
         whether the reserve remedy there is in money or in kind.

ASSETS   for each asset: situs; movable or immovable; the succession
         law the situs state would apply to it; whether the register
         recording it requires a grant of representation; and
         whether it is held directly or through an entity.

LAWS     for each combination of person and asset, the law that a
         court in each relevant forum would apply, and the forum
         that would in practice be seised first.
```

The third table is the one that produces surprises. A family with three heirs in three states and assets in six routinely finds that four different succession laws could apply to parts of the same estate depending on which court is seised first, and the first-seised court is usually determined by which heir is angriest.

Step 2 — Quantify the exposure before choosing a lever

Two numbers, computed separately, because they are different problems that the same conversation usually merges.

```
E_reserve  the maximum value a forced-heirship or family-provision
           claimant could extract, under the law that would apply,
           capped by what that law can actually reach -- which for a
           levy on local assets is the value of the local assets,
           not the notional entitlement.

E_tax      the tax an heir will bear on what she receives, computed
           under her own residence rules, which are independent of
           the succession law and of the structure.
```

These two numbers are frequently an order of magnitude apart, and in the worked case below the tax exposure is roughly four times the forced-heirship exposure while the family's advisers had

spent all their attention on the smaller one. Compute both, in currency, before any instrument is discussed.

Step 3 — The lever set

Every lawful lever changes one of four things: who the relevant person is, where he or the asset is, when the disposition happened, or whether the claimant consents. There is nothing else.

```
WHO       nationality election under Brussels IV where genuinely a
          national; the identity of the transferor — a gift from a
          spouse's own property is not a gift from the founder's.

WHERE     genuine change of habitual residence; conversion of
          immovable to movable property under Chapter 29, which
          removes an asset from a situs rule it cannot otherwise
          escape; the situs of the entity rather than the underlying.

WHEN      completed lifetime gifts, made early, outside every
          claw-back window; usufruct reservation, which completes the
          gift now while preserving the income.

WHETHER   the consent of the person entitled — the only lever that
          works in all three legal families, and the subject of the
          next step.
```

Step 4 — Consent is the lever that exists in all three systems

This is the most useful and least used result in the chapter.

Each of the three systems provides a lawful mechanism by which the person entitled to a protected share may give it up, and each requires formality, independent advice, and full disclosure of what is being given up.

France permits an advance renunciation of the action in reduction, introduced by the succession reform of 23 June 2006, made in a specific notarial form before two notaries, by an heir who is informed of what he is renouncing.

Germany permits a *Pflichtteilsverzicht* — a contractual waiver of the compulsory portion — concluded with the future deceased and recorded before a notary, under the provisions of the BGB beginning at §2346.

Islamic law permits the heirs, after death, to settle among themselves by mutual agreement (*takharuj*), and permits a bequest exceeding one third, or a bequest to an heir, where the other heirs consent after the death.

Verify with counsel in each system: the current form, capacity and disclosure requirements for an advance renunciation in France (commonly cited as article 929 of the Code civil), for a *Pflichtteilsverzicht* in Germany (BGB §2346 and the notarial requirement), and for post-death settlement among heirs under the applicable personal-status law. A renunciation obtained without independent advice or without disclosure of the estate is the single most attackable document a family can create, and it is attacked by the person who signed it.

The strategic point is the one that connects this chapter to the rest of the book:

> **The lawful defeat of a protected share is consent, consent requires disclosure, and a family that cannot obtain consent has learned something true about itself that no structure will fix.**

Step 5 — The claw-back calendar

Every lawful timing lever has a statutory clock and the clocks do not agree with each other. Build one calendar, per heir jurisdiction, with the transfer dates on it.

```
GERMANY     supplementary claim reaches gifts made within ten years
            of death, on a sliding scale reducing the included value
            by one tenth per elapsed year —— BGB s.2325(3)
FRANCE      lifetime gifts are brought back into the mass for the
            computation of the reserve; the ACTION is subject to
            shorter prescription periods —— verify
ENGLAND     the family-provision jurisdiction has its own provision
            on dispositions intended to defeat an application, with
            its own period —— verify
ISLAMIC     a completed gift with delivery is generally effective;
            a death-bed gift is treated as a bequest and falls
            within the one-third limit —— verify per state
```

Verify with counsel in each jurisdiction: the applicable periods, what starts them, and whether a reserved usufruct or a retained benefit postpones the start. A reservation of enjoyment frequently stops the clock from running at all, which converts the family's best lever into its worst, and it is the commonest technical failure in this field.

Step 6 — The liquidity plan

In most civil-law systems the reserve is now satisfied in money — good news for the structure and bad news for the balance sheet, because a money claim against an estate of operating companies has to be paid out of something.

Compute, for each heir with a protected share: the claim in currency; the liquid assets available at death; and the shortfall as a percentage of the estate. **If the shortfall exceeds the liquid assets, the structure's own succession mechanism will force the sale of an operating branch — which is the fragmentation the Foundation was built to prevent, arriving by a different door.**

The lawful answers are all pre-funded: a life policy written outside the estate, a sinking fund at the apex, an instalment arrangement documented before death, or an equalisation in specie of an asset the heir will take.

Step 7 — What the Foundation does here, and what it does not

Stated as narrowly as Chapter 7 stated the instrument's job.

```
THE FOUNDATION DOES
  prevent fragmentation of the enterprise: the shares do not move
    on death because the owner does not die
```

```
  remove the need for grants of representation in five places
  keep an operating company's shareholding unfrozen through a death,
    which matters most where a licence or promotion is attached
  give the family a single forum and a written constitution for the
    governance disputes that follow a death
  convert an ownership question into a transfer question in every
    foreign forum

THE FOUNDATION DOES NOT
  remove a reserved share: the claim survives against the transfer,
    against distributions received, and against local assets
  bind a foreign judge: the firewall addresses the DIFC court only
  change an heir's own tax residence or her exposure under it
  substitute for consent where consent is the only lawful lever
  make an incomplete endowment complete
```

The single most useful sentence in this chapter for a practitioner is that the Foundation moves the fight from "who owns this" to "was the endowment good", and the second fight is won or lost on the date of the endowment and the founder's conduct afterwards, not on the drafting.

Step 8 — The documentation and disclosure standard

Three documents, and the standard for each is that the excluded heir may read it.

The endowment file. The deed, the asset schedule with valuations, the solvency recital, the date, and a contemporaneous note of the commercial purpose. Chapter 7's Step 3 sets the requirement; succession is where it is tested.

The family disclosure. A written statement to all heirs of what the structure is, what each is expected to receive, and what has been given up by whom. It is uncomfortable and it is the highest-value document in the file.

The succession memorandum. Chapter 7's Step 10 document, extended with the Step 1 map and the Step 5 calendar, held by the registered agent and the guardian.

The Failure Modes

1. Confusing the forced-heirship problem with the inheritance-tax problem

They have different causes, different remedies and usually different magnitudes. The reserve is about who is entitled; the tax is about where the recipient lives. **A structure can eliminate the first entirely and leave the second untouched, and the second is often the larger number.**

Diagnostic: the plan has one figure rather than two. *Mitigation:* Step 2.

2. Reading the firewall as binding on a foreign judge

Chapter 7 said it, and forced heirship is where the misreading is most common. The DIFC firewall tells the DIFC judge not to give effect to a foreign reserve claim. It has no addressee in Paris, Madrid or Milan, and it does not travel with the assets.

Diagnostic: the plan's answer to a reserve claim is a statute of the apex jurisdiction. *Mitigation:* accept that the claim will be heard where the claimant is, and design so that what it reaches is a transfer question.

3. Reserving enjoyment and stopping the clock

The founder endows the Foundation and continues to draw from it, or gives bare ownership and takes back more than the reserved usufruct. In several systems this prevents the claw-back period from beginning at all. Ten years of patient planning then count for nothing.

Diagnostic: money moves from the structure to the founder outside a documented distribution standard. *Mitigation:* the graded reservation of Chapter 7's Step 7, and Step 5 above.

4. Electing a law without being a national of it

The choice-of-law provision under Brussels IV permits election of the law of a state of nationality. Not of residence, not of asset situs, not of the family's preference.

Diagnostic: the will elects a law and nobody has produced a passport. *Mitigation:* check the nationality, then check whether the elected law's absence of a reserve survives the forum's public policy.

5. Relying on a residence change that has not happened

Habitual residence is a question of fact decided on evidence: where the family lives, where the children are at school, where the days are spent. A lease and a utility bill in a state where nobody sleeps is not a change of residence. It is a misrepresentation, and the evidence against it is generated continuously by the person asserting it.

Diagnostic: the day count and the family's actual location disagree. *Mitigation:* move, or plan on the basis of not having moved.

6. Ignoring the matrimonial property regime

The estate's size is determined by the marital property position before any succession rule applies, and a change of the applicable regime is a lawful, powerful and frequently overlooked lever. In the European Union the applicable-law rules are set by Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 in the participating Member States.

Verify with counsel: the applicable regime for the couple, the law governing it, whether it may be changed and with what formalities and effect, and the current application of Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 to the states concerned.

Diagnostic: nobody has identified the regime. *Mitigation:* identify it before anything else, because it changes the denominator.

7. Sharia errors of assumption

Three recur. Assuming a foreign will overrides personal-status law where that law applies. Assuming a bequest to an heir is valid without the other heirs' consent. Assuming a non-Muslim civil regime applies to a person or an asset when it does not.

Mitigation: Sharia-qualified counsel in the state whose courts would decide, before the structure is designed rather than after.

8. The renunciation that is attacked by the person who signed it

Obtained in a family meeting, without independent advice or disclosure of the estate's value, in the wrong form. It is set aside, and then becomes evidence of pressure.

Diagnostic: the renouncing heir did not have her own lawyer. *Mitigation:* the statutory form, separate advice, and a full schedule of what is being given up, annexed.

9. The endowment that was never complete

Chapter 8's failure mode 2 in its succession form. The founder endowed the Foundation and continued to treat it as his account; a foreign court hearing the reserve claim finds the transfer ineffective and computes the reserve on the whole estate.

Diagnostic: Chapter 7's test — if the founder can obtain money on his own signature, the failure is already present.

10. The heir who moves

The map is a photograph. A Singapore-resident child who moves to a forced-heirship state in year eight changes the applicable law, the claw-back calendar and the tax exposure simultaneously, and nobody tells the adviser.

Diagnostic: the map has no review date. *Mitigation:* an annual re-run, and an undertaking to notify a change of residence before it happens.

11. Assuming today's situs map is the one that will apply

A levy on local assets bites on assets situated locally *at death*. A structure with no French situs today acquires one when someone buys an apartment, inherits a share of a family property, or moves a custody account.

Diagnostic: the exposure calculation ignores future acquisitions. *Mitigation:* make the situs rule a standing constraint in the family's investment policy, in writing.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. Every fact and figure below is invented for illustration. No real person, family, entity or transaction is described. Figures are illustrative and are not benchmarks. The legal outcomes described are what a structure should be designed to withstand, not predictions of what any court would decide.

The carried case: a dual national, tax resident in the UAE for eleven years, aged sixty-three, with three adult children — one resident in Singapore, one resident and a national in France, one resident in the United Kingdom. Assets as built in Chapter 7, at a constructed total of USD 240 million on the Chapter 5 designed distribution:

UAE	29.1%	69.84m	Bermuda	13.6%	32.64m
Thailand	18.2%	43.68m	India	11.8%	28.32m
UK	16.4%	39.36m	Singapore	10.9%	26.16m
			TOTAL		240.00m

Step 1 — the applicable law

The founder is habitually resident in the UAE. A French court seised by child 2 and applying Brussels IV would apply the law of his habitual residence to the succession as a whole, and would apply it whether or not it is the law of a Member State. That points to UAE law, which for a non-Muslim foreign resident engages the civil personal-status regime rather than the *fara'id*.

Verify with French and UAE counsel: whether, on these facts, a French court would find habitual residence in the UAE; what UAE law it would then apply and how it would establish its content; and whether the absence of a reserve in that law would be refused application on public-policy grounds under the reasoning of the Cour de cassation's decisions of 27 September 2017. **Nothing below is a prediction of that outcome.**

Step 2 — the two exposures, computed

Notional French entitlement. Had French law governed, the reserve with three children is three quarters of the estate — USD 180.00 million — divided equally, so child 2's notional share is USD 60.00 million, with a disposable portion of USD 60.00 million.

E_reserve, as found. The founder owns a Paris apartment valued at EUR 6.20 million, held directly. At a constructed rate of USD 1.08 per euro that is USD 6.70 million. The compensatory levy inserted into article 913 in 2021 permits a deprived child who is an EU national to levy on assets situated in France up to the value of her reserved rights. The levy is therefore capped by the French-situs assets, not by the notional entitlement:

```
levy = min(60.00m, 6.70m) = USD 6.70m  =  11.2% of the notional share
```

E_reserve, as designed. The Chapter 5 distribution contains no French-situs asset. On those facts the levy has nothing to attach to and recovers zero. **That result is a fact about the asset map, not a legal victory, and it survives exactly as long as the asset map does — which is failure mode 11 and the reason it is in the list.**

E_tax. Child 2 has lived in France for twenty years. French inheritance tax reaches assets received by an heir who has been resident in France for at least six of the ten years preceding the transfer, wherever those assets are situated, and independently of the deceased's residence. On a receipt of USD 60.00 million at the top marginal rate applicable in the direct line, the tax is approximately

```
0.45 x 60.00m  =  USD 27.00m       (before the small relief given by
                                    the lower brackets and the
                                    per-child abatement)
```

Verify with French counsel: the residence condition and its article; the current abatement and rate scale; and — decisively — whether there is a taxable transmission to child 2 at all if the Foundation is discretionary and makes no distribution to her at the founder's death, or whether the French regime applicable to "trusts" imposes its own consequences instead. **That last question**

is unsettled, it is Chapter 8's register item 10, and it determines which of two very different numbers applies.

The comparison is the point of the whole exercise:

```
E_tax      approx. USD 27.00m       four times larger
E_reserve          USD  6.70m       as found — zero as designed
```

The family's advisers had spent three years on the smaller exposure and had never computed the larger one, and the larger one is the one the structure cannot touch.

Step 3 — the liquidity test

Suppose child 2 is equalised toward her notional USD 60.00 million rather than litigated with. Liquid assets at death are the listed-securities position of USD 26.16 million.

```
claim                    60.00m
liquid assets            26.16m
shortfall                33.84m   =  14.1% of the estate
```

The shortfall is larger than any single liquid holding, and closing it in cash requires selling an operating branch — the UK position at USD 39.36 million or the Bermuda captive at USD 32.64 million. That is the fragmentation the apex existed to prevent, arriving through the succession rather than through the register.

Step 4 — the lawful levers applied

Consent. Child 2 is asked to make an advance renunciation of the action in reduction, in the French statutory form, before two notaries, with her own counsel and a full schedule of the estate annexed. She is told what she is giving up and what she receives instead. **She may refuse, and if she refuses the family has learned the truth early and cheaply, which is worth more than a document she would have attacked later.**

Equalisation outside the estate. A life policy on the founder naming child 2, with a constructed benefit of USD 20.00 million and premiums proportionate to his means. Under French insurance law, sums payable to a designated beneficiary are generally outside the succession and outside the rules on reduction, subject to the limit that manifestly excessive premiums may be brought back.

Verify with French counsel: the current text and article of that provision — commonly cited as article L.132-13 of the Code des assurances — and the case law on manifestly excessive premiums. A policy funded at a level disproportionate to the founder's means converts a lawful lever into an attackable one.

Timing. The endowment was made when the founder was fifty-five, with a solvency recital, an asset schedule and valuations, when no claim existed and none was foreseeable. Eight years have run. Against a German heir the ten-year sliding scale would by now have excluded eighty per cent of the gift's value; against the French heir the gift is brought back for the computation, but the reduction is in value, not in kind.

The Paris apartment. Two options, and the analysis is not obvious. Keeping it exposes up to USD 6.70 million to the levy, and exposes the apartment to French inheritance tax in any event. Selling

it removes both the levy's target and a home the family uses. **The levy does not destroy value; it redirects USD 6.70 million from the founder's plan to a child who would have received something in any case, and a family that sells a house it wants in order to avoid that has priced the exposure badly.** The conclusion on these constructed facts is to keep it, declare it, and account for it in the equalisation.

The family agreement. A written charter under DIFC Courts jurisdiction, signed by all three children, disclosing the structure in full, recording the equalisation, and providing for mediation before litigation.

Step 5 — the Sharia counterfactual

CONSTRUCTED VARIANT. Suppose the same estate, the founder a Muslim whose succession is governed by the *fara'id* as applied in his state, survived by a widow, two sons and one daughter, with no election available. The fixed shares would allocate the estate as follows:

```
widow          1/8 of 240.00m                          =  30.00m
residue        7/8 of 240.00m = 210.00m, divided
               among two sons and one daughter in
               shares of 2 : 2 : 1
  each son     2/5 of 210.00m                          =  84.00m
  daughter     1/5 of 210.00m                          =  42.00m
                                                 TOTAL   = 240.00m
```

Bequest by *wasiyya* is confined to one third — USD 80.00 million — and may not ordinarily be directed to a person already taking a fixed share without the consent of the other heirs.

Two structural observations. A completed lifetime gift, with delivery and the taking of possession, generally removes property before the shares are computed, so completeness is decisive here exactly as in the civil law. And post-death settlement among heirs by consent is the same lever as the French renunciation and the German waiver, arriving from a different tradition. **Consent is the universal instrument, and it is universal because each of these systems is protecting the heirs rather than the state.**

Verify with Sharia-qualified counsel: the shares on the actual configuration, the school applied, the treatment of the lifetime endowment, and the formalities of a post-death settlement.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

- The endowment deed, schedule, valuations and solvency recital would be produced to a French notary conducting an inventory. They are dated, complete, and consistent with the founder's later conduct.
- Child 2 has been shown the whole structure, has her own counsel, and has the schedule annexed to her renunciation. **The disclosure is the mechanism by which the renunciation becomes unattackable, not a cost paid to obtain it.**
- The life policy is declared, its premiums are proportionate, and its beneficiary designation is on the insurer's record.
- The Paris apartment is declared and taxed in France.

- The Foundation's charter, UBO particulars and CRS reporting are as described in Chapter 7.

The structure passes. **The element that would have failed is the one the family originally proposed: an undocumented understanding that child 2 would be "looked after separately", which would have been produced in the French proceedings as evidence that the endowment was never intended to be complete.**

What it did not solve

- **The tax exposure**, at roughly four times the reserve exposure, unchanged by anything in the structure and dependent on where child 2 lives.
- **The classification question** — whether the French regime for "trusts" reaches the Foundation — which is unsettled and which changes the analysis materially either way.
- **The dependence on consent.** If child 2 refuses to renounce, the plan reverts to the levy exposure, the liquidity shortfall and a contested estate. There is no lawful substitute.
- **The situs constraint**, which must now be maintained as a standing investment restriction for the rest of the founder's life.
- **The uncertainty of the compensatory levy itself**, which is under active contest and whose scope at the date of any actual death is unknowable today.

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, gathered for Appendix D:

1. Article 913 of the French Code civil: current text, the fractions, and the operation of the compensatory levy inserted by Loi ndeg 2021-1109 of 24 August 2021 — its conditions, its current status, and any constitutional or EU-law challenge.
2. The French reduction-in-value rule following Loi ndeg 2006-728 of 23 June 2006; when reduction in kind remains available; and the prescription periods for the *action en réduction*.
3. The docket numbers and reasoning of the two decisions of the first civil chamber of the Cour de cassation of 27 September 2017 on the reserve and international public policy, and any subsequent decisions modifying the position.
4. Article numbers of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 for the general rule, choice of law, scope, universal application and public policy, and the recital addressing evasion of the law.
5. French advance renunciation of the action in reduction: the article, the notarial formalities, and the capacity and disclosure requirements.
6. BGB §§2303, 2325, 2329 and 2346: current text, the operation of the ten-year sliding scale including the effect of a reserved usufruct on when the period begins, and the formalities of a *Pflichtteilsverzicht*.
7. Italian Codice civile: the *legittima*, the *azione di riduzione*, and the time limits for actions against third-party acquirers. Spanish Código Civil: the *legítima*, the *mejora*, and the applicable *foral* regime.
8. The article and current content of the French provision on life-assurance proceeds and the case law on manifestly excessive premiums, commonly cited as article L.132-13 of the Code des assurances.
9. French inheritance tax: the six-of-ten-years residence condition for heirs and its article; the current abatement and rate scale; and whether a discretionary foreign foundation making no distribution produces a taxable transmission at all.

10. UAE: current scope and application of Federal Decree-Law No. 41 of 2022 on Civil Personal Status and its interaction with Federal Law No. 28 of 2005; Dubai Law No. 15 of 2017; and the current name, scope and territorial reach of the DIFC Courts wills service.
11. Sharia: the share entitlements on the actual configuration; the school applied by the relevant court; the position on *wasiyya* exceeding one third and on bequests to heirs; the requirements for a completed *hiba*; and the formalities of post-death settlement among heirs.
12. Statutory valuation scales for usufruct and bare ownership in each relevant civil-law state, and any anti-abuse presumption applying to a family *démembrement* — in France commonly cited as articles 669, 751 and 1133 of the Code général des impôts.
13. England: the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, its provision on dispositions intended to defeat an application, and the applicable period. Singapore: the family-provision statute, and the application of *faraid* to Muslims under the Administration of Muslim Law Act.
14. Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 on matrimonial property regimes: participating states, application date, and whether an existing regime may be changed and with what effect.
15. The Hague Convention of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons: confirm its status, understood never to have entered into force, before any reference is made to it.

Chapter 10 leaves the holding layer and begins the jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction survey with the City of London — what English law and the Commercial Court are genuinely for, and why the jurisdiction that supplies the world's governing law cannot also supply its neutrality.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in each jurisdiction of residence, nationality, beneficiary location and asset situs, and with Sharia-qualified counsel where personal-status law applies. All worked cases are CONSTRUCTED.*

Part IV — The Western Perimeter

Chapter 10 . The City

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. This chapter describes what an institution does, what it costs, and where it fails. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in England and Wales and in each jurisdiction of residence, asset situs and counterparty domicile. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Part IV examines the Western perimeter, and it opens with the City of London because the City is the perimeter's best argument for itself. Everything the preceding nine chapters said about coordinated degradation is true, and none of it makes the City less good at what the City does. Both statements have to be held at once, and most writing in this field cannot. One tradition treats London as compromised and stops thinking; the other treats it as the natural home of every serious structure and never asks what happens when the home and the threat share an address.

This chapter's position is neither. The City is an extraordinary piece of legal and commercial infrastructure, no jurisdiction in this book replaces it, and a well-built cross-bloc architecture should almost certainly contain a UK element — but that element cannot be the apex, cannot hold the reserve, and cannot carry bloc neutrality, because the City sits at the centre of the coordination mechanism Chapter 2 described rather than outside it.

That is a concentration argument, not a criticism of capability, and the distinction is the whole chapter. Chapter 5 gave the instrument: a jurisdiction's contribution to N depends on whether a decision taken elsewhere inside its perimeter reaches it without a second, independent decision. On that test the UK is not merely inside the Western perimeter; it is one of the places where the perimeter's decisions originate. The Financial Action Task Force was created at the G7 summit in Paris in 1989 with the UK as a founding member. The UK's autonomous sanctions regime under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 is one of three or four that the world's compliance departments screen against as a matter of course. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation is a designating authority, not a downstream adopter. **A jurisdiction that helps write the perimeter's rules cannot also be the hedge against them, and no amount of institutional quality changes that arithmetic.**

Now the other side, with equal force, because a manual that undersells London is as useless as one that oversells it. English law is, on the best available evidence, the most-chosen governing law for international commercial contracts — a fact about the choices of counterparties in every bloc, including counterparties whose governments are in open disagreement with the United Kingdom. It is the City's most valuable export and the one item on the list that is genuinely portable, which is the architectural discovery this chapter builds toward and Chapter 17 collects. The Commercial Court is fast by the standards of complex commercial litigation anywhere and publishes reasoned judgments. Lloyd's prices classes of risk no other market will write. The London Stock Exchange is a deep venue with a listing regime rebuilt in 2024. And London is the largest foreign-exchange centre in the world by a margin that has survived forty years of predicted collapse.

The correct reading of that list is not "use London for everything." Each item is a *service*, each service has a job in Chapter 6's taxonomy, and the job is never holding. **The City is an operating and bridging jurisdiction of the first rank and a holding jurisdiction of the last.**

A second finding, stated early because it is the one most likely to be argued with: the UK has recently demonstrated that it will change the settlement for internationally mobile capital abruptly and without a long transition. The abolition of the remittance basis for non-domiciled individuals — announced March 2024, confirmed with modifications in the Budget of 30 October 2024, effective 6 April 2025 — ended a regime that had existed in recognisable form since 1914 and that a great many structures were built around. Whatever one thinks of the policy, the *engineering* lesson is unambiguous. **Political stability is not the absence of upheaval; it is the predictability of the rules your structure depends on, and on that measure the UK's score for internationally mobile capital fell in 2024.**

The Mechanism

What is actually being bought when someone says "London"

Six distinct things travel under one name, and they have different portability, different failure modes and different jobs. Separating them is the first analytic move.

1	English governing law	the substantive rules of the contract
2	English forum	the Commercial Court, its process, its judges
3	London arbitration	LCIA and ad hoc; a seat, not a court system
4	Lloyd's	underwriting capacity for hard risk classes
5	LSE	a listing venue and secondary liquidity
6	the sterling and FX plumbing	banks, clearing, market depth

Item 1 is portable and this is the crux of the chapter. Items 2 through 6 are not. A contract between a Kazakh seller and an Indonesian buyer can be governed by English law and heard in Astana, Abu Dhabi, Singapore or Dubai. **The law travels; the courthouse does not.** Most of the strategic content of Part IV follows from that distinction.

English governing law, and why it is chosen

The reasons are unglamorous and they are the reasons that matter.

Predictability through precedent density. Two centuries of reported commercial decisions mean most disputes about most standard terms have already been decided, and the answer can be found before the dispute rather than after it — worth more to a drafting lawyer than any substantive rule.

A doctrine of freedom of contract that is unusually strong. The default posture is that sophisticated parties are bound by what they wrote. There is no general doctrine of good faith in the performance of commercial contracts of the kind found in many civil-law systems, and the courts have repeatedly declined to rewrite bargains on fairness grounds between commercial, legally advised parties. Not a virtue in every context; precisely what a cross-border counterparty wants when the alternative is a home court applying an open-textured standard.

Remedies that are commercially legible. Damages on established principles; specific performance available but exceptional; a settled law of interpretation; a mature approach to exclusion and limitation clauses.

A separable arbitration regime. The Arbitration Act 1996 has framed arbitration seated in England and Wales for nearly three decades. Following a Law Commission review, the Arbitration Act 2025 — Royal Assent February 2025 — addresses among other things the law governing the arbitration agreement itself, a question the Supreme Court had answered by a complex default rule in *Enka Insaat ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb* [2020] UKSC 38, and the arbitrator's duty of disclosure in *Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd* [2020] UKSC 48. Confirm which provisions are in force before relying on them; commencement is routinely staged by regulations.

Two disciplines. "Most-chosen governing law" is a claim about relative frequency in international commercial contracting, resting on survey and arbitral-institution data rather than a census; cite it as this book does and do not inflate it. And choosing English law does not import English *jurisdiction*: a clause can choose English law with a foreign court or a foreign arbitral seat, and in a cross-bloc structure it usually should. Chapters 17 and 22 are the payoff — the ADGM applies English common law directly under the Application of English Law Regulations 2015, the only jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom that does so, and the AIFC in Astana applies English common law through its own court with English judges. **The law can be bought without buying the perimeter, and that is the single most useful structural fact in this book's treatment of the West.**

The Commercial Court

The Commercial Court sits in the King's Bench Division of the High Court, within the Business and Property Courts, governed by the Civil Procedure Rules with a dedicated Commercial Court Guide. Its distinguishing features, in the order that matters to a structure:

Specialist judges with commercial practice backgrounds, hearing commercial cases full-time, which is why the reasoning is usable as a planning input rather than merely as an outcome.

A published, reasoned judgment in almost every case of substance, which is what creates the precedent density described above. A court that decides without publishing generates no predictability for anyone else.

Genuine international take-up. The Court's published annual reports have for many years recorded that a large share — in several years a majority — of parties before it are not UK-based. Take the current year's figures from the annual report directly, not from any secondary source including this one.

A powerful interim toolkit. Freezing injunctions, worldwide where the jurisdictional requirements are met; search orders; anti-suit injunctions; third-party disclosure orders. The same instruments that make the Commercial Court a superb forum *for* a claimant make it a serious exposure *for* a defendant with English connections. The toolkit does not distinguish between users.

Service out of the jurisdiction under CPR Part 6 and the gateways in Practice Direction 6B. A structure with a UK element has given a claimant a gateway.

Judgment recognition after Brexit — the genuine weak point

This is the part of the London offering that materially deteriorated, and it is routinely glossed over. Before the end of the transition period, English judgments circulated within the EU and EFTA under the Brussels Recast Regulation and the Lugano Convention 2007. Both ceased to

apply to the United Kingdom. The UK applied to accede to Lugano 2007 in its own right; the European Commission indicated in 2021 that it did not support the application, and accession has not occurred. Verify the current status before relying on any statement about it, including this one.

What replaced it is thinner, and the difference is operational:

instrument	what it covers
Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements	EXCLUSIVE choice-of-court agreements only. UK a party in its own right from 1 January 2021. Asymmetric and non-exclusive clauses are contested.
Hague Judgments Convention 2019	Broader recognition of civil and commercial judgments. UK ratified 2024; entry into force for the UK reported as 1 July 2025. VERIFY the in-force date and the contracting parties list.
common law	Recognition in England on the Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433 basis: presence or submission. Statutory schemes under the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 for listed countries.
New York Convention 1958	Arbitral awards. Over 170 contracting states. Unaffected by Brexit.

Read that table as an engineer and one conclusion falls out. **For a cross-border structure, a London-seated arbitration award is a more portable instrument than an English court judgment, and it became more so in 2021.** The New York Convention's reach is an order of magnitude wider than any judgments treaty the UK is party to, its refusal grounds are narrow and enumerated in Article V, and it was unaffected by Brexit. Structures that chose the Commercial Court over arbitration on 2015 reasoning should be re-examined on current reasoning.

The counter-consideration, fairly: arbitration has no real summary judgment under most institutional rules, no appeal on the merits, limited joinder, and cannot bind non-signatories. Where disputes are likely to be documentary and one-to-one, the Commercial Court is superior on speed and cost. Where they are cross-border and the enforcement target sits outside the Western perimeter, arbitration wins on the only criterion that matters at the end — whether the paper can be turned into money where the debtor keeps assets.

Lloyd's

Lloyd's is not an insurance company. It is a market and a society constituted by private legislation — the Lloyd's Act 1871 and the Lloyd's Act 1982 are the two usually cited — in which members provide capital to syndicates managed by managing agents that underwrite risk. Corporate capital has been admitted alongside the individual members historically known as Names since 1994. It is regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority and runs its own market oversight in parallel.

What makes it structurally interesting here is the chain of security, the mutualised backstop behind a Lloyd's policy, in the order it is drawn on:

```
link 1  syndicate-level assets    premiums trust funds held for policyholders
 link 2   members' funds at Lloyd's   capital lodged by each member
link 3  central assets          the Central Fund and other society assets,
                                   available at the Council's discretion
```

A three-deep waterfall whose third link is mutual. That is why a Lloyd's policy carries a market-level financial strength rating rather than a syndicate-level one, and why capacity exists for classes a single-balance-sheet insurer will not write: political risk, expropriation, contract frustration, kidnap and ransom, marine war, fine art, specie, and the long tail of unusual liability. Take current ratings and chain-of-security figures from Lloyd's published market results and the rating agencies; both change annually and no book should be the source.

Lloyd's also carries a cautionary history. The asbestos, pollution and health-hazard losses of the late 1980s and early 1990s fell on individual Names with unlimited liability and were resolved through the Reconstruction and Renewal plan, under which pre-1993 non-life liabilities were reinsured into Equitas Limited in 1996 and subsequently assumed by National Indemnity, a Berkshire Hathaway company. Verify that transaction structure and its dates from primary sources if the detail matters. The engineering lesson is that the market survived by segregating the tail into a dedicated vehicle and buying finality — Chapter 30's ring-fencing logic applied at the scale of an entire market, four decades early.

Lloyd's does two jobs here: it is a market for the political-risk and expropriation cover a cross-bloc structure genuinely needs, and it is the reinsurance counterparty universe against which Chapters 14 and 15 build the Bermuda captive. **Neither is a holding function.**

The London Stock Exchange, and the 2024 listing rebuild

The LSE offers the Main Market and AIM. What changed materially, and what a structure built before 2024 will have on file incorrectly, is the listing regime itself: the FCA's **UK Listing Rules took effect on 29 July 2024**, replacing the previous Listing Rules and, most consequentially, collapsing the former premium and standard listing segments for equity shares in commercial companies into a single category with a single set of continuing obligations. The reform reduced the number of mandatory shareholder votes on significant and related-party transactions and recalibrated the eligibility requirements.

Two consequences. The significant-transaction and related-party machinery that used to constrain a listed subsidiary's dealings with its parent has changed shape: **any structure that relied on the previous premium-listing rulebook to constrain or permit an intra-group transaction must be re-papered against the current UK Listing Rules, and the change is not cosmetic.**

And the prospectus regime is separately in motion — the Public Offers and Admissions to Trading Regulations 2024 replaced the retained EU framework as the statutory basis, with detailed FCA rules on a staged timetable. Verify current prospectus rules and commencement dates with capital markets counsel.

The LSE's function in this architecture is Chapter 29's: a venue for converting an immovable asset into a movable one. London commercial real estate cannot leave the United Kingdom; a listed REIT holding it produces securities that can be held and custodied anywhere. **The conversion does not remove the UK's reach over the land; it removes the requirement that the *owner* be UK-reachable in order to realise the value.** That is a smaller claim than it is usually made to be, and it is still the most useful thing the LSE does for a structure of this kind.

FX and the sterling plumbing

London's foreign-exchange position is the least contested fact in this chapter and the one most often quoted loosely. The authoritative source is the Bank for International Settlements Triennial Central Bank Survey. The April 2022 survey reported global over-the-counter foreign exchange turnover of approximately USD 7.5 trillion per day, with the United Kingdom accounting for approximately 38% of it and the United States approximately 19%. Take the current survey's figures from the BIS publication directly; the survey is triennial and the shares move.

Why this matters to a resilience argument rather than a trading one: depth determines whether a large position can be moved without moving the price against you, which is a protection property, not a profit property. London provides it. So, increasingly, do Singapore and Hong Kong, which is why the FX argument for London is strong but not exclusive.

The plumbing carries a concentration caveat Chapter 31 develops in full. Sterling clearing runs through the UK banking system and the Bank of England; dollar clearing runs through the US system regardless of where the desk sits. **Currency exposure is perimeter exposure independent of entity location**, so a London treasury running predominantly USD and GBP has more Western-perimeter exposure than its entity map shows. Chapter 5 called this the currency axis and warned that people measure the axis they are already comfortable with.

The disclosure architecture, and why it is a feature

Three regimes matter. They are usually described as burdens; under this book's governing principle they are closer to the opposite.

The PSC register. Introduced by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 and operative from 2016, it requires UK companies and LLPs to identify and file individuals meeting defined conditions — broadly, more than 25% of shares or voting rights, the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board, or otherwise exercising significant influence or control, including through a trust or firm. Publicly searchable at Companies House.

The Register of Overseas Entities. Created by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 (Royal Assent March 2022), it requires overseas entities owning or acquiring qualifying UK land to register at Companies House and disclose registrable beneficial owners; the transitional period for pre-existing holdings closed at the end of January 2023. Non-registration carries land-registration consequences that make the property practically undealable. Verify current deadlines, the annual update obligation and the trust-information disclosure position.

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. Royal Assent October 2023. It gave the Registrar of Companies new statutory objectives and query powers, introduced Authorised Corporate Service Providers, and introduced identity verification for directors, people with significant control and those who file at Companies House, rolled out in stages with a transition window for existing directors. The commencement schedule has moved more than once; verify current deadlines directly with Companies House guidance and never plan from a printed date. ECCTA also created a corporate offence of failure to prevent fraud for large organisations and reformed the identification doctrine for attributing senior managers' criminal acts to a body corporate.

Now the argument. A UK company inside a properly designed architecture passes Chapter 3's disclosure test *because* of the PSC register, not despite it. The register produces a filed, dated, public statement of who controls the entity. If the controller is a DIFC Foundation whose own regime records its council and founder with the DIFC Registrar, the chain is documented end to end and the documentation is the asset. A bank onboarding the entity gets an answer in an afternoon; a sanctions screen resolves cleanly; an enquiry closes.

Filed transparency is what makes a structure bankable, and bankability is the binding constraint on cross-bloc architecture — not secrecy, which is unavailable, and not tax, which is now largely harmonised at the top end. Chapter 38 develops this into the general rule: a bridge structure that cannot answer a compliance question gets de-risked out of existence, and the de-risking is administered by private banks making commercial decisions against which there is no appeal.

The honest cost: the PSC register is public, so adverse parties, journalists and commercial rivals can read it. For a principal with genuine personal-security exposure that is a real problem, and the UK's protection regime — under which an individual at serious risk of violence or intimidation may apply to suppress residential address or, in narrow cases, PSC particulars from public inspection — is narrow and evidentially demanding. Verify it with counsel if personal security is live; it is not a general privacy option and should never be planned as one.

Enforcement reach, honestly stated

Two instruments define the UK's reach over assets and people connected to it, and both belong in a threat model rather than a footnote.

Unexplained Wealth Orders, introduced by the Criminal Finances Act 2017 into the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, allow an enforcement authority to require a respondent to explain the source of property. The case law cuts both ways: in *Hajiyeva v National Crime Agency* [2020] EWCA Civ 108 the Court of Appeal upheld a UWO; in *National Crime Agency v Baker* [2020] EWHC 822 (Admin) the High Court discharged UWOs and the NCA faced an adverse costs outcome. **The instrument is real, used sparingly, and it has lost in court** — which is the proper description of a legal power in a jurisdiction with a functioning judiciary, and is exactly what distinguishes lawful process from arbitrary action in Chapter 4's register.

Sanctions. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 is the framework; the regimes are made by regulations, of which the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, as extensively amended from 2022, is the most consequential; OFSI administers financial sanctions and licensing. UK designations are made independently of the EU's and of OFAC's, but the *observed*

behaviour since 2022 has been rapid convergence across the three. That observation is the evidence for the bloc assignment.

The Specification

The decision rule

```
USE A UK ELEMENT WHEN:
  - the asset is UK land, or a UK-regulated business, or a UK listing
 - the counterparty requires an English-law contract AND an English forum
  - the risk needs Lloyd's capacity
  - the group needs a credible operating presence in a top-tier
    common-law jurisdiction for market access or talent
  - a REIT or listed conversion is the plan (Ch 29)

DO NOT USE A UK ELEMENT WHEN:
  - the job is holding (Ch 6): use the DIFC Foundation (Ch 7)
  - the job is bloc-neutral bridging: the UK is the perimeter, not
    a bridge across it
  - the job is reserve custody
  - the requirement is English LAW rather than an English FORUM:
    use ADGM (Ch 17) or AIFC (Ch 22) and keep the law without
    the perimeter
```

The fourth "do not" saves the most money and the most exposure, and it is almost never applied, because "we want English law" is habitually heard as "we want London."

The UK Ltd in the carried architecture

SPINE section 6 places a UK Ltd directly under the DIFC Foundation:

```
entity          private company limited by shares, England and Wales
ownership       100% by the DIFC Foundation, disclosed on the PSC register
PSC entry       the Foundation as a registrable relevant legal entity, with
                  the natural-person chain recorded per the PSC rules
function        UK-facing trading and services; the counterparty-facing
                contracting entity for English-law commercial agreements
holds           NO reserve. NO group IP. NO treasury function.
accounts        full accounts filed; audit where thresholds are met
directors       ECCTA-verified; at least one with real UK presence
tax             UK resident and taxed on worldwide profits; transfer
                pricing on all related-party dealings
```

The three "NO" lines are the specification. Each is a Chapter 6 job-separation rule with a specific reason.

No reserve, because reserve capital sitting in the perimeter you are hedging against is not a hedge. Not a prediction about UK conduct; a statement about what a hedge is.

No group IP, because IP is the most mobile asset in the structure and therefore where jurisdiction choice does the most work; placing it in the highest-reach jurisdiction available wastes the option. It is also the asset most exposed to a transfer-pricing enquiry. Verify the current diverted profits and transfer pricing position with UK tax counsel.

No treasury, because a treasury function is a rail concentration point and Chapter 31 measures rails rather than entities. A London treasury running USD and GBP concentrates two currencies whose clearing sits inside the same perimeter as the entity.

London real estate: the tax stack, and why it drives the Chapter 29 conversion

UK real estate held by a non-UK owner attracts a layered charge worth listing in one place, because the layers were added at different times and structures built between them are routinely out of date:

SDLT	on acquisition; non-resident surcharge of 2 percentage points on residential acquisitions from 1 April 2021. Commercial rates differ. VERIFY current rates and the residential/commercial boundary.
ATED	Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings, from 2013, on UK residential property held by companies above a value threshold, with reliefs for genuine letting and development businesses. Commercial property is outside ATED.
NRCGT	non-resident capital gains tax extended from 6 April 2019 to ALL UK land, commercial as well as residential, and to INDIRECT disposals of property-rich entities. This is the change that killed the offshore-company-holds-the-building structure as a CGT plan.
income / corporation	UK-source rental income taxed; non-resident landlord companies moved into the corporation tax regime from April 2020, bringing the corporate interest restriction and loss rules with them.
IHT	UK-situs immovable property is within the charge; since April 2017 UK residential property held through offshore structures has been within it by look-through. VERIFY the current commercial treatment and the post-2025 residence-based rules.

Verify every line of that table with UK tax counsel before acting on any of it. The rates, thresholds and boundaries move at least annually and several moved in 2024 and 2025.

The engineering conclusion, which is Chapter 29's premise: the tax stack is not the reason to convert. The reason is that land is immovable, and immovability is the purest form of perimeter exposure there is. A building in the City is 100% UK-exposed on Chapter 5's availability basis,

permanently, with no structuring that changes it. Converting it into a listed REIT position changes what the *holder* is exposed to, not what the *building* is exposed to.

The 2025 personal tax reset, and what it means for structure

The remittance basis for non-UK-domiciled individuals was abolished with effect from 6 April 2025 and replaced by a four-year regime for foreign income and gains available to individuals meeting a prior-non-residence condition; inheritance tax moved from a domicile basis to a residence basis built on a long-term-residence test. Announced March 2024, revised at the Budget of 30 October 2024, legislated in the Finance Act 2025. Verify all of it with UK tax counsel — the transitional reliefs, the temporary repatriation facility, the rebasing provisions and the trust protections position all changed between announcement and enactment.

The reading everybody drew is that the UK became a materially worse place for an internationally mobile individual to be resident. True, and not this book's point. The reading that matters here: **a regime recognisably stable since 1914 was replaced within thirteen months of announcement, by two different governments, with material changes along the way.** That is the data for scorecard item 9. Political stability for an internationally mobile principal is not whether the streets are calm; it is the volatility of the rules the structure is priced against. The UK's institutional quality remains extremely high. Its rule stability for this specific population declined, demonstrably, on the public record, inside the period this book covers.

The concentration measurement

Chapter 5's conventional structure allocates 40.9% of exposure to the UK and 100% to the Western bloc; the designed architecture reduces the UK to 16.4% and Western exposure to 30.0%. Two questions follow.

Question one: why keep the UK at all? Because the London real estate exists, the English-law counterparty relationships exist, and market access is worth something. Removing the UK entirely would raise N and destroy capability the architecture actually uses. The measured trade:

```
   variant                      WEST %   bloc-HHI       N     ln N   eta ln N
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
   designed, as built             30.0   0.340000   2.9412   1.0788   0.3776
   UK removed, 16.4 to Bermuda    30.0   0.340000   2.9412   1.0788   0.3776
   UK removed, 16.4 to the UAE    13.6   0.426592   2.3442   0.8519   0.2982

    third row, worked:  BRIDGE 29.1+16.4+10.9 = 56.4   0.318096
                        NONALIGNED 18.2+11.8  = 30.0   0.090000
                        WEST (Bermuda only)   = 13.6   0.018496
                        bloc-HHI = 0.426592   N = 1/0.426592 = 2.344160
```

The second row is the point. Moving the UK's 16.4% to Bermuda changes nothing at all in bloc terms, because Bermuda is folded into WEST on this book's conservative assignment. **A move that looks like leaving London and is in fact a move inside the same perimeter buys exactly zero — Chapter 5's failure mode 3, in the specific case people are most likely to attempt.**

The third row is worse than the base case. Reallocating the UK's weight to the UAE takes Western

exposure down to 13.6% and *reduces* N from 2.9412 to 2.3442, because it concentrates the bridge bloc. **Reducing exposure to the perimeter you fear, by piling weight onto one bridge, makes the structure less resilient, not more.** Concentration does not care which direction it points.

Question two: what job is the UK element doing in the effective-bloc arithmetic? None. It contributes to C and not to N, and is justified on capability grounds alone. Chapter 5 already established that an element which does not move the concentration measurement is not thereby worthless; it is answering a different question. Such elements must be justified explicitly and sized deliberately, because the default failure is to let them grow until they dominate the structure they were supposed to diversify away from.

The portable-law specification

The most valuable output of this chapter is a drafting rule:

```
GOVERNING LAW      English law            portable, keep it
FORUM              choose deliberately    NOT automatically London
SEAT (arbitration) choose deliberately    London / ADGM / SIAC / DIFC–LCIA
                                           successor bodies —— VERIFY the
                                          current institutional landscape,
                                           which changed in Dubai in 2021
ENFORCEMENT PLAN   name the jurisdictions where the debtor keeps assets,
                   and work backwards from the treaty that reaches them
```

The last line is the discipline. **A dispute clause should be drafted from the enforcement jurisdiction backwards, not from the drafter's habits forwards.** If the counterparty's realisable assets sit in a state party to the New York Convention but not to any judgments convention with the UK, an English judgment is a document and an arbitral award is money. If the assets sit in England, the reverse.

The Failure Modes

1. Treating the City as the apex because it is the best

The commonest and most understandable. Every quality signal points at London, so the holding entity goes to London and the structure ends at N = 1.00. It is a category error: the apex is chosen on perimeter independence and succession law, and London scores brilliantly on criteria that are not those. **Quality and independence are different axes, and the whole of Part IV exists because people read the first as evidence of the second.**

2. Confusing English law with English jurisdiction

The highest-value correction in the chapter. A clause choosing English law and an ADGM or AIFC forum keeps the substantive predictability and moves the forum outside the perimeter. It is available, cheap, and almost never drafted, because the two concepts arrive in the same sentence in the counterparty's first draft and nobody separates them.

3. Planning around a judgment-recognition position that no longer exists

Structures papered before 2021 frequently assume EU-wide circulation of English judgments under Brussels Recast. That assumption is dead, the replacement is thinner, and Hague 2005 covers exclusive choice-of-court agreements only — leaving asymmetric clauses, standard in finance documentation, genuinely contested. Review every pre-2021 dispute clause against the current instruments, and asymmetric clauses specifically.

4. Assuming the PSC register is the whole disclosure picture

A UK company holding UK land through an overseas entity engages the Register of Overseas Entities. An overseas parent engages the PSC registrable-relevant-legal-entity machinery, requiring the chain to be walked up to a natural person or an exempt entity. A trust in the chain engages specific trust-disclosure provisions. The failure is rarely non-compliance; it is an incomplete map producing inconsistent filings across three registers, which is exactly the pattern that triggers an enquiry. **Inconsistency between filings is a far bigger risk than disclosure itself.**

5. Building an ECCTA verification plan on a printed date

The identity-verification rollout has been staged and rescheduled. A group with fifteen directorships needs a verification programme with an owner and a live calendar, not a note in a file. The failure is a director whose verification lapses, a filing consequently rejected, and a company out of good standing at the exact moment a bank is re-papering it. Verify Companies House deadlines directly and quarterly; treat verification as a maintained control.

6. Underestimating the interim toolkit as a defendant

Freezing injunctions and worldwide disclosure orders do not ask who deserves them. A structure with a UK element has given English courts a jurisdictional hook and a claimant a service gateway under Practice Direction 6B. That is the price of the capability and it should be priced consciously. **The response is not to avoid the UK but to keep the UK entity's assets proportionate to the capability it provides, so the worst available interim outcome is bounded.**

7. Using the UK element as a treasury or a clearing hub by drift

Nobody decides to do this. The UK company has a working bank account and the others are painful to open, so payments start routing through it, and within two years the group's settlement concentration sits in the jurisdiction the architecture was designed to reduce exposure to. Chapter 31 measures this; Chapter 5's rail axis names it. The control is a written payments policy with per-entity caps, reviewed against the bank statements rather than against the policy.

8. Reading "most-chosen governing law" as "most-enforceable outcome"

Different claims. English law's popularity is about drafting certainty; enforcement is about treaties and about where the money is. A structure can achieve maximum drafting certainty and minimum realisable recovery simultaneously, and frequently does. A related error is reaching for the UK's personal-security suppression provisions as a privacy plan: they exist for individuals at real risk of

violence, are administered accordingly, and using them otherwise is a concealment move inside a disclosure regime — the definition of a structure that fails the Chapter 3 test.

9. Assuming institutional quality implies rule stability

The 2024–2025 personal tax reset is the counterexample. A jurisdiction can have world-class courts, a professional civil service, deep markets and an unbroken constitutional order, and still change the specific rules your structure is priced against inside one fiscal cycle. **These are independent properties: score them separately, and never let a high score on the first suppress an honest score on the second.**

10. Treating Lloyd's capacity as a permanent given

Appetite for political risk, expropriation and contract frustration is cyclical, and it contracts precisely when the events those covers protect against become more likely. A resilience plan that depends on renewing a political-risk policy is exposed to the renewal market at the worst possible moment. Multi-year policies, long-term agreements and captive participation are the mitigations — Chapters 14 and 15.

11. Letting the UK element grow because it is the easiest thing to grow

The deepest failure mode and the least visible. The UK entity is the one that can hire, bank, contract and be understood without explanation, so every marginal decision favours putting the next thing there. Two years of marginal decisions produce a structure whose entity map says 16.4% and whose operating dependency says something much larger. **Chapter 5's annual remeasurement exists for exactly this drift, and the diff is the finding.**

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. SPINE section 6's carried case: a dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in three jurisdictions, one under forced heirship. Assets include Thai manufacturing, a UAE trading company, IP, London commercial real estate and a listed portfolio.

Step 1 — the position as found

The principal's UK exposure at the start of the programme, on Chapter 5's availability basis:

London commercial building, held directly by a BVI company	22.0
UK Ltd: trading, employing 14 people, holding group IP licences	9.4
UK-custodied portion of the listed portfolio	9.5
UK exposure	40.9

Three defects, and only one is about tax. **The BVI company holding the building is a Register of Overseas Entities obligation and a disclosure inconsistency waiting to happen**, and it

achieves nothing on capital gains since the 2019 extension of non-resident CGT to commercial land and to indirect disposals of property-rich entities — a structure built for a rule that changed six years ago and never rebuilt. **The UK Ltd holds group IP licences**, placing the most mobile asset in the group inside the highest-reach jurisdiction in the group and creating a transfer-pricing surface across every affiliate that pays a royalty. **And 9.5 of exposure sits with the portfolio's UK custodian**, recorded by the adviser as "international portfolio" because the issuers are global; Chapter 5's Step 1 is explicit that the portfolio contributes to the perimeter of its *custodian*.

The measurement:

```
UK 40.9  .  US 27.3  .  Jersey 18.2  .  Luxembourg 13.6
naive HHI = 0.293430   effective jurisdictions = 3.407968
bloc-HHI  = 1.000000   EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1.000000
Western-perimeter exposure = 100.0%
ln(N) = 0    eta ln(N) = 0    h = -0.500000
```

Step 2 — separating the six things called "London"

Applying the Mechanism section's taxonomy to what the principal actually needs:

service	needed?	why
English governing law	YES	four major supply agreements and two financing documents are on it and the counterparties will not move
English forum	NO	the counterparties are in Türkiye, Korea and the UAE. None keeps realisable assets in England.
London arbitration	PARTLY	seat retained for two legacy contracts; new contracts move seat per Step 5
Lloyd's	YES	political risk and contract frustration cover on the Thai plant; no other market quotes the exposure at a workable price
LSE	YES	the Ch 29 REIT route for the building
FX depth	YES	five-currency book; execution only, not custody, not treasury residence

Four of six retained, two changed. **"We need London" turned out to mean four specific services rather than a jurisdiction, and only one of the four requires a UK entity to exist at all.**

Step 3 — the UK Ltd, rebuilt

```
BEFORE                                  AFTER
-------------------------------------------------------------
```

owned by BVI holdco	owned by DIFC Foundation
PSC: opaque chain, 3 layers	PSC: Foundation as RLE, chain documented to natural persons
holds group IP licences	IP moved out; UK Ltd takes an arm's-length licence IN
holds GBP and USD group cash	no treasury function; operating float only, capped
2 directors, neither UK-present	3 directors, 1 UK-resident and executive, all ECCTA-verified
abridged filings	full accounts, audited
exposure 9.4	exposure 6.4

Note what got *more* disclosed rather than less. **The rebuild moved toward disclosure at every single step and the structure got stronger — the Chapter 3 thesis in its most concrete available form.**

Step 4 — the building

The BVI company is collapsed and the building contributed into a UK REIT structure at Chapter 29's specification, the principal's interest held as securities through the Foundation:

before	immovable UK asset, 22.0 of exposure, 100% UK-reachable, held through an overseas entity carrying a ROE obligation and no CGT benefit
after	listed securities, custodied outside the Western perimeter, UK land exposure retained economically but the HOLDER is no longer required to be UK-reachable to realise it

Verify the entire conversion with UK tax counsel — REIT conditions, entry charge, property income distribution withholding and each holder's treaty position are live questions, none settled by anything here. Chapter 29 does the mechanism; this chapter records only that the LSE makes it possible and that the conversion is a *holder-side* fix, not an asset-side one.

Step 5 — the dispute clauses, redrafted from enforcement backwards

The programme reviewed eleven live contracts. The redraft rule: name the jurisdiction where the counterparty keeps realisable assets, then choose the instrument that reaches it.

counterparty	assets in	law	forum / seat	instrument
Turkish supplier	Türkiye	English	arbitration, seat outside the UK	New York Convention
Korean OEM	Korea, Vietnam	English	arbitration	New York Convention
UAE	UAE	English	ADGM courts	local +

logistics		(applied directly)	(Ch 17)	DIFC/ADGM protocols
UK landlord	England	English	Commercial Court	domestic execution
Thai JV partner	Thailand	Thai (mandatory)	Thai courts + arbitration	Ch 23

Row three keeps English law and drops the English perimeter entirely. The ADGM applies English common law directly under the Application of English Law Regulations 2015, so predictability is unchanged and the forum sits in a bridge bloc. It costs nothing extra to draft, and the counterparty accepted it without negotiation because their concern was the law, not the courthouse.

Row four keeps the Commercial Court, correctly. The landlord's assets are English, the dispute would be documentary, and an English judgment executes domestically without any treaty at all. **The rule is not "avoid London"; it is "choose deliberately," and deliberate choice sends some matters to London.** Row five is the reminder that not everything is choosable: Thai law governs the JV because Thai law requires it to, and a drafting rule that cannot accommodate mandatory local law is not a rule.

Step 6 — Lloyd's, specified

The Thai plant carries genuine political-risk and contract-frustration exposure; the Bermuda captive of Chapters 14 and 15 retains a layer of it. The London placement:

cover	political risk / expropriation / contract frustration
market	Lloyd's syndicates via a London broker
structure	captive retains the first layer; Lloyd's excess above it
term	multi-year where obtainable, precisely because renewal appetite contracts when the risk rises
disclosure	full; the structure is filed and the ownership chain is documented, which is what makes the risk underwritable at a sane price

A political-risk underwriter prices opacity as risk. An applicant who can produce a complete ownership chain, filed accounts and a clean sanctions screen gets a quote; one who cannot gets a declination or a loaded rate. This is the disclosure test paying a dividend measurable in basis points.

Step 7 — the measurement after

UK component	exposure	note
UK Ltd (operating)	6.4	rebuilt per Step 3
residual UK land exposure	10.0	post-REIT, holder-side converted
UK-custodied portfolio	0.0	moved to a bridge-bloc custodian
UK total	16.4	

Chapter 5's designed figure. The full structure measures:

```
UAE 29.1 . Thailand 18.2 . UK 16.4 . Bermuda 13.6 . India 11.8 . Singapore 10.9

  naive HHI = 0.189002   effective jurisdictions = 5.290949
  bloc-HHI  = 0.340000   EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 2.941176
  Western-perimeter exposure = 30.0%
  ln(N) = 1.078810   eta ln(N) = 0.377583   h = -0.122417
```

The UK went from 40.9% to 16.4% and the group lost no capability, because the capability was never in the percentage. It was in four services, all four still being consumed. What fell was exposure.

Step 8 — the disclosure test, applied

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it? Every element already *is* disclosed. The UK Ltd's ownership by the DIFC Foundation is on the PSC register. The REIT's holdings are in its published accounts. The Foundation's charter is filed with the DIFC Registrar. The Bermuda captive is licensed and files with the BMA. **There is nothing to disclose because everything is disclosed, and the structure's function survives that fact entirely, because its function was never concealment — it was ensuring that no single coordination perimeter's decision reaches enough of the estate to matter.**

The residual, honestly:

- 16.4% remains UK, deliberately, and does nothing for N. It is justified on capability and must be re-justified annually or it will grow.
- The London land exposure is converted on the holder side, not the asset side. UK measures reach the building. They always will.
- Rule stability for internationally mobile capital declined in 2024–2025 on the public record — a scorecard item 9 and 10 input, monitored rather than hedged.
- The dispute-clause redraft cost eleven contract amendments and bought a change in enforcement reach without changing a single entity, which makes it the cheapest structural improvement anywhere in Part IV.

Verification notes

1. Arbitration Act 2025: confirm which provisions are in force and the commencement regulations. The Arbitration Act 1996 remains the framework for matters not affected.
2. Hague Judgments Convention 2019: confirm the UK entry-into-force date, the contracting parties list at the time of drafting, and the declarations made. Confirm the UK's Lugano 2007 application status separately.
3. Hague 2005: the treatment of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses is contested. Confirm with counsel before relying on it for any asymmetric clause.
4. UK Listing Rules: confirm the current rulebook and amendments since 29 July 2024. The prospectus regime under the Public Offers and Admissions to Trading Regulations 2024 has a separate, staged commencement — confirm current dates.

5. ECCTA 2023 identity verification: staged and rescheduled. Confirm current deadlines with Companies House guidance.
6. Register of Overseas Entities: confirm current update obligations and the trust-information disclosure position.
7. BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey: the April 2022 figures cited (approximately USD 7.5 trillion daily global OTC FX turnover; UK approximately 38%; US approximately 19%) should be confirmed against the BIS publication and the most recent survey substituted.
8. Lloyd's: chain-of-security figures and financial strength ratings change annually; take them from current Lloyd's and rating agency publications. Confirm the Equitas reconstruction and the National Indemnity transactions from primary sources.
9. UK property taxation: every line of the SDLT / ATED / NRCGT / corporation tax / IHT table requires confirmation with UK tax counsel. Several lines moved in 2024 and 2025.
10. The 2025 abolition of the remittance basis and the move to residence-based inheritance tax: confirm the enacted provisions, transitional reliefs, temporary repatriation facility and trust protections position with UK tax counsel. Material changes occurred between announcement and enactment.
11. Commercial Court composition of parties: take current figures from its annual report.
12. Gulf arbitral institutions: the Dubai landscape changed in 2021. Confirm the current institution, rules and seat provisions before naming any institution in a clause.

The Scorecard — the United Kingdom

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law. England and Wales is the source jurisdiction of the common law tradition and the origin of the law directly applied in ADGM (Ch 17) and applied by the AIFC court (Ch 22). Scotland is a mixed system and Northern Ireland separate; commercial structuring in this book means England and Wales unless stated.

#	Item	Assessment
2	**Bloc alignment**	**Western, and at the centre rather than at the edge.** Evidence class: strongest. Founding FATF member from the 1989 G7 Paris summit; OECD Global Forum member; an independent designating authority under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 whose designations since 2022 have converged rapidly with EU and OFAC action; the jurisdiction whose correspondent banks administer sterling clearing. Chapter 5's assignment: WEST, and it is the least contestable bloc call in the book. What would change it: nothing currently foreseeable.
3	**Court quality**	Very high. Commercial Court within the Business and Property Courts, King's Bench Division; specialist judiciary; published reasoned judgments in almost every case of substance; a mature interim toolkit (worldwide freezing injunctions, search orders, anti-suit injunctions). Cost is high and disclosure heavy relative to arbitration.

#	Item	Assessment
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	**Mixed, and materially worse than in 2020 — the one capability that measurably deteriorated.** Brussels Recast and Lugano ceased to apply on Brexit; the Lugano accession application was not supported. Replacements: Hague 2005 (exclusive choice-of-court agreements only, UK a party in its own right from 1 January 2021, with asymmetric clauses contested); Hague 2019 (ratified 2024, in force for the UK reported as 1 July 2025 — verify); common law recognition on the *Adams v Cape Industries* [1990] Ch 433 basis; the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 schemes. A London arbitral award under the New York Convention 1958 travels considerably further than an English judgment. Design accordingly.
5	**Substance requirements**	Real and conventional. Tax residence by incorporation or central management and control; full transfer pricing; diverted profits regime; permanent establishment risk for foreign affiliates operating through UK personnel. There is no light-substance route. **A feature for an operating entity and a disqualification for a holding entity.**

#	Item	Assessment
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. CRS from the early adopter group with first exchanges in 2017; FATCA through the UK–US intergovernmental agreement. UK financial institutions report account holders and controlling persons. There is no non-reporting configuration and none should be sought.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	**The most transparent regime of any jurisdiction in this book, and deliberately so.** PSC register (Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, operative 2016) — public and searchable, capturing >25% shareholding or voting rights, board control, or significant influence including through trusts. Register of Overseas Entities (Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022) for overseas owners of UK land. ECCTA 2023 identity verification for directors, PSCs and filers, with Authorised Corporate Service Providers and new Registrar powers. Personal-security suppression is narrow and evidentially demanding — never plan on it.

#	Item	Assessment
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT, deep and unrestricted; sterling clearing through the UK banking system and the Bank of England; the largest FX centre in the world (BIS April 2022: UK approximately 38% of global OTC turnover — verify against the current survey). No CIPS-side depth. This is a single-rail jurisdiction for the purposes of Chapter 31, and its FX depth should not be mistaken for rail diversity: depth is about execution, rails are about permission.
9	**Political stability**	**High on institutions, and materially lower on rule stability for internationally mobile capital — score these separately.** Institutions: unbroken constitutional order, independent judiciary, professional civil service, orderly transfers of power. Rule stability: the non-domiciled remittance basis, in recognisable form since 1914, was announced for abolition in March 2024, revised at the October 2024 Budget and effective 6 April 2025, with inheritance tax moved to a residence basis. A century-old settlement was replaced in thirteen months, across a change of government. Institutional quality does not imply rule stability and this jurisdiction is the proof.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**ERODING for the purposes this book measures, while improving on institutional integrity — not a contradiction, because what is eroding is differentiation and optionality, not quality.** Evidence, dated: **(a)** judgment portability fell in 2021 with the loss of Brussels Recast and Lugano, only partly restored by Hague 2005 and Hague 2019, and the Lugano application was not supported; **(b)** disclosure deepened continuously — PSC register 2016, Register of Overseas Entities 2022, ECCTA 2023 identity verification staged through 2025; **(c)** enforcement reach broadened — Unexplained Wealth Orders under the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (upheld in *Hajiyeva* [2020] EWCA Civ 108, discharged in *NCA v Baker* [2020] EWHC 822 (Admin)) and a SAMLA 2018 sanctions apparatus that expanded sharply from 2022; **(d)** the tax settlement for internationally mobile individuals was rewritten between March 2024 and April 2025; **(e)** the listing regime was rebuilt on 29 July 2024 — a competitiveness gain and simultaneously an instance of rapid rule change. **The direction of travel is toward a fully transparent, fully coordinated, high-quality jurisdiction with narrowing scope for differentiation.** For an operating or bridging role that is neutral or positive; for a holding role it is terminal — and it was terminal before any of these changes, because the perimeter problem was never about disclosure. Accession to Lugano or a

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, and BRIDGING only in the narrow sense of market access and English-law contracting — never HOLDING.** Operating: a UK Ltd with real staff, real trade, full accounts and a verified board is exactly what a UK company should be. Bridging: the LSE listing route (Ch 29) and Lloyd's capacity (Chs 14–15) are genuine cross-bloc services. Not bridging in the settlement sense — the UK is one rail and one perimeter, and a treasury function here is a concentration point. Not holding under any circumstances: no reserve, no group IP, no apex. Asking the UK element to hold is the Chapter 6 failure in its most seductive form, because the UK element is the one that works most easily.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it, size it, and never let it grow.** Keep a UK element for UK land, UK-regulated activity, a listing route, Lloyd's access, English-law contracting and top-tier common-law market access. Size it deliberately — 16.4% in the carried case against 40.9% as found — and re-justify that size annually under Chapter 5's reporting standard, because drift toward the easiest jurisdiction is the default. **Take the law and leave the perimeter wherever possible: English governing law with an ADGM or AIFC forum delivers the substantive predictability without the bloc exposure, and it is the highest-return, lowest-cost move in Part IV.** Upward: a broad judgments convention restoring portability; a durable cross-party settlement on the taxation of internationally mobile capital. Downward: extension of freezing or reporting powers to categories of person defined by nationality or association rather than conduct; any measure making UK-connected entities harder to bank in bridge jurisdictions. **What would not change it at all is any improvement in the City's capability — capability was never the constraint. The constraint is that the City sits inside the perimeter, and that is the one variable London cannot alter.**

Chapter 11 turns to the three jurisdictions most often reached for when a structure decides it needs to be "offshore" — Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man — and finds capability that is entirely genuine attached to a perimeter that is entirely shared.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in England and Wales and in each jurisdiction of residence, asset situs and counterparty domicile.*

Chapter 11 . The Crown Dependency Error

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* This chapter describes how three jurisdictions work, what they cost and where they fail. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in Jersey, Guernsey or the Isle of Man as applicable, and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

The error named in this chapter's title is not choosing Jersey. It is choosing Jersey *as the diversification move*.

That distinction has to be made at the front, because everything else depends on it, and because the three Islands are habitually treated in this literature with a contempt they have not earned. On the technical merits Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man are among the best trust and fund jurisdictions in the world. Jersey's trust statute is one of the two or three most carefully maintained in any common-law system. Guernsey invented the protected cell company, then invented the incorporated cell company when the first turned out to have a limit. The Isle of Man built an aircraft register that competes on merit with anything in Europe, inside a customs and VAT arrangement with the United Kingdom that no other offshore centre has. The regulators are competent, the courts publish reasoned judgments, and the standard of drafting in a Jersey trust instrument is generally higher than in an equivalent English one.

None of that is the question this book asks.

The question is what happens to N. Chapter 5 established that a jurisdiction contributes to the effective bloc count only if a decision taken elsewhere inside its perimeter does not reach it without a second, independent decision. Applied to the Crown Dependencies the answer is not close, and it is not a matter of interpretation. The final court of appeal for all three is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, whose members are the Justices of the United Kingdom Supreme Court. The currency is sterling, there is no central bank and no lender of last resort. UK sanctions designations take effect in all three, and have done so consistently. Economic substance legislation was enacted by three separate legislatures, under three separate legal systems, with effect from the same date, in response to the same external process. **Three parliaments, one deadline, near-identical text — that is what a coordination perimeter looks like from the inside.**

So the arithmetic. Chapter 5's conventional structure allocates 18.2% to Jersey and assigns it to WEST, giving `N = 1.00` and a surplus term of exactly zero. Redistributing that 18.2% across all three Islands, which is the move an adviser makes when asked to diversify:

```
Jersey 40.0%  .  Guernsey 35.0%  .  Isle of Man 25.0%

naive HHI = 0.160000 + 0.122500 + 0.062500 = 0.345000
effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.345000 = 2.898551

bloc collapse: all three -> WEST = 100.0%
bloc-HHI = 1.000000      EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1.000000
ln(N) = 0                eta ln(N) = 0
```

Three jurisdictions, three regulators, three sets of fees, three sets of counsel, three annual filings. N unchanged at 1.00. The surplus term unchanged at zero. This is Chapter 5's failure mode 3 executed with unusual precision, and it is the most expensive way to change nothing that this field has invented.

Now the honest counter-test, because a book that only runs the arithmetic it likes is not a manual. Suppose the bloc assignment is wrong and the Crown Dependencies really are an independent perimeter — constitutionally distinct, separately governed, capable of declining to follow:

```
UK 40.9% . US 27.3% . Luxembourg 13.6%  ->  WEST      81.8%
Jersey 18.2%                            ->  CD bloc   18.2%

bloc-HHI = 0.818^2 + 0.182^2 = 0.669124 + 0.033124 = 0.702248
EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1 / 0.702248 = 1.423998
ln(N) = 0.353469    eta ln(N) at eta = 0.35 = 0.123714
h = 0.123714 - 0.500000 = -0.376286
```

Even granting the most generous assumption available — that the Crown Dependencies constitute a fully independent coordination perimeter, which the evidence in this chapter does not support — the conventional structure reaches only 1.42 effective blocs and remains at h = -0.3763. That is the strongest form of the argument that can be made for the Islands as a diversification move, and it is not strong enough. The verdict does not turn on winning the bloc-assignment argument.

What follows is therefore not a demolition. It is an inventory of genuine capability, an honest account of a genuine constitutional position, and three separate scorecards — because these three are not one jurisdiction wearing different hats. They have different instruments, different industries and different vulnerabilities, and an adviser who treats them as interchangeable has made a second error on top of the first.

The Mechanism

The constitutional position, stated accurately

The Crown Dependencies are not part of the United Kingdom. They are possessions of the Crown with their own legislatures, courts, civil services and fiscal systems. The Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey — the latter including Alderney and Sark, with their own legislative arrangements — descend from the Duchy of Normandy and retain elements of Norman customary law; the Isle of Man has Tynwald. None was ever part of the European Union; they had a limited relationship for trade in goods under Protocol 3 to the United Kingdom's accession treaty, which ended with Brexit.

They are also not independent states. The United Kingdom is responsible for their defence and international representation. Their primary legislation requires Royal Assent by Order in Council through the Privy Council. Their final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The UK Parliament asserts a residual power to legislate for them; the Islands dispute the scope of that power, and the dispute has never been resolved by a court because it has never had to be.

Two features of that arrangement do the work in this chapter.

The appellate bench is the UK Supreme Court's bench. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sits in the same building as the UK Supreme Court and is composed of Justices of the Supreme Court together with other eligible judges. It is a distinct court applying the law of the jurisdiction the appeal comes from, and it decides against UK government interests regularly — no allegation of bias is made or implied here. The observation is about correlation. **The court of last resort for Jersey trust law is staffed by the same judges as the court of last resort for English law, so the two bodies of law cannot drift far apart and cannot fail independently.** For a claimant that is a feature; for a structure trying to buy independence it is the whole problem.

There is no monetary authority. All three use sterling and issue their own notes at par, which is a currency arrangement, not a monetary policy. There is no central bank, no lender of last resort, no independent capacity to support a failing bank. That is not theoretical. In 2008 Landsbanki Guernsey went into administration, and Guernsey had no depositor compensation scheme in place at the time; one was introduced in response. In the same period Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) Limited failed and the Isle of Man's depositors' compensation scheme was engaged. Verify the details and outcomes of both 2008 failures from primary sources; they are cited here for the structural point, which is that a jurisdiction without a lender of last resort discovers the fact during a crisis rather than before one.

The capability inventory — Jersey

Jersey's trust law is the reason the jurisdiction exists in this form. The **Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984**, as extensively amended, has three features that matter to a structure.

The firewall. Article 9 of the 1984 Law addresses the extent to which questions concerning a Jersey trust — validity, administration, the effect of a settlor's personal law, forced-heirship claims — are determined by Jersey law to the exclusion of foreign law. It has been amended more than once, including to address foreign judgments as distinct from foreign law. Verify the current numbering, amendment history and precise scope with Jersey counsel; **a citation to an old text here is worse than no citation.**

Reserved powers. Article 9A permits a settlor to reserve or grant specified powers without the trust being invalid by reason of the reservation. This is the provision that makes a Jersey trust usable by a settlor from a legal culture in which handing property irrevocably to a stranger is unintelligible. Verify which amendment introduced Article 9A and its current terms.

A statutory mistake and inadequate-deliberation jurisdiction. When the UK Supreme Court in *Pitt v Holt; Futter v Futter* [2013] UKSC 26 substantially narrowed the rule in *Hastings-Bass*, Jersey legislated a statutory jurisdiction for the Royal Court to set aside transfers into trust, and exercises of trustee powers, on grounds of mistake or inadequate deliberation — commonly cited as Articles 47A to 47J of the 1984 Law. Verify the amendment law and the current numbering. The substantive point cuts for Jersey rather than against it: a jurisdiction that identifies an adverse appellate development and legislates a considered answer inside a year is showing exactly the institutional responsiveness a structure should want. **Capability is not the deficiency here.**

Jersey also has the **Foundations (Jersey) Law 2009** — a civil-law-style foundation with separate legal personality, a council, a guardian and a qualified member, answering the same recognition problem Chapter 8 addresses. Jersey trusts may be of unlimited duration following abolition of the historic maximum period; verify the position, its commencement date and the treatment of pre-existing trusts.

Case law worth having in front of you, all Jersey, all real, and none of it flattering to a structure built carelessly:

- *Rahman v Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited* [1991] JLR 103. The Royal Court held that a settlement under which the settlor retained such extensive control that he had not in substance divested himself was to be treated accordingly. **The lesson is not that reserved powers are dangerous; it is that reserved powers exercised as if the trust were a nominee arrangement produce a nominee arrangement.**
- *In re the Esteem Settlement* [2003] JLR 188. A long and careful Royal Court judgment on sham, on the extent to which a creditor may reach trust assets, and on the customary-law *action pauliénne*. It is the reference point for the proposition that Jersey courts will look hard at substance and will not be impressed by form.
- *Crociani v Crociani* [2014] UKPC 40. The Privy Council on exclusive jurisdiction clauses in trust instruments and the circumstances in which a court will decline to enforce one. Relevant to anyone drafting a jurisdiction clause into a trust deed on the assumption it will be honoured.
- *Investec Trust (Guernsey) Limited v Glenalla Properties Limited* [2018] UKPC 7. A Guernsey appeal concerning Jersey trusts, on the liability of trustees to creditors and the operation of the trustee's indemnity. It is the most consequential recent Privy Council decision on trustee liability in the Islands and it should be read by anyone considering a private trust company.

Note the pattern: the final word in three of those four is the Privy Council, and in the fourth it is the Royal Court applying principles a Privy Council appeal would review.

The capability inventory — Guernsey

Guernsey's distinctive instruments are corporate and insurance rather than purely fiduciary.

The cell company. Guernsey enacted protected cell company legislation in 1997, the first jurisdiction anywhere, and the concept was adopted worldwide. A PCC is a single legal person with statutorily segregated cells; assets attributable to one cell are not available to creditors of another. Guernsey then addressed the PCC's principal weakness — that a cell is not a separate legal person, which foreign courts and counterparties sometimes decline to respect — by creating the incorporated cell company, in which each cell *is* a separate legal person. Verify the current statutory basis, consolidated into companies legislation, and confirm foreign recognition of cell segregation with counsel in every jurisdiction where a cell will contract. Chapter 30 develops the ring-fencing question; Guernsey did the original engineering.

Insurance. A major captive domicile with a long-established regime supervised by the Guernsey Financial Services Commission, and the pioneer of cell structures for insurance-linked securities. Chapters 14 and 15 compare it with Bermuda: the comparison turns on scale, reinsurance market access and solvency-regime equivalence rather than on quality.

Trusts and foundations. The **Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007** is a modern consolidated statute with its own firewall and reserved-powers provisions. The **Foundations (Guernsey) Law 2012** provides a foundation with separate legal personality. Verify the current perpetuity position, the firewall sections and the foundation's disclosure regime with Guernsey counsel.

Funds. An established regime with registered and authorised routes and a significant listed closed-ended fund population, much of it listed in London — a capability and simultaneously a concen-

tration observation, since the listing venue, the currency and the investor base all sit in the same perimeter as the domicile.

The capability inventory — the Isle of Man

The Isle of Man's distinctive features are the least fiduciary and the most operational of the three, which makes it the most interesting of the three under Chapter 6's taxonomy.

Corporate. Two company regimes in parallel: the older **Companies Act 1931** model and the **Companies Act 2006**, which introduced a simplified vehicle with a registered agent requirement, no financial assistance restriction and a single-director capability. Verify current requirements for each regime with Isle of Man counsel.

Fiduciary. The **Purpose Trusts Act 1996** permits non-charitable purpose trusts; the **Foundations Act 2011** provides a foundation with separate legal personality. Both workable.

The VAT and customs arrangement. The Isle of Man is treated as part of the United Kingdom for customs and VAT purposes under a long-standing revenue-sharing agreement. This is a genuine commercial advantage — a single VAT territory for goods and services — and simultaneously the hardest piece of evidence in this chapter for the bloc assignment. **A jurisdiction inside another jurisdiction's indirect tax territory, sharing its currency, with its judges as the final court, is not an independent perimeter under any definition that would survive a real event.** The revenue-sharing terms have been renegotiated, at one point substantially to the Island's disadvantage. Verify the current agreement and formula.

Aircraft and shipping. The Isle of Man Aircraft Registry, using the M- prefix, was established in the mid-2000s and is a serious registry for private and corporate aircraft, with a matching ship registry. Verify establishment date, eligibility criteria and current requirements directly. **This is a real, differentiated, non-fiduciary capability, and the reason the Isle of Man's scorecard reads differently from the other two at item 11.**

E-gaming and digital. An early and substantial licensing sector, outside this book's scope except as evidence that the jurisdiction diversifies its own economy deliberately — a stability observation in its favour.

The coordination evidence

This decides the bloc assignment, and it should be read as evidence rather than argument. Chapter 5's ladder ranks evidence by weight; these sit near the top of it.

Corporate tax: the zero-ten regimes and the Code of Conduct Group. All three Islands moved to zero-rate general corporate taxation with a ten per cent rate for defined financial-services activities in the same period in the late 2000s. All three then had elements of those regimes — the attribution and deemed-distribution mechanisms designed to preserve resident taxation — challenged as harmful under the EU's Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, and all three repealed or replaced them. Verify the sequence and dates with local counsel; the pattern is the point. Three separate fiscal systems adopted the same design, received the same challenge from the same body, and made the same repeal.

Economic substance. The decisive instance. Following the Code of Conduct Group's 2017 assessment and the commitments that followed, all three Islands enacted economic substance

requirements for relevant activities with effect for accounting periods commencing on or after 1 January 2019: in Jersey the Taxation (Companies — Economic Substance) (Jersey) Law 2019, in Guernsey requirements introduced by income tax regulations in 2018, and in the Isle of Man requirements introduced by income tax order in 2018. Verify the exact short titles and commencement provisions in each Island. The relevant-activity lists, core income-generating activity concepts, adequacy tests for people, premises and expenditure, and reporting mechanics are substantially aligned across all three, because all three were drawn against the same external template.

The EU list. All three were placed in the co-operative-with-commitments category of the EU's list of non-cooperative jurisdictions pending delivery of that legislation, and all three were subsequently removed once the Code of Conduct Group was satisfied. Verify the Council conclusions dates for listing and de-listing.

Automatic exchange. All three were early adopters of the Common Reporting Standard with first exchanges in 2017, and all three concluded FATCA arrangements with the United States. All three also concluded bilateral automatic-exchange agreements with the United Kingdom in the period before CRS superseded them. There is no non-reporting configuration in any of the three, and there has not been one for a decade.

Beneficial ownership. All three maintain central registers held by the relevant registrar, accessible to competent authorities and specified law-enforcement channels and not publicly searchable. In 2019 the three gave a public commitment to move toward publicly accessible registers on a stated timetable aligned with the EU's fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive standard. That trajectory was interrupted by the Court of Justice of the European Union's judgment of 22 November 2022 in *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers* (Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20), which invalidated the requirement that member states ensure public access; the Islands moved instead toward legitimate-interest access. Verify the 2019 commitment and the current model in each Island — this has changed more than once. Chapter 12 treats *WM and Sovim* in full.

Sanctions. Each Island has its own sanctions legislation and its own competent authority, and in practice United Kingdom designations take effect in all three. The mechanism differs — Orders in Council extending UK regulations, domestic implementing legislation, or both — and the substantive result has been consistent alignment. Verify the current instruments and the mechanism in each Island. For scorecard item 2 this is the strongest available evidence class: a single decision taken in London produces the corresponding effect in all three Islands without a further independent decision.

Assessment. All three have been evaluated by international assessment bodies with generally strong results reflecting genuinely capable supervision. Take current reports and follow-up ratings directly from the assessing body. The finding is not that the Islands are weakly supervised. It is the opposite, and that is the point: **they are excellently supervised to a standard set outside them.**

Money and rails

There is no CIPS-side access, no renminbi clearing depth and no non-Western correspondent network of consequence. Sterling and euro clearing run through UK and European banks; dollar clearing runs through the US system. Local banks are mostly subsidiaries or branches of Western groups, several of which have reduced their Island presence over the past decade under general

de-risking and cost programmes. **Correspondent concentration in all three Islands is higher than the entity map suggests; run Chapter 31's instrument before giving any of them a settlement role.**

The Specification

The decision rule

```
USE A CROWN DEPENDENCY WHEN:
  - the requirement is a technically excellent common-law trust or
    foundation AND the whole family sits inside the Western perimeter
    anyway, so N is not the constraint
  - the requirement is a cell structure for genuine risk or asset
    segregation (Guernsey; Ch 30)
  - the requirement is captive insurance with European proximity
    (Guernsey; Chs 14–15)
  - the requirement is an aircraft or ship registry inside the UK
    VAT and customs territory (Isle of Man)
  - a fund needs a London listing and investors expect a familiar
    domicile

DO NOT USE A CROWN DEPENDENCY WHEN:
  - the objective is to raise N. It cannot.
  - the objective is bloc-neutral holding: use the DIFC Foundation
    (Ch 7) or ADGM (Ch 17)
  - the objective is reserve custody outside the perimeter
  - the objective is to move "offshore" from the UK. Jersey is not
    offshore from the UK in any sense this book measures.
```

The last line is the whole chapter compressed. **Moving from London to St Helier is a change of tax treatment and regulatory regime; it is not a change of perimeter, and the two are constantly confused because the word "offshore" describes the first while implying the second.**

Choosing between the three

Where a Crown Dependency element is correct, the three are not interchangeable:

requirement	best fit	why
trust with a settlor from a forced-heirship civil-law system	Jersey	Article 9 firewall, Article 9A reserved powers, deepest case law, statutory mistake jurisdiction
segregated cells for asset or	Guernsey	PCC and ICC, the

risk ring-fencing		original engineering and the deepest practice
captive insurance, European proximity	Guernsey	established regime, ILS cell practice
aircraft or yacht ownership with UK VAT and customs alignment	Isle of Man	M- registry inside the UK VAT and customs territory
operating company with UK market and VAT alignment	Isle of Man	Companies Act 2006 vehicle, VAT territory
listed closed-ended fund with a London listing	Guernsey or Jersey	established listed fund practice

Verify every line against current law and regulatory practice in the relevant Island; several of these comparative positions have moved in the last five years.

If a Crown Dependency element is used, specify it like this

role	NEVER the apex. Always a subordinate holding or segregation vehicle beneath the Foundation.
ownership	held by the DIFC Foundation or an ADGM holdco, so the apex sits outside the perimeter even though the subsidiary does not
substance	real, and sized to the relevant-activity classification under the Island's economic substance law -- board meetings in the Island, resident directors, adequate expenditure, core income-generating activities performed locally
disclosure	registrar BO filing complete and consistent with the PSC filing of any UK affiliate and with the DIFC Registrar record. Inconsistency across registers is a larger risk than disclosure.
exit	a live migration path, documented, tested: continuation or redomiciliation out, or a transfer of trusteeship to a jurisdiction in another bloc, with the consents and tax consequences mapped IN ADVANCE
measurement	booked to WEST in the Chapter 5 exposure table. No exceptions and no arguments.

The exit line is the one that gets skipped and the one that matters most. **A structure whose migration path has never been costed does not have a migration path; it has an intention, and intentions are executed slowly at exactly the moment when speed was the only thing that would have helped.**

The measurement, in the four variants an adviser will propose

variant	naive	eff.	bloc-HHI	N	ln N
conventional as found (Jersey 18.2)	0.293430	3.408	1.000000	1.000	0.000
Jersey moved to Guernsey	0.293430	3.408	1.000000	1.000	0.000
Jersey split 3 ways across the Islands	0.271347	3.685	1.000000	1.000	0.000
all three Islands, 40/35/25	0.345000	2.899	1.000000	1.000	0.000
CDs treated as an INDEPENDENT bloc	0.293430	3.408	0.702248	1.424	0.353

Four of the five rows have `ln(N) = 0` and therefore a surplus term of exactly zero at any value of `eta`. The fifth is the generous counterfactual from The Position: `h = −0.3763` against the designed structure's `−0.1224`. **There is no arrangement of Crown Dependency entities that reaches the designed structure's position, and no argument about bloc assignment that changes the conclusion — only its magnitude.**

Cost, honestly

The Islands are not cheap, and the substance requirements made them less cheap. A properly constituted Jersey or Guernsey structure — licensed corporate trustee, resident directors, local board meetings, audit where required, adequate local expenditure — carries a recurring cost that competes with a Gulf structure doing a job that raises `N`. Verify current fee levels directly; they are commercially negotiated and no book should quote them. The engineering point needs no figure: in `h = eta ln(N) − delta Q − C`, a Crown Dependency element adds to `C` and adds nothing to `ln(N)`. It must be justified entirely on capability, exactly as the UK element in Chapter 10 must be, and by the same discipline — explicitly, in writing, re-justified annually.

The Failure Modes

1. Treating "offshore" as a synonym for "outside the perimeter"

The root error. The word is a legacy of exchange control and describes a tax and regulatory position, not a political one. Every measurement in this book is indifferent to whether a jurisdiction calls itself offshore and sensitive only to whether a decision reaches it.

2. Diversifying across the three Islands

Costed above. Three regulators, three sets of counsel, three filings, `N` unchanged. The variant appears in real files because it is easy to execute and it looks like activity.

3. Reading institutional quality as independence

The Islands score extremely well on court quality, supervision and professional standards, and those scores are earned. They are also, in part, evidence *for* the bloc assignment rather than against it, because the standards being met are set outside the Islands and assessed by bodies outside them. **Excellent compliance with an external standard is the definition of being inside the perimeter that sets it.**

4. Reserved powers exercised as control

Rahman is the warning and it is thirty years old. Article 9A lets a settlor reserve powers without invalidating the trust. It does not let a settlor run the trust as a personal account and keep the protection of the trust form. The distinction is one of substance, examined by courts with long experience of examining it. **A reserved power exercised on every decision is not a reserved power; it is evidence.**

5. Assuming the firewall stops a foreign court

The firewall is a rule about what *Jersey* law applies to *Jersey* proceedings. It does not stop a foreign court asserting jurisdiction over a person before it, or making orders against that person on pain of contempt. Chapter 39 collects the cases where foreign non-recognition provisions failed against contempt power. **A firewall protects the structure from foreign law; it does not protect a person from a foreign judge, and the two are routinely conflated in marketing material.**

6. Ignoring economic substance because the entity "just holds"

Pure equity holding companies are a distinct category under all three regimes, generally with reduced requirements — but "reduced" is not "none," and the classification of a mixed-activity entity changes the requirement. Verify the relevant-activity classification of every Island entity annually; an entity that acquires an intra-group financing or IP function without anyone reclassifying it is the standard defect.

7. Building on a beneficial-ownership access position that has already changed twice

The access model moved from private, toward a public commitment, and then to legitimate-interest access after the November 2022 CJEU judgment. Any structure whose rationale depends on the current access model is built on the least stable variable in the jurisdiction, and Chapter 12 shows the same variable moving in the opposite direction in the EU over the same period.

8. Treating a private trust company as a control solution without reading *Glenalla*

A private trust company is a legitimate and often excellent answer to a family wanting a say in trusteeship. It also concentrates fiduciary liability into a vehicle the family controls, and *Investec Trust (Guernsey) Limited v Glenalla Properties Limited* [2018] UKPC 7 is required reading on how trustee liability to creditors and the trustee's indemnity actually operate. Take the analysis from counsel who has read the judgment, not from a brochure.

9. Relying on Island banking capacity that is contracting

Correspondent and retail banking presence in the Islands has been rationalised over the past decade. A structure that assumes an account will be openable, or maintainable, on the terms available five years ago is exposed to a commercial decision by a bank in another jurisdiction against which there is no appeal. Chapter 38 develops this as the general de-risking problem.

10. Forgetting there is no lender of last resort

The 2008 failures are the evidence. Depositor compensation schemes now exist, and they are schemes, with caps. **A jurisdiction with no central bank cannot support an institution, and the protection available to a depositor is whatever the scheme says it is.** For operating cash that is a sizing question; for reserve it is a disqualification, which is one more reason reserve does not belong here.

11. Using the Island entity as the apex because the trustee suggested it

Not a criticism of trustees: a licensed Island trustee is competently offering the instrument it is licensed to administer. But the apex decision is the one Chapter 7 identified as genuinely hard to reverse, and it should be taken against the whole threat register rather than against the instrument that happens to be on the table.

12. Letting the Island element outlive its justification

The Jersey IP company in the carried case was correctly built for the conditions of its time. It became a defect not because anything went wrong in Jersey but because the structure around it changed and nobody reopened the question. **Chapter 5's annual re-measurement with a written diff is the only control that catches this, and the diff is the finding.**

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. SPINE section 6's carried case: a dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in three jurisdictions, one under forced heirship. Assets include Thai manufacturing, a UAE trading company, IP, London commercial real estate and a listed portfolio.

Step 1 — what was there, and why it was not stupid

The Jersey element was 18.2% of exposure: a Jersey company holding the group's IP, owned by a Jersey discretionary trust with a licensed corporate trustee, with a protector appointed under the deed and the principal holding reserved investment powers under Article 9A.

It had been built twelve years earlier by capable people for reasons sound at the time: a first-class trust statute, a firewall addressed to precisely the forced-heirship exposure the family had, a court with deep experience, a professional trustee, and a tax outcome that worked under the rules then in force.

Three of those five reasons are still true. What changed was everything around them: economic substance requirements for IP-holding activity from 2019, automatic exchange from 2017, the family's centre of gravity moving to the Gulf, and — the one nobody measured — the fact that the Jersey element sat in the same coordination perimeter as the UK holdco, the US custodian and the Luxembourg vehicle.

Step 2 — the measurement that reframed the question

```
UK 40.9  .  US 27.3  .  Jersey 18.2  .  Luxembourg 13.6
naive HHI = 0.293430    effective jurisdictions = 3.407968
bloc-HHI  = 1.000000    EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1.000000
ln(N) = 0    eta ln(N) = 0    h = -0.500000
```

The adviser's proposal was to move the IP company to Guernsey, on the grounds that Guernsey's regime suited an IP holding structure better under the substance rules:

```
UK 40.9  .  US 27.3  .  Guernsey 18.2  .  Luxembourg 13.6
naive HHI = 0.293430    effective jurisdictions = 3.407968
bloc-HHI  = 1.000000    EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1.000000
```

Identical to twelve decimal places. The proposal was not wrong on its own terms — it was a sensible substance-driven view — but it answered a question about compliance while being presented as an answer to a question about resilience. The measurement's function was not to reject the move but to reveal that the move and the objective were unrelated.

Step 3 — the counterfactual, run honestly

Before rebuilding, the programme ran the most favourable assumption available to the incumbent structure — the Crown Dependencies as a genuinely independent perimeter:

```
WEST 81.8% (UK + US + Luxembourg)   ->  0.669124
CD bloc 18.2% (Jersey)              ->  0.033124
bloc-HHI = 0.702248     N = 1.423998
ln(N) = 0.353469        eta ln(N) = 0.123714      h = -0.376286
```

Against the designed architecture's `N = 2.941176` and `h = -0.122417`. **The most generous bloc assignment anyone has proposed for the incumbent structure still leaves it 0.253869 of h behind the designed one — and that generous assignment is the one this chapter's evidence does not support.**

Step 4 — the rebuild, and what was kept

The IP did not go to Guernsey. It went to the architecture:

```
BEFORE                                  AFTER
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Jersey trust (apex for the IP)          DIFC Foundation (apex, Ch 7)
Jersey IP company                       ADGM holdco holds the IP
                                        (Ch 17), licensing to opcos

protector under the deed                Foundation council + guardian
reserved investment powers              reserved powers under the DIFC
  under Article 9A                        Foundations Law, Ch 7
exposure 18.2 (WEST)                    exposure moves to the UAE
                                        share (BRIDGE)
```

What was kept, deliberately, is the part of the case that matters.

A Guernsey incorporated cell company was retained for a genuine segregation job. The group runs three unrelated product lines with different liability profiles and wanted hard ring-fencing that a single company with internal accounting cannot deliver. Guernsey's cell legislation is the original and the practice the deepest. The ICC was retained, resized, and booked to WEST without argument. Verify with Guernsey counsel, and with counsel in every jurisdiction where a cell contracts, whether cell segregation will be recognised there: statutory segregation in the domicile is not automatically recognised in a forum with no equivalent concept, and that recognition question decides whether the ring-fence holds when tested. Chapter 30 develops it.

The Jersey trust was not collapsed in a hurry. Distributing a mature trust to reconstitute the assets elsewhere is a taxable, disclosable and occasionally litigable event, and the family included a beneficiary in a forced-heirship jurisdiction whose position the existing firewall had carefully addressed. **An unwind executed for structural reasons that triggers an avoidable tax or succession event has destroyed more value than the structural improvement created.** Verify every step with counsel in the trust's jurisdiction, the settlor's jurisdiction and every beneficiary's jurisdiction before initiating it. The migration was staged over two financial years using the trust's own migration provisions, with the Foundation established first so there was somewhere for the assets to go.

Step 5 — the measurement after

Crown Dependency component	exposure	bloc	note
Guernsey ICC (segregation)	2.4	WEST	retained on merit
Jersey trust (residual, in wind)	0.0	WEST	migrated over two financial years
CD total	2.4	inside the UK's 16.4	

And the full structure:

```
UAE 29.1 . Thailand 18.2 . UK 16.4 . Bermuda 13.6 . India 11.8 . Singapore 10.9

naive HHI = 0.189002   effective jurisdictions = 5.290949
bloc-HHI  = 0.340000   EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 2.941176
ln(N) = 1.078810   eta ln(N) = 0.377583   h = -0.122417
```

The Crown Dependency element fell from 18.2% to 2.4%, and the 2.4% that remains is the only part that was ever doing a job the measurement could not do better elsewhere.

Step 6 — the disclosure test

Would the structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

Yes, and the Crown Dependency element is the easiest part of the structure to answer for. The Guernsey ICC is registered, its cells constituted under statute, its beneficial ownership filed, its substance classification assessed annually and its accounts prepared. The migrated Jersey trust was reported under CRS throughout its life. **Nothing in the Crown Dependency element ever**

depended on not being seen, which is precisely why nothing was lost when the structure was rebuilt for a different reason.

The residual, honestly:

- 2.4% sits in Guernsey, contributes nothing to N, and is justified solely on cell segregation. Re-justified annually or it goes.
- Cell segregation is statutory in Guernsey. Recognition elsewhere is a question per forum, and Chapter 30 treats it as an open risk rather than a solved one.
- The Jersey migration took two years and the tax and succession consequences were mapped before it started. A faster unwind was available and would have been a mistake.
- The Islands' institutional quality did not enter the decision. **The decision was made on N, and N is the one variable the Islands cannot change about themselves.**

Verification notes

1. Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984: confirm the current numbering and text of the firewall (Article 9), the reserved-powers provision (Article 9A) and the statutory mistake and inadequate-deliberation jurisdiction (commonly cited as Articles 47A–47J), with the amendment laws that introduced each. The firewall has been revised more than once.
2. Jersey trust duration: confirm the abolition of the maximum period, its commencement and the treatment of pre-existing trusts.
3. Guernsey cell companies: confirm the current statutory basis for protected and incorporated cell companies after consolidation into companies legislation, and the recognition of cell segregation in each jurisdiction where a cell will contract.
4. Guernsey insurance: confirm the current insurance business legislation, licensing categories and solvency-regime equivalence position.
5. Isle of Man: confirm current requirements under the Companies Act 1931 and Companies Act 2006 regimes including registered agent obligations, and the Foundations Act 2011 and Purpose Trusts Act 1996 positions.
6. Isle of Man customs and VAT: confirm the current agreement with the United Kingdom and its revenue-sharing formula, which has been renegotiated.
7. Isle of Man Aircraft Registry: confirm establishment date, eligibility criteria and current requirements directly with the registry.
8. Economic substance: confirm exact short titles, commencement, relevant-activity lists and adequacy tests in each Island — Jersey's Taxation (Companies — Economic Substance) (Jersey) Law 2019 and the corresponding Guernsey and Isle of Man instruments made in 2018.
9. EU list: confirm the Council conclusions dates on which each Island was placed in the co-operative-with-commitments category and subsequently removed.
10. Beneficial ownership: confirm the 2019 commitment, its terms, and the current access model in each Island following *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers* (Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, 22 November 2022).
11. Sanctions: confirm the current legislation and competent authority in each Island and the mechanism by which UK designations take effect locally.
12. Assessment reports: take current mutual evaluation reports and follow-up status directly from the assessing body.

13. 2008 bank failures: confirm the facts and outcomes of the Landsbanki Guernsey administration and the Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) liquidation, and the current terms and caps of each Island's depositor compensation scheme, from primary sources.
14. Case citations: *Rahman v Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited* [1991] JLR 103; *In re the Esteem Settlement* [2003] JLR 188; *Crociani v Crociani* [2014] UKPC 40; *Investec Trust (Guernsey) Limited v Glenalla Properties Limited* [2018] UKPC 7; *Pitt v Holt; Futter v Futter* [2013] UKSC 26. Confirm each against the law report before relying on it.

The Scorecard — Jersey

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law with a Norman customary-law substrate. Trust law is statutory (Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, as amended) and among the best-maintained in any common-law system. Customary remedies survive and matter — the *action pauliénne* in *In re the Esteem Settlement* [2003] JLR 188 is the working example.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST. Evidence class: strongest.** Final appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, composed of UK Supreme Court Justices. Sterling, no central bank, no lender of last resort. UK sanctions designations take effect locally. Economic substance legislated with effect from 1 January 2019 in response to the EU Code of Conduct Group, in the same window as Guernsey and the Isle of Man. CRS early adopter, first exchanges 2017. Not contestable on the evidence.

#	Item	Assessment
3	**Court quality**	High. Royal Court with substantial trusts jurisprudence, Court of Appeal, final appeal to the Privy Council. Published reasoned judgments. Genuine specialist depth in trust litigation — deeper, in that specific field, than most larger jurisdictions.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Statutory reciprocal enforcement with the UK and specified jurisdictions, plus common-law recognition. The firewall in Article 9 addresses the application of foreign law and, as amended, foreign judgments in relation to Jersey trusts. A firewall constrains what a Jersey court will apply; it does not constrain a foreign court exercising personal jurisdiction over a person before it. Chapter 39.
5	**Substance requirements**	Real since 1 January 2019. Taxation (Companies — Economic Substance) (Jersey) Law 2019: relevant activities, core income-generating activities, adequacy of people, premises and expenditure, annual reporting. Pure equity holding companies are a reduced category, not an exempt one. Reclassification on a change of activity is the standard defect.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. CRS early adopter with first exchanges in 2017; FATCA arrangements with the US; earlier bilateral automatic exchange with the UK, superseded by CRS. **No non-reporting configuration exists and none has for a decade.**

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Central register held by the registrar; not publicly searchable; accessible to competent authorities and specified law-enforcement channels. A 2019 commitment pointed toward public access; the trajectory changed after the CJEU judgment of 22 November 2022 in *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers* and the model moved toward legitimate-interest access. Verify the current position — it has changed twice.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT only. Sterling and euro clearing through UK and European banks; dollar clearing through the US system. No CIPS-side access, no renminbi depth, and a correspondent concentration higher than the entity map suggests. Run Chapter 31's instrument before assigning any settlement role.
9	**Political stability**	High. Stable government, continuous constitutional order, professional civil service, a diversified-by-Island-standards economy. The genuine instability is not internal: it is the residual legislative power asserted at Westminster and the absence of a lender of last resort.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**STABLE on capability, ERODING on differentiation — and differentiation was the only thing being bought.** Evidence, dated: **(a)** zero-ten corporate tax adopted in the late 2000s, then the attribution and deemed-distribution elements challenged under the EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation and repealed or replaced; **(b)** CRS early adoption with first exchanges in 2017, ending any information advantage; **(c)** economic substance from 1 January 2019, under the same external process and to the same deadline as Guernsey and the Isle of Man; **(d)** placement in, and removal from, the co-operative-with-commitments category of the EU list; **(e)** the beneficial-ownership access model moved private -> 2019 public-access commitment -> legitimate-interest access after November 2022. On capability the trajectory is flat to improving: the statute is maintained, the response to *Pitt v Holt* was legislated inside a year, the court gets better. On the variable this book measures it has been one-directional for fifteen years — every difference between Jersey and the United Kingdom that was worth having has been narrowed by a process Jersey does not control. What would change it: nothing available to Jersey. The Island cannot legislate itself a different final appellate court, a different currency or a different sanctions alignment, and those three set item 2.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING, in the narrow sense of a subordinate fiduciary vehicle beneath a non-perimeter apex — never the apex itself.** A Jersey trust or foundation is an excellent instrument for segregating a defined pool under first-class law with a first-class court, and it should sit under the DIFC Foundation rather than above anything. **Not operating** — the substance regime permits real activity but there is no market reason to put it here. **Not bridging** — one rail, one perimeter, no lender of last resort; a treasury or settlement function here is a concentration point.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it when the job is a technically excellent trust and `N` is not the constraint; never use it to raise `N`, because it cannot.** Jersey is the best of the three for a settlor from a forced-heirship civil-law system — firewall, reserved powers, statutory mistake jurisdiction, depth of case law. Size it, book it to WEST without argument, keep a documented and costed migration path, re-justify annually. *Upward*: a change in the final appellate arrangement, an independent monetary authority, or a demonstrated instance of declining to give effect to a UK designation — none realistically available. *Downward*: a further narrowing of the firewall by Privy Council authority; a de-risking cycle making Island entities unbankable in bridge jurisdictions; a substance tightening making a subordinate holding vehicle uneconomic at the family's scale.

The Scorecard — Guernsey

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law with a Norman customary-law substrate, as Jersey. Trusts under the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007; foundations under the Foundations (Guernsey) Law 2012; the distinctive corporate law is the cell company, protected and incorporated.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST. Evidence class: strongest.** Identical to Jersey on every operative test: Privy Council as final appeal, sterling with no central bank, UK sanctions designations effective locally, economic substance from 1 January 2019 under the same external process, CRS early adopter. Guernsey and Jersey are not two blocs, two perimeters, or two independent points of failure; they are two administrations inside one.
3	**Court quality**	High. Royal Court, Court of Appeal, Privy Council. Strong commercial and fiduciary jurisprudence — *Investec Trust (Guernsey) Limited v Glenalla Properties Limited* [2018] UKPC 7 is the leading recent authority on trustee liability and indemnity to emerge from the Islands.

#	Item	Assessment
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Statutory reciprocal enforcement with the UK and specified jurisdictions, plus common-law recognition. Firewall and reserved-powers provisions in the 2007 Law — verify sections and current wording with Guernsey counsel. The Chapter 39 caveat applies identically: a firewall does not reach a foreign judge exercising personal jurisdiction.
5	**Substance requirements**	Real since 1 January 2019, under substance requirements introduced by income tax regulations in 2018 — verify the exact instrument. Relevant activities, core income-generating activities, adequacy tests and annual reporting, aligned in design with Jersey and the Isle of Man because all three were drawn against the same external template.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. CRS early adopter with first exchanges in 2017; FATCA arrangements with the US; earlier bilateral automatic exchange with the UK. No non-reporting configuration.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Central register held by the registrar; not publicly searchable; accessible to competent authorities and specified law-enforcement channels. Same 2019 commitment, same post-November-2022 change of direction as Jersey and the Isle of Man. Verify the current access model.

#	Item	Assessment
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT only. Sterling and euro clearing through UK and European banks. No CIPS-side access. Correspondent concentration high and, on the evidence of the past decade, contracting.
9	**Political stability**	High, with one honest qualification the other two do not carry to the same degree. Guernsey has no central bank and no lender of last resort, and it discovered in 2008 that it had no depositor compensation scheme either; the scheme that exists was introduced in response to that failure. Verify its current terms and caps.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**STABLE on capability, ERODING on differentiation — same direction as Jersey, with one capability moving the other way.** Evidence, dated: **(a)** zero-ten adopted in the same period, challenged elements repealed under Code of Conduct Group pressure; **(b)** CRS first exchanges 2017; **(c)** economic substance effective 1 January 2019; **(d)** EU list placement and removal on the same cycle; **(e)** beneficial-ownership access moved private -> 2019 public commitment -> legitimate-interest access after the CJEU's 22 November 2022 judgment; **(f)** the 2008 Landsbanki Guernsey administration exposed the absence of a depositor compensation scheme, which was then created — an improvement made in response to a failure rather than in anticipation of one. The one genuinely improving line is the cell-company franchise: Guernsey invented the protected cell company in 1997 and engineered the incorporated cell company to fix the PCC's recognition weakness, and that capability has strengthened rather than converged, because nobody legislated it away. Everything a fiduciary structure could once buy here that London could not supply has narrowed. The segregation engineering has not.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING with a genuine segregation specialisation, and a real risk-transfer capability under Chapters 14–15 — never the apex, never bridging.** The correct Guernsey use in this architecture is a cell structure doing hard ring-fencing that a single company cannot do, or a captive with European proximity, held beneath a non-perimeter apex. **Not the apex** — same perimeter as the UK. **Not bridging** — one rail, no monetary authority.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for cells and for captives; do not use it as an alternative to Jersey, because there is no such thing as an alternative inside the same perimeter.** The cell-company franchise is genuine, original, deep, and the best reason in this chapter to have a Crown Dependency element at all. Book it to WEST, size it to the segregation job, confirm cell recognition in every forum where a cell contracts (Ch 30). *Upward*: recognition of statutory cell segregation by a broad international instrument, converting a domicile advantage into a portable one. *Downward*: an adverse recognition decision in a major forum; further contraction of Island banking; a substance or solvency change making the captive proposition uneconomic against Bermuda.

The Scorecard — Isle of Man

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law, Manx, with its own statutory corpus. Two parallel company regimes (Companies Act 1931 and Companies Act 2006); foundations under the Foundations Act 2011; non-charitable purpose trusts under the Purpose Trusts Act 1996. Verify current requirements for each regime.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, and on the hardest evidence of the three.** Privy Council as final appeal; sterling; UK sanctions designations effective locally; economic substance from 1 January 2019 on the same external template; CRS early adopter. And the item neither Bailiwick has: the Isle of Man sits inside the United Kingdom's customs and VAT territory under a revenue-sharing agreement. A jurisdiction inside another's indirect tax territory, sharing its currency, with its judges as the final court, is not an independent perimeter under any workable definition.
3	**Court quality**	High. High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man with its appellate division, final appeal to the Privy Council. Competent and experienced, with a thinner trusts jurisprudence than Jersey's — which matters if the instrument is a complex trust and does not if it is a company or a registry filing.

#	Item	Assessment
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Statutory reciprocal enforcement with the UK and specified jurisdictions, plus common-law recognition. Verify the current statutory scheme with Manx counsel. The Chapter 39 caveat applies.
5	**Substance requirements**	Real since 1 January 2019 under substance requirements introduced by income tax order in 2018 — verify the exact instrument. Same design as Jersey and Guernsey: relevant activities, core income-generating activities, adequacy tests, annual reporting.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. CRS early adopter with first exchanges in 2017; FATCA arrangements with the US; earlier bilateral automatic exchange with the UK. No non-reporting configuration.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Central register held by the relevant authority; not publicly searchable; accessible to competent authorities and specified law-enforcement channels. Same 2019 commitment and same post-November-2022 change of direction as the Bailiwicks. Verify the current access model.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT only, and inside the UK's indirect tax territory for goods and services. No CIPS-side access. Correspondent concentration high; retail and correspondent banking presence has been rationalised over the past decade.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	High. Tynwald, continuous constitutional order, and a deliberately diversified economy — fiduciary services, e-gaming, aerospace and registries — which is a genuine stability advantage over a jurisdiction that does one thing. The 2008 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) liquidation and the engagement of the depositors' compensation scheme is the evidence on the other side: no central bank, no lender of last resort. Verify the scheme's current terms and caps.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**STABLE on capability, ERODING on differentiation, with the strongest single piece of convergence evidence in the chapter — and one capability that has genuinely improved.** Evidence, dated: **(a)** zero-ten adopted in the same period as the Bailiwicks, the challenged attribution mechanism repealed under Code of Conduct Group pressure; **(b)** CRS first exchanges 2017; **(c)** economic substance effective 1 January 2019 on the same template and deadline; **(d)** EU list placement and removal on the same cycle; **(e)** beneficial-ownership access moved private -> 2019 public commitment -> legitimate-interest access after 22 November 2022; **(f)** the customs and VAT agreement with the United Kingdom has been renegotiated, at one point substantially reducing the Island's revenue share — a demonstrated instance of the Island's fiscal position being reset by a decision taken outside it, which is the perimeter test satisfied in cash terms rather than in theory. The genuinely improving line is the aircraft and ship registry franchise, built from the mid-2000s and competing on operational merit rather than opacity — a capability automatic exchange, substance rules and beneficial-ownership reform have not touched, because there was never anything hidden in it to remove.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, distinctively — and this is the one Crown Dependency whose primary job in this book is not holding.** The aircraft and ship registries, the Companies Act 2006 vehicle and the UK VAT and customs alignment are genuine operating and asset-registration capabilities with real commercial content. **Holding** is available and competent but is done better in Jersey on the fiduciary merits and better outside the perimeter altogether on the N merits. **Not bridging** — one rail, one currency, inside another jurisdiction's tax territory.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for registries, for asset ownership inside the UK VAT and customs territory, and for a straightforward operating vehicle; do not use it for the apex and do not use it to raise N.** The Island's honest advantage here is the M-registry and the customs alignment, both operational advantages that survive full disclosure without alteration — exactly the Chapter 3 property this book wants. Book it to WEST. *Upward*: nothing available on item 2; on item 11, further registry and aviation growth would strengthen an already sound operating case. *Downward*: an adverse renegotiation of the customs and VAT agreement, which has precedent; a competing registry taking the aviation business on service or cost; continued contraction of Island banking.

Chapter 12 turns to the four European centres most often proposed as the sophisticated alternative — Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland — and makes an argument that is not the one the reader expects: they are not becoming less secret. One of them became measurably more private in November 2022. They are becoming less differentiated, at premium cost, with the concentration intact.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in the relevant Island and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs.*

Chapter 12 . The Convergence

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. This chapter describes how four jurisdictions work, what they cost and where they fail. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands or Switzerland as applicable, and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

The received account of Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland is that they were secretive and are becoming less so. That account is wrong, and it is wrong in a way that produces bad structures: a principal who believes the problem is disclosure will spend money buying privacy that is not the constraint while ignoring the constraint that is.

Here is the fact that breaks it. On 22 November 2022 the Court of Justice of the European Union, sitting as the Grand Chamber, gave judgment in *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers*, Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, holding invalid the provision of Directive (EU) 2018/843 — the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive — insofar as it required member states to ensure that beneficial-ownership information is accessible in all cases to any member of the general public, on the ground that the interference with the rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights was not limited to what is strictly necessary. Luxembourg's register suspended public access the same day; the Netherlands suspended its own within hours; other member states followed.

Luxembourg became measurably more private in November 2022, by decision of the European Union's own highest court, and so did the Netherlands and Ireland. Competent authorities retain access; so, under the regime that replaced it, do persons demonstrating a legitimate interest. But the public register is gone, and any analysis premised on these jurisdictions "losing their secrecy" is describing a trend that reversed direction three years ago.

So what happened to them? **They lost differentiation**, which is a different thing entirely. A jurisdiction commands a premium only for what it can do that its neighbours cannot, and across fifteen years almost every source of differentiation has been removed — not by secrecy reform, but by coordinated harmonisation of the tax base, the rate, the anti-abuse rules and the reporting:

source of differentiation	what removed it	when
headline rate advantage	Pillar Two, 15% minimum for groups above EUR 750m turnover	FY2024–25
base and financing advantage	ATAD I (interest limitation, GAAR, CFC, exit tax); ATAD II (hybrid and reverse-hybrid mismatches)	2019 2020–22
ruling and structure secrecy	DAC6 mandatory disclosure DAC7 platform reporting DAC8 crypto-asset reporting	2020 2023 2026

information advantage	CRS and, for Switzerland, AEOI	2017–18
substance-free holding	the Danish beneficial-ownership judgments and the EU-law abuse principle	2019
Swiss cantonal special regimes	TRAF, approved by referendum 19 May 2019	2020

And the cost went up. Pillar Two compliance is not a filing but a data-collection programme across every entity in a group; DAC6 requires hallmark assessment and reporting; substance means directors, offices, staff, minutes and transfer-pricing documentation in each jurisdiction. **The result is the worst combination available in structuring: a jurisdiction that has lost its distinctive advantage while retaining — and increasing — its distinctive price.**

The third element is this book's actual subject, and it never changed: bloc concentration is intact. The three EU members are inside the Western perimeter by construction. Switzerland is the interesting case, and the evidence is unambiguous — from 28 February 2022 it adopted the European Union's sanctions packages against Russia through ordinances made under the Embargo Act of 22 March 2002, and has aligned with successive packages since. **Neutrality is a doctrine about military alliance. It did not survive contact with the financial coordination mechanism, and the date on which that became demonstrable is on the public record.**

The arithmetic, on the structure an adviser proposes when asked to diversify within Europe:

```
Luxembourg 35.0% . Ireland 25.0% . Netherlands 25.0% . Switzerland 15.0%

naive HHI = 0.122500 + 0.062500 + 0.062500 + 0.022500 = 0.270000
effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.270000 = 3.703704
bloc collapse, all WEST:  bloc-HHI = 1.000000   N = 1.000000
ln(N) = 0                 eta ln(N) = 0         h = -0.500000

generous counterfactual, Switzerland as its OWN perimeter:
WEST 85.0% -> 0.722500     CH 15.0% -> 0.022500
bloc-HHI = 0.745000    N = 1.342282
ln(N) = 0.294371       eta ln(N) = 0.103030     h = -0.396970
```

Even treating Switzerland as a fully independent coordination perimeter — which the sanctions evidence does not support — the four-jurisdiction European structure reaches 1.34 effective blocs against the designed architecture's 2.94, and h = −0.3970 against −0.1224.

This chapter is not a dismissal. Luxembourg runs the second-largest fund domicile in the world and runs it well. Ireland is the only common-law EU member state with the euro, an English-speaking workforce and the world's leading aircraft leasing cluster. The Netherlands has a first-rate judiciary, an English-language commercial court, and in the *stichting administratiekantoor* one of the most useful control-separation instruments in any legal system. Switzerland has custody depth, political durability and a currency that is not anybody else's policy instrument. **None of them is a bloc, and the mistake this chapter names is paying a premium for the second thing while receiving only the first.**

The Mechanism

Luxembourg

What it is. A small civil-law jurisdiction that built the second-largest investment fund domicile in the world on the UCITS passport and then the AIFM Directive, supervised by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier. The vehicle set runs from the SOPARFI — an ordinary commercial company under the general tax regime benefiting from the participation exemption — through the specialised investment fund (Law of 13 February 2007), the SICAR (Law of 15 June 2004), the reserved alternative investment fund (Law of 23 July 2016), the special limited partnership (AIFM Law of 12 July 2013) and securitisation vehicles (Law of 22 March 2004 as amended in 2022). Verify each statute and the current conditions of the participation exemption with Luxembourg counsel, and take fund assets-under-management figures from the CSSF's monthly statistics.

What removed the differentiation, in order. **ATAD I** — Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 — transposed by the Luxembourg law of 21 December 2018 with effect from 1 January 2019, bringing an EBITDA-based interest limitation, exit taxation, a general anti-abuse rule and controlled foreign company rules; financing structures relying on unlimited interest deductibility stopped working. **ATAD II** — Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 — transposed by the law of 20 December 2019, with reverse-hybrid provisions from 1 January 2022, ending the hybrid-mismatch financing structures and the transparent-partnership arrangements that had been standard in cross-border fund and financing work. Verify both transposition dates.

Pillar Two. Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523 of 14 December 2022 was transposed by the **Luxembourg law of 22 December 2023**, applying to fiscal years beginning on or after 31 December 2023 — in practice **FY2024**. In-scope groups have consolidated revenue of at least EUR 750 million in at least two of the four preceding fiscal years, with a qualified domestic top-up tax and an income inclusion rule from FY2024 and the undertaxed profits rule following; amending legislation was adopted in December 2024. Verify the amending law, the safe harbours and current filing deadlines. For a group above the threshold the Luxembourg effective rate is now floored at fifteen per cent by the same instrument that floors it in Dublin, Amsterdam and Zurich — so the rate differential that justified the structure no longer exists for the population that built it.

DAC6, DAC7, DAC8. Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 requires disclosure of reportable cross-border arrangements against defined hallmarks, with reporting from 2020 and a look-back to June 2018. Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 of 22 March 2021 extended reporting to digital platform operators from 2023. Council Directive (EU) 2023/2226 of 17 October 2023 extends the framework to crypto-assets, applicable from **1 January 2026** — the date that matters most to any structure with a digital-asset component, and the reason Chapter 32 must be read alongside this one. The Court of Justice has trimmed DAC6 at the edges, in Case C-694/20 *Orde van Vlaamse Balies* (8 December 2022), without disturbing the framework. Verify all four citations and the current deadlines.

The state aid cases, and why what happened after matters more than what was decided. Three Luxembourg cases went the full distance, and Luxembourg won all three at final instance:

case	Commission decision	General Court	Court of Justice
Fiat	October 2015	upheld, 2019	SET ASIDE, 8 Nov 2022 Joined Cases C-885/19 P

			and C-898/19 P
Amazon	October 2017	ANNULLED, 12 May 2021, T-816/17 and T-318/18	Commission appeal DISMISSED, 14 Dec 2023, C-457/21 P
Engie	June 2018	upheld, May 2021	SET ASIDE, 5 Dec 2023, Joined Cases C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P

Verify every citation against the law report. In *Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe* the Court held, in substance, that the Commission could not apply an arm's-length principle of its own construction detached from the national law of the member state concerned — a significant limit on state aid as a tax instrument, and a vindication for Luxembourg.

And the process cost landed anyway: most of a decade of litigation, recovery amounts collected and held pending outcome, advance pricing agreement practice reshaped, and a reputational event — the November 2014 LuxLeaks publication — whose consequences reached the individuals involved, with the European Court of Human Rights holding in *Halet v Luxembourg*, Grand Chamber, 14 February 2023, that the whistleblower's conviction violated Article 10. **Winning is not the same as being unaffected.** A structure upheld after eight years has still consumed eight years of management attention, still had its documentation examined line by line, and still operated under a contingent recovery liability throughout. Chapter 4's threat 1 is arbitrary action; this is threat 2, lawful process, and the cost of lawful process is paid by the winner as well as the loser.

The contrast case runs the other way. In *Commission v Ireland and Others*, Case C-465/20 P, judgment of 10 September 2024, the Court of Justice set aside the General Court's 2020 annulment and definitively upheld the Commission's 2016 decision. **Ireland spent eight years arguing it was not owed approximately thirteen billion euro, and lost.**

The privacy inversion. Luxembourg's register of beneficial owners was established by the Law of 13 January 2019 and was publicly accessible. After *WM and Sovim* on 22 November 2022, public access was suspended. The EU's 2024 anti-money-laundering package — commonly cited as Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 establishing the Anti-Money Laundering Authority — provides for access on a legitimate-interest basis from dates in 2027. Verify every instrument number, the access conditions and the application dates.

Ireland

What it is. The only common-law member state of the European Union, with the euro, an English-speaking workforce, a dense treaty network and — the genuinely differentiated cluster — the world's leading centre for commercial aircraft leasing.

The 12.5% rate, and what happened to it. Ireland's 12.5% corporation tax rate on trading income was the jurisdiction's defining feature for a quarter of a century. Ireland joined the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework statement of 8 October 2021 and implemented the minimum tax through **Finance (No. 2) Act 2023**, which inserted the Pillar Two rules into the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 for fiscal years beginning on or after 31 December 2023. Verify the Part and section references with Irish tax counsel. The result is the cleanest illustration of this chapter's thesis anywhere. The 12.5% rate survives for groups below the EUR 750 million threshold and is superseded by a

15% effective floor above it — so the differential disappeared for exactly the population that built structures to capture it.

What had already gone. The arrangement commonly called the Double Irish was closed to new structures from 1 January 2015 by Finance Act 2014, grandfathered to the end of 2020; the successor commonly called the Single Malt was addressed by a competent authority understanding with Malta. Verify both and their dates.

What still works. The Irish Collective Asset-management Vehicle under the Irish Collective Asset-management Vehicles Act 2015; the securitisation company under **section 110 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997**, amended by Finance Act 2016 to restrict Irish property loan structures; the investment limited partnership as modernised by the Investment Limited Partnerships (Amendment) Act 2020; and the Knowledge Development Box introduced by Finance Act 2015, whose rate was adjusted in the light of Pillar Two. Verify each, including the current KDB rate and nexus conditions. The Register of Beneficial Ownership, established by statutory instrument in 2019, lost public access after *WM and Sovim*; verify the current model.

Aircraft leasing. Ireland's leasing cluster is a genuine, substance-based, hard-to-replicate capability built on the Cape Town Convention framework, a deep pool of specialist expertise and decades of accumulated practice — and it is the capability GIFT City is explicitly targeting, which Chapter 24 treats. This is what real differentiation looks like: made of people and accumulated practice rather than of a tax rate, and therefore not something somebody else's directive can legislate away.

The honest fragility. A significant share of Irish corporation tax receipts derives from a small number of large foreign-headquartered groups, a concentration Ireland's own fiscal institutions have analysed; take current figures from the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council and the Department of Finance. The jurisdiction whose selling point was tax now has a fiscal position concentrated in the taxpayers most able to leave — Chapter 5's instrument pointed at a treasury instead of at an estate.

The Netherlands

What it is. A civil-law jurisdiction with an unusually extensive treaty network, a participation exemption of long standing, an excellent judiciary, and — the item most often missed — the Netherlands Commercial Court, which since 2019 has heard international commercial disputes in English within the Dutch court system. For a structure wanting a civil-law forum operating in English inside the EU, that is a real capability. Verify its jurisdiction, rules and fees.

The conduit role, and its deliberate dismantling. The most interesting case in the chapter, because the Netherlands did not lose its differentiation to somebody else's directive. It removed its own. The **Withholding Tax Act 2021** introduced, from 1 January 2021, a conditional withholding tax on interest and royalty payments to affiliated entities in low-tax and listed jurisdictions and in abusive situations, at the headline corporate income tax rate, and the regime was **extended to dividends from 1 January 2024**. It came from a deliberate policy programme, informed by an advisory committee on the taxation of multinationals reporting in 2020, whose stated objective was to end the jurisdiction's conduit role. Verify current rates, listed-jurisdiction criteria and abuse conditions with Dutch tax counsel, and take the measured effect on flows from De Nederlandsche Bank's published statistics. ATAD I and ATAD II did the rest; the reverse-hybrid rule from 1 January 2022 ended the CV/BV structures standard in US-outbound planning for decades.

State aid. The Netherlands won its principal case: the General Court annulled the Commission's Starbucks decision on 24 September 2019 in Cases T-760/15 and T-636/16, and the annulment was not appealed. Verify the citation.

What still works, and is genuinely excellent. The **stichting administratiekantoor** — a foundation that holds shares and issues depositary receipts, separating voting control from economic entitlement. It is a lawful, registered, entirely visible mechanism for keeping control of a business in defined hands while distributing economic benefit to a wider family group. It is the single most useful control instrument in this chapter, it passes the Chapter 3 disclosure test without qualification, and it is systematically under-used outside the Netherlands. Chapter 8 compares it with the foundation and the trust; Chapter 34 uses it in the leverage layer, because separating control from economics is exactly what a carve-out requires. Also working: the participation exemption, the innovation box, the BV, and one of the widest treaty networks in the world — several of those treaties now carrying principal-purpose tests, so verify each counterparty position.

Disclosure and rule volatility. The Dutch UBO register was implemented in 2020 and public access was suspended on 22 November 2022, immediately following *WM and Sovim*; verify the current model. The expatriate ruling commonly known as the 30% ruling has been cut, restructured and partially restored across successive budgets. Verify the current position; the point for scorecard item 9 is not the rate but the frequency of change.

Switzerland

What it is. A civil-law confederation outside the European Union, with its own currency and central bank, the deepest private-banking custody capability in the world, direct-democratic checks, and — an item the post-Brexit United Kingdom no longer has — party status to the Lugano Convention 2007.

Banking secrecy, precisely. Article 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of 8 November 1934 remains in force. **What ended was not Swiss banking secrecy; what ended was its availability against foreign tax authorities.** That is not pedantry: secrecy against private parties, and the procedural protections in domestic matters, are different from the cross-border tax dimension, and only the last was removed. Verify Article 47's current scope with Swiss counsel.

How it was removed. Switzerland signed the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on 19 November 2014; the Federal Act on the International Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters of 18 December 2015 entered into force on 1 January 2017; first exchanges took place in September 2018. That is CANON's 2014–2018 window and the founding fact of this book's thesis. The enforcement history that produced it shows the mechanism: UBS entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice in February 2009 and paid USD 780 million; Wegelin & Co, the oldest Swiss bank, pleaded guilty in January 2013 and closed; the Department announced a programme for Swiss banks in August 2013 under which many institutions sought non-prosecution agreements; Credit Suisse pleaded guilty in May 2014 and paid approximately USD 2.6 billion. Verify each from primary sources. Swiss banking secrecy was not repealed by the Swiss parliament as a matter of first principle; it was dismantled through enforcement pressure applied to institutions that needed dollar clearing access — Chapter 31's argument arriving fifteen years early.

The differentiator Switzerland abolished by referendum. The cantonal special regimes for holding, domiciliary and mixed companies were the country's principal corporate tax differentiator and had

been challenged by the EU and the OECD for years. The Federal Act on Tax Reform and AHV Financing was approved by referendum on 19 May 2019 and entered into force on 1 January 2020, abolishing them and substituting a patent box, an R&D super-deduction and transitional step-up mechanisms alongside cantonal rate reductions. A further constitutional amendment enabling Pillar Two was approved by referendum on 18 June 2023, with the domestic top-up tax in force from 1 January 2024 and the income inclusion rule from 1 January 2025. Verify current cantonal rates, transitional positions and the undertaxed profits rule position.

The sanctions alignment, and why it settles the bloc question. From 28 February 2022 Switzerland adopted the EU's sanctions measures against Russia through ordinances made under the Embargo Act of 22 March 2002, and has aligned with successive packages since. Verify the ordinances and the current position. For Chapter 5's perimeter test this is evidence of the strongest class: a decision taken in Brussels produced the corresponding effect in Bern without an independent Swiss decision on the merits of each designation. A structure holding Swiss assets on the assumption that neutrality insulates it from Western coordinated measures holds an assumption that was tested in 2022 and failed.

Credit Suisse, and the most important single data point in this chapter. On 19 March 2023 the takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS was announced with the involvement of the Swiss authorities. In connection with it, approximately CHF 16 billion of Additional Tier 1 instruments were written down to zero by order of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority under emergency ordinance powers, while shareholders received consideration — inverting the ordinary expectation that equity absorbs loss before subordinated debt. Holders challenged the order and proceedings followed. Verify their current status before relying on any statement about the outcome.

The analytical point does not depend on that outcome. A jurisdiction with an unbroken record of the rule of law used emergency ordinance powers over a weekend to alter the contractual priority of a class of instruments held by international investors. This is not threat 1 in Chapter 4's register — it was not directed at a person or a nationality, and it was a systemic-crisis measure of a kind every jurisdiction reserves. It belongs here because it is the sharpest illustration of a proposition the whole book depends on: institutional quality and political stability do not mean the rules governing your holdings cannot change overnight. They mean that when the rules change, the process will be lawful. Different guarantees, and only one of them protects a position.

Fiduciary instruments, and a limitation routinely missed. Switzerland has no domestic trust law. It ratified the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition with effect from 2007, so foreign trusts are recognised, and a domestic trust project was prepared and not pursued. Swiss foundations exist under the Civil Code, but the Code restricts family foundations to defined purposes such as education, endowment and support, so a Swiss family foundation cannot do what a DIFC Foundation does. Verify the restriction with Swiss counsel before assuming a Swiss foundation is available for a general family-holding purpose — the most common error made about Switzerland by advisers trained in common-law systems.

The premium cost, itemised

What a group pays for a four-jurisdiction European structure, over and above the entities:

Pillar Two	data collection across every constituent entity; GloBE Information Return preparation; safe harbour analysis. VERIFY current filing deadlines.

DAC6	hallmark assessment on every cross-border arrangement; intermediary and taxpayer reporting
DAC8	crypto-asset reporting from 1 January 2026 for any structure with a digital-asset component (Ch 32)
substance	directors, premises, staff, minutes, and the ability to show decisions are taken where the entity is. The Court of Justice's February 2019 beneficial-ownership judgments established an EU-law abuse principle that makes a letterbox company indefensible for directive benefits. VERIFY the case numbers and holdings.
transfer pricing	documentation for every intra-group flow; master file, local file, country-by-country reporting
audit and counsel	in four jurisdictions, in three legal systems

The engineering conclusion needs no figure: in `h = eta ln(N) - delta Q - C`, this structure adds substantially to `C` and adds exactly nothing to `ln(N)`, because all four sit in one perimeter. It is the worst possible position on the storage law — maximum maintenance, zero surplus — and it is also, by a wide margin, the most common structure among sophisticated European families.

The Specification

The decision rule

```
USE LUXEMBOURG WHEN:
  - the requirement is a regulated fund with EU distribution
    (UCITS or AIFMD passport). Nothing replaces this.
  - the requirement is a securitisation or note-issuance vehicle
    with EU investor access

USE IRELAND WHEN:
  - the requirement is aircraft or asset leasing
  - the requirement is an ICAV or an EU fund in a common-law setting
  - the requirement is a section 110 securitisation vehicle

USE THE NETHERLANDS WHEN:
  - the requirement is control separation: the STAK (Ch 8, Ch 34)
  - the requirement is an EU forum operating in English in a
    civil-law system (Netherlands Commercial Court)
  - a treaty position is genuinely needed and survives a
    principal-purpose test

USE SWITZERLAND WHEN:
```

```
  - the requirement is custody depth and CHF exposure
  - the requirement is a Lugano-covered judgments position

USE NONE OF THEM WHEN:
  - the objective is to raise N. All four are one bloc.
  - the objective is the apex: use the DIFC Foundation (Ch 7)
  - the objective is a rate advantage and the group is above the
    EUR 750m Pillar Two threshold. The advantage is gone.
  - the objective is privacy. It is better than in 2021, and it is
    still not a reason to build here.
```

The sizing rule, and the measurement

If a European element is used, size it to the capability and book the whole of it to WEST. Never the apex and never the reserve; held by the DIFC Foundation or an ADGM holdco; substance to the standard set by the Court of Justice's beneficial-ownership case law, meaning decisions taken where the entity is by people who are there; Pillar Two in-scope status determined before building and re-determined annually; register filings consistent with every other register in the group.

variant	naive	eff.	bloc-HHI	N	ln N
conventional as found (Lux 13.6)	0.293430	3.408	1.000000	1.000	0.000
Lux moved to Ireland	0.293430	3.408	1.000000	1.000	0.000
Lux moved to the Netherlands	0.293430	3.408	1.000000	1.000	0.000
Lux moved to Switzerland	0.293430	3.408	1.000000	1.000	0.000
all four, 35/25/25/15	0.270000	3.704	1.000000	1.000	0.000
all four, CH as a SEPARATE bloc	0.270000	3.704	0.745000	1.342	0.294

Five of the six rows produce a surplus term of exactly zero; the sixth is the generous counterfactual and produces h = −0.3970. **Moving a Luxembourg vehicle to the Netherlands or to Switzerland is the single most common "diversification" step taken by European families, and it changes the effective bloc count by exactly nothing.**

The one genuinely portable thing in this chapter

```
STICHTING ADMINISTRATIEKANTOOR -- the shape

foundation (stichting)  holds legal title to the shares and
                        exercises the votes through its board
depositary receipts     issued to the economic beneficiaries;
                        carry the economics, no votes
conditions              administration conditions, including
                        transfer restrictions and the terms on
                        which receipts may be exchanged for shares
disclosure              visible throughout: the foundation is
                        registered, the shareholding is registered,
                        the separation is a matter of record
```

Verify formation requirements, the tax treatment of the receipt holders and the UBO consequences with Dutch counsel and with counsel in each holder's jurisdiction. It belongs in this book because of Chapter 3: **it achieves what a great many concealment structures are built to achieve — control in defined hands, economic benefit spread wider — entirely on the public record.**

The Failure Modes

1. Diagnosing the problem as secrecy loss

The chapter's title error. A principal who believes the four jurisdictions are becoming less private will spend on privacy and ignore concentration. The Court of Justice moved the privacy variable in the opposite direction in November 2022. **Privacy is not the constraint here and has not been for some years; buying more of it purchases nothing the structure needs.**

2. Moving between the four and calling it diversification

Costed above at exactly zero — the most common structural move made by European families and the least productive.

3. Building for a rate differential that Pillar Two removed, or crossing the threshold unnoticed

A group above EUR 750 million consolidated revenue has a fifteen per cent effective floor in all four jurisdictions, so a structure whose business case was the rate differential must be re-costed. The threshold test is consolidated revenue of at least EUR 750 million in at least two of the four preceding fiscal years; a group growing by acquisition crosses it mid-plan and acquires a group-wide data and filing obligation. Determine in-scope status before building and re-determine annually — the two-of-four-years mechanic is the part people get wrong.

4. Assuming a state-aid win means no cost

Luxembourg won *Fiat*, *Amazon* and *Engie* at final instance and paid most of a decade in proceedings, disclosure and reputational cost to do it. Ireland argued for eight years that it was not owed money and lost in September 2024. **Neither outcome is available as a planning assumption, and the cost of the process is incurred before the outcome is known.**

5. Relying on a treaty position that a principal-purpose test defeats

Many treaties now carry a principal-purpose test, and the Court of Justice's beneficial-ownership case law supplies an EU-law abuse principle independent of any treaty. A holding company whose only function is to sit between two other companies for treaty purposes is the paradigm case those instruments were built to defeat.

6. Treating Swiss neutrality as insulation, or Swiss stability as immunity

Neutrality was tested in 2022 and failed: Switzerland aligned with EU sanctions packages from 28 February 2022, and a Swiss account is a Western-perimeter asset. Stability is a separate error with the same shape — the March 2023 Additional Tier 1 write-down shows that emergency

powers exist in every jurisdiction and are used when the conditions for their use arise. **The quality of a jurisdiction's institutions determines the lawfulness of the process, not the stability of the outcome.**

7. Assuming a Swiss foundation can do a family-holding job

The Civil Code restricts family foundations to defined purposes. The most common Switzerland-specific error made by advisers trained in common-law systems, and it is discovered late, after fees.

8. Ignoring DAC8 in a structure with digital assets

Crypto-asset reporting applies from 1 January 2026. Combined with Chapter 32's finding that public chains are more traceable than correspondent banking, a digital-asset component inside an EU structure is among the most comprehensively reported positions available anywhere — fine if the structure was built to be seen, fatal if it was not.

9. Missing the STAK because it is Dutch and unfamiliar

The most valuable single instrument in this chapter is a control-separation mechanism most non-Dutch advisers do not propose because they have not used one. It is lawful, visible, and directly answers the problem Chapter 34's carve-out creates.

10. Letting the European element persist because unwinding is painful

A Luxembourg vehicle interposed for treaty reasons that were sound in 2012 survives into 2026 because collapsing it triggers work. **The correct response is neither haste nor inertia: cost the unwind, calendar it, and re-justify the vehicle annually until either the justification or the vehicle goes.**

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. SPINE section 6's carried case: a dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in three jurisdictions, one under forced heirship. Assets include Thai manufacturing, a UAE trading company, IP, London commercial real estate and a listed portfolio.

Step 1 — the vehicle as found, and what had changed underneath it

The Luxembourg element was 13.6% of exposure: a SOPARFI interposed between the UK holding company and two European operating subsidiaries, established eleven years earlier for a treaty position on dividends and a financing conduit. Two directors provided by a corporate services firm, both locally resident, both on many other boards. No premises, no employees, minutes prepared by the services firm, and an advance pricing agreement on the financing margin obtained before the state-aid cases changed practice. **Every one of those features was standard, defensible and widely used when the vehicle was built.** Several stopped being defensible while it sat unchanged.

```
2016   BEPS outputs and the multilateral instrument; treaties begin
       acquiring principal-purpose tests
2019   ATAD I in force in Luxembourg: interest limitation, GAAR, CFC
2019   the Court of Justice's beneficial-ownership judgments supply an
       EU-law abuse principle independent of any treaty
2020   ATAD II in force; DAC6 reporting begins
2022   reverse-hybrid rules apply
2022   WM and Sovim: public register access closes -- the ONE change
       that made the vehicle MORE private, and the only one anybody
       in the family had heard about
2024   Pillar Two applies to the group's first in-scope fiscal year
```

The family's understanding of its Luxembourg position had been formed entirely by the 2022 line in that table — the only one that moved in their favour and the least important on the list.

Step 2 — the measurement, and three proposals

```
UK 40.9  .  US 27.3  .  Jersey 18.2  .  Luxembourg 13.6
naive HHI = 0.293430    effective jurisdictions = 3.407968
bloc-HHI  = 1.000000    EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1.000000    h = -0.500000
```

proposal	bloc-HHI	N	ln N
move the SOPARFI to Ireland (common law)	1.000000	1.000	0.000
move it to the Netherlands (treaty depth)	1.000000	1.000	0.000
move it to Switzerland ("outside the EU")	1.000000	1.000	0.000
move it to Switzerland, CH as a separate bloc	0.749296	1.334	0.288

The fourth row is the generous variant, computed as WEST 86.4% and CH 13.6%, and here the arithmetic must be reported correctly rather than conveniently: 0.864^2 + 0.136^2 = 0.746496 + 0.018496 = 0.764992. **Recomputed at full precision, bloc-HHI = 0.764992, N = 1.307203, ln(N) = 0.267890, eta ln(N) = 0.093761, h = -0.406239.** The printed fourth row is wrong and is left visible deliberately: it is what happens when a bloc-HHI is estimated rather than computed, and SPINE section 8 exists because that error propagated through four chapters of Volume Three before anyone caught it. The conclusion is unaffected — **all four proposals leave the structure below N = 1.35 against the designed architecture's 2.94, and three leave it at exactly 1.00.**

Step 3 — the rebuild

The SOPARFI was not moved to Ireland, the Netherlands or Switzerland. The treaty function was re-examined from first principles, and three findings emerged. The treaty position it was built for had thinned: principal-purpose tests and the EU-law abuse principle meant it depended on substance the vehicle did not have. The financing function was better placed elsewhere, and moved to the ADGM holdco (Chapter 17), inside a bridge bloc, with real substance. **And one European function was genuinely worth keeping, and it was not the one anybody expected** — the family's governance problem, three heirs in three jurisdictions with one under forced heirship

and a need to keep operating control in two hands while distributing economic benefit to all three, is precisely the problem a Dutch *stichting administratiekantoor* solves.

BEFORE	AFTER
Luxembourg SOPARFI, treaty conduit + financing margin	wound up over one financial year, treaty position re-examined and abandoned
financing function in Luxembourg	ADGM holdco (Ch 17), with substance, in a bridge bloc
no control-separation mechanism	Dutch STAK: votes with the foundation board, economics with the depositary receipts
exposure 13.6 (WEST)	Netherlands residual ~2.0 (WEST); balance to UAE

Verify the entire unwind with Luxembourg tax counsel — liquidation treatment, any recapture, the position of the advance pricing agreement, and the consequences in every counterparty jurisdiction. An unwind executed for structural reasons that triggers an avoidable charge has destroyed more value than the structural improvement created.

Step 4 — the measurement after, and the disclosure test

Dutch STAK + subsidiaries	2.0	WEST	retained on merit
Luxembourg	0.0	WEST	wound up

```
UAE 29.1 . Thailand 18.2 . UK 16.4 . Bermuda 13.6 . India 11.8 . Singapore 10.9
 naive HHI = 0.189002   effective jurisdictions = 5.290949
 bloc-HHI  = 0.340000   EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 2.941176
 ln(N) = 1.078810   eta ln(N) = 0.377583   h = -0.122417
```

Would the structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it? Yes, and the European element is the clearest case in the book. The STAK is a registered foundation; the shareholding is on the register; the depositary receipts and their conditions are documented; the Foundation's holding of the receipts is recorded with the DIFC Registrar; every beneficial owner is reported under CRS. **The control separation the family actually needed is achieved by an instrument whose entire operation is a matter of public record — which is why the loss of register privacy in 2022, and its partial restoration by the Court of Justice, made no difference to the structure in either direction.**

The residual, honestly:

- 2.0% of exposure sits in the Netherlands, contributes nothing to N, and is justified solely on the control-separation capability. Re-justified annually or it goes.
- The group must monitor its Pillar Two in-scope status annually; crossing the threshold changes the compliance economics of every entity in the chain, including entities outside Europe.
- Dutch treaty positions are subject to principal-purpose tests and to the EU-law abuse principle. The STAK is not held for treaty reasons and does not depend on them, which is deliberate.

- **The one thing the European element does not do, and was never going to do, is raise N.** It was retained because it does something else well, and that justification is written down where the next person can find it.

Verification notes

1. *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers*, Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, 22 November 2022: confirm the operative part and the provision of Directive (EU) 2018/843 held invalid.
2. EU anti-money-laundering package: confirm the numbers commonly cited as Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, Directive (EU) 2024/1640 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, the legitimate-interest access conditions and the application dates.
3. Pillar Two: confirm Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523; the Luxembourg law of 22 December 2023 and its December 2024 amendment; Ireland's Finance (No. 2) Act 2023 and the Part inserted into the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997; the Dutch implementing act; the Swiss referendum of 18 June 2023 with QDMTT and IIR commencement and the UTPR position; the EUR 750 million threshold test's precise formulation; and the safe harbours.
4. ATAD I (2016/1164) and ATAD II (2017/952): confirm each transposition instrument and date and the reverse-hybrid commencement. DAC6 (2018/822), DAC7 (2021/514), DAC8 (2023/2226): confirm numbers, transposition, deadlines and the DAC8 application date of 1 January 2026, and Case C-694/20 *Orde van Vlaamse Balies* (8 December 2022).
5. State aid: confirm *Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe*, Joined Cases C-885/19 P and C-898/19 P (8 November 2022); *Commission v Amazon.com*, C-457/21 P (14 December 2023); *Luxembourg and Engie*, Joined Cases C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P (5 December 2023); *Commission v Ireland and Others*, C-465/20 P (10 September 2024); the Starbucks annulment in T-760/15 and T-636/16 (24 September 2019); and *Halet v Luxembourg*, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 14 February 2023.
6. The Court of Justice's February 2019 beneficial-ownership judgments on the Interest and Royalties and Parent-Subsidiary Directives: confirm the joined case numbers and holdings on the EU-law abuse principle before relying on any summary, including this one.
7. Luxembourg vehicles: confirm the current statutes and conditions for the SOPARFI participation exemption, the SIF (13 February 2007), the SICAR (15 June 2004), the RAIF (23 July 2016), the SCSp and the securitisation law of 22 March 2004 as amended.
8. Ireland: confirm the ICAV Act 2015, section 110 TCA 1997 as amended by Finance Act 2016, the Investment Limited Partnerships (Amendment) Act 2020, the Knowledge Development Box rate and nexus conditions, and the Double Irish and Malta closure dates. Take corporation tax concentration figures from the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council.
9. Netherlands: confirm the Withholding Tax Act 2021 and its dividend extension from 1 January 2024, the listed-jurisdiction criteria, participation exemption conditions, innovation box rate, the Netherlands Commercial Court's rules, STAK formation requirements and UBO consequences, and the current expatriate ruling position. Take flow data from De Nederlandsche Bank.
10. Switzerland: confirm Article 47 of the Banking Act of 8 November 1934 and its scope; the MCAA signature of 19 November 2014, the AEOI Act of 18 December 2015 and first exchanges September 2018; the FATCA model change and intended application date; the TRAF referendum of 19 May 2019 and entry into force 1 January 2020; the sanctions or-

dinances under the Embargo Act of 22 March 2002 from 28 February 2022; the status of the Credit Suisse AT1 litigation; the Hague Trusts Convention ratification and the abandoned domestic trust project; the Civil Code restriction on family foundations; and the current state of EU–Swiss relations.

11. All HHI and storage-law figures were computed at full precision from the stated shares. The deliberately incorrect fourth row in Worked Application Step 3 is identified as such in the text; the corrected values are `bloc–HHI = 0.764992`, `N = 1.307203`, `ln(N) = 0.267890`, `h = −0.406239`.

The Scorecard — Luxembourg

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Civil law, with a heavily developed commercial and financial statutory corpus and a strong fund-law tradition. Foundations exist only in limited form; the workhorses are companies and partnerships, not fiduciary instruments.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, by construction.** EU member state; euro; ECB and Single Supervisory Mechanism; EU sanctions apply directly; ATAD, DAC and Pillar Two apply as EU law; CJEU jurisdiction. The least contestable bloc assignment in Part IV after the United Kingdom's.
3	**Court quality**	Good and improving, with genuine fund and financial-services depth. The Court of Justice sits above it on EU-law questions — a quality gain and a concentration fact at once.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Strong within the EU and EFTA — Brussels Recast within the Union, Lugano 2007 with EFTA states; a real advantage over the post-Brexit United Kingdom. Ordinary private international law beyond.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Real and rising: directors, premises, decision-making and documentation to the standard set by the Court of Justice's beneficial-ownership case law and ATAD I. A vehicle administered entirely by a services firm with no independent decision-making is the paradigm case those instruments defeat.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. CRS through the amended administrative cooperation directive; FATCA by intergovernmental agreement; DAC6 from 2020, DAC7 from 2023, DAC8 from 1 January 2026. No non-reporting configuration exists.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	**The counterintuitive item, and the one that defines this chapter.** The register established in 2019 was publicly accessible until *WM and Sovim* (22 November 2022), when public access was suspended following the Court of Justice's invalidation of the public-access requirement. The 2024 package restores access on a legitimate-interest basis from dates in 2027. Competent authorities retain full access throughout. Luxembourg is more private today than in 2021, and it changes nothing about whether a structure should be built here.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT, TARGET services and SEPA, with deep euro clearing. No CIPS-side depth. Euro clearing is itself a perimeter dependency, not a hedge against one.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	Very high domestically: consensus politics, continuous constitutional order, an economy built around one well-run industry. The instability is external — the rules governing that industry are made in Brussels and at the OECD, and Luxembourg's influence over them is that of one small member state.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**ERODING on differentiation, IMPROVING on privacy, STABLE on capability — and only the first matters.** Evidence, dated: (a) ATAD I effective 1 January 2019, removing the financing and base advantages; (b) ATAD II effective 1 January 2020 with reverse-hybrid rules from 1 January 2022, ending the mismatch structures; (c) DAC6 from 2020, DAC7 from 2023, DAC8 from 1 January 2026, ending arrangement confidentiality; (d) Pillar Two by the law of 22 December 2023 effective FY2024, flooring the effective rate at 15% above EUR 750m — the largest single removal of differentiation in the jurisdiction's modern history, legislated by Luxembourg itself under a directive it voted for; (e) the state-aid cycle from the 2014 LuxLeaks publication through Fiat, Amazon and Engie — all three ultimately won, the process cost landing anyway across most of a decade; (f) and running the other way, *WM and Sovim* closing public register access on 22 November 2022. Luxembourg's differentiation was removed by tax harmonisation, its cost rose through compliance, and its bloc position has not moved in fifteen years: it is converging on an ordinary, well-run, expensive EU jurisdiction with an outstanding fund industry. Nothing available to Luxembourg would change items 2, 6 or 10, all set at EU and OECD level.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, in the specific sense of running regulated fund and securitisation platforms — never HOLDING, never BRIDGING.** The fund domicile is a genuine operating capability with real people, real regulation and real market access, and nothing in this book replaces it for EU-passported distribution. An apex here sits inside the perimeter, with rising substance cost and no succession advantage over a DIFC Foundation; and one currency bloc, one rail and one sanctions regime do not make a bridge.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for regulated funds and for securitisation with EU investor access. Do not use it as a holding company, a treaty conduit, or a diversification move.** The SOPARFI-as-conduit model most families actually hold is what the last decade of legislation was written to defeat; re-cost it rather than maintain it by inertia. Book it to WEST. *Upward*: nothing realistic — the differentiators are set outside the jurisdiction. *Downward*: substance tightening making small platforms uneconomic; an abuse doctrine reaching fund structures.

The Scorecard — Ireland

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	**Common law — and the only common-law member state of the European Union.** That combination is genuinely unique and is the jurisdiction's most durable structural asset, because unlike a tax rate it cannot be harmonised away.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, by construction.** EU member state; euro; ECB and SSM; EU sanctions apply directly; ATAD, DAC and Pillar Two as EU law; CJEU jurisdiction. Common-law legal family does not alter bloc alignment — legal family and coordination perimeter are independent axes, and confusing them is a Chapter 36 error.
3	**Court quality**	High. Commercial list of the High Court with active case management; Court of Appeal; Supreme Court. Common-law reasoning in English inside the EU is a specific advantage for a party wanting EU judgment circulation with familiar doctrine.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Strong. Brussels Recast within the EU, Lugano 2007 with EFTA states, ordinary private international law beyond. Post-Brexit this is the item on which Ireland gained most relative to the United Kingdom, and it is under-weighted in most comparisons.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Real. Residence rules tightened progressively from 2015; the EU-law abuse principle from the 2019 beneficial-ownership judgments; transfer pricing. The leasing sector runs on genuine substance and always has.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. CRS through the amended administrative cooperation directive; FATCA by intergovernmental agreement; DAC6, DAC7, and DAC8 from 1 January 2026. No non-reporting configuration.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Register of Beneficial Ownership established by statutory instrument in 2019. Public access suspended following *WM and Sovim* (22 November 2022); restricted access thereafter, with the 2024 EU package providing for legitimate-interest access. Verify the current model.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT, TARGET services, SEPA, euro clearing. No CIPS-side depth. Single-perimeter.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	High politically, with a publicly documented fiscal fragility: a significant share of corporation tax receipts derives from a small number of large foreign-headquartered groups, a concentration Ireland's own fiscal institutions have analysed. Take current figures from the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council. Chapter 5's instrument pointed at a treasury rather than an estate gives the same reading: high concentration, low effective count, dependence on decisions taken elsewhere.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**ERODING sharply on tax differentiation, STABLE to IMPROVING on legal and operating differentiation — and the second is the part worth having.** Evidence, dated: (a) the Double Irish closed to new structures from 1 January 2015 under Finance Act 2014, grandfathered to end-2020, with the Malta understanding closing the successor route; (b) Ireland joined the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework statement on 8 October 2021; (c) Pillar Two implemented by Finance (No. 2) Act 2023 for fiscal years beginning on or after 31 December 2023 — the 12.5% now survives only below EUR 750m, so the differential vanished for precisely the population that structured to capture it; (d) ATAD, DAC6, DAC7 and DAC8 apply as in every member state; (e) *Commission v Ireland and Others*, C-465/20 P, 10 September 2024 — the Court of Justice set aside the General Court and upheld the Commission's 2016 decision, so Ireland lost after winning below, having spent eight years arguing it was not owed approximately thirteen billion euro; (f) and running the other way, register access closed in November 2022 while Ireland's post-Brexit position as the only common-law EU member with judgment circulation strengthened. The tax story is over. The common-law-in-the-EU story and the aircraft leasing cluster are not, because neither is made of a rate.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, and unusually strong at it.** Aircraft and asset leasing, fund platforms (ICAV), securitisation (section 110), and genuine commercial operations with EU market access. Not holding: inside the perimeter, with a fiscal position under pressure. Not bridging — and the common-law legal family, which looks like a bridge, is not one.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for leasing, funds and securitisation, and for a common-law commercial presence inside the EU. Do not use it for the rate, which is gone above the threshold, and do not use it for the apex.** The leasing cluster is a substance-based capability a competitor must build rather than legislate — the most durable thing in this chapter. Book it to WEST. *Upward*: further post-Brexit gains in EU-facing common-law work. *Downward*: a corporation tax receipts shock from concentration; competitive erosion of leasing by GIFT City (Ch 24).

The Scorecard — the Netherlands

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Civil law, with a modern and flexible corporate law, an unusually well-developed foundation (*stichting*) tradition, and the Netherlands Commercial Court hearing international commercial disputes in English since 2019.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, by construction.** EU member state; euro; ECB and SSM; EU sanctions apply directly; ATAD, DAC and Pillar Two as EU law; CJEU jurisdiction.
3	**Court quality**	High and distinctive: a well-regarded judiciary, an active commercial bar, and the Netherlands Commercial Court operating in English inside a civil-law system — a combination not otherwise available in the EU. Verify its jurisdiction, rules and fees.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Strong. Brussels Recast within the EU, Lugano 2007 with EFTA states, ordinary private international law beyond.
5	**Substance requirements**	Real and enforced, reinforced by a domestic policy programme explicitly directed at ending letterbox conduits. Substance requirements for financial service companies, transfer pricing, and the EU-law abuse principle all apply.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. CRS, FATCA, DAC6, DAC7, and DAC8 from 1 January 2026. No non-reporting configuration.

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	UBO register implemented in 2020; **public access suspended on 22 November 2022, the same day as the *WM and Sovim* judgment** — the fastest response of any member state and a clean illustration of the chapter's thesis. Restricted access thereafter; the 2024 EU package provides for legitimate-interest access. Verify the current model.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT, TARGET services, SEPA, euro clearing, and a large payments and banking sector. No CIPS-side depth. Single-perimeter.
9	**Political stability**	High on institutions; **moderate on rule stability for internationally mobile capital, and the jurisdiction supplies its own evidence.** The conditional withholding tax arrived in 2021 and was extended to dividends in 2024; the expatriate ruling has been cut, restructured and partially restored across successive budgets. Stable constitutionally, volatile in the sense that matters to a structure.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**ERODING on differentiation — and uniquely in this chapter, largely SELF-INFLICTED and deliberate.** Evidence, dated: (a) ATAD I and ATAD II on the common EU timetable, with reverse-hybrid rules from 1 January 2022 ending the CV/BV structures; (b) the Withholding Tax Act 2021, in force 1 January 2021, imposing a conditional withholding tax on interest and royalties to low-tax and listed jurisdictions at the headline corporate rate and extended to dividends from 1 January 2024 — a domestic statute whose stated purpose was to end the country's own conduit role; (c) DAC6, DAC7, DAC8 and Pillar Two on the common timetables; (d) public UBO register access suspended 22 November 2022, making the jurisdiction more private; (e) the Starbucks decision annulled by the General Court on 24 September 2019 and not appealed — a clean win, and ruling practice changed regardless. The Netherlands is the clearest proof that this chapter's trajectory is not imposed from outside: given the choice, a member state dismantled its own most profitable differentiator on policy grounds. What survives is what was never a tax differentiator — the treaty network, the courts, the corporate law and the STAK.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING, in one narrow and genuinely excellent sense — control separation through the STAK — plus OPERATING.** The STAK is the best control-separation instrument in this chapter and should sit beneath the DIFC Foundation, not above it. A BV with real activity and EU market access is a sound operating vehicle. Not the apex; not bridging.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for the STAK, for an English-language EU forum, and for genuine operations. Do not use it as a conduit — that function has been legislated away by the Netherlands itself.** The STAK is the most under-used instrument in Part IV. Book it to WEST. *Upward*: growth of the Netherlands Commercial Court; wider foreign recognition of depositary-receipt structures. *Downward*: further extension of the conditional withholding tax; treaty renegotiations narrowing the network.

The Scorecard — Switzerland

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Civil law, cantonal federalism. **No domestic trust law** — the Hague Trusts Convention was ratified with effect from 2007 so foreign trusts are recognised, and a domestic trust project was prepared and not pursued. Foundations exist under the Civil Code, but family foundations are restricted to defined purposes such as education, endowment and support, so a Swiss foundation cannot perform a general family-holding function. Verify with Swiss counsel; this is the most common error made about Switzerland by common-law advisers.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST — the contestable call in the chapter, resolved by evidence rather than doctrine.** Not an EU member; own currency and central bank; own sanctions statute. But from 28 February 2022 Switzerland adopted the EU's Russia sanctions packages through ordinances under the Embargo Act of 22 March 2002, and has aligned with successive packages since. AEOI participant from 2017–18. Party to Lugano 2007. On Chapter 5's perimeter test — does a decision taken elsewhere in the perimeter reach it without an independent decision — the 2022 record answers yes.

#	Item	Assessment
3	**Court quality**	High. Cantonal courts, Federal Supreme Court, Federal Administrative Court; a strong arbitration tradition and a developed body of law on setting aside awards. Proceedings run in the relevant official language — a practical consideration for an English-speaking group.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Strong, and better than the United Kingdom's since 2021: Switzerland is a party to the Lugano Convention 2007, plus the Private International Law Act for other cases and the New York Convention for awards. Genuine and under-counted.
5	**Substance requirements**	Real. Effective management and control tests; cantonal substance practice; transfer pricing. The post-TRAF regime rewards genuine activity through the patent box and R&D deduction rather than status.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Full participant. MCAA signed 19 November 2014; the AEOI Act of 18 December 2015 in force 1 January 2017; first exchanges September 2018. FATCA applies, with a change of model agreed and intended to apply later — verify. Article 47 of the Banking Act of 8 November 1934 remains in force, but its availability against foreign tax authorities is gone. Swiss banking secrecy was not repealed; its cross-border tax dimension was removed, and the distinction matters.

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	No EU-style public register; identification runs through financial-institution due diligence and company-law obligations, with external pressure to introduce a central register. Verify the current position and any legislative proposal — an active file.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT throughout; Swiss franc clearing through the SNB and the SIC system; the deepest private-banking custody infrastructure in the world. No CIPS-side depth. The custody depth is a genuine capability and it is not rail diversity — Chapter 31's distinction between execution depth and settlement permission applies exactly.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	Among the highest in the world on institutions and process — direct democracy, consensus government, an unbroken constitutional order, a currency that is its own policy instrument — **and the March 2023 events show why that is not the same as stability of outcome.** In connection with the UBS takeover of Credit Suisse announced 19 March 2023, approximately CHF 16 billion of Additional Tier 1 instruments were written down to zero by FINMA order under emergency ordinance powers while shareholders received consideration, inverting the ordinary priority over a weekend; now litigated, and the current status must be verified. Institutional quality guarantees that a change of rules will be lawful. It does not guarantee that the rules will not change.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**ERODING, and the longest-running erosion documented in this book — with the bloc position confirmed rather than degraded, because it was never independent in the relevant sense.** Evidence, dated: (a) the UBS deferred prosecution agreement of February 2009, the Wegelin guilty plea and closure in January 2013, the US programme for Swiss banks announced August 2013 and the Credit Suisse guilty plea in May 2014 — secrecy dismantled by enforcement leverage applied through dollar clearing access, not by Swiss legislative choice; (b) MCAA signature 19 November 2014, AEOI Act 18 December 2015 in force 1 January 2017, first exchanges September 2018 — CANON's founding window; (c) TRAF approved by referendum 19 May 2019, in force 1 January 2020, abolishing the cantonal holding, domiciliary and mixed company regimes — **Switzerland removed its own principal corporate differentiator by popular vote**; (d) Pillar Two enabled by referendum 18 June 2023, QDMTT from 1 January 2024, IIR from 1 January 2025; (e) sanctions alignment with the EU from 28 February 2022 and continuing — the decisive bloc evidence; (f) the March 2023 AT1 write-down under emergency ordinance. Switzerland has spent fifteen years converting itself from a differentiated jurisdiction into a high-quality ordinary one, mostly by its own legislative and democratic choices under

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**BRIDGING in one narrow and real sense — custody and currency — and OPERATING. Never HOLDING at the apex.** Custody: the deepest private-banking infrastructure available, with CHF exposure that is not any other bloc's policy instrument — a genuine, if intra-perimeter, diversification scoring on Chapter 5's counterparty and currency axes. Not holding: no domestic trust law, family foundations restricted by the Civil Code, and a perimeter position confirmed in 2022. **Not bridging in the bloc sense — a Swiss account does not span perimeters; it sits inside one with a different currency.**

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for custody, for CHF exposure and for a Lugano-covered judgments position. Do not use it for the apex, do not use it for secrecy, and do not book it as a separate bloc.** Size it on the counterparty and currency axes; book it to WEST on the jurisdiction axis. *Upward*: a demonstrated instance of declining to follow a coordinated Western measure — the only thing that would move item 2, and 2022 makes it unlikely; a domestic trust law would improve items 1 and 11. *Downward*: **a public beneficial-ownership register would not change the verdict at all, which is the chapter's point**; a further emergency-powers episode or a narrowing of Lugano coverage would.

Chapter 13 completes Part IV with the jurisdiction that inverts every finding in this chapter: the United States offers more genuine formation privacy than any of these four, and less protection against its own courts than any jurisdiction in this book.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in each relevant jurisdiction and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs.*

Chapter 13 . US Domestic

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. This chapter describes how four state law regimes and one federal overlay work, what they cost and where they fail. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel admitted in the relevant state and with US federal tax and bankruptcy counsel, and with counsel in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Part IV closes with the jurisdiction that inverts every finding in the three chapters before it.

Chapter 12 argued that Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland are not becoming less secret but less differentiated. The United States is the opposite case on both axes: it offers more genuine formation privacy than any of those four, it is moving toward more rather than less, and it offers less protection against its own courts than any jurisdiction in this book. Two facts establish the shape of it.

On disclosure, the United States moved in the opposite direction from Europe in March 2025. The Corporate Transparency Act, enacted on 1 January 2021 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 and codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5336, required most US companies to report their beneficial owners to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. After constitutional challenge and a period of injunctions, FinCEN issued an interim final rule in March 2025 that removed domestic reporting companies from the beneficial-ownership reporting requirement, leaving the regime applicable to entities formed abroad and registered to do business in a US state. Verify the current rule, its Federal Register citation, whether a final rule has superseded the interim rule, and any subsequent litigation or legislation before relying on a word of this. This area has moved repeatedly and may have moved again. Subject to that verification, the position is that a limited liability company formed in Delaware, South Dakota, Nevada or Wyoming by US persons discloses less about its ownership to any government than a Luxembourg company does.

On protection, the United States is the least protective jurisdiction in this book, and the case law is old, settled and unambiguous. In *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), the principals of a Cook Islands trust asserted that a foreign trustee's refusal made compliance impossible; the impossibility defence failed and they were held in civil contempt. In *In re Lawrence*, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002), the same defence failed again, and the debtor remained incarcerated for years. **A United States court with personal jurisdiction over a person does not need jurisdiction over the assets. It orders the person, and the sanction for refusal is imprisonment.** No state statute, no foreign trust, no non-recognition provision and no firewall addresses that mechanism, because the mechanism does not operate on the assets at all.

And the concentration finding, which is the reason this chapter sits in Part IV rather than elsewhere: **the United States is not merely inside the Western coordination perimeter. It is the perimeter's centre of gravity.** Dollar clearing runs through Fedwire and CHIPS; the Office of Foreign Assets Control is the world's most consequential designating authority; secondary sanctions reach non-US persons dealing with designated parties; and the approximately USD 300 billion of Russian central bank reserves immobilised in 2022 — the event CANON identifies as having

changed institutional thinking on reserve concentration — was a coordinated Western action in which the United States was central.

The arithmetic, on the move an adviser makes when asked to diversify domestically:

```
Delaware 40.0%  .  South Dakota 25.0%  .  Nevada 20.0%  .  Wyoming 15.0%

naive HHI = 0.160000 + 0.062500 + 0.040000 + 0.022500 = 0.285000
effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.285000 = 3.508772

bloc collapse, all WEST:  bloc-HHI = 1.000000   N = 1.000000
ln(N) = 0                 eta ln(N) = 0         h = -0.500000
```

Chapters 11 and 12 each ran a generous counterfactual — the Crown Dependencies, and then Switzerland, as independent perimeters — to show the conclusion survived the most favourable assumption available to the incumbent structure. **No such counterfactual exists here, and that is the distinguishing feature of this chapter.** These are states of one country, under one Constitution, subject to one federal judiciary, one currency, one central bank, one sanctions authority, one bankruptcy code and the Full Faith and Credit Clause at Article IV, section 1. There is no version of the facts in which a decision taken in Washington reaches Delaware and not Wyoming. **The bloc assignment is not a judgement call; it is arithmetic.**

There is a further exposure that entity mapping never shows. **A structure denominated in dollars has United States perimeter exposure regardless of where its entities sit** — a Singapore company holding dollars in a Singapore bank holds a claim that clears, ultimately, through the US banking system. Chapter 31 measures this properly; the point here is that the US share of a real exposure table is almost always larger than the entity list suggests.

What follows is not a warning against using US entities. These four states contain some of the best-engineered commercial statutes in existence — Delaware's corporate law and Chancery bench are, on the merits, the strongest combination of substantive law and specialist adjudication anywhere in this book, and Wyoming invented the limited liability company. The argument is about job assignment. These are operating and asset-protection jurisdictions for people already inside them, and the worst available choice for capital trying to sit outside the perimeter, because they are the perimeter.

The Mechanism

The federal layer, which applies identically in all four states

Everything in this section overrides everything in the state sections. It is set out first for that reason.

Beneficial-ownership reporting. The Corporate Transparency Act (Pub. L. 116-283, Division F, enacted 1 January 2021), codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5336, and FinCEN's Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule at 87 Fed. Reg. 59498 (30 September 2022), effective 1 January 2024, required reporting companies to file beneficial-ownership information. The regime was challenged: in *National Small Business United v. Yellen* the Northern District of Alabama held it unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs in March 2024, and in *Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v.*

Garland the Eastern District of Texas issued a nationwide preliminary injunction in December 2024, which the Supreme Court stayed in January 2025. In March 2025 FinCEN issued an interim final rule removing domestic reporting companies from the requirement. Verify all of it — the citations, the procedural history, the interim rule's Federal Register citation, whether it has been finalised, and the present state of any appeal or legislation. **Nothing in this book should be the source for the current position on the CTA.**

Information exchange. The United States is not a participant in the Common Reporting Standard. It exchanges under FATCA intergovernmental agreements, many of which contain reciprocity language whose implementation has been the subject of long-running criticism. Verify the current position on US reciprocity under the applicable IGA before making any assumption about what a non-US tax authority will or will not receive. The practical consequence for a structure is asymmetry: a US financial institution reports to the IRS, and what flows outward depends on an agreement rather than on a multilateral standard.

Transfer taxes. US citizens and residents are subject to estate and gift tax on worldwide assets. Non-resident non-citizens are subject to estate tax on US-situs assets with a statutory exemption of only USD 60,000 under 26 U.S.C. § 2102(b) — unindexed, and a trap for foreign investors holding US shares directly. The generation-skipping transfer tax under 26 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. is what dynasty trusts in perpetuity states are built to work with, and legislation signed in July 2025 set the basic exclusion amount at a permanent indexed level from 2026. Verify the current exclusion, the GST exemption, the situs rules and any treaty relief with US federal tax counsel.

Real property. The Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act regime at 26 U.S.C. § 897, with withholding under § 1445, treats gain on the disposition of a US real property interest as effectively connected income and requires withholding on the purchaser. It reaches indirect holdings through US real property holding corporations. **Verify current rates, exemptions and the withholding mechanics.**

Bankruptcy, and the single most important fact about domestic asset protection trusts. 11 U.S.C. § 548(e), added by the 2005 bankruptcy amendments, permits the trustee to avoid a transfer made within **ten years** before the filing to a self-settled trust or similar device, if made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. A domestic asset protection trust therefore provides no protection in a bankruptcy commenced within ten years of funding where the requisite intent is found, and the state statute's shorter seasoning period is irrelevant to that analysis. Verify the provision and its interpretation in the relevant circuit.

Fraudulent transfer law. The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, promulgated in 2014 as a revision of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, has been enacted in most states with variations. Its actual-intent and constructive-fraud provisions are the general law against which every protective transfer is measured. **Verify the enacting state's version and its limitation periods.**

The Constitution. Article IV, section 1 requires each state to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of every other state; the Supremacy Clause subordinates state law to federal law. Together they mean a state statute purporting to insulate assets from other states' courts operates at the edge of what a state can do, and the case law reflects that. **The contempt power** is federal and state, operates on persons rather than property, and is why the entire offshore non-recognition literature has a poor record against US claimants.

Delaware

What it is. The default jurisdiction of American corporate law. The Delaware General Corporation Law at Title 8 of the Delaware Code and the Court of Chancery — a non-jury court of equity operating since 1792, with judges who do nothing else, and appeals to the Delaware Supreme Court — are together the most specialised combination of substantive corporate law and expert adjudication in this book.

The corporate statute. Section 102(b)(7) permits exculpation for duty-of-care breaches; section 141(a) vests management in the board; section 220 provides the books-and-records right that structures most stockholder litigation; section 262 provides appraisal. A very large share of US public and venture-backed companies is incorporated there, and the reason is not tax — Delaware has a franchise tax and a corporate income tax on Delaware-source income — but the predictability of the case law.

The alternative-entity statutes. The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act at 6 Del. C. § 18-101 et seq. is the workhorse. Section 18-703 makes the charging order the exclusive remedy of a judgment creditor of a member. Section 18-215 provides for series limited liability companies. The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act contains a parallel charging-order provision at 6 Del. C. § 17-703. The Delaware Statutory Trust Act at 12 Del. C. § 3801 et seq. underpins a large part of the US securitisation and fund market. Verify every section reference and the current text; alternative-entity provisions are amended most years.

Asset protection. The Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act at 12 Del. C. § 3570 et seq., enacted in 1997, was among the first domestic asset protection trust statutes. Delaware has also abolished the rule against perpetuities for personal property held in trust, with a long fixed period for real property. Verify the current sections, the seasoning period, the excepted creditor classes and the perpetuities position.

The 2024–2025 franchise defence, and why it belongs in a resilience book. Delaware's corporate law came under sustained competitive and litigation pressure in 2024 and 2025. Chancery decisions on stockholder agreements and on executive compensation prompted amending legislation in successive sessions, and at least one very large issuer reincorporated in another state after a stockholder vote. Verify the specific bills, their dates, the decisions that prompted them and the reincorporation in question with Delaware counsel before citing any of it.

The engineering reading cuts both ways and both halves belong on the scorecard. **Delaware demonstrated that it will legislate a considered answer to an adverse development within months, which is exactly the institutional responsiveness a structure should want.** And the same events demonstrated that the Delaware corporate-law settlement is now a live political variable rather than a fixed background condition, which is a different and less comfortable finding.

Disclosure. Delaware does not require the members of a limited liability company to be identified in the public formation record. A registered agent is required. Subject to the federal position above, formation privacy in Delaware is real.

South Dakota

What it is. The most deliberately engineered trust jurisdiction in the United States, and the one that attracted most attention when the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists published the Pandora Papers in October 2021.

The features. No state income tax. The rule against perpetuities was abolished, permitting trusts of unlimited duration and therefore genuine dynasty trusts working with the federal generation-skipping transfer tax exemption. A domestic asset protection trust statute. A directed trust framework separating investment, distribution and administrative functions among trust advisors and a trustee — South Dakota was among the earliest states to codify this, and the architecture is now standard across the industry. And an unusually strong trust privacy statute providing for the sealing of trust court proceedings. Verify every one of these — the perpetuities repeal, the qualified disposition chapter, the directed trust chapter, the sealing provision and their current section numbers — with South Dakota counsel. This chapter deliberately does not cite section numbers it has not confirmed.

The institutional feature that is genuinely unusual. South Dakota maintains a standing body that reviews and updates the trust code on a recurring basis, with industry participation, and amendments are enacted most years. **Verify the body's current name, composition and mandate.** For a resilience analysis this is a real, if double-edged, finding: a jurisdiction with a permanent legislative maintenance process for one industry is highly responsive to that industry and correspondingly exposed if the political consensus supporting it changes.

What it does not do. Nothing in South Dakota law affects federal bankruptcy law, federal transfer taxes, the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the contempt power. A South Dakota trust holding a portfolio for a beneficiary in a foreign forced-heirship jurisdiction solves neither the succession problem of Chapter 9 nor the concentration problem of Chapter 5.

Nevada

What it is. The most aggressive of the four on asset protection timing and the most explicitly management-friendly on corporate governance.

The features. No state income tax. The Nevada spendthrift trust statute at NRS chapter 166 provides a domestic asset protection trust with what is generally described as the shortest seasoning period in the United States. Nevada provides charging-order exclusivity for limited liability companies and — distinctively — extends charging-order protection to the shares of closely held corporations, which most states do not. Nevada's corporate statute codifies director protection more strongly than Delaware's and the legislature has extended it further in recent sessions. Perpetuities are permitted for a long fixed term rather than abolished outright. Verify each of these with Nevada counsel, including the seasoning period, the excepted creditor classes, the charging-order sections, the corporate director-protection provisions and the perpetuities period. Nevada amends these statutes frequently.

A claim to treat carefully. Nevada has historically been marketed on the basis that the state has no information-sharing agreement with the Internal Revenue Service. Whatever the position on state-level sharing, federal reporting obligations — income reporting, withholding, FATCA, and the CTA regime as it currently stands — operate independently of any state arrangement, and a structure built on the state-sharing point has misidentified where the reporting comes from.

The trade-off. Nevada's corporate law is less tested than Delaware's, its Business Court is younger, and the body of published decisions is far thinner. For a company that expects governance litigation, thin case law is a cost, not a benefit — the whole value of Delaware is that most questions have already been answered.

Wyoming

What it is. The originator of the American limited liability company — Wyoming enacted the first LLC statute in the United States in 1977 — and the cheapest and most private of the four to maintain.

The features. No state income tax. Charging-order exclusivity for limited liability companies. A qualified spendthrift trust statute. A very long permitted perpetuities period. A well-developed private trust company regime. No public disclosure of LLC members. And a distinctive line in digital-asset entity law, including a statute providing for decentralised autonomous organisations to be organised as limited liability companies. Verify every statute and section with Wyoming counsel, including the charging-order provision, the spendthrift trust act, the perpetuities period and the current state of the digital-asset entity legislation, which is recent and evolving.

The honest assessment. Wyoming is an excellent, low-cost, low-friction vehicle jurisdiction with genuine formation privacy. It has a small bar, a thin body of commercial case law and no specialised business court of Delaware's calibre. It is a good place to form an entity and a poor place to litigate about one, which is exactly the profile a structure should want for a single-purpose holding vehicle and exactly the wrong profile for an operating company with governance complexity.

The contempt problem, and what asset protection actually delivers

This is the section the rest of the chapter exists to support, and it has to be stated without softening.

A United States court that has personal jurisdiction over a person may order that person to act, and may imprison them for refusing. It does not matter where the assets are, what the trust deed says, or that a foreign trustee has declined to comply — that last is precisely the argument that failed in *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999) and again in *In re Lawrence*, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002), where the courts treated the settlor's inability as self-created.

Domestic asset protection trusts face a second and distinct problem, which is that they depend on another state's court applying the trust state's law:

- In *Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker*, 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018), the Alaska Supreme Court held that a state statute purporting to confer exclusive jurisdiction on Alaska courts over fraudulent transfer claims against Alaska trusts could not divest the courts of other states of jurisdiction. **Verify the citation and holding.**
- In *In re Huber*, 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013), an Alaska self-settled trust established by a Washington debtor was held ineffective, the court applying the law of the state with the most significant relationship under conflict-of-laws principles and applying 11 U.S.C. § 548(e). **Verify the citation and holding.**
- In *Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions*, 2012 IL 112906, the Illinois Supreme Court applied Illinois public policy against self-settled spendthrift trusts to a Nevada trust. **Verify the citation and holding.**

Charging-order protection has an analogous limit. In *Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission*, 44 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court held that the charging order was not the exclusive remedy against a single-member limited liability company, and Florida subsequently legislated in response. **Verify the citation, the holding and the responsive statute.** The doctrinal

justification for the charging order is the protection of *other* members from an intrusion by one member's creditor. Where there are no other members, the justification is absent, and several courts have said so.

The synthesis, stated as a specification rather than as a warning:

```
A US asset protection structure works against a creditor who:
  - must sue in the trust or entity state, AND
  - is outside the ten-year window of 11 U.S.C. s.548(e), or the
    debtor does not enter bankruptcy, AND
  - cannot establish actual intent under the UVTA, AND
  - is not a federal agency or a court with in personam
    jurisdiction over the debtor prepared to use contempt

It does not work against:
  - a federal court with personal jurisdiction over the debtor
  - a bankruptcy trustee inside the ten-year window
  - the creditor's home-state court applying its own public policy
  - a transfer made after the claim arose
```

Every element of that specification is about timing and about who the creditor is, and none of it is about jurisdiction shopping. This is Chapter 4's threat 2 — lawful process — and CANON is explicit that it is a different problem from the one this book is mainly about. A structure built after a claim has arisen is a fraudulent transfer in most states, and no state statute in this chapter changes that.

The Specification

The decision rule

```
USE A US ENTITY WHEN:
  - the operating business is in the United States
  - the requirement is a Delaware vehicle because the counterparties,
    the investors or the market expect one (venture financing,
    securitisation, a US-listed structure)
  - the requirement is charging-order protection for a
    MULTI-MEMBER operating LLC
  - the requirement is a US-situs asset that cannot be held
    otherwise

USE A US TRUST WHEN:
  - the settlor and the likely creditors are all inside the United
    States, and the planning is done LONG before any claim arises,
    with US counsel, on the record

DO NOT USE A US ENTITY WHEN:
  - the objective is to raise N. There is not even a colourable
    argument here.
```

```
  - the objective is the apex: use the DIFC Foundation (Ch 7)
  - the objective is reserve custody outside the perimeter
  - the objective is protection from a US court and the principal
    is within its personal jurisdiction. Nothing here does that.
  - the objective is privacy from a foreign tax authority. The
    formation record may be private; the reporting is federal
    and the analysis belongs to Ch 38, not to state law.
```

The non-US principal's specification

This is the configuration most relevant to the carried case, and it is dominated by two federal provisions that state law does not touch:

```
US-situs shares held DIRECTLY by a non-US individual
    -> within the US estate tax net
    -> statutory exemption of USD 60,000 under 26 U.S.C. s.2102(b)
    -> top rate applies above it
    -> VERIFY the situs rules, the current rates and any applicable
       estate tax treaty with US federal tax counsel

US real property held directly or through a US real property
holding corporation
    -> FIRPTA, 26 U.S.C. s.897, withholding under s.1445
    -> VERIFY rates, exemptions and mechanics

The conventional responses -- a non-US holding company between the
individual and the US assets, or holding US equity exposure through
non-US funds -- are standard, well documented, and highly
fact-specific. VERIFY every element with US federal tax counsel and
with counsel in the individual's jurisdiction of residence.
```

The estate tax exposure of a non-US individual holding US shares directly is the single most commonly missed item in cross-border private structuring, and it is missed because it is federal, invisible at the state level, and unaffected by every state feature described in this chapter.

Charging-order specification

```
members          MORE THAN ONE, with genuine economic substance to
                 each interest. Single-member LLCs are the weak case
                 -- Olmstead and its progeny.
operating agmt   distribution provisions that are real and are
                 followed; transfer restrictions; admission
                 provisions
conduct          the entity must be run as an entity: separate
                 accounts, real records, no personal use of assets.
                 Veil-piercing and alter-ego doctrines are available
                 in every state in this chapter.
timing           formed and funded long before any claim arises
VERIFY           the charging-order provision, its exclusivity, and
```

```
                    the treatment of single-member entities in the
                    formation state AND in every state where a creditor
                    might sue
```

The measurement

variant	naive	eff.	bloc-HHI	N	ln N
conventional as found (US 27.3)	0.293430	3.408	1.000000	1.000	0.000
US split DE / SD / NV / WY	0.229...	varies	1.000000	1.000	0.000
four states alone, 40/25/20/15	0.285000	3.509	1.000000	1.000	0.000
ANY generous counterfactual	–	–	–	–	–

The last row is empty because there is nothing to put in it. Chapters 11 and 12 could each run a best-case assumption in the incumbent structure's favour; this chapter cannot, because one Constitution, one federal judiciary, one currency and one sanctions authority leave no room for one. The honest statement to a client is that domestic diversification within the United States is a state-law optimisation with real value on asset protection and litigation risk, and precisely zero value on the measurement this book uses.

The Failure Modes

1. Confusing formation privacy with protection

The two are unrelated, and the United States is the clearest case in the book of a jurisdiction with a great deal of the first and very little of the second. A structure whose only asset is that nobody knows about it fails Chapter 3's disclosure test by construction — and it fails in the jurisdiction with the most effective discovery apparatus in the world.

2. Believing a DAPT defeats a federal court, or ignoring § 548(e)

It does not. *Affordable Media* and *In re Lawrence* have not been distinguished away, and the impossibility defence fails when the impossibility was created by the person asserting it. Nor is a two-year state seasoning period a two-year protection period: **if the debtor enters bankruptcy within ten years of funding and actual intent is found, the state period is irrelevant.** That gap between how domestic asset protection trusts are marketed and how they work is the largest in this chapter.

3. Assuming the trust state's law will be applied

Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker, *In re Huber* and *Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions* are the answer. A creditor sues where it can obtain jurisdiction, that court applies its own conflict-of-laws rules, and its own public policy may exclude a self-settled spendthrift trust entirely. **The protective statute is only as good as the willingness of a foreign forum to apply it, and that willingness is not something the trust state can legislate.**

4. Using a single-member LLC for charging-order protection

Olmstead and the responses to it. The doctrinal basis for the charging order is protecting other members; with no other members the basis is absent. Verify the treatment of single-member entities in the formation state and in every state where a creditor might sue.

5. Planning after the claim arises

Fraudulent transfer law under the UVTA governs, and the badges of intent are well developed and familiar to every court. This is CANON's threat 2, and CANON is explicit that timing-bound fraudulent transfer law is a different problem from the arbitrary-action problem this book addresses. Chapter 39 collects the cases.

6. Missing the § 2102(b) estate exposure

A non-US individual holding US shares directly has a USD 60,000 exemption. The figure is federal, unindexed, and invisible from any state-law analysis. Verify with US federal tax counsel, and verify any treaty relief.

7. Treating the CTA position as settled, or state non-cooperation as meaningful

The reporting regime was enacted, litigated, enjoined, stayed and then narrowed by rule inside four years. **Any structure whose rationale depends on the current reporting position is built on the least stable variable available** — and Chapter 12's mirror image, where the EU moved toward privacy over the same period, makes the general point unmistakable. The related error is assuming a state's non-cooperation matters: federal reporting, withholding and exchange operate independently of any state arrangement, and the reporting comes from the institution and from federal law, not from the Secretary of State's office.

8. Buying Nevada or Wyoming corporate law for a company that will be litigated over

Delaware's value is answered questions. A jurisdiction with a thinner body of decisions offers more favourable text and less predictability, and for an entity likely to face governance litigation the second consideration usually dominates. **Choose Delaware for governance complexity and Wyoming or Nevada for simple single-purpose vehicles, and do not let a fee differential decide it.**

9. Forgetting that dollars are perimeter exposure

The deepest error and the one entity maps never reveal. A structure with no US entity at all can be majority US-perimeter exposed through currency and clearing. **Run Chapter 5's instrument on the currency and rail axes before concluding that the US share is 27.3% or 16.4% or anything else.**

10. Letting the US element carry the reserve because the custodian is good

US custody is deep, cheap and excellent, which is exactly why reserve drifts into it. Chapter 5's step 1 is explicit: a portfolio contributes to the perimeter of its **custodian**, not of its issuers. A

globally diversified portfolio held through a US custodian is a US-perimeter holding and should be booked as one.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. SPINE section 6's carried case: a dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in three jurisdictions, one under forced heirship. Assets include Thai manufacturing, a UAE trading company, IP, London commercial real estate and a listed portfolio. **The principal is not a US person.**

Step 1 — the US position as found

The US element was 27.3% of exposure: a Delaware limited liability company holding the listed portfolio through a US broker-dealer, with the LLC owned by a BVI company owned by the principal.

The adviser's file described the portfolio as "internationally diversified" because the issuers were spread across Asia, Europe and the Americas. Chapter 5's step 1 is explicit that this is the wrong basis. **The portfolio contributes to the perimeter of its custodian, and the custodian was in New York.**

Three exposures, only one of which the family had identified:

Identified. The concentration exposure — a single custodian, a single jurisdiction, a single rail — was in the file and had been raised twice.

Not identified. The federal estate tax position. The chain ran individual -> BVI company -> Delaware LLC -> US-situs securities. Whether the interposed entities are effective to remove the individual from the US estate tax net is a fact-specific federal question turning on the classification of the entities and the situs rules. Verify with US federal tax counsel. The family's advisers had assumed the BVI company solved it and had never obtained an opinion.

Not identified. The reporting position. The Delaware LLC's obligations under the CTA regime had changed twice in eighteen months, and the file recorded neither the original obligation nor the change.

Step 2 — the measurement

```
UK 40.9  .  US 27.3  .  Jersey 18.2  .  Luxembourg 13.6
naive HHI = 0.293430    effective jurisdictions = 3.407968
bloc-HHI  = 1.000000    EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 1.000000
ln(N) = 0    eta ln(N) = 0    h = -0.500000
```

Two proposals were put forward and both were run:

```
proposal                                        bloc-HHI       N    ln N
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
move the LLC from Delaware to Wyoming          1.000000   1.000   0.000
split across Delaware, South Dakota, Nevada    1.000000   1.000   0.000
```

Both leave N at exactly 1.00 and the surplus term at exactly zero. The second proposal would have added two registered agents, two sets of state filings and two more sets of counsel in exchange for

no change in any measurement in this book. It was, on its own terms, a sensible asset-protection suggestion; it was presented as a resilience measure, and it is not one.

Step 3 — the currency measurement nobody had run

The exposure table was rebuilt on Chapter 5's currency axis, which produced the finding that changed the programme:

```
entity-based US exposure                          27.3%
USD-denominated share of the balance sheet        61.0%
settlement volume clearing through the US system  ~58%
```

The structure's entity map said 27.3% and its dependency said something closer to sixty per cent. The exposure to a decision taken in Washington was more than double what the jurisdiction table reported, and every additional entity in the group had been assessed against the smaller number. This is Chapter 5's failure mode 6 — measuring one axis and calling it the structure — in its most expensive form.

Step 4 — the rebuild

BEFORE	AFTER
Delaware LLC holding the portfolio via a New York custodian	portfolio custody moved to a bridge-bloc custodian (Ch 20, Ch 31)
BVI company above the LLC	collapsed; DIFC Foundation holds through an ADGM holdco
no federal estate tax opinion	opinion obtained BEFORE restructuring; entity classification confirmed
USD 61% of the balance sheet	USD reduced toward the operating requirement; AED, SGD and THB balances raised per Ch 31
exposure 27.3 (WEST)	US exposure ~0; a Delaware LLC RETAINED for the US operating and contracting function, sized small

Four things about that table deserve comment. **A Delaware LLC was retained deliberately** — the group sells into the United States and contracts with US counterparties, and the entity is multi-member, has a real operating agreement, holds no reserve and no group IP, and is booked to WEST without argument. **The federal opinion came before the restructuring, not after**: moving securities, changing custodians and collapsing an interposed company are all potentially taxable events, and every step must be verified with US federal tax counsel and with counsel in the principal's jurisdiction of residence before initiating it. **The currency reduction did more for the measurement than the entity change** — moving custody out reduced entity exposure, while reducing USD balances reduced the exposure the entity map never showed. And **nothing in this rebuild was about privacy**, which is the point of the chapter: the Delaware LLC's formation

record was private before and is private now, and the change was in where a decision could reach, not in who could see.

Step 5 — the measurement after

US component	exposure	bloc	note
Delaware LLC (US operating)	2.0	WEST	multi-member, real operating agreement, no reserve, no IP
US-custodied portfolio	0.0	WEST	moved to a bridge custodian
US total	2.0	inside the UK/WEST	30.0

And the full structure:

```
UAE 29.1 . Thailand 18.2 . UK 16.4 . Bermuda 13.6 . India 11.8 . Singapore 10.9
 naive HHI = 0.189002   effective jurisdictions = 5.290949
 bloc-HHI  = 0.340000   EFFECTIVE BLOCS N = 2.941176
 Western-perimeter exposure = 30.0%
 ln(N) = 1.078810   eta ln(N) = 0.377583   h = -0.122417
```

Step 6 — the disclosure test, and the residual

Would the structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

Yes, and the US element is the interesting case because it is the one where the answer would be yes *even though* less is disclosed. The Delaware LLC's members are not on a public record; its owner is nonetheless documented through the DIFC Registrar, reported under CRS by the custodian chain, and identified to every bank that onboards it. The structure's resilience does not come from the formation record being private, and it would not be reduced if the formation record were public — which is the test for whether a structure depends on concealment, applied to the jurisdiction that offers the most concealment.

The residual, honestly:

- 2.0% of exposure remains in Delaware for a real operating reason and contributes nothing to N. Re-justified annually or it goes.
- **If the principal or any heir becomes a US person, the entire analysis in this chapter changes, and it changes in the direction of less protection, not more.** US personal jurisdiction over an heir would expose the structure to the contempt mechanism described above. This is monitored, and it is the single item in the carried case most likely to change the architecture.
- The CTA reporting position must be reviewed at least annually and confirmed with US counsel. It has changed twice in eighteen months.
- **USD exposure remains the largest single perimeter dependency in the structure and is not eliminable, only reducible.** Chapters 31 and 32 carry it. The dollar is not a jurisdiction that can be exited by moving an entity.

Verification notes

1. Corporate Transparency Act: confirm the enactment (Pub. L. 116-283, Division F, 1 January 2021), 31 U.S.C. § 5336, the FinCEN Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule at 87 Fed. Reg. 59498 (30 September 2022), the March 2025 interim final rule removing domestic reporting companies, whether a final rule has superseded it, and the current state of litigation and legislation. **This is the most volatile citation in the chapter.**
2. Case citations: confirm *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); *In re Lawrence*, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); *Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker*, 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018); *In re Huber*, 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013); *Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions*, 2012 IL 112906; *Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission*, 44 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2010); *National Small Business United v. Yellen* (N.D. Ala. 2024); and *Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. Garland* (E.D. Tex. 2024) with the subsequent stay. Confirm each against the reporter.
3. Federal tax: confirm 26 U.S.C. § 2102(b) and the current non-resident exemption; the current basic exclusion amount and GST exemption following the July 2025 legislation; 26 U.S.C. § 897 and § 1445; and any applicable estate or income tax treaty.
4. Bankruptcy: confirm 11 U.S.C. § 548(e), its ten-year period and its interpretation in the relevant circuit.
5. Uniform Voidable Transactions Act: confirm the enacting state's version, its badges of intent and its limitation periods.
6. Delaware: confirm the DGCL sections cited (102(b)(7), 141(a), 220, 262); the LLC Act sections (18-101 et seq., 18-215, 18-703); DRULPA § 17-703; the Statutory Trust Act (12 Del. C. § 3801 et seq.); the Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act (12 Del. C. § 3570 et seq.); the perpetuities position; and the 2024 and 2025 amending legislation with the decisions that prompted it.
7. South Dakota: confirm the perpetuities repeal, the qualified disposition chapter, the directed trust chapter, the privacy and sealing provision, the LLC charging-order provision and the standing trust-code review body. **Section numbers are deliberately not asserted in the text.**
8. Nevada: confirm NRS chapter 166, the seasoning period and excepted creditor classes; the LLC and closely held corporation charging-order provisions; the corporate director-protection provisions and recent amendments; and the perpetuities period.
9. Wyoming: confirm the LLC act and its 1977 enactment; the charging-order provision; the qualified spendthrift trust act; the perpetuities period; the private trust company regime; and the current state of the digital-asset entity legislation.
10. FATCA and CRS: confirm the current US position on reciprocity under the applicable intergovernmental agreement, and the non-participation of the United States in the Common Reporting Standard.
11. All HHI and storage-law figures were computed at full precision from the stated shares. The currency and settlement percentages in Worked Application Step 3 are constructed inputs to the constructed case, not measurements of any real structure.

The Scorecard — Delaware

Items 2, 6, 8 and the federal components of 4, 5, 7 and 9 are identical for all four states and are set by federal law. They are stated in full here and cross-referred in the three scorecards that follow.

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law, with the most developed body of corporate and alternative-entity statutory law in the United States: the DGCL at Title 8, the LLC Act at 6 Del. C. § 18-101 et seq., DRULPA, and the Statutory Trust Act at 12 Del. C. § 3801 et seq.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, and at the centre of it — the strongest bloc assignment in this book.** One Constitution, one federal judiciary, one currency, one central bank, one sanctions authority (OFAC), one bankruptcy code, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause at Article IV, section 1. **There is no colourable argument for treating any US state as an independent coordination perimeter, and this chapter therefore runs no generous counterfactual, because none exists.**
3	**Court quality**	**The highest in this book for corporate matters, without qualification.** The Court of Chancery is a non-jury court of equity operating since 1792 with judges who hear nothing but business disputes, appeals to the Delaware Supreme Court, and a body of published decisions unmatched anywhere. The whole value proposition is answered questions.

#	Item	Assessment
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Sister-state judgments circulate under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Foreign-country judgments are recognised under state enactments of the uniform recognition acts, on ordinary comity principles, and subject to defences. **Verify the Delaware enactment and its defences.** Inbound recognition is not the operative question in this chapter — the operative question is outbound reach, and that is item 12.
5	**Substance requirements**	Minimal at state level: a registered agent and franchise tax. Federal substance, transfer-pricing and effectively-connected-income analysis apply independently and are where the real requirements sit.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	**The United States is not a CRS participant.** It exchanges under FATCA intergovernmental agreements, with reciprocity that has been the subject of long-running criticism. Verify the current position under the applicable IGA.

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	**The counterintuitive item.** No public disclosure of LLC members at formation; a registered agent is required. Federally, the CTA regime (31 U.S.C. § 5336) was narrowed by FinCEN's March 2025 interim final rule to exclude domestic reporting companies, after enactment, litigation, injunction and stay. **Verify the current rule and any successor before relying on this.** Subject to verification, formation privacy in Delaware exceeds that available in any Chapter 12 jurisdiction.
8	**Rail access**	The centre of the dollar system: Fedwire and CHIPS, plus SWIFT. **No CIPS-side depth, and the deepest single-rail dependency in this book — a dependency that reaches structures with no US entity at all, through dollar denomination.** Chapter 31.
9	**Political stability**	Very high institutionally. **Lower than usually assumed on rule stability for corporate law specifically**: in 2024 and 2025 Delaware amended the DGCL in successive sessions in response to Chancery decisions and to competitive pressure from other states, with at least one very large issuer reincorporating elsewhere after a stockholder vote. Verify the specifics with Delaware counsel.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**STABLE to IMPROVING on capability, ERODING on rule predictability, and UNCHANGED on the variable this book measures.** Evidence, dated: (a) the CTA enacted 1 January 2021 and effective 1 January 2024, then narrowed by FinCEN interim final rule in March 2025 after litigation — **disclosure moved toward the principal, not away, the opposite of the Chapter 12 trajectory and the sharpest available demonstration that reporting regimes move in both directions**; (b) the DGCL amended in successive 2024 and 2025 sessions in response to Chancery decisions and interstate competition, with a major reincorporation as the trigger — responsiveness and volatility at once; (c) 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)‘s ten-year reachback, in place since 2005, continuing to hollow out the marketed protection of every domestic asset protection trust regardless of state; (d) *Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker* (Alaska 2018) confirming that a state cannot legislate other states’ courts out of jurisdiction. The direction is toward more privacy, less predictable corporate law, and no change whatever in bloc position — broadly neutral for a US operating group, and irrelevant for capital trying to sit outside the coordinating perimeter, because the perimeter’s centre cannot be an exit from the perimeter.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, unambiguously, and BRIDGING only in the market-access sense — never HOLDING.** Operating: a Delaware entity for a US business, US contracting, US investors, securitisation or a US listing is the correct answer and nothing here replaces it. Not holding: no reserve, no group IP, no apex — the apex belongs outside the perimeter (Ch 7). Not bridging in the settlement sense: this is one rail and the perimeter's centre.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	Use it for the US operating and contracting function and for vehicles the US market expects. Never use it to hold, to hide, or to escape a US court. Delaware's corporate law and Chancery bench are the best of their kind; that is a capability argument and it does not touch item 2. Size the element to the US business, book it to WEST, and re-justify annually. The decisive monitored risk in the carried case is not Delaware law: it is whether any principal or heir becomes a US person, because personal jurisdiction — not asset location — is what the contempt mechanism operates on. *Upward*: a durable, cross-party settlement on Delaware corporate law would restore item 9. *Downward*: continued interstate franchise competition producing further rapid statutory change; any extension of US reporting or freezing powers to categories defined by nationality or association rather than conduct.

The Scorecard — South Dakota

Items 2, 6 and 8 are federal and identical to Delaware's. See above.

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law, with the most deliberately engineered trust code in the United States: perpetuities abolished, a qualified disposition (DAPT) regime, a directed trust framework separating investment, distribution and administration, and an unusually strong trust privacy and court-sealing provision. Verify every provision and section number with South Dakota counsel; this chapter deliberately does not assert section numbers it has not confirmed.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, at the centre.** Identical to Delaware — one Constitution, one federal judiciary, one currency, one sanctions authority, one bankruptcy code, Full Faith and Credit. No counterfactual exists.
3	**Court quality**	Competent, with a small bar and a thin body of published commercial and trust decisions relative to Delaware. For an uncontested administration that is not a defect; for litigation it is.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Sister-state judgments under Full Faith and Credit; foreign-country judgments under the state's recognition act and comity. The material point is the reverse direction: *Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker* (Alaska 2018) and *In re Huber* (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) show that another state's court may take jurisdiction and apply its own law and public policy to a South Dakota trust.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	A qualifying trustee with a South Dakota presence, and administration actually conducted in the state. That requirement is real and is the thing most often under-delivered by structures administered elsewhere in practice. Verify the qualifying-trustee conditions.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Federal. Not a CRS participant; FATCA IGAs with contested reciprocity. Verify.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	No public trust register. Court proceedings concerning trusts are subject to a sealing regime that is among the strongest in the United States. Federally, the CTA position as narrowed in March 2025 applies to entities rather than to trusts; **verify how the current rule treats trusts and trust-owned entities.**
8	**Rail access**	Federal. Fedwire, CHIPS, SWIFT. No CIPS-side depth.
9	**Political stability**	High, with an unusual and double-edged feature: a standing body reviews the trust code with industry participation and amendments are enacted most years. A jurisdiction with a permanent legislative maintenance process for one industry is highly responsive to that industry and correspondingly exposed if the political consensus supporting it changes. Verify the body's current name and mandate.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**IMPROVING on trust-law capability, STABLE on privacy, ERODING on political insulation, and UNCHANGED on bloc position.** Evidence, dated: (a) the perpetuities repeal and successive codifications of directed trust, DAPT and privacy provisions across four decades, each strengthening the offering — **the only jurisdiction in Part IV whose core statutory product has consistently improved rather than converged**; (b) the October 2021 Pandora Papers publication placing South Dakota at the centre of international commentary on onshore trust jurisdictions and generating sustained political attention; (c) the federal CTA cycle from 2021 to the March 2025 narrowing, moving privacy toward the principal; (d) 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)'s ten-year reachback and the *Wacker* and *Huber* line, both limiting what any state trust code can deliver against a determined creditor. The state's product is getting better and the constraints on it are federal and interstate, so further state legislation cannot fix them. That is the honest ceiling on the jurisdiction.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING, in the narrow domestic sense of a long-duration trust for a family already inside the United States — and nothing else in this book.** It is not an apex for a cross-bloc structure: it sits at the perimeter's centre, offers no succession advantage over a DIFC Foundation for civil-law heirs, and adds nothing to N. Not operating; not bridging.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	Use it if the settlor, the beneficiaries and the likely creditors are all inside the United States and the planning is done long before any claim arises. Do not use it as the apex of a cross-border structure. The trust code is genuinely the best-engineered of the four and that is a capability finding, not a resilience one. *Upward*: nothing available to South Dakota — the binding constraints are federal and interstate. *Downward*: federal legislation on trust reporting; a change in the political consensus that sustains the standing review process; further adverse conflict-of-laws decisions in creditor home states.

The Scorecard — Nevada

Items 2, 6 and 8 are federal and identical to Delaware's. See above.

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law. Distinctive on two axes: a spendthrift trust statute at NRS chapter 166 with what is generally described as the shortest seasoning period in the United States, and charging-order protection extended beyond LLCs to the shares of closely held corporations. Corporate law codifies director protection more strongly than Delaware's. Verify every provision, seasoning period, excepted creditor class and section number with Nevada counsel; Nevada amends these statutes frequently.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, at the centre.** Identical to Delaware. No counterfactual exists.
3	**Court quality**	Competent, with a younger business court and a substantially thinner body of published decisions than Delaware's. For a company expecting governance litigation, thin case law is a cost rather than a benefit — favourable text with unpredictable application is worse than settled text.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Sister-state judgments under Full Faith and Credit; foreign-country judgments under the state's recognition act and comity. *Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions*, 2012 IL 112906, in which the Illinois Supreme Court applied Illinois public policy to a Nevada self-settled trust, is the case to read before relying on the Nevada statute against an out-of-state creditor.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	A qualifying trustee for the spendthrift trust; a registered agent for entities. Minimal at state level; federal requirements apply independently.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Federal. Not a CRS participant; FATCA IGAs with contested reciprocity. The historically marketed point that Nevada has no state information-sharing agreement with the IRS is beside the point: federal reporting, withholding and exchange operate independently of any state arrangement.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	No public disclosure of LLC members at formation; a registered agent is required; officers and directors of corporations are filed. Federally, the CTA position as narrowed in March 2025 applies. Verify.
8	**Rail access**	Federal. Fedwire, CHIPS, SWIFT. No CIPS-side depth.
9	**Political stability**	High institutionally, with a legislature that meets biennially and has repeatedly amended the asset-protection and corporate statutes to compete with Delaware and with the other trust states. Stable in the constitutional sense, actively competitive in the statutory sense.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**IMPROVING on statutory generosity, ERODING on the reliability of that generosity outside the state, and UNCHANGED on bloc position.** Evidence, dated: (a) successive legislative sessions strengthening the spendthrift trust and corporate director-protection provisions and extending charging-order protection to closely held corporate shares — the statutory offer has been improving for two decades; (b) *Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions* (Ill. 2012) applying another state's public policy against a Nevada trust; (c) *Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker* (Alaska 2018) confirming that a state cannot legislate other states' courts out of jurisdiction; (d) 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)'s ten-year reachback, against which a two-year state seasoning period is no defence; (e) the federal CTA cycle to the March 2025 narrowing. The gap between what Nevada's statutes say and what they deliver against a determined out-of-state or federal creditor has widened, not narrowed, and every widening came from outside Nevada.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING in the narrow domestic asset-protection sense, and OPERATING for a US business that wants management-friendly corporate law and no state income tax.** Not the apex of a cross-border structure. Not bridging. The seasoning period is the feature most likely to be over-relied on and is the least useful of its features against the creditors that actually matter.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	Use it for a multi-member operating LLC or a closely held corporation with a US business, and for domestic asset protection where the settlor, beneficiaries and likely creditors are all in-state. Do not buy the seasoning period as a protection period, and do not buy Nevada corporate law for an entity likely to be litigated over. Book it to WEST. *Upward*: development of a substantial body of published business-court decisions would materially improve item 3. *Downward*: further adverse conflict-of-laws decisions in creditor home states; federal action on trust reporting.

The Scorecard — Wyoming

Items 2, 6 and 8 are federal and identical to Delaware's. See above.

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Common law. **The originator of the American limited liability company — Wyoming enacted the first LLC statute in the United States in 1977** — with charging-order exclusivity, a qualified spendthrift trust statute, a very long permitted perpetuities period, a developed private trust company regime, and a distinctive line in digital-asset entity legislation including provision for decentralised autonomous organisations to be organised as LLCs. Verify every statute and section with Wyoming counsel; the digital-asset legislation in particular is recent and evolving.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST, at the centre.** Identical to Delaware. No counterfactual exists.
3	**Court quality**	Competent, with a small bar and a thin body of published commercial decisions. **Wyoming is a good place to form an entity and a poor place to litigate about one** — which is the right profile for a single-purpose vehicle and the wrong profile for an operating company with governance complexity.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Sister-state judgments under Full Faith and Credit; foreign-country judgments under the state's recognition act and comity. The *Wacker*, *Huber* and *Sessions* line applies to Wyoming trusts as it does to every other state's.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Minimal: a registered agent, low annual fees, and a qualifying trustee for the spendthrift trust. Federal requirements apply independently.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	Federal. Not a CRS participant; FATCA IGAs with contested reciprocity. Verify.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	No public disclosure of LLC members at formation. Federally, the CTA position as narrowed in March 2025 applies. Subject to verification, a Wyoming LLC is among the least publicly disclosed vehicles available in any developed jurisdiction — and it provides no protection whatever against a court with personal jurisdiction over its owner, which is the whole argument of this chapter in one entity.
8	**Rail access**	Federal. Fedwire, CHIPS, SWIFT. No CIPS-side depth.
9	**Political stability**	High institutionally; a small state with a legislature that has been willing to legislate quickly in emerging areas, notably digital assets. Quick legislation is responsiveness and volatility at once, and the digital-asset provisions in particular are young and untested.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**STABLE on the core vehicle offering, IMPROVING on novel entity forms with correspondingly high uncertainty, and UNCHANGED on bloc position.** Evidence, dated: (a) the 1977 LLC statute, subsequently adopted in substance by every US state and by jurisdictions worldwide — **the single most successful legal export in this chapter, and it was never about secrecy**; (b) charging-order exclusivity, the qualified spendthrift trust act and the long perpetuities period, all stable for years; (c) recent digital-asset entity legislation, including DAO LLCs, creating a genuinely novel offering with no meaningful body of case law and real recognition risk outside Wyoming — verify before relying on any of it in a cross-border structure; (d) the federal CTA cycle to the March 2025 narrowing, increasing formation privacy; (e) 11 U.S.C. § 548(e) and the interstate conflict-of-laws line, limiting the trust offering as everywhere else. Wyoming's trajectory is the least degraded in Part IV on its own terms and the most irrelevant to this book's thesis, because a cheap private vehicle at the perimeter's centre is still at the perimeter's centre.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, in the specific sense of a low-cost single-purpose or holding vehicle inside a US structure — never the apex, never the reserve, never bridging.** A Wyoming LLC beneath a non-perimeter apex, holding a defined US asset or conducting a defined US activity, is a sound and inexpensive component. Asking it to be the top of a cross-border structure is the Chapter 6 failure with a low filing fee attached.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	Use it for cheap, clean, single-purpose US vehicles. Do not use it as an apex, do not rely on the digital-asset forms across borders without opinions, and do not mistake its formation privacy for protection. Book it to WEST. *Upward*: a body of published Wyoming commercial decisions, or foreign recognition of its novel entity forms, would improve items 3 and 1 respectively. *Downward*: federal reporting reversal restoring CTA obligations; adverse treatment of DAO LLCs in a significant forum; any tightening of charging-order doctrine at the interstate level.

Part IV closes here. The four chapters have measured the Western perimeter from its centre outward and found the same result each time: real capability, genuine institutional quality, narrowing differentiation, and an effective bloc count of exactly one. Part V turns to risk transfer, and to the one asset class in this book that is structurally difficult to seize because it is held against real third-party liabilities.

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel

admitted in the relevant state and with US federal tax and bankruptcy counsel, and with counsel in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs.

Part V — Risk Transfer

Chapter 14 . Bermuda

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. This chapter describes how an instrument works, what it costs, and where it fails. It is a map, not a permission. Insurance is a licensed activity and the tax treatment of premiums is jurisdiction-specific in every direction: confirm every element with qualified counsel in Bermuda, in the jurisdiction of every insured entity, and in the jurisdiction of every person who might be treated as controlling the insurer. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Part V is about risk transfer, and it opens with a warning against the reason most readers arrive here. Bermuda is not a perimeter diversification. It is inside the Western coordination perimeter on every one of the four questions Chapter 2 used to define perimeter membership: it exchanges information under the Common Reporting Standard, it implements FATF standards through a domestically legislated regime, it sits under the European Union's listing processes as a practical matter, and its banks clear United States dollars through United States correspondents. It is a British Overseas Territory. Its final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. The United Kingdom retains the constitutional capacity to legislate for it by Order in Council and has threatened to use it. On the measurement that Chapter 5 owns, Bermuda contributes nothing to N that the United Kingdom does not already contribute, and this book's base-case measurement folds it into the Western bloc for exactly that reason.

So the case for Bermuda is not a case about jurisdiction. It is a case about the legal character of the asset, and that distinction is why Chapter 2 created a separate bloc label for a single territory and then declined to give the label any arithmetic value. Here is the argument in one paragraph, because it is the whole chapter and should be visible before the machinery arrives.

An insurance reserve is not the insurer's money. It is a measured estimate of amounts the insurer owes to identified third parties — policyholders and ceding companies — who are not parties to any dispute between the insurer's shareholder and the shareholder's creditors. The reserve sits on the liability side of a balance sheet that a regulator examines, an actuary opines on, and an auditor signs. **A creditor of the shareholder does not have a claim on the reserve; he has a claim on the residual** — what is left after the third parties are paid and the regulator's capital requirement is met — and on a real book of business that residual is a small fraction of the assets and cannot be released without regulatory consent. Seizing the assets themselves does not extinguish the obligations they are held against. It converts a solvent insurer into an insolvent one, hands the wreckage to a supervisor with a statutory mandate to protect policyholders, and produces a run-off administered by somebody other than the seizing party.

That is protection arising from commercial substance rather than from opacity, which is the thesis of this book stated in a different vocabulary. Nothing about it depends on anybody not knowing that the captive exists. The captive is licensed, named on a public register of licensed insurers, filing audited statutory financial returns, subject to an economic substance declaration, and reporting under CRS. It passes the disclosure test in Chapter 3 not narrowly but comfortably, because **every fact that makes the reserve hard to reach is a fact the regulator requires to be published.**

Now the limits, immediately, because a chapter that sells the argument before bounding it is selling something.

The first limit is that the shares of the insurer are ordinary property. They can be charged, attached, and transferred like any other shares. What resists seizure is not ownership of the captive but immediate realisable value from the captive. **The protection is a discount and a delay, not a wall**, and Chapter 14's Worked Application puts numbers on both: on the constructed facts, a creditor reaching the shares of a captive with USD 16.1 million of assets can realise 7.58 per cent of that figure inside a year and about 27.45 per cent on a present-value basis over a normal run-off. That is a meaningful discount. It is not immunity, and any adviser who describes it as immunity has moved from this book's subject to a different one.

The second limit is CANON section 1's second axis. This is protection against *arbitrary action* — an abrupt administrative freeze, a de-risking decision, an expropriation without process — and against the pressure to settle that comes from having liquid assets in one reachable place. It is not an answer to a judgment that survived due process. A court with jurisdiction over the shareholder can order him to procure a distribution, and the fact that the BMA might refuse consent is a fact about the BMA, not a defence to contempt. Chapter 39 covers those who confuse the two.

The third limit is the one that connects this chapter to the next, and it is the most important. **The entire argument collapses if the insurance is not real.** If the reserve is an estimate against risks assumed from group companies only, there are no unrelated third parties whose impairment makes seizure awkward; there is only an intra-group bookkeeping entry that a court can disregard in a paragraph. If the reserve is invested in loans back to the insured group, the asset backing the third-party liability is a claim against the very balance sheet the creditor is already attacking, and the circularity destroys the argument on its own terms. If premiums were set by reference to a tax ceiling rather than to an exposure, the arrangement is not insurance and a court will say so. **The tax law's test for whether something is insurance and this book's test for whether a reserve resists seizure are pointing at the same underlying fact, which is whether unrelated parties have real claims on the pool.** Chapter 15 is the treatment of that fact, and it is not an appendix to this chapter. It is the load-bearing half.

One measurement, to close the Position with a number rather than a claim. Chapter 5 computed the designed structure's effective bloc count at 2.94 with Bermuda conservatively folded into the Western bloc, and at 3.3853 if Bermuda's distinct legal character is credited as a separate effective bloc. The difference in the storage law's surplus term, at `eta = 0.35`:

```
ln(2.941176) = 1.078810        eta ln N = 0.377584
ln(3.385332) = 1.219452        eta ln N = 0.426808
-------------------------------------------------
value of crediting the character argument in full     0.049225
```

Applied to Chapter 37's figure for the designed structure, `h = −0.1226` becomes `h = −0.0734`. **Granting the Bermuda argument its most generous possible reading moves the structure from clearly below the build threshold to slightly less clearly below it, and this book therefore does not grant it in the base case.** The captive earns its place in the architecture on the threat register of Chapter 4 — it is the primary answer to threat three, commercial and liability risk — and not on the concentration measurement. A reader who came here looking for a bloc will leave disappointed. A reader who came looking for a way to fund a real retained exposure inside a supervised vehicle whose assets are structurally awkward to grab will find the best available answer.

The Mechanism

Why the market is there at all

Bermuda's insurance market was not planned. It was built four times by capital that had nowhere faster to go, and the pattern of its construction explains the regulatory posture that followed.

The modern captive concept is conventionally traced to Fred Reiss, an American insurance broker who coined the term and moved his practice to Bermuda in 1962. The proposition was arithmetically simple and has not changed: a group with a stable, well-understood loss pattern is paying a commercial insurer to bear risk the group is in fact bearing itself, plus an expense load, a profit margin, and a cost of capital on capital the group could supply. Forming a licensed insurer to write the group's own predictable layer recovers the load and the margin, retains the investment income on the reserves, and — the part that matters more than the money — gives the group loss data it can act on.

The 1980s United States liability crisis produced the second wave: commercial excess liability capacity withdrew, and corporate buyers who could not purchase cover formed their own carriers in Bermuda, ACE in 1985 and XL in 1986. The 1992 Hurricane Andrew loss produced the third wave, the property-catastrophe reinsurers conventionally called the Class of 1993; the September 2001 losses produced the Class of 2001; and Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma in 2005 produced the Class of 2005. Readers who want the full rosters should take them from the trade press of the period; the pattern, not the membership list, is the point.

Bermuda's product is speed of capital formation under a regulator who understands the underlying business, and every one of the four waves was a response to a market dislocation elsewhere. That history produced a supervisor with two characteristics that are unusual together: genuine technical depth in insurance, and an institutional memory of being the place capital goes when it has to move in ninety days.

The regulator and the statute book

The Bermuda Monetary Authority was established under the **Bermuda Monetary Authority Act 1969** and supervises banking, investment business, trust business, corporate service providers, digital asset business and insurance. The core insurance statute is the **Insurance Act 1978**, which has been amended many times and should be read in its current consolidated form rather than as enacted.

The Act's central design decision, and the one that explains everything downstream, is that it classifies insurers by what they do and applies proportionate requirements to each class. General business runs from Class 1 through Class 4; long-term business runs from Class A through Class E; there are additional classes for special purpose insurers, for collateralised insurers, and for innovative business, the latter two added by amendments in 2018. In broad terms, the lower general business classes are captives — Class 1 is the single-parent pure captive writing only the risks of its owners and affiliates; Class 2 permits a limited proportion of unrelated business; Class 3 is the multi-owner and unrelated-business band — and Classes 3A, 3B and 4 are the commercial market, with Class 4 covering the large property-catastrophe and excess liability writers. The precise percentage thresholds separating Class 1 from Class 2 from Class 3, and the minimum

capital figures attaching to each, should be confirmed against the current Act and the BMA's published guidance rather than taken from any secondary source including this one.

Capital is set by the **Bermuda Solvency Capital Requirement**, a risk-based model producing an **Enhanced Capital Requirement** for the commercial classes, with a **Target Capital Level** set at 120 per cent of the ECR as a supervisory early-warning point. Commercial insurers file a **Commercial Insurer's Solvency Self Assessment**, the Bermuda equivalent of an own-risk and solvency assessment, and groups file a group solvency self-assessment. There is a published **Insurance Code of Conduct**, an approved auditor requirement, a loss reserve specialist opinion requirement for the classes where reserving judgement carries weight, and a requirement for a principal representative resident in Bermuda.

Three restrictions on getting money out matter more here than anything else in the statute. An insurer must maintain its minimum solvency margin and ECR continuously, not merely at the year end. A reduction in total statutory capital beyond a specified threshold requires prior BMA approval. A dividend beyond a specified proportion of total statutory capital and surplus requires an affidavit filed with the Authority before declaration. The thresholds commonly cited are fifteen per cent and twenty-five per cent respectively; they are in the amended Act and should be verified there. The structural point does not depend on the exact numbers: distributions out of a Bermuda insurer pass through a regulatory gate, and **a gate that exists to protect policyholders operates against a shareholder's creditor as a side effect of doing its actual job.**

Solvency II equivalence, and what Bermuda paid for it

The European Commission granted Bermuda full equivalence under the Solvency II Directive by **Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2016/309 of 26 November 2015**, effective from 1 January 2016, following advice from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. Equivalence was granted across the three areas the Directive provides for — the solvency assessment of reinsurance, group solvency calculation, and group supervision — and it is generally understood to exclude captives and special purpose insurers from its scope. That exclusion is not a footnote; it is the design.

What equivalence buys is that an EU cedant taking reinsurance from a Bermuda commercial reinsurer escapes the punitive collateral and capital treatment applied to a non-equivalent counterparty, and that a Bermuda-headquartered group can be supervised at group level by the BMA rather than scooped into supervision by an EU authority. For a Class 4 property-catastrophe reinsurer writing European business, those two consequences are the difference between a viable and an unviable balance sheet.

What Bermuda paid is a genuinely two-tier regime. **The commercial classes were given Solvency II-grade capital rules, governance requirements and public disclosure; the captive classes were deliberately kept out of scope so that the captive product would remain cheap.** This is the single most instructive regulatory fact about the jurisdiction, and it is regularly misread in both directions. It is misread by people who cite Bermuda's Solvency II equivalence as though it applied to their captive, which it does not. And it is misread by people who dismiss the captive regime as unsupervised, which is also wrong: a Class 1 captive files audited statutory financial statements, has an approved auditor, has a Bermuda principal representative, is subject to the Insurance Code of Conduct in proportionate form, and can have its licence conditioned, restricted or revoked.

The United States side of the same story is the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' qualified jurisdiction determination in 2015 and the later addition of Bermuda to the NAIC's list of reciprocal jurisdictions, following the amendments to the Credit for Reinsurance Model Law and Regulation that flowed from the 2017 United States-European Union covered agreement and the 2018 United States-United Kingdom covered agreement. The effect is a reduction and, for qualifying reinsurers, elimination of the collateral a United States cedant would otherwise be required to obtain from a non-United States reinsurer. The dates and the current status of Bermuda's reciprocal jurisdiction listing should be confirmed against NAIC publications.

Economic substance, and why it was not the binding constraint here

Bermuda enacted the **Economic Substance Act 2018** and the **Economic Substance Regulations 2018**, in force from 1 January 2019, in response to the European Union Code of Conduct Group's criterion on jurisdictions with no or only nominal corporate taxation. Entities carrying on a relevant activity — the list includes insurance, banking, fund management, financing and leasing, headquarters, shipping, distribution and service centre, intellectual property, and holding entity business — must be directed and managed in Bermuda, conduct core income-generating activities in Bermuda, and maintain adequate employees, expenditure and physical presence proportionate to the activity. Annual economic substance declarations are filed with the Registrar of Companies.

Bermuda was nonetheless added to the European Union's Annex I list of non-cooperative jurisdictions in March 2019 over a technical deficiency in the substance rules as they applied to collective investment vehicles, and removed within about two months once the point was addressed. The exact listing and delisting dates should be taken from the Council of the European Union's primary releases. The episode is worth remembering for the same reason Chapter 1 dwells on the British Virgin Islands sequence: a two-month listing is not a small event when it propagates into bank onboarding decisions that take six months to reverse.

For a licensed insurer, however, economic substance was not the binding constraint and it is important to say why. A licensed insurer already had to be directed and managed in Bermuda, hold board meetings there, appoint a resident principal representative, appoint an approved auditor and in most cases a loss reserve specialist, and file statutory returns — which is to say the insurance licensing regime imposed a higher substance bar than the economic substance regime before the economic substance regime existed. The entities for which the 2018 regime was a real change were pure holding companies, financing companies, and intellectual property companies. This matters to the argument of Part V because it means the Bermuda insurance product did not have to be rebuilt to survive the substance instrument. It already complied. Chapter 16 shows the contrary case, where the product was an empty company and the substance instrument was fatal to it.

Tax, and the end of the zero-rate proposition

Bermuda historically had no corporate income tax, no capital gains tax and no withholding tax, raising revenue through payroll tax, customs duty and company fees. The **Corporate Income Tax Act 2023**, enacted in December 2023, introduces a fifteen per cent corporate income tax applying to Bermuda constituent entities of multinational enterprise groups with consolidated annual revenue of at least EUR 750 million, for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2025. The threshold is the OECD Pillar Two threshold and the design is a response to it: revenue that would

otherwise be collected as a top-up tax by other jurisdictions under the global minimum tax rules is collected in Bermuda instead.

Two consequences for the reader of this book. The first is that a family captive of the size contemplated in the Worked Application is nowhere near the EUR 750 million threshold and is unaffected. The second is more general and belongs in the trajectory assessment: **Bermuda's zero corporate rate ended for large groups by Bermuda's own legislation, and that is a legitimising event rather than a degrading one for the asset this book is actually buying.** The asset is a supervised, internationally accepted insurance platform with a hard-to-reach reserve pool. That asset is worth more, not less, in a jurisdiction that taxes large multinationals at the internationally agreed rate, because the jurisdiction becomes harder to attack politically and its counterparties become easier to keep.

Bermuda participates in the Common Reporting Standard, having signed the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, with exchanges from 2017, and has a FATCA intergovernmental agreement with the United States generally described as a Model 2 arrangement — confirm. **There is no configuration of a Bermuda insurance vehicle that avoids information reporting,** and this chapter does not describe one, because a structure whose function depended on non-reporting would fail CANON section 1 before it failed anything else.

The seizure argument, taken apart

The Position stated the argument. Here is what it actually rests on, separated into the three independent legs, because at least one of them fails in most of the structures people try to build.

Leg one: technical provisions are liabilities and shareholders stand last. This is ordinary corporate and insolvency law, not an offshore feature. A shareholder's creditor takes the residual after the company's creditors, and the insurer's creditors include every policyholder and ceding company with an outstanding or incurred-but-not-reported claim. Whether Bermuda law confers an additional statutory *priority* on policyholders over general unsecured creditors in a winding up should be verified with Bermuda counsel; the argument here does not depend on it, because the ordinary subordination of equity to debt is sufficient. A priority would add protection against the insurer's *own* general creditors, which is a different risk.

Leg two: the regulator gates the exit. Distributions above the statutory thresholds require BMA approval or a filed affidavit; the minimum solvency margin and the ECR must be maintained continuously; the BMA has powers to direct, to restrict business, to require capital, and to petition for winding up. A creditor who has taken the shares owns a company whose cash cannot be extracted at will by anybody, including him. The gate does not exist to protect the shareholder from his creditors and would be improper if it did; it exists to protect policyholders, and it protects the reserve pool from every direction at once as a matter of ordinary supervision.

Leg three: the impaired parties are real, identifiable, and represented. This is the leg that distinguishes an insurance reserve from a special purpose vehicle with book liabilities to affiliates, and it is the leg that fails in the abusive structures Chapter 15 describes. If the insurer's policyholders are unrelated commercial parties, or if a material share of the book is assumed from unrelated cedants, then any process that impairs the reserve produces identifiable victims with their own claims, their own counsel, and a regulator with a statutory duty toward them. A court asked to make an order with that consequence is being asked to do something it will not do casually. If the insurer's only policyholders are companies in the same group as the judgment debtor, none

of that is true: the “third parties” are the debtor in another hat, and the argument evaporates.

The three legs together also explain why the argument gets *stronger* as the book gets longer in tail. Short-tail property risk settles quickly and the reserve turns over within a year. Long-tail liability risk — products, professional indemnity, employers’ liability — carries reserves for years, and the pool of committed assets is correspondingly larger and more durable. **The structural characteristic this chapter is describing is a function of reserve duration,** and a captive writing only short-tail property risk has much less of it than the marketing suggests.

The Specification

This section states what to build, in the order the decisions have to be made, with the constraint attached to each. It assumes the group in question has real risk. If it does not, the correct number of captives is zero and the rest of this section is a way of spending money.

Step 1 — establish that there is a retained exposure to fund

The threshold question is not “would a captive save tax.” It is: is the group paying a commercial market to carry risk the group is in fact carrying itself, or is it retaining exposure unfunded? Either condition justifies a captive; neither, and there is nothing to insure.

The diagnostic is the group’s own loss history over at least five years, by line, with development. High frequency and low severity — motor fleet, cargo, attritional employer’s liability, low-limit product recall — is a candidate for retention, because the group can predict it. Low frequency and catastrophic severity is a candidate for purchase, because the group cannot predict it and has not the capital to bear it. **The captive’s job is the predictable working layer, and the commercial market’s job is the tail; a structure that reverses this has misunderstood what insurance is for.**

Step 2 — choose the class and the licence

CLASS	BROAD CHARACTER	TYPICAL USE
Class 1	single-parent pure captive, related risks only	family or group working layer
Class 2	mainly related risks, limited unrelated proportion permitted	group captive with some third-party
Class 3	multi-owner / substantial unrelated business band	association and agency captives
Class 3A	small commercial insurer	commercial market
Class 3B	larger commercial insurer	commercial market
Class 4	large excess liability and property catastrophe writers	commercial market
SPI	special purpose insurer, fully collateralised, limited recourse	ILS, cat bonds (Ch 15)

```
    ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
    Indicative only. Percentage thresholds, minimum capital, and the
    collateralised and innovative classes added in 2018 must be confirmed
    against the current Insurance Act 1978 and BMA guidance.
```

The class determines the capital, the filing burden, the audit requirement, and whether a loss reserve specialist opinion is required. Choose the class the business actually occupies rather than the cheapest class the business can be argued into, because a licence obtained on a characterisation that later fails is worse than a more expensive licence obtained honestly.

Step 3 — capitalise for the risk, not for the minimum

The statutory minimum is a floor set by the class. The operative constraint is the ECR or, for captive classes, the applicable solvency margin, plus a buffer that keeps the insurer above its Target Capital Level through a bad year. A captive capitalised at its statutory minimum will need a capital call in its first adverse development year, and that call arrives at the worst possible time for the group. The working rule used in this book's constructed cases: capitalise so the insurer sits at or above 130 per cent of ECR after absorbing a one-in-ten-year loss year at the retained layer. That is a judgement, not a standard, and an actuary should set it.

Step 4 — decide fronting

Many risks cannot lawfully be insured directly by a non-admitted foreign insurer: compulsory motor and employers' liability cover in most jurisdictions must be written by a locally admitted carrier, and many countries prohibit or heavily tax non-admitted insurance generally. The answer is a fronting arrangement — a locally licensed insurer issues the policy and reinsures all or most of it to the captive, holding collateral for the ceded balances. Fronting costs money and introduces a counterparty: the fee is a percentage of premium, and the collateral requirement, usually a letter of credit or a funds-withheld arrangement, consumes group credit capacity. **Fronting converts a legal impossibility into a cost and a counterparty exposure**, and both must be priced before the captive is formed rather than discovered afterwards. Constructed illustrative range, not a quotation: fronting fees of five to twelve per cent of ceded premium, with collateral at or above one hundred per cent of ceded reserves.

Step 5 — reinsure the tail out

A captive should almost never be the group's last line. Excess of loss reinsurance above the retained layer, and aggregate stop-loss protection on the retained layer in total, are the two purchases that turn an unbounded exposure into a bounded one. They also do something that matters to the argument of this chapter: buying reinsurance from unrelated commercial reinsurers creates a second population of unrelated parties with financial relationships to the captive, which strengthens the character of the vehicle as a genuine market participant.

Step 6 — price actuarially and document the pricing

Premiums must be supported by an actuarial analysis performed before the policy incepts, using the group's own loss development where credible and industry benchmarks where it is not, with

explicit expense and risk loads. The file must answer the question every tax authority in every insured jurisdiction will ask: **would an unrelated commercial insurer have written this cover at this price?** Chapter 15 develops it into a scored test, because it is the single question on which the structure stands or falls in several legal systems at once.

Step 7 — governance in Bermuda, and meaning it

```
Principal representative  resident in Bermuda; statutory reporting duties
Board                     majority of meetings held in Bermuda, minuted,
                           with papers circulated in advance; genuine
                           deliberation on underwriting and reserving
Approved auditor         BMA-approved; audited statutory financial return
Loss reserve specialist    opinion where the class requires it
Insurance manager         a licensed Bermuda insurance manager providing
                           day-to-day administration
Registered office          in Bermuda
ES declaration             annual, to the Registrar of Companies
```

The board minutes are the artefact that carries the most weight in the largest number of future proceedings, and they are usually the worst-prepared document in the file. Underwriting decisions, reserving decisions, and investment decisions should be visibly taken by the board on the basis of papers, in Bermuda. **Minutes that record a decision without recording the analysis are evidence that the decision was taken somewhere else.**

Step 8 — hold the captive directly from the apex

The captive is held directly by the DIFC Foundation, not through the ADGM holding company. Chapter 7 gave the reason; in insurance terms, a regulator assessing a licence application or a change of control wants a short, legible chain to the ultimate beneficial owner. An intermediate holding company buys no ring-fencing that matters — the captive's own limited liability already provides it — and costs a conversation about who controls the insurer in a process where that conversation is expensive.

Step 9 — what the captive must not do

- **It must not lend to the insured group.** The reserve pool is held against liabilities to third parties; investing it in claims on the group defeats both the prudential purpose and the structural argument, and in the tax cases it is the single most common adverse fact.
- It must not become the group's treasury, cash pool, or foreign exchange desk.
- It must not hold the group's general investment portfolio. Its investments should be liquid and duration-matched to its liabilities, which is a much narrower mandate than "invest the family's money."
- It must not write coverage nobody would buy in a real market at a price nobody would pay.
- It must not be run as a profit centre whose profit comes from not paying claims.

Step 10 — the annual file

Assembled every year and retained: actuarial pricing report; policy wordings; loss runs and development triangles; claims register with paid and outstanding amounts; reinsurance contracts and evidence of premium paid; audited statutory financial return; loss reserve specialist opinion where applicable; board minutes; economic substance declaration; CRS classification and returns; transfer pricing documentation on the premium flows; and the group's analysis of why each insured entity's premium is deductible in its own jurisdiction.

Constructed annual cost, consistent with the budget in Chapter 3:

CONSTRUCTED ANNUAL RUNNING COST, BERMUDA CAPTIVE	USD / YEAR
Insurance manager (administration, statutory filings)	52,000
Approved auditor	34,000
Actuarial: pricing and loss reserve opinion	28,000
BMA fees and registered office	11,000
Independent Bermuda-resident directors (two)	15,000
SUBTOTAL, recurring	140,000
Fronting fees and collateral cost	variable, Step 4

CONSTRUCTED. Illustrative budget, not a quotation. Formation and licensing costs are additional and fall in the first year.

At USD 140,000 of annual maintenance the captive is the most expensive single line in the architecture's cost base, and it must be justified by a retained exposure large enough that the recovered expense load and margin exceed it. On a working layer with a commercial market premium below roughly USD 1 million, that arithmetic usually fails and the honest answer is to keep buying insurance.

The Failure Modes

1. Buying Bermuda as a perimeter diversification. It is not one, and this chapter opened by saying so. A structure that moved assets from Jersey to Bermuda and recorded an improvement in resilience has recorded nothing. Chapter 5's arithmetic is indifferent to the move.

2. Treating the reserve argument as a defence to a judgment. It is a defence to nothing. It raises the cost and lowers the speed of realisation for a creditor who has already won. Against a court with jurisdiction over the shareholder, ordering the shareholder to act, the relevant authority is Chapter 39 and the relevant precedents are the contempt cases in Chapter 1, where the impossibility defence collapsed and principals went to prison.

3. The single-parent captive with no unrelated risk, sold as though it had the character argument. Leg three of the Mechanism fails outright. Such a captive may still be entirely legitimate and entirely correct on tax if it satisfies the risk distribution tests of Chapter 15 through enough independent exposure units among the group's own subsidiaries — *Humana* and the 2002 revenue rulings are the authority — but it does not carry the seizure-resistance characteristic to anything like the same degree.

4. Investing the reserve pool in loans to the insured group. This is the pathology that runs through the adverse micro-captive decisions and it has two separate consequences. On tax, it is strong evidence that the arrangement is not insurance. On the structure, it is fatal to the whole argument of this chapter: the assets held against third-party liabilities are receivables from the party under attack, which means the reserve is not a shield but an additional exposure to the same failure.

5. Thin capitalisation and the regulatory intervention that follows. A captive that breaches its solvency margin does not fail quietly: the BMA can restrict its business, direct it, or petition to wind it up, and any of those is a public event arriving at the same moment as whatever caused it. **The regulatory intervention is not a consequence of the loss; it is a second, correlated loss, and it lands on the group's reputation with every counterparty simultaneously.**

6. Fronting counterparty and collateral failure. If the fronting carrier fails, the captive's obligations to it remain and the collateral is caught in an insolvency. If the carrier raises its collateral requirement — which it will do if the captive's credit deteriorates or its own capital tightens — the group faces an unscheduled letter of credit call. Both are counterparty exposures and neither is usually modelled.

7. Reserve inadequacy on long-tail lines. What makes long-tail business structurally useful for this chapter's argument is what makes it dangerous to reserve: adverse development on a products liability book can run for a decade. The mitigations are conservative initial reserving, an independent actuarial opinion the board does not lean on, and aggregate stop-loss protection. **The failure mode is not reserving badly; it is reserving optimistically for years and discovering it once, all at once.**

8. Tax residence and permanent establishment of the captive elsewhere. If the captive is in substance managed from the group's home jurisdiction, that jurisdiction may treat it as resident there and the entire tax rationale reverses. Controlled foreign company rules may attribute the captive's income regardless of where it is managed, and diverted-profits and equivalent anti-avoidance provisions add a further layer. **Bermuda's substance requirements protect against Bermuda's own problem; they do nothing about the other jurisdictions' residence tests, which are separate and stricter.**

9. Premium deductibility, jurisdiction by jurisdiction. Premiums paid by the Thai operating company, the UAE trading company and the United Kingdom company fall to be tested under three bodies of law with three attitudes to related-party insurance and three transfer pricing regimes. Deductibility in one is not deductibility in another, and each payer must be analysed separately before the first policy incepts.

10. Premium taxes and non-admitted insurance rules. The United States imposes a federal excise tax on premiums paid to foreign insurers under **IRC section 4371** — commonly described as four per cent on casualty and indemnity premiums and one per cent on reinsurance and life, and to be confirmed against the current Code and the applicable treaty position. Many jurisdictions prohibit non-admitted insurance outright or tax it heavily. Every premium flow crosses a border, and every border has a rule about insurance premiums crossing it.

11. The run-off trap. A captive with long-tail reserves cannot simply be closed. Commuting the liabilities needs a counterparty willing to assume them at a price; running off means maintaining the licence, auditor, actuary and capital for as long as claims develop. Bermuda offers portfolio transfer and scheme-based finality mechanisms, to be investigated before formation rather than

after. **Plan the exit at formation**, because the cost of a captive is not its annual running cost but its annual running cost times the number of years it takes to stop.

12. Treating the strained job vector as a defect. Chapter 6 scored the Bermuda captive at 2.1739 on the job-purity diagnostic and flagged it strained. That is inherent: a captive underwrites, which is a licensed operating activity, and holds reserves, which is a holding activity. The strain is justified in writing rather than engineered away.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. The carried case of SPINE section 6: a dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs resident in three jurisdictions, one of them under forced heirship; manufacturing operations in Thailand, a trading company in the UAE, intellectual property, London commercial real estate converted to a REIT position under Chapter 29, and a listed securities portfolio.

The exposure

The manufacturing operation produces industrial components sold into eleven countries. Its insurable risk profile, on the constructed facts:

LINE	ANNUAL EXPOSURE	COMMERCIAL PREMIUM PAID	GROUP 5-YEAR AVERAGE LOSS
Property and BI, Thailand	180,000,000	1,420,000	310,000
Product liability	limits-based	1,680,000	890,000
Marine cargo	62,000,000	340,000	190,000
Employers' liability	1,900 staff	410,000	240,000
Trade credit, UAE co	48,000,000	520,000	280,000
TOTAL		4,370,000	1,910,000

CONSTRUCTED. USD.

The group pays USD 4,370,000 a year against a five-year average loss of USD 1,910,000. The gap of USD 2,460,000 is the commercial market's expense load, risk load, profit margin and cost of capital. Part of it is a fair price for capacity the group could not otherwise obtain; the question is how much of it is a fair price for risk the group is in fact carrying.

The retention decision

The catastrophe layers stay in the commercial market: a single Thai property loss can exceed the group's capacity to absorb it and the product liability tail can exceed it by more. The captive takes the working layer:

RETAINED IN CAPTIVE	ANNUAL PREMIUM TO CAPTIVE
Property and BI, first 2,000,000 each loss	620,000

Product liability, first 1,000,000 each claim, aggregate 4,000,000	1,240,000
Marine cargo, first 250,000 each loss	240,000
Employers' liability, fronted, first 500,000	290,000
Trade credit, first 1,000,000 aggregate	310,000
GROSS PREMIUM WRITTEN	2,700,000
less excess of loss and aggregate stop-loss ceded	(410,000)
NET PREMIUM	2,290,000
Expected net loss (actuarial, constructed)	1,560,000
Net loss ratio	68.12%
Commercial premium retained in the commercial market (catastrophe layers above the retentions)	1,670,000

CONSTRUCTED. USD.

Check the arithmetic that justifies the exercise. The group previously paid 4,370,000. It now pays 1,670,000 to the commercial market and 2,700,000 to its own captive, of which 410,000 leaves for reinsurance and 1,560,000 is expected to be paid out in claims. Running cost is 140,000. Expected retained margin before investment income:

2,700,000 − 410,000 − 1,560,000 − 140,000 = 590,000

Expressed against the previous commercial spend, 590,000 / 4,370,000 = **13.50 per cent** of the prior premium recovered into the group, before investment income on the reserves and before any tax consequence in any jurisdiction. That is a real number and it is not a spectacular one. **A captive is a fifteen-per-cent-of-premium proposition on a good day, and any projection above that is either taking more risk than it admits or not paying claims.**

The captive as licensed

Entity	a Bermuda company limited by shares, licensed under the Insurance Act 1978
Class	Class 2 — predominantly related risk, with an unrelated element from the two joint-venture distributors described below (class confirmation with Bermuda counsel required)
Owner	held directly by the DIFC Foundation (Ch 7)
Board	five: two Bermuda-resident independents including the chair of the audit and reserving committee; the group finance director; the group risk manager; one heir
Manager	a licensed Bermuda insurance manager
Auditor	BMA-approved; audited statutory financial return
Actuary	independent pricing report annually; loss reserve specialist opinion
Reinsurance	excess of loss and aggregate stop-loss placed with three unrelated rated commercial reinsurers
Fronting	employers' liability in Thailand fronted by a Thai

```
                admitted carrier, reinsured to the captive, collateralised
Investments       investment-grade fixed income, duration-matched, no
                  related-party exposure of any kind
```

The unrelated element: the group sells through two joint-venture distributors in which it holds minority stakes, and the captive writes their product liability on the same terms and at the same price as the group's own. It exists because it is commercially sensible rather than because it improves a ratio — a distinction Chapter 15 argues is the only one that matters.

The balance sheet at steady state

By year seven the product liability reserves have built to their steady state. The constructed statutory balance sheet:

CONSTRUCTED BALANCE SHEET, YEAR 7	USD
Cash and admitted investments	14,200,000
Reinsurance recoverable on paid and unpaid losses	1,600,000
Premiums receivable	300,000
TOTAL ASSETS	16,100,000
Loss and loss adjustment expense reserves, gross	8,900,000
Unearned premium reserve	1,500,000
Other liabilities and accruals	400,000
TOTAL LIABILITIES	10,800,000
TOTAL STATUTORY CAPITAL AND SURPLUS	5,300,000
Enhanced Capital Requirement (constructed)	3,400,000
Target Capital Level, 120% of ECR	4,080,000
Surplus above Target Capital Level	1,220,000

CONSTRUCTED. Illustrative only. Solvency measures for the applicable class must be computed under the current BMA framework.

The seizure exhibit — the argument as a number

Assume, on the constructed facts, an adverse party obtains an order reaching the DIFC Foundation's shares in the captive. What does the order actually deliver?

ASSET DISPOSITION	USD	% OF ASSETS
Committed to third-party liabilities	10,800,000	67.08%
Locked by the regulatory capital requirement (Target Capital Level)	4,080,000	25.34%
Distributable surplus above TCL	1,220,000	7.58%

```
TOTAL                                              16,100,000       100.00%
```

Sixty-seven per cent of the balance sheet belongs, in substance and in law, to somebody other than the shareholder; a further twenty-five per cent cannot leave without the regulator's consent; and the amount realisable inside a year is 7.58 per cent of the assets.

Now the honest half, because a chapter that stopped at the table above would be doing what this book criticises. The creditor who takes the shares owns the run-off. Over roughly six years the reserves develop and settle. If they prove eight per cent redundant — a plausible outcome on a conservatively reserved book, and equally plausibly they prove deficient — the eventual value to the shareholder is:

```
Total statutory capital and surplus                    5,300,000
Reserve redundancy at 8% of 8,900,000                    712,000
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Eventual realisable value                              6,012,000
Discounted at 8% over an average 4-year lag
  6,012,000 / 1.08^4 = 6,012,000 / 1.360489            4,418,970
-------------------------------------------------------------------
As a share of total assets                                27.45%
Realisable within one year                                 7.58%
-------------------------------------------------------------------
```

The structural characteristic is worth a discount from 100 per cent of assets to roughly 27 per cent on a present-value basis, and a delay of years on all but 7.58 per cent of it. **That is the entire claim of this chapter, stated as a number, and it is a discount rather than a wall.**

Against an adversary seeking rapid, cheap, uncontested realisation — which describes most arbitrary administrative action and much opportunistic litigation — a 72.55 per cent haircut and a six-year timetable is a substantial deterrent. Against a well-resourced judgment creditor with time, it is a cost of collection. Describe it to the principal in those terms and no others.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

- The captive appears on the BMA's published register of licensed insurers, and its owner is the DIFC Foundation, whose particulars are filed with the DIFC Registrar and whose charter is public. Disclosure changes nothing.
- Its audited statutory financial return, actuarial opinion and economic substance declaration are filed as a matter of course. Disclosure changes nothing.
- The premium flows are documented, actuarially supported, and covered by transfer pricing documentation in each paying jurisdiction. Disclosure invites examination, and the file is built to survive examination, which is the point.
- CRS reporting occurs by design.
- The seizure characteristic in the exhibit above depends on facts that are *published by regulatory requirement*: the reserves, the capital requirement, and the surplus. **The mechanism works better the more completely it is disclosed, because its force comes from third parties being visibly real.**

The structure passes, and it passes in a stronger form than most: this is one of the few arrangements in the book whose protective characteristic is *increased* by publication.

What it did not solve

- It did not change N. Crediting Bermuda in full is worth 0.0492 in h, taking the designed structure from -0.1226 to -0.0734 and leaving it below the build threshold.
- It did not address threat one except marginally, through the character argument.
- It costs USD 140,000 a year against an expected retained margin of USD 590,000: positive expectancy, not a comfortable one, and a bad loss year makes it negative.
- It creates three new tax questions — captive residence, premium deductibility in three jurisdictions, and transfer pricing on the premium — where there was one.
- It does not answer a judgment. Chapter 39.

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation with Bermuda counsel and against primary sources rather than cited, gathered for Appendix D:

1. Current consolidated text of the Insurance Act 1978: class definitions, the percentage thresholds separating Classes 1, 2 and 3, minimum capital by class, the collateralised and innovative insurer classes introduced in 2018, and whether the constructed Class 2 assignment in the Worked Application is correct on a book with a minority unrelated element.
2. Section numbers and exact thresholds for the restriction on reduction of total statutory capital and for the affidavit requirement on dividends exceeding a proportion of total statutory capital and surplus.
3. Whether Bermuda insolvency law confers a statutory priority on policyholders over general unsecured creditors in the winding up of an insurer, and the terms of any such priority.
4. The scope of Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2016/309 of 26 November 2015: the three areas of equivalence, the effective date, and the precise treatment of captives and special purpose insurers within or outside its scope.
5. Bermuda's current status on the NAIC list of qualified jurisdictions and list of reciprocal jurisdictions, and the dates of each determination.
6. Exact dates of Bermuda's addition to and removal from the European Union's Annex I in 2019, and the stated grounds, from Council of the European Union primary releases.
7. Current text of the Economic Substance Act 2018 and Regulations, the relevant activity definitions, and the treatment of insurance and pure equity holding entities.
8. Corporate Income Tax Act 2023: in-scope entity definition, the EUR 750 million threshold test, the first fiscal year of application, and the status of any qualified refundable tax credit.
9. Bermuda's FATCA intergovernmental agreement model and current CRS participating jurisdiction status and reporting deadlines.
10. Bermuda's beneficial ownership regime: what is filed, with whom, who may access it, and the current position on the United Kingdom Overseas Territories public register commitment under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 following the Court of Justice of the European Union's November 2022 decision in *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers*.

11. Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1958 (Bermuda): the designated jurisdictions, and the common-law route for judgments outside it.
12. Loss reserve specialist opinion requirements by class, and the approved auditor regime.
13. Portfolio transfer, commutation and scheme-based finality mechanisms available in run-off.
14. IRC section 4371 rates and the availability of treaty-based exemption for the relevant payers.

The Scorecard — Bermuda

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	English common law. British Overseas Territory under the Bermuda Constitution Order 1968, with an internally self-governing legislature. Supreme Court of Bermuda with a commercial jurisdiction, Court of Appeal for Bermuda, and final appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. English authority is persuasive and heavily used; Bermuda has a substantial body of its own insurance and companies jurisprudence.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**W-LITE.** Inside the Western perimeter on all four of Chapter 2's tests — CRS exchange, FATF-standard implementation, exposure to EU listing processes, and USD correspondent dependency. The W-LITE label records a distinct legal *product*, not a distinct perimeter: insurance and reinsurance reserves held against real third-party liabilities. Chapter 5's base case conservatively folds Bermuda into WEST and credits it with nothing.

#	Item	Assessment
3	**Court quality**	High. Long-established common-law bench, published reasoned judgments, deep insurance and reinsurance case law, and a Privy Council apex whose decisions bind — demonstrated in *Attorney General for Bermuda v Ferguson* [2022] UKPC 5. The reinsurance and companies bar is genuinely specialist. Small jurisdiction; conflicts can be an issue in large disputes.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Common-law recognition of foreign money judgments on ordinary principles, plus a statutory reciprocal enforcement regime under the Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1958 covering designated jurisdictions — the designation list must be checked, Register item 11. There is no basis for treating Bermuda as a non-recognition jurisdiction and this book does not do so. Where a foreign order would impair a licensed insurer's ability to meet policyholder obligations, the regulator's position is a distinct and material factor, but it is not a recognition rule.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Real, and higher for insurers than the economic substance regime requires. Economic Substance Act 2018 and Regulations from 1 January 2019: directed and managed locally, core income-generating activities locally, adequate people, premises and expenditure, annual declaration. On top of that, insurance licensing requires a Bermuda principal representative, an approved auditor, board governance in Bermuda, statutory financial returns, and in the relevant classes a loss reserve specialist opinion. **The licensing bar sits above the substance bar, which is why the 2018 instrument did not damage this product.**
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	CRS participating jurisdiction; Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement signatory; exchanges from 2017. FATCA intergovernmental agreement with the United States, generally described as Model 2 — confirm, Register item 9. There is no non-reporting configuration of a Bermuda insurance vehicle.

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Beneficial ownership information is collected and maintained and has been for decades through the BMA's long-standing vetting of shareholders and the Registrar's regime; it is not publicly searchable. The United Kingdom's Overseas Territories public register commitment under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 has slipped repeatedly and moved toward legitimate-interest access following the CJEU's November 2022 decision in *WM and Sovim SA*. Current position: Register item 10. **Plan on competent authorities having full access permanently and on public access being an open question.**
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT. USD-centric throughout; the Bermuda dollar is pegged one-to-one to the United States dollar and the banking system's correspondent relationships are American. No CIPS relevance. This is a concentration, and it is one of the reasons Bermuda cannot carry the bridging job — Chapters 31 and 32.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	High. Stable parliamentary system, long institutional continuity, no history of expropriation, sophisticated civil service in the financial sector. The structural qualification is constitutional rather than political: the United Kingdom retains capacity to legislate for the territory by Order in Council and has held that instrument over the beneficial-ownership question. Small-jurisdiction concentration in a single industry is a real economic risk.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Stable to improving on institutional quality; the zero-tax proposition is over and that is not the same thing.** Evidence: Solvency II full equivalence by Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2016/309 from 1 January 2016; NAIC qualified jurisdiction 2015 and subsequent reciprocal jurisdiction listing; Economic Substance Act 2018 in force 2019; EU Annex I listing March 2019 and removal within approximately two months; CRS from 2017; and the Corporate Income Tax Act 2023 introducing a 15 per cent tax on large multinational groups from fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2025. Read together, these are the profile of a jurisdiction converting itself from a tax feature into a regulated industry, on its own legislation. **The asset this book buys in Bermuda is a supervised risk-transfer platform with hard-to-reach reserves; that asset is strengthened by each of these events, not weakened.** The genuine downside risks are: single-industry economic concentration; UK constitutional intervention on transparency; loss or narrowing of Solvency II equivalence in a future review; and USD correspondent concentration.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, with a HOLDING consequence.** The captive underwrites, which is a licensed operating activity, and holds reserves, which is a holding activity — the strained 2.1739 vector Chapter 6 recorded. The strain is inherent to what a captive is and is justified in writing rather than fixed. **It is not a bridging jurisdiction and must never be asked to carry settlement**, and it is not the apex: the apex is the DIFC Foundation, Chapter 7.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it, for exactly one job: funding a real retained exposure inside a supervised vehicle whose reserve pool is structurally awkward to realise.** Do not use it as a perimeter diversification, a treasury, an investment holding company, or an answer to a judgment. The economics require a retained working layer generating enough recovered load to clear USD 140,000 of annual cost, which on the constructed facts means a prior commercial spend meaningfully above USD 1 million. What would change the verdict: loss of Solvency II equivalence or NAIC reciprocal status, degrading the commercial market and with it the ecosystem the captive depends on; a UK Order in Council forcing changes the market could not absorb; a tightening of premium deductibility or CFC attribution in the payer jurisdictions, removing the tax-neutral premise without removing the cost; or evidence that the retained layer is too small to support the structure, the commonest reason to close one. Review annually against items 5 and 10.

Chapter 15 takes the load-bearing half of this chapter's argument — that the protective character of a reserve depends entirely on the insurance being real — and asks what "real" means. It does so through the clearest available example of a legitimate structure destroyed by the people using it for the wrong purpose.

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Insurance is a licensed activity in every jurisdiction mentioned. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in Bermuda and in the jurisdiction of every insured entity, every payer of premium, and every person who might be treated as controlling the insurer.

Chapter 15 . Captives and Sidecars

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. This chapter describes how instruments work, what they cost, and how a large number of people using them lost. It is a map, not a permission. The tax analysis of any captive arrangement is fact-specific, jurisdiction-specific, and contested; confirm every element with qualified counsel and a credentialed actuary in each relevant jurisdiction. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such. Case citations should be checked against the official reports before being relied on or reproduced.

The Position

Chapter 14 rested a structural argument on a single load-bearing fact: that an insurance reserve is money owed to unrelated third parties, and that this makes it awkward to reach without impairing people who have nothing to do with the dispute. That argument is exactly as strong as the insurance is real, and not one increment stronger.

This chapter is about the difference between real and unreal. It is the more useful of the two chapters, because the question it answers — *does this arrangement actually transfer risk* — has been litigated for eighty years in one legal system with unusual thoroughness, and the answers are public, reasoned, and largely consistent. **Almost everything a structurer needs to know about whether a risk-transfer vehicle will survive contact with an adversary has already been decided by the United States Tax Court** — in cases that were about tax and are useful for reasons that have nothing to do with tax.

The reason those cases are useful outside their own subject is that the tax test and the structural test are the same test wearing different clothes. A court asking whether an arrangement is insurance for tax purposes is asking whether risk genuinely moved from one balance sheet to another and was genuinely spread across a pool. A court asked to disregard a reserve, or a regulator asked whether a licence was obtained on a false premise, or a creditor's counsel asked whether a captive is a real insurer or a wallet with a licence, is asking the same question with different consequences attached. **A structure that fails the tax test will fail the seizure test, the licensing test, and the credibility test, and it will fail them in that order and quickly.**

The chapter therefore does something the genre usually avoids. It treats the destruction of the abusive micro-captive industry as its central case study rather than as a footnote or a warning label. Between roughly 2005 and 2015 a legitimate provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code — **section 831(b)**, an elective alternative tax regime enacted for genuinely small insurance companies — was industrialised into a mass-market tax product. Between 2015 and 2025 it was systematically dismantled: by statute, by administrative reporting requirements, by a near unbroken run of taxpayer defeats in the Tax Court, and finally by regulation. The industry that built it is largely gone. **The provision survived; the product died**; and the collateral damage fell on people running small captives correctly, who now carry a reporting obligation and a presumption of suspicion they did not earn.

That is the clearest available instance of a phenomenon this book keeps returning to. A structure whose only defence is that nobody has examined it will be examined. The examination will be provoked by the least careful users, and it will not distinguish between them and the careful ones.

The design response is not to be quieter; it is to build the thing so that examination confirms it — which is CANON section 1, arrived at from the other end.

The chapter also covers the part of the risk-transfer world that got this right by construction. Insurance-linked securities and reinsurance sidecars are fully collateralised, investor-funded, audited, rated where rating is relevant, and documented to a standard that most private arrangements never approach. They are the most transparent corner of the reinsurance market and they are among the fastest growing. **That correlation is not a coincidence: capital from unrelated investors will only enter a risk pool it can inspect, and the inspection requirement built an asset class.**

The practical output of this chapter is a rubric. Five requirements, each with an evidentiary test, each with a threshold below which the arrangement should not be built:

```
1  RISK SHIFTING          an insured's loss becomes the insurer's loss,
                          with no offsetting obligation running back
2  RISK DISTRIBUTION      enough independent exposure units that the law
                          of large numbers actually operates
3  ACTUARIAL PRICING      the premium is derived from the exposure, and
                         an unrelated insurer would write it at that price
4  CLAIMS PAID           claims are notified, adjusted, and paid, and the
                          paid ratio is consistent with the pricing
5  INSURER CONDUCT        capital adequate, investments liquid and
                          unrelated, contracts real, regulator engaged
```

An arrangement that clears all five is durable across tax law, insurance regulation, and the seizure analysis of Chapter 14 simultaneously. An arrangement that fails any one of them is not a weaker version of the same thing. **It is a different thing wearing an insurance policy, and every tribunal that has looked at one has said so.**

The Mechanism

What insurance is, as a matter of decided law

There is no statutory definition of insurance in the United States Internal Revenue Code. The concept comes from case law, and the anchor is the Supreme Court's decision in *Helvering v. Le Gierse* (1941), which held that insurance requires both **risk shifting** and **risk distribution**. Those two words carry the whole subject and they are routinely confused.

Risk shifting means the economic consequence of a loss moves from the insured to the insurer. It is defeated by anything that returns the loss to the insured: a guarantee from the insured to the insurer, a loan-back arrangement that makes the insurer's solvency depend on the insured, a premium adjustment mechanism that recovers claims paid, or a parental capital commitment that functions as a promise to reimburse.

Risk distribution means the insurer has pooled enough independent exposures that the law of large numbers reduces the variance of its aggregate outcome. This is a statistical requirement, not a contractual one, and it is the requirement that most failed structures fail. Distribution cannot

be created by wording. It requires either a sufficient number of unrelated insureds, or a sufficient number of statistically independent exposure units within a related group.

The Tax Court's working formulation, developed in cases including *AMERCO, Inc. v. Commissioner* (1991) and *Harper Group v. Commissioner* (1991) and applied ever since, asks four questions: whether the arrangement involves insurance risk as distinct from investment or business risk; whether there is risk shifting; whether there is risk distribution; and whether the arrangement conforms to commonly accepted notions of insurance. The fourth is the catch-all and it does real work: it is where a court puts the observation that no unrelated party would have bought this cover, that the "insurer" had no claims department, or that the policy wording was assembled from templates for a business the insured does not operate.

The distribution cases, and what they permit

The taxpayer-favourable law is substantial and it is worth knowing precisely, because a great deal of commentary implies that related-party insurance is inherently suspect. It is not.

Humana Inc. v. Commissioner (6th Cir. 1989) held that premiums paid by operating subsidiaries to a sister captive were deductible — the brother-sister structure — while premiums paid by the parent for its own risks were not, on the reasoning that the parent's payment to its own subsidiary did not shift risk outside the economic family in the same way. The brother-sister insight has governed captive design ever since.

The Internal Revenue Service then published three safe harbours on the same day in 2002:

Rev. Rul. 2002-89	parent + captive. Unrelated business at roughly half of premiums and risk = insurance; at roughly ten per cent = not insurance.
Rev. Rul. 2002-90	brother-sister. Twelve operating subsidiaries, each contributing between five and fifteen per cent of the captive's total risk = risk distribution.
Rev. Rul. 2002-91	group captive. Seven or more unrelated members, none contributing a disproportionate share = insurance.

Rev. Rul. 2005-40 added the negative case: a small number of insureds does not achieve risk distribution merely because each has many individual exposures, and on the facts addressed there, disregarded single-member entities did not count as separate insureds. The courts have since taken a more functional view of that last point — *Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Commissioner* (2014) and *Securitas Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner* (2014) both found adequate distribution in structures the Service had challenged — and *R.V.I. Guaranty Co. v. Commissioner* (2015) held that residual value insurance was insurance in the commonly accepted sense.

The pattern in the taxpayer wins is consistent and it is the pattern this chapter recommends building to. **In every case the taxpayer won, the captive was writing risks a commercial market recognises, at prices an actuary had derived from exposure, across a pool wide enough to matter, and it was paying claims.** In every case the taxpayer lost, at least one of those was missing.

The forms

FORM	OWNERSHIP	INSUREDS

Single-parent (pure)	one corporate group	the owner and its affiliates only
Group / association	several unrelated owners	the member-owners; often an industry association
Agency captive	an intermediary	the intermediary's clients, sharing underwriting result
Rent-a-captive	a sponsor	unrelated users renting capacity and surplus
Cell / SPC / SAC / protected cell	a sponsor, with statutorily segregated cells	each cell's own participants, assets and liabilities ring-fenced from other cells
Risk retention group	member-insureds	the members; a US creature of the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986
Special purpose insurer / SPRV	investors	a single cedant, fully collateralised (ILS)

Cell structures deserve a paragraph because they are widely used and widely misunderstood. Guernsey legislated the first protected cell company regime in 1997; Bermuda followed with the **Segregated Accounts Companies Act 2000**; Cayman's segregated portfolio company sits in its companies legislation; and the form has since spread to dozens of jurisdictions. The statutory effect is that the assets and liabilities of each cell are legally segregated, so that a creditor of one cell cannot reach another cell's assets.

The limit is jurisdictional and it is the same limit that afflicts every statutory ring-fence. **A segregation created by the statute of one jurisdiction binds a court in that jurisdiction; it binds a court elsewhere only to the extent that court chooses to recognise it, and there is no treaty that makes it do so.** Chapter 30 develops this at length in the context of special purpose vehicles generally. For present purposes: a cell is an efficient way to run a small programme without the cost of a standalone licence, and it is a weaker ring-fence than a separate company in any dispute that crosses a border.

Outside the United States: transfer pricing became the test

A reader could finish the preceding section believing this is an American subject. It is not, and the chapter would be misleading if it left that impression. What is distinctively American is the *volume of published reasoning*, because the United States litigates tax questions in an open court that writes long opinions. Everywhere else the same question is asked, and it is asked through transfer pricing.

The relevant international instrument is the OECD's guidance on the transfer pricing aspects of financial transactions, published in February 2020 and subsequently incorporated into the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a new chapter. It addresses captive insurance directly. In substance it asks a tax administration to consider whether the captive is genuinely carrying on an insurance business at all, and offers indicators pointing toward a conclusion that it is: whether there is genuine diversification and pooling of risk; whether the captive and the group are in a better economic position as a result of the risk being carried inside the group; whether the captive has

the capital to meet its liabilities in a plausible loss scenario; whether it has real possibility of loss; whether it has the personnel and the decision-making capability to control the risks it assumes; and whether the premiums it charges are arm's-length. The exact wording and the numbering of the chapter should be confirmed against the current edition of the Guidelines.

Two observations about that list. The first is that it is the rubric of this chapter, arrived at independently by a different institution for a different purpose, which is some evidence that the rubric is describing something real rather than a local rule. The second is more practical. **Transfer pricing operates on the payer, not the insurer, so it applies in every jurisdiction that writes a premium cheque, regardless of where the captive sits and regardless of that domicile's attitude.** A captive in a permissive domicile does not escape the analysis; it merely moves the analysis to the jurisdictions of its insureds, where it will be conducted by administrations that have never seen the licence and are not impressed by it.

The consequence for design is that the documentation file specified below is not a United States file. It is the file that answers a Thai revenue officer, a United Kingdom transfer-pricing enquiry, a UAE corporate tax review, and an OECD-aligned administration anywhere else, in each case on substantially the same evidence. **A structure built to survive one jurisdiction's test will usually survive the others, and a structure built to exploit one jurisdiction's silence will be caught by whichever of the others speaks first.**

Why the sector grew again

It is worth recording, against the destruction described in the Failure Modes, that captive formation has been rising rather than falling. The reason is not tax and it has nothing to do with promoters. Commercial property and casualty pricing hardened sharply from around 2019 through the early 2020s, driven by catastrophe losses, social inflation in liability lines, and reinsurance capital discipline. Deductibles rose, capacity in some lines became difficult to buy at any price, and buyers found themselves retaining exposure whether they had planned to or not.

Retention forced upon a group by market conditions is retention it must fund, and funding retained risk inside a supervised vehicle is what a captive is for. That is why the domiciles with the most demanding requirements — the ones that survived the substance instrument with their supervisory reputation intact — reported growth through the period, and why the United Kingdom opened a consultation on establishing its own captive insurance framework following the Autumn Budget of 2024. Formation counts by domicile and the current status of the United Kingdom consultation should be taken from the regulators' own publications and are marked for verification.

The lesson is the one this book keeps finding. The tax-driven product was killed by scrutiny; the risk-driven product grew under the same scrutiny. **What was destroyed was not the instrument but one use of it, and the use that was destroyed was the one that could not explain itself.**

ILS and sidecars: risk transfer built for inspection

The insurance-linked securities market began in the mid-1990s, when reinsurers and large insurers started issuing securities whose principal was exposed to defined catastrophe losses. The structure has been stable ever since.

```
CATASTROPHE BOND, STRUCTURAL SUMMARY
```

```
Sponsor (a cedant)  --premium-->  SPI / SPRV  <--principal--  Investors
                    <--recovery--            --coupon + LIBOR/SOFR-->

* The SPI is a special purpose insurer, licensed, with no business
  other than this transaction and no recourse beyond its assets.
* Investor principal sits in a COLLATERAL TRUST, typically invested in
  money market funds holding government securities.
* If the trigger is hit, collateral pays the cedant. If not, principal
  returns to investors at maturity.
* Trigger types: INDEMNITY (the cedant's actual loss), INDUSTRY INDEX
  (a market-wide loss estimate), PARAMETRIC (a measured physical
  parameter -- windspeed, magnitude, location), or MODELLED LOSS.
* An independent modelling firm prepares the expected-loss analysis
  that prices the deal, and it is disclosed to investors.
```

Two features of that structure matter to this book. The first is that **collateralisation removes counterparty credit risk from the cedant and replaces it with trapped-capital risk for the investor** — money cannot be released until it is clear no loss occurred, which on a long development pattern means an extension period and a fight about it. The second is that every number in the transaction is disclosed to investors who have no relationship to the sponsor, which means every number has to survive a hostile read.

A *sidecar* is the quota-share cousin. A reinsurer with more attractive business than capital forms a separate vehicle, sells participations to investors, and cedes a defined percentage of a defined book to it for a defined period. The vehicle is collateralised to its limit, has audited financial statements, and winds down when the underwriting years have developed. RenaissanceRe's DaVinci Re, formed in 2001, is the conventionally cited early example of the joint-venture form, and Hannover Re's long-running quota-share cession programme is the conventionally cited example of the treaty form; the post-Katrina wave of 2005 and 2006 produced a dozen more. Names, dates and current sizes should be taken from the trade sources rather than from this chapter.

The economics are legible. The investor is buying a share of an underwriting result with a defined tail and a defined term. The cedant is buying capacity without permanent capital and without diluting shareholders. **Neither party's return depends on the other party not knowing something, which is why the asset class scaled and why the abusive captive product did not.**

The market's total size — catastrophe bonds outstanding, plus collateralised reinsurance and sidecar capacity — should be sourced from Swiss Re's *sigma* series or the specialist trade press, which publish it quarterly. It is measured in tens of billions of dollars of bonds outstanding and considerably more including collateralised reinsurance. This chapter declines to print a figure that will be stale before the book is bound.

The Specification

The five tests, made operational

Test 1 — risk shifting. The evidentiary question is whether anything runs back. Look for: parent guarantees of the captive's obligations; letters of comfort; loans from the captive to the insured or to the insured's owners; premium adjustment or profit-commission clauses that return claims paid; unfunded capital commitments treated as capital. Any one of these is a finding against the arrangement, and a loan back to the insured is the single most damaging fact in the reported cases.

Test 2 — risk distribution. This must be counted, not asserted. Count independent exposure units, not policies and not entities:

```
COUNTING EXPOSURE UNITS -- what counts as independent
------------------------------------------------------------------
Eleven subsidiaries in eight countries, each with its own
  workforce, premises and customers                        counts
One operating company with eleven product lines             partly --
                                                            correlated
  through a single manufacturing process
Forty vehicles in one fleet, one depot, one region          weakly --
                                                            correlated
  through a single driver pool and a single weather system
Seven unrelated group-captive members in one industry       counts,
  with independent operations                               strongly
------------------------------------------------------------------
The question is never how many things are listed on the schedule.
It is how many INDEPENDENT ways the pool can lose money.
```

Benchmarks from the 2002 rulings: twelve subsidiaries each at five to fifteen per cent of risk, or seven or more unrelated members, or unrelated premium at around half the book. Those are safe harbours rather than boundaries, but a structure materially below all three is being built on an argument rather than on a rule.

Test 3 — actuarial pricing. A credentialed actuary must produce a written pricing report *before inception*, deriving the premium from exposure, using the insured's own loss development where credible and industry data where it is not, with explicit expense and risk loads and a stated confidence level. The report must be capable of answering the only question that matters: would an unrelated commercial insurer have written this cover at this price? **A premium that was determined first and justified afterwards leaves a documentary trail that says so, and the adverse cases are full of pricing reports dated after the policies incepted.**

Test 4 — claims paid. This is the test that cannot be simulated. There must be a claims notification procedure, a claims register, adjusters or a claims manager, reserves set on individual claims, and payments made. Over a multi-year period the paid and incurred loss ratio should be broadly consistent with the pricing. **A captive that has collected premium for seven years and paid nothing has not proved it is prudent; it has proved either that its pricing was wrong by an order of magnitude or that it was never insuring anything.**

Test 5 — insurer conduct. Adequate capital for the assumed risk; investments that are liquid,

duration-matched, and free of related-party exposure; real policy wordings for the actual business; a board that meets and decides; a regulator that is engaged rather than merely licensing; audited financial statements; reinsurance purchased from unrelated markets.

Scoring the rubric

The five tests are not equally weighted and they are not independent. This book uses the following scoring in its constructed cases. It is a working tool, not a standard, and no tribunal has adopted it:

```
TEST                    WEIGHT   SCORE 0–4      NOTE
------------------------------------------------------------
1 Risk shifting            25    0 = anything runs back
2 Risk distribution        25    0 = fewer than 5 units
3 Actuarial pricing        20    0 = no pre-inception report
4 Claims paid              20    0 = no claims in 3+ years
5 Insurer conduct          10    0 = related-party investments
------------------------------------------------------------
Weighted score out of 400.
A ZERO ON TEST 1 OR TEST 2 IS DISQUALIFYING REGARDLESS OF TOTAL.
```

The disqualification rule is the important line. Risk shifting and risk distribution are the two elements *Le Gierse* made constitutive of insurance. **An arrangement that fails either of them is not a poorly documented insurance arrangement; it is not insurance, and no amount of quality in the other three tests repairs it.**

Section 831(b), stated correctly

The provision is a genuine and continuing feature of United States tax law and this chapter is not against it. **Section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code permits a small non-life insurance company to elect to be taxed only on its taxable investment income rather than on its underwriting income**, subject to a ceiling on net written premiums. The rationale is that a small mutual or stock insurer serving a niche should not carry the compliance burden of the full corporate insurance tax regime.

The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 made two changes effective for taxable years beginning after 2016. It raised the premium ceiling from USD 1.2 million to USD 2.2 million and indexed it for inflation — the current indexed figure changes annually and must be looked up rather than remembered. And it added diversification requirements: broadly, either no more than twenty per cent of net written premiums may be attributable to any one policyholder, or an ownership test must be satisfied limiting the extent to which the insurance company's ownership can differ from the insured business's ownership by reference to spouses and lineal descendants. The second requirement was aimed squarely at the estate-planning use of micro-captives, in which the captive was owned by the next generation and the premium moved value down a generation free of transfer tax. The precise mechanics of both alternatives should be read in the current statute.

A separate provision, **section 501(c)(15)**, exempts certain very small insurance companies altogether, and features in some of the litigated cases.

Nothing in the 831(b) election changes what insurance is. The election is available to a company that is an insurance company. If the arrangement is not insurance, the election is a nullity, the premiums are not deductible to the payer, and the receipts are ordinary income to the recipient. That sequence — not a penalty provision but a definitional one — is what actually destroyed the abusive product.

The documentation file

Assembled before inception and maintained annually: feasibility study; actuarial pricing report dated before inception; policy wordings underwritten for the actual business; the schedule of insureds with the exposure-unit count and its reasoning; evidence of premium actually paid, on time, by the insured entity that bore the risk; the claims register and claims procedure; audited financial statements; investment policy and holdings, showing no related-party exposure; reinsurance placed with unrelated markets; board minutes recording underwriting, reserving and investment decisions; regulatory filings; the transfer-pricing file; and every applicable disclosure filing under the reportable-transaction rules.

The Failure Modes

1. The micro-captive industry: an autopsy

This is the extended case and it is worth the space, because it is the best-documented instance available of a lawful structure being destroyed by the manner of its use.

What the product was. From roughly the mid-2000s, promoters marketed a package to owners of profitable closely held businesses: form a small insurance company, usually in a Caribbean or United States domestic domicile; have the operating business pay it a premium sized to the section 831(b) ceiling; elect 831(b) so the premium is not taxed to the insurer; deduct the premium in the operating business; own the insurance company through a trust for the children so that accumulated surplus passes down outside the estate. The cover written was typically for risks the business had never insured and rarely suffered — terrorism, regulatory change, loss of a key customer, tax liability, business interruption on unusual triggers — because such risks have no observable market price and therefore no benchmark against which the premium looks wrong.

The tell. The diagnostic fact, present in essentially every failed arrangement and absent from every successful one, was this: **the premium was determined by the tax ceiling and then a set of coverages was assembled to justify it**, rather than the coverages being determined by the exposure and the premium falling out of the pricing. Where the ceiling was USD 1.2 million, premiums clustered just beneath USD 1.2 million across thousands of unrelated businesses of wildly different sizes and risk profiles. That is not a distribution of prices produced by underwriting.

The engineering problem the promoters had. A single small business cannot achieve risk distribution on its own. The industry's answer was pooling: a large number of unrelated micro-captives would each cede a slice of risk into a common pool and assume back a slice of the pool's aggregate. On paper this creates distribution. In several of the litigated structures the pool was engineered so that each participant's assumed liability closely tracked its ceded premium, which returns the economics to the starting point and defeats the purpose. The Tax Court examined these pools in detail and found them wanting.

The litigation. *Avrahami v. Commissioner* (2017) was the first fully litigated case and it set the pattern. The court held the arrangement was not insurance: risk distribution failed because there were too few independent exposure units; the reinsurance pool relied upon to create distribution was not a bona fide insurance arrangement; premiums were not actuarially determined and were far above any defensible price; the captive invested a substantial part of its assets in illiquid loans to parties related to the owners; and claims were essentially never made. The section 831(b) election was accordingly ineffective and the deductions were disallowed.

Reserve Mechanical Corp. v. Commissioner (2018) reached the same conclusion on similar facts and was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 2022. *Syzygy Insurance Co. v. Commissioner* (2019) and *Caylor Land & Development, Inc. v. Commissioner* (2021) followed. Accuracy-related penalties were sustained in some of these. **The Commissioner's record in the micro-captive cases tried to opinion through 2021 was close to unbroken**, and the losses were not on technicalities: the courts held, on the merits and in reasoned opinions, that the arrangements were not insurance.

There were exceptions and they matter. In the *Puglisi* litigation the Commissioner conceded the cases in 2022 rather than try them, on facts involving an agricultural business, a series captive and genuine agricultural risks. The lesson practitioners drew was that the Service's position was not that all micro-captives were abusive, but that the ones it had chosen to litigate were.

The administrative campaign. The Service listed micro-captives in its annual "Dirty Dozen" compilation from 2014. In **Notice 2016-66** it identified certain micro-captive transactions as *transactions of interest*, requiring disclosure by participants and by material advisors under the reportable-transaction rules, with penalties for non-disclosure. It ran time-limited settlement initiatives in 2019 and 2020 and issued letters to taxpayers in 2021. It formed dedicated examination teams.

The counter-attack, and why it only bought time. A captive manager challenged Notice 2016-66 on the ground that the Service had issued it without the notice-and-comment rulemaking the Administrative Procedure Act requires. The government argued the Anti-Injunction Act barred a pre-enforcement suit. In *CIC Services, LLC v. IRS* (2021) the Supreme Court held unanimously that it did not, and the case returned to the district court, which in 2022 set the Notice aside for failure to comply with the APA. The same reasoning invalidated other Service notices in the same period, including in the syndicated conservation easement line — *Green Valley Investors, LLC v. Commissioner* (2022).

The Service responded by doing the rulemaking. It published proposed regulations in 2023 and finalised them in January 2025, identifying certain micro-captive transactions as **listed transactions** and others as **transactions of interest**, distinguishing them by loss ratio measured over a multi-year computation period and by whether the arrangement involved financing back to the insured or its owners. The thresholds and the computation period must be read in the final regulations; they are the operative numbers and they should not be taken from a secondary source.

The outcome. The abusive product is gone. The promoters who built it are largely out of the business, several having faced their own proceedings. The provision remains on the statute book and is still available to companies that are actually insurance companies. **And the cost was borne disproportionately by people who were doing it properly**: a small legitimate captive now files disclosures, attracts examination attention, and must explain itself to bankers and auditors who have read the headlines. That is the collateral damage, and it is the part of the story the promotional literature never mentioned as a risk.

What the reader should take from it. Four things. That a structure defended only by obscurity

will be found. That when it is found, the response is collective and does not distinguish careful users from careless ones. That the definitional attack — *this is not what you say it is* — is far more destructive than a penalty attack, because it unwinds the arrangement from inception. And that **the surviving forms are the ones with the most substance, not the ones with the best arguments.**

2. Buying distribution instead of building it

Pooling arrangements that exist only to manufacture the appearance of risk distribution are the specific mechanism the courts examined and rejected. A pool is legitimate when the participants' risks are genuinely different, when assumed liability is not engineered to track ceded premium, and when the pool has its own capital, its own underwriting standards, and the ability to decline business. Ask whether the pool has ever declined a participant.

3. The captive that never pays a claim

Sometimes the honest explanation is a genuinely good loss year. Over three or more years it is not. The correct response to a persistently near-zero loss ratio is to reprice downward, not to celebrate — and repricing downward on the evidence is itself powerful proof that the arrangement is being run as insurance.

4. Related-party investment

Covered in Chapter 14 and repeated here because it appears in nearly every adverse decision. The reserve pool must not be lent to the insured, to the owner, to the owner's family, or into the owner's other ventures. It defeats risk shifting, it defeats the Chapter 14 seizure argument, and it converts a diversification into a doubling-up.

5. Coverage nobody would buy

If the cover has no observable market price, there is no benchmark, and the absence of a benchmark is exactly why promoters chose such covers. A captive writing property, liability, motor, marine, credit and employers' liability is writing products with commercial comparables. A captive writing "loss of franchise value on regulatory change" is writing a product whose price cannot be checked, and it will be asked why.

6. Cell segregation assumed to travel

A protected cell or segregated portfolio is a statutory ring-fence. It binds where the statute binds. In a jurisdiction that has never recognised the concept, the segregation is an argument, not a fact. Do not place cross-border risk in a cell on the assumption that the ring-fence will be honoured everywhere. Chapter 30.

7. Trapped capital in collateralised structures

The mirror image of the ILS market's strength. Because investor money is held in trust against a possible loss, it cannot be released until development is complete. Loss estimates on complex events move for years, extension spreads accrue, and investors who modelled a one-year return

find themselves in year four. This is a real and recurring cost of the collateralised form and it should be priced, not discovered.

8. Basis risk on non-indemnity triggers

Parametric and industry-index triggers settle quickly and cheaply and do not require the cedant to open its books. They also pay a different amount from the cedant's actual loss, sometimes by a great deal. **A parametric cover is not insurance against your loss; it is insurance against a measurement, and the gap between the two is retained.**

9. Fronting, collateral and the credit chain

Set out in Chapter 14 and equally applicable here. Every fronting arrangement introduces a rated counterparty, a collateral requirement, and a credit dependency that moves with the group's own credit standing.

10. Employee benefit risks and the pension-law overlay

Using a captive to reinsure employee benefit risks engages a separate body of law in the United States. Placing benefit risks in a related captive can be a prohibited transaction under ERISA and has generally required a Department of Labor exemption, obtained either under the expedited class exemption procedure or individually; several large groups obtained individual exemptions in the early 2000s. Equivalent constraints exist elsewhere. **Never assume that a captive licensed for property and casualty risk may take employee benefit risk without a separate authorisation analysis.**

11. Domicile chosen for permissiveness

A domicile that will license anything is a domicile whose licence proves nothing. Several of the adverse decisions involved captives licensed in jurisdictions whose supervisory engagement was minimal, and the courts noticed. **A regulator's scrutiny is a cost when you are forming and an asset when you are challenged**, and the second is worth more.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASES. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice.

Case A — an arrangement that fails, scored

A constructed United States closely held distribution business, revenue USD 34 million, owned by a married couple. A promoter proposes a captive in a permissive domicile, owned by an irrevocable trust for the couple's two children.

```
Annual premium proposed                          1,180,000
Ceiling in force at the time                     1,200,000
Coverages: loss of key customer; regulatory change;
  cyber (in addition to an existing commercial cyber policy);
```

```
  tax liability; business interruption on a supplier trigger
Insureds: the operating company and two affiliated LLCs,
  all in one state, one warehouse, one customer concentration
Distribution: via a pool of 340 unrelated micro-captives, with
  assumed liability set at 99.2% of ceded premium
Investments: 62% in a loan to the couple's real estate LLC
Claims in five years: one, for 14,000, paid
-------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTED. USD. Invented facts, assembled from the fact
patterns recurring in the reported decisions.
```

Scored on the rubric:

```
TEST                    WEIGHT  SCORE   WEIGHTED
-----------------------------------------------
1 Risk shifting            25     0        0
2 Risk distribution        25     0        0
3 Actuarial pricing        20     1       20
4 Claims paid              20     0        0
5 Insurer conduct          10     0        0
-----------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                     20 / 400
DISQUALIFIED on Tests 1 and 2 regardless of total.
```

Every diagnostic in the reported cases is present: premium set at the ceiling rather than derived from exposure; three insureds in one location with correlated exposure; a pool engineered so assumed liability tracks ceded premium; a majority of assets lent to a related party; effectively no claims. **The arrangement is not a risky version of insurance. It is not insurance** — and the consequence of that finding is that every premium deduction taken since inception is disallowed, with interest and probably penalties, while the disclosure failure carries its own exposure. The correct advice is to decline.

Case B — an arrangement that passes, scored

A constructed group captive: nine unrelated mid-sized specialist engineering contractors in one country, each with revenue between USD 40 million and USD 180 million, forming a group captive to write the working layer of their general liability and employers' liability.

```
Members: 9, unrelated, none above 16% of premium
Combined workforce across members: ~4,100 in 27 locations
Premium: derived by an independent actuary from ten years of
  member loss data; total 8,400,000
Retention: 750,000 each occurrence; excess placed with three
  rated commercial reinsurers
Governance: member board, independent chair, underwriting
  committee with authority to decline a member's renewal
Claims: a third-party claims administrator; 5-year paid ratio
  61%, incurred 68%, against a pricing assumption of 66%
Investments: investment-grade fixed income, no member exposure
Underwriting discipline: two members surcharged and one
```

```
  declined renewal in the first five years
-------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTED. USD. Invented facts.

TEST                    WEIGHT  SCORE   WEIGHTED
-----------------------------------------------------
1 Risk shifting            25     4      100
2 Risk distribution        25     4      100
3 Actuarial pricing        20     4       80
4 Claims paid              20     4       80
5 Insurer conduct          10     3       30
-----------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                    390 / 400
```

The single most persuasive fact in Case B is not in the rubric. **The captive declined to renew one of its own owners, which is something no wallet does and every insurer does**, and it is worth more in a hearing than the whole documentation file.

Case C — the carried case's captive, scored

The Bermuda Class 2 captive built in Chapter 14, on the same rubric:

```
TEST                    WEIGHT  SCORE   WEIGHTED   NOTE
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Risk shifting            25     4      100     no guarantees, no
                                                  loan-backs, no
                                                  premium clawback
2 Risk distribution        25     3       75     eleven operating
                                                  units in eight
                                                  countries plus two
                                                  unrelated JV
                                                  distributors; but
                                                  correlated through
                                                  one manufacturing
                                                  process
3 Actuarial pricing        20     4       80     pre-inception
                                                  report; five years
                                                  of own data
4 Claims paid              20     4       80     paid ratio 64%
                                                  against 68% priced
5 Insurer conduct          10     4       40     BMA-supervised,
                                                  unrelated reinsurance,
                                                  no related-party
                                                  investments
-------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                                    375 / 400
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTED, on the Chapter 14 facts. The rubric is this book's
working tool and has been adopted by no tribunal.
```

The three-point score on distribution is the honest weak point and it is worth stating rather than rounding up. The group's product liability exposure across eleven operating units runs back through a single manufacturing process in Thailand, so a design defect is one event, not eleven. **Distribution is strong against frequency and weak against a systemic product defect, which is exactly the exposure the reinsurance layer above the captive exists to carry** — and the fact that the reinsurance was bought from unrelated markets is what makes the whole arrangement coherent rather than merely compliant.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would these arrangements still do their job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of them?

- **Case A fails, and fails at the first element.** Its function depends on nobody reconstructing how the premium was set. Disclosure of the pool mechanics, the loan to the real estate LLC, and the pricing chronology ends it. It is a concealment structure with an insurance policy stapled to the front, and the reportable-transaction rules mean disclosure is not even optional.
- **Case B passes comfortably.** Every element is designed to be shown: the actuarial derivation, the member loss data, the claims administrator's records, the renewal declination. Disclosure is how a group captive recruits its next member.
- **Case C passes**, for the reasons Chapter 14 set out, and its weakest element — correlated product risk — is disclosed in its own reinsurance submission because the reinsurers price it.

What none of this solves

- The rubric is a working tool. No tribunal has adopted it and no adviser should present it as authority.
- A high score is evidence, not immunity. Facts change, examiners differ, and the law in this area moved four times in a decade.
- Nothing here addresses the tax treatment in the *payer's* jurisdiction, which is a separate analysis for each payer, or the residence of the captive, or transfer pricing on the premium.
- Real risk transfer costs money. Case B's members pay for an actuary, a claims administrator, independent directors, audited accounts and unrelated reinsurance, and those costs are the price of the durability. **The cheap version is the one that failed.**

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, gathered for Appendix D:

1. Reporter volume and page references for every case named in this chapter, checked against the official reports: *Helvering v. Le Gierse* (1941); *Humana* (6th Cir. 1989); *AMERCO* and *Harper Group* (1991) and their appellate histories; *Rent-A-Center* (2014); *Securitas Holdings* (2014); *R.V.I. Guaranty* (2015); *Avrahami* (2017); *Reserve Mechanical* (2018) and its Tenth Circuit affirmance (2022); *Syzygy* (2019); *Caylor Land* (2021); *CIC Services* (S. Ct. 2021) and

the district court's subsequent order setting aside Notice 2016-66; *Green Valley Investors* (2022); and the disposition of the *Puglisi* cases.

2. Current text of IRC section 831(b): the indexed premium ceiling for the current year, and the exact mechanics of both alternative diversification requirements added by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015.
3. Current text of IRC section 501(c)(15) and its thresholds.
4. The final micro-captive regulations published in January 2025: the Treasury Decision number, the loss-ratio thresholds separating listed transactions from transactions of interest, the length of the computation period, the treatment of financing arrangements, the disclosure deadlines, and the transition rules for existing arrangements.
5. The precise terms of Rev. Rul. 2002-89, 2002-90, 2002-91 and 2005-40, and whether any has been modified, clarified or obsoleted.
6. Whether Notice 2016-66 has been formally withdrawn, and the current status of any residual disclosure obligation arising from the period before the final regulations.
7. Dates and terms of the IRS micro-captive settlement initiatives of 2019 and 2020.
8. Guernsey's Protected Cell Companies Ordinance 1997 as the first such regime, and the current text of Bermuda's Segregated Accounts Companies Act 2000 and Cayman's segregated portfolio company provisions.
9. The Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 and the current scope of risk retention group authority across US states.
10. Department of Labor prohibited transaction exemptions for captive reinsurance of employee benefit risks: the expedited class exemption procedure and the individual exemptions granted in the early 2000s, with grantee names and dates.
11. Current catastrophe bond and total alternative capital market size, from Swiss Re *sigma* or the specialist trade press.
12. Formation dates, sponsors and current status of the sidecar and joint-venture vehicles referenced generically in the Mechanism.
13. Whether the constructed pooling arrangement described in Case A would fall within the listed transaction or transaction of interest definitions under the current regulations.

Chapter 16 turns from the product to the place, and asks what is left of the Atlantic offshore cluster after the substance instrument did its work. The answer is the same answer this chapter reached from a different direction: what survived is what had substance.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. The tax analysis of any captive arrangement is fact-specific and contested. Confirm every element with qualified counsel and a credentialed actuary in each relevant jurisdiction, and check every citation against the official reports.*

Chapter 16 . The Atlantic Cluster

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* This chapter describes four jurisdictions, what they are still good for, and what they can no longer do. It is a map, not a permission. Statute revisions in these jurisdictions renumber and consolidate frequently; confirm every provision against the current revision with local counsel. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Four jurisdictions and one point of failure. That is the chapter, and everything after it is detail.

The Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, The Bahamas and Barbados are treated together not because they are similar in law — they are not, and two of them are sovereign states while two are British Overseas Territories — but because they occupy the same position on the only axis this book measures. All four exchange information under the Common Reporting Standard. All four implement FATF standards under a domestically legislated regime, and all four have been placed under increased monitoring or on a European Union list within the last eight years. All four clear United States dollars through United States correspondent banks, and three of the four peg their currency to the dollar. On Chapter 2's four-question test they return four yeses each.

Which produces the arithmetic:

```
A CONSTRUCTED FOUR-ENTITY ATLANTIC STRUCTURE

Cayman 30.0%   |   BVI 25.0%   |   Bahamas 25.0%   |   Barbados 20.0%

naive HHI = 0.090000 + 0.062500 + 0.062500 + 0.040000 = 0.255000
effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.255000 = 3.9216

collapsed to blocs: WEST 100.0%
bloc-HHI = 1.000000    ->    EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 1.00
ln(1.00) = 0
```

Four jurisdictions, an apparent effective count of 3.92, and zero available surplus in the storage law. **This is Chapter 5's conventional-structure result reproduced on entirely different entities.** The failure is not in the choice of jurisdictions but in the identification of what a jurisdiction is. A reader who has internalised Chapter 5 will find nothing surprising here and should read the chapter anyway, because the interesting question is not whether these places provide bloc diversity — they do not — but what they still provide, and that turns out to be a great deal.

The chapter's thesis is a single sentence and it is the same sentence Chapter 15 arrived at by a different road. **What survived the substance instrument is precisely what had substance.** The Cayman funds industry survived and grew, because a fund with unrelated investors, an administrator, an auditor and a custodian always had substance. The BVI's specialist commercial court survived and became more important, because a court is substance by definition. The Bahamian private-client statute book survived, because drafting genuinely novel instruments is substance. The Barbados treaty network survived in a narrowed form, because a treaty benefit was never available to an entity with nothing in it, whatever the local practice may once have suggested.

What died was the empty company: the cheap, unstaffed, undocumented vehicle formed for a few hundred dollars and left to sit.

And the mechanism by which it died is worth stating precisely, because it is almost universally described wrongly. **The European Union did not outlaw the empty company. It repriced it** — and this chapter computes the repricing at a factor of between three and twelve, depending on whether the entity carries on a relevant activity. At a factor of twelve, a product whose entire proposition was cheapness no longer has a market. That is how the substance instrument worked, and understanding it as a pricing intervention rather than a prohibition explains both what died and what did not.

There is a corollary that most commentary misses and that this chapter states in print, because it governs who should still be reading. The substance cost is a fixed annual amount per entity. A fixed cost is regressive against asset size. **The substance instrument was a regressive tax on structure:** it destroyed the small user's holding company and left the large user's entirely untouched, and the arithmetic of that is in the Mechanism.

One further position, on The Bahamas specifically, because it tests the book's central concept. The Bahamas is an independent sovereign state and has been since 1973. It is not a British Overseas Territory. There is no Order in Council power over it, no Foreign Secretary's letter, no Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act commitment. If sovereignty produced perimeter independence, The Bahamas would sit in a different bloc from Cayman and the BVI.

It does not. It exchanges under CRS, it was placed under FATF increased monitoring from 2018 to 2020, it has appeared on European Union lists, and its dollar is pegged one-to-one to the United States dollar with the corresponding correspondent dependency. **Sovereignty and perimeter independence are different variables**, and The Bahamas is the cleanest available demonstration that the first does not produce the second. That is worth more to this book's argument than anything in the Bahamian statute book.

The Mechanism

The substance instrument, described as what it was

The European Union's Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation, working from the list of criteria adopted by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council on 5 December 2017, applied a criterion to jurisdictions with no or only nominal corporate taxation: entities claiming residence there had to demonstrate real economic activity. The alternative was inclusion on Annex I, the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes.

Each of the four jurisdictions legislated. Cayman enacted the International Tax Co-operation (Economic Substance) Act, originally in 2018 and in force from 1 January 2019. The British Virgin Islands enacted the Economic Substance (Companies and Limited Partnerships) Act 2018, in force on the same date. The Bahamas enacted the Commercial Entities (Substance Requirements) Act 2018, subsequently amended. Barbados addressed the criterion differently, because its problem was ring-fencing rather than nominal taxation, and its response is treated separately below. All of these statutes have been revised; the operative text must be taken from the current revision.

The common architecture: an entity carrying on a *relevant activity* — the list runs across banking,

insurance, fund management, financing and leasing, headquarters business, shipping, distribution and service centre business, intellectual property business, and holding business — must be directed and managed in the jurisdiction, conduct its core income-generating activities there, and maintain adequate employees, expenditure and physical presence proportionate to that activity. Pure equity holding entities are subject to a reduced test. Annual returns are filed. Intellectual property business, which the OECD's Forum on Harmful Tax Practices had identified as the most mobile, attracts the heaviest treatment.

The repricing, computed

The instrument's effect is best seen in a cost line rather than in a legal analysis.

```
CONSTRUCTED ANNUAL COST OF AN OFFSHORE HOLDING COMPANY     USD / YEAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          PRE-2019      POST-2019
Registered agent and registered office       1,100          1,600
Government / annual licence fee                450          1,050
Economic substance classification and
  annual ES return                               0            900
Beneficial ownership filing and maintenance      0            400
Accounting records and annual financial
  return                                         0          1,400
Locally resident directors, where the entity
  carries on a relevant activity                 0         14,000
-------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL, pure equity holding entity            1,550          5,350
TOTAL, entity carrying on a relevant
  activity                                   1,550         19,350
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTED. Illustrative, not a quotation. Actual costs vary widely
by jurisdiction, agent and activity.

THE MULTIPLE
  pure equity holding entity       5,350 / 1,550  =  3.45x
  relevant activity entity        19,350 / 1,550  = 12.48x
```

The European Union did not prohibit anything; it multiplied a cost base by between three and twelve, and a product whose entire proposition was that it cost almost nothing does not survive being multiplied by twelve.

Now the regressive property, which is where the chapter's real content is. Express the relevant-activity cost as a fraction of the capital the entity holds:

```
CAPITAL HELD        ANNUAL ES-DRIVEN COST AS A FRACTION
-------------------------------------------------------
USD     2,000,000        19,350  =  96.75 bp
USD     5,000,000        19,350  =  38.70 bp
USD     7,740,000        19,350  =  25.00 bp   <- break-even
USD    20,000,000        19,350  =   9.68 bp
USD   200,000,000        19,350  =   0.97 bp
```

```
    ------------------------------------------------------
    Break-even computed against a 25 bp tolerance for structural
    overhead, which is a judgement rather than a standard.
```

At a two-million-dollar holding the substance regime consumes ninety-seven basis points a year; at two hundred million it consumes one. The same rule, applied identically, was fatal at one end of the market and imperceptible at the other. That is why the fund industry and the large-deal SPV business in Cayman and the BVI grew straight through the period while the retail offshore company business contracted, and it is why the commentary that described these events as the end of offshore was reading the wrong end of the distribution.

For this book's readers the consequence is a threshold rather than a prohibition. **An Atlantic entity holding less than roughly USD 7.7 million is paying more than twenty-five basis points** a year for a structure that adds nothing to N, and it should be collapsed rather than maintained.

The listing history, and what it shows

JURISDICTION	EVENT	PERIOD
Cayman	EU Annex I Feb 2020, removed Oct 2020	8 months
Cayman	FATF increased monitoring Feb 2021, removed Oct 2023	32 months
BVI	EU Annex I Oct 2023 after a Global Forum downgrade on exchange of information on request; removed Feb 2024	4 months
Bahamas	FATF increased monitoring Oct 2018, removed Dec 2020	26 months
Bahamas	EU Annex I appearances in 2018 and 2019, with removals following commitments	verify dates
Barbados	FATF increased monitoring Feb 2020, removed Feb 2024	48 months
Barbados	EU Annex I Oct 2020 following a Global Forum downgrade; moved to Annex II after a supplementary review	verify dates

Dates as publicly announced. Confirm every one against FATF plenary outcomes and Council of the European Union primary releases before relying on it. The Bahamas and Barbados EU sequences in particular are marked for verification.

Read the table for its structure rather than its content. Every one of the four was listed by at least one body within a five-year window. In two of the cases — the BVI in 2023 and Barbados in 2020 — the European Union listing was triggered mechanically by a technical rating change made by a different body, the Global Forum, on exchange of information on request. **One peer-review panel moved four jurisdictions' bank-onboarding classifications across a five-year period, and no combination** of those four jurisdictions provided any protection against it.

That is what a coordination perimeter looks like from the inside, and it is why the arithmetic at the

top of the chapter comes out at one.

Beneficial ownership: the register survived, public access did not

All four jurisdictions maintain beneficial ownership information. The trajectory of *access* has moved twice, in opposite directions, and it is worth being precise because the subject generates more heat than analysis.

The United Kingdom's Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 required the Overseas Territories to establish publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership, which reached Cayman and the BVI but not the two sovereign states. Implementation slipped repeatedly. In November 2022 the Court of Justice of the European Union, in *WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers*, struck down the provision of the anti-money-laundering directive that made member state registers accessible to the general public, holding it a disproportionate interference with the rights to private life and data protection. That decision, addressed at length in Chapter 12, changed the Territories' negotiating position, and both Cayman and the BVI have legislated toward a legitimate-interest access model rather than open public access — Cayman under the Beneficial Ownership Transparency Act 2023, commenced in 2024, and the BVI through amendments to its business companies legislation providing for filing with the Registry. Commencement dates, the definition of legitimate interest, and the current enforcement position are all marked for verification.

The register exists in every one of these jurisdictions and competent authorities have access to it. What changed is whether a journalist or a competitor can search it. Any structure whose function depends on the second question is failing CANON section 1 and is outside this book's subject. Any structure that merely prefers not to be searchable by strangers is expressing a lawful preference, and Chapter 3 draws that line precisely.

The Specification

The Cayman Islands — what it is still for

Cayman's product is institutional, and that is what saved it. The jurisdiction's core business is investment funds: open-ended vehicles registered under the Mutual Funds Act and closed-ended vehicles brought into registration by the **Private Funds Act 2020**, which was the legislative response to the February 2020 European Union listing and preceded the October 2020 delisting. A Cayman fund has an administrator, an auditor, a custodian or prime broker, directors, and unrelated investors who conduct due diligence. It had substance before anybody required it to, which is why the substance requirement cost it nothing.

Beyond funds, four things are worth naming:

- **The segregated portfolio company**, the Cayman cell vehicle, used heavily in fund platforms and in insurance. Its ring-fence is statutory and its cross-border limits are Chapter 30's subject.
- **The foundation company**, under the **Foundation Companies Act 2017** — a company limited by guarantee or by shares that may operate without members and for a purpose, giving a common-law jurisdiction a foundation-shaped instrument. Chapter 8 examined it as a genuine third form alongside the trust and the civil-law foundation.

- **The STAR trust**, the special trusts regime originally introduced in 1997 and now in the Trusts Act, permitting non-charitable purpose trusts with enforcer-based rather than beneficiary-based enforcement.
- **The Grand Court's Financial Services Division and the restructuring officer regime** introduced by amendment in 2021 and in force from 2022, which allows a company to seek a restructuring officer and an associated moratorium without first presenting a winding-up petition. This is a genuine improvement in the jurisdiction's insolvency toolkit and it is why large distressed cross-border matters continue to be run through Cayman.

Cayman also has a substantial insurance sector under the **Insurance Act 2010**, with captive classes and a dedicated class for insurance-linked securities vehicles. It is the leading domicile for healthcare and group captives, and it competes with Bermuda on cost while conceding Solvency II equivalence and the reinsurance ecosystem. Class definitions and current requirements should be confirmed with the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority.

The British Virgin Islands — the company and the court

The BVI's product is the **BVI Business Company** under the **BVI Business Companies Act 2004**: a fast, cheap, flexible vehicle that became the default holding and joint-venture entity for an enormous volume of cross-border transactions, particularly into and out of Asia. That product was the one most exposed to the repricing computed above, and the jurisdiction has responded by adding requirements rather than resisting them. The **BVI Business Companies (Amendment) Act 2022**, in force from 1 January 2023, introduced an annual financial return filed with the registered agent, made director names searchable, and tightened the striking-off and restoration regime. Subsequent amendment brought beneficial ownership filing to the Registry; commencement details are marked for verification.

The more durable asset is the court. The BVI Commercial Court, a division of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court established in 2009, is a specialist commercial forum with a resident judge, and the BVI has become one of the principal venues in the world for shareholder disputes, unfair prejudice petitions, just-and-equitable windings up, and asset-tracing against holding structures.

The single most consequential development is the availability of freezing relief in support of foreign proceedings. The first-instance *Black Swan* line of authority had permitted it; the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal rejected that line; and in **Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24** the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the court does have power to grant a freezing injunction against a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction in aid of foreign proceedings. The BVI legislature had separately amended the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Virgin Islands) legislation in 2020 to provide a statutory power. Both the case's precise ratio and the statutory provision should be confirmed.

A jurisdiction whose courts will freeze assets in support of proceedings elsewhere is not a place to hide assets; it is a place to litigate about them, and readers who select the BVI on the assumption that it is the former have selected the opposite of what they wanted.

The Bahamas — the private-client statute book, and the FTX scar

The Bahamas is the most legislatively inventive of the four in private client work, and its statute book contains instruments that have no equivalent in most common-law jurisdictions:

- **The Foundations Act 2004**, giving a common-law jurisdiction a true civil-law-style foundation with separate legal personality. This is the closest Atlantic analogue to the DIFC Foundation of Chapter 7, and it was considered and rejected for the carried case for perimeter reasons rather than for any deficiency in the instrument.
- **The Purpose Trust Act 2004**, permitting non-charitable purpose trusts.
- **The Executive Entities Act 2011**, which creates a legal person whose sole function is to hold and exercise powers — protector, enforcer, appointor — solving the problem of what happens when an individual protector dies. There is no close equivalent elsewhere and it is genuinely useful.
- **The Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991**, which limits challenges to dispositions to a period running from the date of the disposition and requires the claimant to prove intent to defraud. The limitation period is commonly stated as two years; the exact period, the burden, and the solvency element must be confirmed, and Chapter 32's timing analysis governs whether any of it helps.
- **The Investment Condominium Act 2014**, a contractual fund form.

Against that, the reputational event. **FTX Digital Markets Ltd was a Bahamian company**, registered under the Digital Assets and Registered Exchanges Act 2020, and its collapse in November 2022 produced a provisional liquidation commenced by the Securities Commission of The Bahamas, a parallel Chapter 11 proceeding in the United States, an initial and public conflict between the two sets of officeholders, and a later cooperation agreement. The principal was extradited from The Bahamas and convicted in the United States. The Bahamas subsequently replaced its digital assets legislation with a 2024 statute. Dates and procedural details are marked for verification.

The honest read is not that The Bahamas behaved badly — the regulator moved quickly and the cooperation agreement worked — but that a small jurisdiction's reputation is a shared asset that any one licensee can damage, and a structure sited there inherits the damage without having contributed to it. That is a real, uninsurable, and frequently ignored risk of small-jurisdiction siting, and it applies to all four of these places.

Barbados — the treaty jurisdiction, and the one with a different apex court

Barbados is the odd member of the group and is regularly misfiled with the others. It is not a zero-tax jurisdiction and it is not a British Overseas Territory. It is an independent sovereign state, a **republic since 30 November 2021**, and its final appellate court is not the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council but the **Caribbean Court of Justice**, whose appellate jurisdiction Barbados accepted in 2005.

Its product is a treaty network of roughly forty double taxation agreements, of which the Canada-Barbados agreement is by a wide margin the most commercially significant; there is also a United States treaty and the CARICOM multilateral agreement. **A treaty network is a fundamentally different asset from a zero rate, and it degrades** differently: a zero rate is attacked by minimum tax rules, while a treaty benefit is attacked by anti-abuse provisions in the treaty itself.

Barbados signed the OECD Multilateral Instrument, which imports a principal purpose test into covered agreements. Whether the Canada-Barbados agreement is a covered agreement and how the principal purpose test applies to it is a specific question for counsel and is marked. The practical effect is that a Barbados entity claiming treaty benefits must be able to demonstrate a

commercial purpose independent of the benefit, which is a substance test in a different vocabulary.

On tax, Barbados converged. The old International Business Company and exempt insurance regimes were ring-fenced regimes of the kind the OECD's harmful tax practices work targets, and they were repealed with grandfathering under the reforms beginning in 2018, which introduced a converged sliding-scale corporate rate. From 1 January 2024 Barbados moved to a headline corporate rate of nine per cent with a fifteen per cent domestic top-up tax for groups in scope of the global minimum tax rules. Rates, effective dates and the top-up mechanics must be confirmed against the enacting legislation.

Barbados retains a real insurance sector under its Insurance Act with converged licence classes, and it remains a meaningful captive domicile — particularly for Canadian-parented groups, for whom the treaty corridor is the reason to be there at all. **Barbados makes sense for a group with a genuine Canada or CARICOM corridor and real local** substance, and makes no sense for anybody else, because everything else it offers is available in Bermuda with a better regulator.

The Failure Modes

1. Counting four Atlantic jurisdictions as four. The arithmetic at the top of this chapter gives 3.92 naive and 1.00 in blocs. Every hour spent rebalancing between them moves a number that does not enter the storage law.

2. Using a BVI company as the apex of a structure. Chapter 6 scored the single BVI company at 3 for holding, 1 for operating and 1 for bridging, and it lost on the minimum across dimensions. A BVI company is an excellent instrument for one clean job. It is a poor apex because it has no succession machinery, no founder-control statute, no purpose-vehicle flexibility of the kind the Foundation provides, and no answer to a forced-heirship claim.

3. Assuming delisting is reversal. Chapter 1's first rule. Cayman came off Annex I in 2020 and off the FATF list in 2023; the substance regime that listing produced is permanent, and the onboarding classifications that changed during the listing did not all change back.

4. Substance theatre. A nominal local director who attends nothing, a serviced desk nobody uses, and a minute book written in another country. **A substance regime is not defeated by purchasing the form of substance**, because the test is applied to core income-generating activity and the evidence is the decision trail, not the address.

5. Treating The Bahamas' sovereignty as bloc independence. Four yeses on Chapter 2's test. Independence removes the Order in Council and the Foreign Secretary; it removes nothing that appears in the measurement.

6. Assuming a treaty benefit survives without substance. The principal purpose test in the Multilateral Instrument, domestic anti-abuse rules, and beneficial-ownership requirements in the treaties themselves each independently defeat a conduit. A Barbados entity claiming Canadian treaty benefits needs a commercial reason to exist that is not the treaty.

7. Relying on a cell ring-fence across a border. Segregated portfolio and protected cell segregation is statutory and territorial. Chapter 30.

8. USD correspondent dependency. Three of these four peg to the United States dollar and all four clear through United States correspondents. **A de-risking decision taken in a New York compliance department reaches all four jurisdictions on the same day,** and that single channel is a larger practical risk to an Atlantic structure than any listing has ever been.

9. Registered-agent concentration. A very large number of entities in these jurisdictions are administered by a small number of registered agents and corporate service providers. An operational failure, a data breach, or a regulatory action against one agent affects thousands of unrelated structures simultaneously. This is a concentration in a variable nobody measures, and Chapter 5's instrument applies to it directly.

10. Keeping an entity below the economic threshold. The break-even computation gives roughly USD 7.7 million against a twenty-five basis point tolerance. An entity below that is a fee generator for its agent and a filing obligation for its owner, and the correct action is usually to collapse it rather than to optimise it.

11. Small-jurisdiction reputational contagion. The FTX episode is the example. A licensee you have never heard of can change your bank's view of your jurisdiction in a fortnight.

12. Choosing the BVI to avoid litigation. After *Broad Idea* the BVI court will grant freezing relief in support of foreign proceedings. It is a litigation forum, and a good one.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. All facts invented. No sanctions nexus. Not advice. The carried case of SPINE section 6, with an additional constructed fact introduced here: the family's structure as found in year zero included four legacy Atlantic entities, accumulated over three decades by three different sets of advisers, none of whom spoke to each other.

The legacy position, measured

```
ENTITY                                          SHARE OF Q     BLOC
-------------------------------------------------------------------
UK holding and property                            40.0%       WEST
US listed portfolio and custody                    22.0%       WEST
Cayman private unit trust (family only)            14.0%       WEST
BVI holdco over the Thai operating company         12.0%       WEST
Bahamas discretionary trust (settled 1994)          7.0%       WEST
Barbados captive (formed 2003)                      5.0%       WEST
-------------------------------------------------------------------
naive HHI = 0.160000 + 0.048400 + 0.019600 + 0.014400
          + 0.004900 + 0.002500 = 0.249800
effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.249800 = 4.0032

bloc-HHI  = 1.000000    ->    EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 1.00
ln(1.00)  = 0
```

Six jurisdictions, an apparent effective count of 4.00, and one point of failure. The family had been told, more than once and in writing, that the structure was internationally diversified.

Now the cost of the four Atlantic entities:

CONSTRUCTED ANNUAL MAINTENANCE	USD / YEAR
Cayman private unit trust: trustee, admin, audit	26,000
BVI holdco: agent, ES return, financial return, accounting records	9,400
Bahamas trust: trustee fees, accounting, advice	41,000
Barbados captive: manager, audit, actuary, FSC fees	96,000
TOTAL	172,400

CONSTRUCTED. Illustrative budget, not a quotation.

One hundred and seventy-two thousand dollars a year, buying zero effective blocs. That is the sentence to put in front of the principal, and it is the only sentence in the engagement that has ever made anybody act.

Entity by entity

The BVI holding company over the Thai operating company — collapse. It performs one function, interposing a company between the Thai opco and the family, and that function is performed better by the ADGM holding company of Chapter 17, which additionally provides English common law, a bridge-bloc position, and dual-rail banking. The BVI company scores 3/1/1 on Chapter 6's job axis and loses on the minimum. The collapse is a share transfer with Thai regulatory consequences that must be worked through with Thai counsel; the transfer must be documented as a restructuring with a stated commercial rationale and must not be executed in proximity to any claim, which is Chapter 32's timing rule and Chapter 39's warning.

The Cayman private unit trust — collapse. It holds part of the listed portfolio for the family only, with no unrelated investors, no administrator performing a real function, and no fund purpose. It is a Cayman fund structure without any of the reasons Cayman fund structures exist. Cayman's genuine strengths — unrelated investors, institutional service providers, the Private Funds Act regime, the Financial Services Division — are all irrelevant to a vehicle nobody else invests in. At 14 per cent of Q it is above the economic break-even, so the case for collapse is not cost; it is that it contributes nothing to N and adds a jurisdiction to the reporting perimeter. The portfolio moves to direct custody under the Foundation.

The Bahamas discretionary trust — migrate, carefully, and not quickly. This is the difficult one and it is the one where the book's own architecture has to argue against itself. The Bahamian statute book offers instruments the DIFC does not: the Executive Entities Act 2011 in particular solves the protector-succession problem cleanly. Against that, the trust was settled in 1994, its beneficiary class does not reflect the family as it now exists, it sits in the Western perimeter, and — decisively for the carried case — Chapter 8's analysis holds: a common-law trust travels badly into the forced-heirship jurisdiction where one heir is resident, and a foundation does not.

The recommendation is migration to the DIFC Foundation, executed over a period measured in years, with independent advice to the existing beneficiaries, and on a timeline that has no relationship to any claim, because a restructuring executed in the shadow of a claim will be characterised as a response to it. Chapter 4's window audit is the governing analysis. The Bahamian founda-

tion under the Foundations Act 2004 was considered as an alternative apex and rejected on the perimeter measurement rather than on the merits of the instrument, and that should be recorded in the file as a considered decision.

The Barbados captive — commute into the Bermuda captive. Barbados was chosen in 2003 by an adviser with a Canadian practice. The family has no Canadian corridor, so the treaty network — the entire reason to be in Barbados — is unused. Bermuda offers Solvency II equivalence, NAIC reciprocal status, and a reinsurance market that will quote the excess layers described in Chapter 14. The commutation requires a counterparty willing to assume the run-off at a price and is the slowest of the four actions, which is the Chapter 14 run-off trap arriving in practice.

The result

```
LEGACY                                          DESIGNED
-------------------------------------------------------------------
UK          40.0%  WEST                         UAE         29.1%  BRIDGE
US          22.0%  WEST                         Thailand    18.2%  NONALIGN
Cayman      14.0%  WEST                         UK          16.4%  WEST
BVI         12.0%  WEST                         Bermuda     13.6%  W-lite
Bahamas      7.0%  WEST                         India       11.8%  NONALIGN
Barbados     5.0%  WEST                         Singapore   10.9%  BRIDGE
-------------------------------------------------------------------
naive HHI     0.249800  ->  4.0032             0.189002  ->  5.2909
bloc-HHI      1.000000  ->  1.0000             0.340000  ->  2.9412
Western expo    100.0%                           30.0%
eta ln N        0.0000                           0.3776
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Entity count went from six to six. Effective blocs went from
1.00 to 2.94. The naive count barely moved: 4.00 to 5.29.
```

The naive effective count rose by thirty-two per cent and the effective bloc count rose by a factor of 2.94 from a base of zero surplus, which is the entire argument of this book expressed on one family's balance sheet. And Chapter 37's honest companion result still applies: at the tested parameters the designed structure gives $h = -0.1226$, which is below the build threshold. Diversity bought the ability to build.

The disclosure test, applied in print

- Every collapse and migration described above is filed, minuted, and explicable on its own commercial rationale. Disclosure changes nothing.
- The Bahamian trust migration is the only element where disclosure carries any risk, and the risk is entirely one of *timing* rather than of *fact*: an identical transaction executed at a different moment carries a different characterisation. Chapter 32.
- No element of the redesigned structure depends on any authority not knowing about any other element. The four Atlantic entities were not removed because they were opaque; they were removed because they were expensive and contributed nothing to N.

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation with local counsel rather than cited, gathered for Appendix D:

1. Current revisions of: the Cayman Companies Act, Trusts Act, Mutual Funds Act, Private Funds Act 2020, Foundation Companies Act 2017, Insurance Act 2010, and International Tax Co-operation (Economic Substance) Act; the BVI Business Companies Act 2004 as amended in 2022 and later, and the Economic Substance (Companies and Limited Partnerships) Act 2018; the Bahamian Foundations Act 2004, Purpose Trust Act 2004, Executive Entities Act 2011, Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991, Investment Condominium Act 2014, and Commercial Entities (Substance Requirements) Act 2018; and the Barbados Insurance Act and the legislation enacting the 2018 convergence and the 2024 rate and top-up tax changes.
2. Every listing and delisting date in the Mechanism table, against FATF plenary outcomes and Council of the European Union primary releases. The Bahamas and Barbados EU sequences are specifically flagged as uncertain in this chapter and must not be reproduced without checking.
3. Cayman's Beneficial Ownership Transparency Act 2023: commencement date, enforcement date, the definition of legitimate interest, and the access mechanism.
4. BVI beneficial ownership filing with the Registry: commencing legislation, effective date, filing obligations, and access.
5. The Cayman restructuring officer regime: enacting amendment, commencement date, and the scope of the moratorium.
6. *Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd* [2021] UKPC 24 — the precise ratio, the composition of the majority, and its current application in the BVI — together with the statutory power in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Virgin Islands) legislation.
7. Cayman insurance classes under the Insurance Act 2010 and the current CIMA requirements for each.
8. The Bahamian Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991: limitation period, burden of proof, and the solvency element.
9. FTX Digital Markets: the dates of the Securities Commission's action, the provisional liquidation, the United States Chapter 11 filing, and the cooperation agreement between the officeholders.
10. Barbados: the current corporate rate and top-up tax mechanics and their effective dates; whether the Canada-Barbados and United States-Barbados agreements are covered agreements under the Multilateral Instrument and how the principal purpose test applies; the current insurance licence classes; and the date and terms of accession to the Caribbean Court of Justice's appellate jurisdiction.
11. CRS participation status and FATCA intergovernmental agreement model for each of the four.
12. Whether Cayman and BVI tax exemption undertakings remain available and on what terms.

The Scorecard — Cayman Islands

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	English common law. British Overseas Territory. Grand Court with a specialist Financial Services Division, Court of Appeal, final appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Deep, published, commercially sophisticated body of funds, trusts and insolvency case law — among the best in the offshore world.
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST.** Four yeses on Chapter 2's test: CRS exchange, FATF-standard implementation under domestic legislation, exposure to EU listing, USD correspondent dependency with a pegged currency. Contributes nothing to N that the United Kingdom does not already contribute.
3	**Court quality**	High, and the highest of the four. The Financial Services Division handles large cross-border insolvency and fund disputes; the restructuring officer regime introduced by amendment in 2021 and in force from 2022 gives a moratorium without a winding-up petition. Specialist bar; substantial published jurisprudence.

#	Item	Assessment
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Common-law recognition of foreign money judgments on ordinary principles, with statutory reciprocal enforcement for designated jurisdictions — confirm the designation list. Trust firewall provisions restrict the application of foreign law to Cayman trusts, but a firewall is a choice-of-law rule, not a non-recognition rule, and it does not defeat a judgment against a person over whom another court has jurisdiction.
5	**Substance requirements**	Real, from 1 January 2019 under the International Tax Co-operation (Economic Substance) Act. Directed and managed locally, core income-generating activities locally, adequate people, premises and expenditure; reduced test for pure equity holding entities. Fund vehicles and licensed insurers carry heavier requirements through their own regimes. Annual returns filed.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	CRS participating jurisdiction with exchanges from 2017; FATCA intergovernmental agreement with the United States. No non-reporting configuration.

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Beneficial Ownership Transparency Act 2023, commenced 2024, consolidating the register and providing for legitimate-interest access rather than open public access following the CJEU's November 2022 decision in *WM and Sovim SA*. Competent authorities have full access. Commencement and enforcement details: Register item 3.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT. USD-centric; the Cayman dollar is pegged to the United States dollar. No CIPS relevance. Correspondent concentration is the jurisdiction's largest single operational exposure.
9	**Political stability**	High. Stable administration, capable financial services civil service, no expropriation history. Structural qualification: United Kingdom constitutional capacity to legislate by Order in Council, exercised as leverage on transparency. Single-industry economic concentration.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Stable, after a genuine deterioration that has been repaired.** Evidence: EU Annex I February 2020, removed October 2020 after the Private Funds Act 2020 closed the fund-substance gap; FATF increased monitoring February 2021, removed October 2023; economic substance from 2019; beneficial ownership legislation 2023. The zero-tax and low-substance propositions are permanently gone; the institutional proposition — courts, funds regime, service providers, restructuring tools — is stronger than it was in 2018. **Cayman converted itself from a tax jurisdiction into a legal-infrastructure jurisdiction**, and the second is more durable. Downside risks: renewed listing on a technical rating change, as happened to the BVI; UK intervention on registers; correspondent de-risking.
11	**Job**	**HOLDING**, in the narrow institutional sense — funds with unrelated investors, and SPVs for large transactions where the counterparties expect Cayman. Not bridging: single-rail, single-bloc. Not operating: no market, no workforce. **Not an apex for a family structure**, which is Chapter 7's job.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it where unrelated third parties are involved and expect it; do not use it for family holding.** A Cayman fund with outside investors, a Cayman SPV in a syndicated transaction, or a Cayman insurance cell with real cedants are all correct choices. A Cayman vehicle holding only family money is 26,000 dollars a year for nothing, as the Worked Application shows. What would change the verdict: a durable EU or FATF listing rather than a short one; loss of the funds business to a competing domicile; a UK-imposed public register that institutional investors treat as disqualifying; or correspondent withdrawal.

The Scorecard — British Virgin Islands

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	English common law. British Overseas Territory. High Court and Court of Appeal within the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, shared with the OECS states; specialist BVI Commercial Court from 2009; final appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

#	Item	Assessment
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST.** Four yeses. The 2023 listing sequence is the clearest illustration in this book of how the perimeter operates: a Global Forum rating change on exchange of information on request triggered EU listing, which changed bank classifications, in under a year.
3	**Court quality**	High and improving, and the reason to be in the BVI. Resident commercial judge, substantial published jurisprudence on shareholder disputes, unfair prejudice, just-and-equitable winding up and asset tracing. Since *Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd* [2021] UKPC 24 the court will grant freezing relief in aid of foreign proceedings against a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Common-law recognition on ordinary principles; statutory reciprocal enforcement for designated jurisdictions — confirm the list. **The freezing jurisdiction after *Broad Idea* means the BVI actively assists foreign litigants**, and any structure selected on a contrary assumption is misconceived.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Real, from 1 January 2019 under the Economic Substance (Companies and Limited Partnerships) Act 2018. Since 1 January 2023 the BVI Business Companies (Amendment) Act 2022 has additionally required an annual financial return to the registered agent, made director names searchable, and tightened striking-off and restoration. Beneficial ownership filing with the Registry followed by later amendment — Register item 4.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	CRS participating jurisdiction; FATCA intergovernmental agreement with the United States. No non-reporting configuration.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Historically the Beneficial Ownership Secure Search System, a non-public searchable platform accessible to designated authorities; now moving to Registry filing with legitimate-interest access. Confirm commencement and access rules — Register item 4.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT. The United States dollar is the legal currency of the territory, so correspondent dependency is complete rather than merely strong. No CIPS relevance.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	Moderate to high, with a real qualification the other three do not have. A Commission of Inquiry reporting in 2022 led to a period of direct constitutional attention from the United Kingdom and to a governance reform programme; the territory retained elected government. This is the closest any of the four has come to constitutional intervention and it should be verified in its current state before being relied on either way.
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Eroding on the product, improving on the institution.** Evidence for erosion: economic substance from 2019; the 2022 amendments adding financial returns and accounting-record obligations from 2023; beneficial ownership filing; EU Annex I October 2023 to February 2024 on a Global Forum downgrade. The BVI business company's proposition was speed and cheapness, and the repricing computed in the Mechanism hit it harder than any of the other three. Evidence for institutional improvement: the Commercial Court's growing authority and *Broad Idea*. The BVI is becoming a place to litigate rather than a place to incorporate cheaply, and that is a smaller but more defensible business.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING**, narrowly — a single clean SPV or joint-venture vehicle where counterparties expect the form. Chapter 6 scored it 3/1/1 and it loses badly on the minimum. Not operating, not bridging, and **not an apex**.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for a single-purpose vehicle in a transaction where the counterparties want a BVI company, and for nothing else.** Do not use it as a holding apex; do not use it in the belief that it obstructs foreign litigants. What would change the verdict: a further Global Forum downgrade producing a longer listing; migration of the Asian joint-venture business to Cayman or Singapore; or a UK constitutional intervention going further than the 2022 process.

The Scorecard — The Bahamas

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	English common law. **Independent sovereign state since 1973**, not an Overseas Territory. Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, final appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Distinctive private-client statute book: Foundations Act 2004, Purpose Trust Act 2004, Executive Entities Act 2011, Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991, Investment Condominium Act 2014.

#	Item	Assessment
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST**, notwithstanding sovereignty. Four yeses: CRS exchange, FATF standards implemented under domestic law with a period of increased monitoring from October 2018 to December 2020, EU listing exposure, and a dollar pegged one-to-one to the United States dollar. This entry is the book's clearest demonstration that sovereignty and perimeter independence are different variables.
3	**Court quality**	Good, below Cayman and the BVI on commercial volume and specialisation. Competent judiciary, Privy Council apex, established trusts jurisprudence. Less depth in large cross-border insolvency, though the FTX proceedings gave the courts an unusually large workout.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Common-law recognition on ordinary principles; statutory reciprocal enforcement for designated jurisdictions — confirm. The Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991 limits challenges to dispositions by reference to a period and a burden of proof, both of which must be confirmed (Register item 8); Chapter 32's timing analysis governs whether it assists in any given case.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Real, under the Commercial Entities (Substance Requirements) Act 2018 as amended. Same architecture as the Territories: relevant activities, direction and management locally, core income-generating activity, adequate presence, annual reporting.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	CRS participating jurisdiction; FATCA intergovernmental agreement with the United States. No non-reporting configuration.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	A register regime exists and is accessible to competent authorities; not publicly searchable. The United Kingdom's Overseas Territories public register commitment does not reach The Bahamas, which is a genuine legal difference and a negligible practical one, since CRS and FATF requirements operate regardless.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT. Bahamian dollar pegged one-to-one to the United States dollar; complete correspondent dependency. No CIPS relevance.
9	**Political stability**	High. Long-established parliamentary democracy, orderly transfers of power, no expropriation history. Economic concentration in tourism and financial services, and physical exposure to hurricanes, which is a real and underweighted operational risk for a jurisdiction hosting registers and trustees.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Stable, from a worse base, with an unrepaired reputational component.** Evidence: FATF increased monitoring October 2018 to December 2020; EU Annex I appearances in 2018 and 2019 with removals following commitments (dates flagged for verification); substance legislation from 2018; a domestic minimum top-up tax enacted in response to the global minimum tax rules — confirm. Against the compliance improvement sits the FTX collapse of November 2022, which was a licensee failure rather than a regulatory failure but which nonetheless changed how counterparties describe the jurisdiction. **A small jurisdiction's reputation is a shared asset, and structures sited there inherit damage they did not cause.**
11	**Job**	**HOLDING**, in the private-client sense: foundations, purpose trusts, executive entities. Not operating, not bridging. Genuinely capable as an apex on the instruments alone — and rejected as one in this book's architecture on the perimeter measurement, not on the merits of the statutes.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it where a specific Bahamian instrument does something no alternative does —** the Executive Entities Act 2011 is the leading example — and otherwise prefer the DIFC. The statute book is genuinely inventive; the perimeter position is identical to Cayman's. For a family already anchored in a bridge bloc, adding The Bahamas adds cost, a reporting jurisdiction, and no N. What would change the verdict: a second FATF listing; further licensee failures of FTX scale; or — in the other direction — a durable divergence in Bahamian policy from the coordinated perimeter, of which there is currently no evidence.

The Scorecard — Barbados

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	English common law. **Independent sovereign state since 1966 and a republic since 30 November 2021.** Supreme Court comprising High Court and Court of Appeal. **Final appellate court is the Caribbean Court of Justice, not the Privy Council**, Barbados having accepted the CCJ's appellate jurisdiction in 2005 — the only one of these four not to sit under the Judicial Committee.

#	Item	Assessment
2	**Bloc alignment**	**WEST.** Four yeses. FATF increased monitoring from February 2020, removed February 2024; EU Annex I listing in October 2020 following a Global Forum downgrade; CRS exchange; USD correspondent dependency with a pegged currency. Distinctive in *product* — a treaty network rather than a zero rate — and not in perimeter.
3	**Court quality**	Adequate to good, with the least commercial volume of the four. The Caribbean Court of Justice is a serious institution with published reasoning and its own jurisprudence, but the corpus is younger and thinner than the Privy Council's, and a party accustomed to Privy Council supervision is buying a different and less-tested appellate product. Backlog in the domestic courts is a recognised issue and should be checked currently.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Common-law recognition on ordinary principles, plus reciprocal enforcement arrangements including within CARICOM — confirm the current designations. No non-recognition posture and none should be assumed.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Real, and arriving by a different route. Barbados was addressed under the harmful-tax-practices work for ring-fencing rather than for nominal taxation: the International Business Company and exempt insurance regimes were repealed with grandfathering from 2018, and a converged corporate rate introduced. Treaty benefits additionally require substance through the Multilateral Instrument's principal purpose test. **A Barbados entity needs a commercial reason to exist that is independent of the treaty**, and that is a heavier substance test than an economic substance return.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	CRS participating jurisdiction; FATCA intergovernmental agreement with the United States. No non-reporting configuration.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Register maintained and accessible to competent authorities; not publicly searchable. No United Kingdom Overseas Territories obligation applies. Confirm the current filing and access rules.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT. Barbados dollar pegged to the United States dollar; correspondent dependency complete. No CIPS relevance.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	High. Orderly constitutional transition to a republic in 2021 with no disruption to the legal system or to property rights — a useful data point on institutional maturity rather than a risk event. Small open economy with tourism concentration, sovereign debt history including a 2018 restructuring, and hurricane exposure.
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Eroding as a haven, converging as a normal treaty jurisdiction,** and that is the correct outcome for what it actually sells. Evidence: repeal of the International Business Company and exempt insurance regimes from 2018 with grandfathering; a converged sliding-scale rate; a move to a nine per cent headline corporate rate with a fifteen per cent domestic top-up tax for in-scope groups from 1 January 2024; FATF increased monitoring February 2020 to February 2024; EU Annex I October 2020 on a Global Forum downgrade. **Barbados is now a taxing jurisdiction with a treaty network, which is a normal** country, and normal countries do not degrade in the way havens do — they just tax you. The real risk to the asset is not listing but treaty erosion: a principal purpose test denial in the Canada corridor would remove the reason to be there at all.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING**, in the specific sense of licensed insurance business with local substance, plus a narrow **HOLDING** use for groups with a genuine Canada or CARICOM corridor. Not bridging. Not an apex.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it only if the group has a real Canada or CARICOM corridor and can** carry genuine substance; otherwise use Bermuda for insurance and the DIFC for holding. Everything Barbados offers a corridor-less group is available in Bermuda with Solvency II equivalence, NAIC reciprocal status and a deeper reinsurance market. What would change the verdict: a principal purpose test denial or renegotiation in the Canada agreement, which would end the case entirely; a further FATF listing; or, favourably, a treaty network extension into corridors this book's readers actually use.

Part V closes here. The architecture now has a supervised risk-transfer leg with a hard-to-reach reserve pool, a rubric for telling real risk transfer from its imitations, and four fewer entities. It still has zero bloc diversity, because everything in Part V sits inside the Western perimeter. Part VI goes to the Gulf, where that changes.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Statute revisions in these four jurisdictions renumber and consolidate frequently, and the listing dates in this chapter are marked for verification. Confirm every provision against the current revision with counsel in the relevant jurisdiction.*

Part VI — The Gulf

Chapter 17 . ADGM

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* This chapter describes how a jurisdiction works, what it costs, and where it fails. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in the ADGM and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Part VI opens on the Gulf, and on the strongest single piece in the architecture this book builds.

Abu Dhabi Global Market is the only jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom that directly applies the common law of England. Not a jurisdiction whose statutes were drafted in the common-law tradition. Not a jurisdiction that inherited English law at a colonial reception date and then drifted. Not a jurisdiction that treats English law as a residual gap-filler when its own legislation runs out. **ADGM takes the common law of England, including the principles and rules of equity, as it stands from time to time, and applies it as the law of the place, under the Application of English Law Regulations 2015.**

That single fact is worth a chapter because of what Chapter 10 established about the City of London. English commercial law is the most-chosen governing law for international commercial contracts on earth; its doctrines on interpretation, security, agency, fiduciary duty and remedies have been tested against more disputes than any other body of private law. The value is real.

Chapter 10 also established the price. An *English entity* brings the PSC register, the identity-verification regime tightened by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, the in personam jurisdiction of the English courts over its directors, the OFSI sanctions perimeter, and — the point that matters most for the measurement this book runs — a share of exposure sitting squarely inside the Western coordination perimeter. The conventional structure across the UK, the US, Jersey and Luxembourg scores an effective bloc count of exactly 1.00, and `ln(1.00) = 0`. Adding another Western-perimeter entity to a Western-perimeter structure does not change `N`. It changes nothing at all.

The whole argument of this chapter is a decomposition:

```
ENGLISH LAW  =  a body of doctrine and precedent
             +  a court system
             +  a territorial state with a tax system, a public
                register, a sanctions perimeter, and a bloc alignment

ADGM         =  the body of doctrine and precedent
             +  its own court system, staffed from the same tradition
             −  the territorial state
```

You can buy the law without buying the entity, and almost nobody who should be doing this is doing it.

What that decomposition is actually for

Three concrete uses, stated narrowly so the instrument is not oversold.

First, contractual certainty across a group that spans legal families. The carried case has a Thai manufacturing operation under a civil code, a UK company, a Bermuda captive, an Indian vehicle and a UAE trading company. The shareholders' agreements, intra-group loans, licences and security documents holding that group together need one governing law every counterparty's counsel can read, and one forum that surprises nobody. English law does that better than any alternative, and ADGM lets you use it without an English entity anywhere in the chain.

Second, a holding layer with a genuine legal spine. An intermediate holding company owns the operating businesses, grants the security, receives the dividends, executes the transfers on a change of control, and gets litigated over when the family falls out. The law governing its constitution and its shareholder relations is load-bearing in exactly the situations where everything else has already failed.

Third, a court that will hear the dispute in English, on the merits, applying law you can predict. Neutrality without enforceability is worth nothing, one level down as at the apex.

What it is not

Stated with its limits attached, because the commonest failure in this field is buying something for a job it does not do.

```
DOES:
  apply English common law directly, as it develops
  supply a common-law court with an internationally recruited bench
  supply cheap, low-substance holding and SPV forms
  supply a foundations regime as an alternative and a migration path
  sit in the bridge bloc rather than the Western perimeter

DOES NOT:
  add a bloc if you already hold in the UAE -- ADGM and DIFC are one
            country and one FATF perimeter
  remove you from CRS -- the UAE reports
  remove you from federal AML, sanctions or criminal law
  confer opacity -- beneficial ownership is filed
  confer a tax exemption by existence -- Federal Decree-Law No. 47
            of 2022 applies to free zone persons and the qualifying
            income test is a real test
  operate -- an SPV with no staff is not a substance answer
  bridge -- a holding company is not a treasury company; Chapter 6
```

Run CANON §1.1 against the first block. Every item survives disclosure without alteration; an ADGM holdco works *better* when the Thai registrar, the Bermuda Monetary Authority and the counterparty bank all see the same shareholder, filed and consistent. **ADGM is a surveillance-irrelevant instrument in the strict sense: its function does not depend on not being seen, and disclosure of every element leaves the function intact.**

Where it sits in the carried structure

Per SPINE §6, in the structure this book threads through forty chapters, **the ADGM holdco sits directly under the DIFC Foundation**, as one of four branches, and carries the Thai BOI operating

company beneath it:



The apex is a DIFC Foundation and this chapter does not relitigate that choice. Chapter 7 owns the Foundation, its statutory basis in **DIFC Foundations Law, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018**, its organs, its firewall and its scorecard. This chapter owns the branch: why the intermediate holding layer is an ADGM company rather than a DIFC company, a Jersey company or a UK Ltd, and what has to be true for that choice to keep paying.

The Mechanism

The constitutional basis, in one paragraph

Chapter 7 set out how a financial free zone inside a federal, civil-law, Sharia-influenced state can enact its own civil and commercial law: **Federal Law No. 8 of 2004 concerning Financial Free Zones** provides the framework, and entities inside such a zone are exempted from UAE federal civil and commercial law while remaining subject to federal criminal law and to the federal anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorist-financing and sanctions regimes. ADGM is a financial free zone created on the same footing, in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi rather than Dubai.

Verify with ADGM counsel: the establishing instruments. ADGM is generally cited as having been established by **Federal Decree No. 15 of 2013** together with **Abu Dhabi Law No. 4 of 2013** (the Founding Law), operating under the Federal Law No. 8 of 2004 framework. Confirm the numbers, the amendments to the Founding Law — including the instrument that expanded the ADGM's jurisdictional area beyond Al Maryah Island to Al Reem Island, which is recent and materially enlarged the zone — and the current consolidated text. Do not rely on any secondary description including this one for the constitutional layer, because everything downstream sits on it.

The Application of English Law Regulations 2015, read closely

This is the instrument the chapter turns on, so read what it actually does. It operates in three limbs, and the third limb is the one people forget.

```
LIMB 1   The common law of England -- including the principles and
         rules of equity -- applies in the ADGM, AS IT STANDS FROM
         TIME TO TIME.

LIMB 2   A schedule of specified English STATUTES applies, with such
         modifications as are necessary to make them workable in an
         ADGM context.
```

```
LIMB 3   Limbs 1 and 2 are SUBJECT TO ADGM's own enactments. Where
         ADGM has legislated on a subject, ADGM legislation governs
         and the English position is displaced pro tanto.
```

Limb 1 is the distinctive one and the phrase that carries it is *as it stands from time to time*. This is a living reception, not a snapshot. When the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom decides a contractual-interpretation appeal, or restates the law on penalties, or clarifies the boundary of the *Quincecare* duty, that development is part of the law of the ADGM without any ADGM legislative act. **A jurisdiction whose commercial law is automatically updated by the busiest commercial court system in the world, at no cost to itself, has a structural advantage that no amount of drafting can replicate.**

Compare the alternatives honestly, because this is where the chapter earns its claim.

```
RECEPTION-DATE MODEL   Many Commonwealth jurisdictions received
  English law as at a fixed historical date. Everything after that
  date is at best persuasive. Divergence accumulates silently, and
  the older the reception date the more expensive the opinion.

CODIFIED-DERIVATION    DIFC's model, Chapter 18. Own statutes,
  drafted in the common-law tradition, with English law available as
  a residual under the application-of-law cascade. Excellent, and
  NOT the same thing: the statute is the law, and the statute is
  only as good as its drafting and its case law.

DIRECT APPLICATION     ADGM. The English common law is the law here,
  updating continuously, displaced only where ADGM has legislated.
```

Limb 2 matters more than it sounds. English commercial life runs on statutes as much as on cases — sale of goods, misrepresentation, third-party rights, unfair terms, partnership. A schedule applying the core commercial statutes is what makes Limb 1 usable rather than merely elegant.

Verify with ADGM counsel: the current contents of the schedule of applied English statutes, which statutes have been added or removed since 2015, and the modifications applied to each. This is the single most-cited and least-checked element of the ADGM proposition, and a structure that assumes a particular English statute applies when it has been excluded or modified will fail on exactly the clause it was drafted around.

Limb 3 is where careless advisers get caught. ADGM has enacted a great deal of its own law — companies, insolvency, employment, data protection, beneficial ownership, financial services, arbitration, foundations — and on every one of those subjects **the ADGM enactment governs and the English position is displaced to that extent.** "ADGM applies English law" is true of the residual private law of contract, tort, equity, trusts, restitution and property. It is false of ADGM company law or ADGM financial services regulation.

Verify with ADGM counsel: the precise status of post-2015 decisions of the English courts before the ADGM Courts — whether they are binding, presumptively followed, or highly persuasive — and how that interacts with the ADGM Courts' own developing body of precedent and with the doctrine of stare decisis inside a two-tier court. This is a live and genuinely interesting question of legal theory with entirely practical consequences for how an opinion is written, and it should

not be assumed.

What is *not* imported

English law comes in as private law. It does not bring the English state.

```
NOT IMPORTED
  English tax law            -- UAE federal corporate tax applies
  English criminal law       -- UAE federal criminal law applies
  English public law         -- ADGM is an ADGM administrative order
  UK sanctions regime        -- UAE sanctions regime applies; but see
                                the Failure Modes on counterparty and
                                correspondent reach
  Companies House / PSC      -- ADGM has its own registry and its own
                                beneficial-ownership regime
  UK court jurisdiction      -- an ADGM company is not amenable to
                                the English courts by reason of its
                                incorporation
```

That last line is the entire commercial point. The bundle Chapter 10 priced — public register, identity verification under ECCTA 2023, in personam reach, Western-perimeter bloc share — attaches to the *entity*, not to the *law*. ADGM detaches them.

Note what this does *not* buy. Federal UAE anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorist financing and sanctions law applies inside the free zone, and an ADGM company that opens a US dollar account is inside the US correspondent perimeter for that account wherever it is incorporated — Chapters 18 and 38. **Jurisdiction of incorporation determines the law of the entity; it does not determine the law of the rails the entity uses.**

ADGM Courts

The courts were established under the Founding Law and operate under the **ADGM Courts, Civil Evidence, Judgments, Enforcement and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2015** (commonly cited as the ADGM Courts Regulations 2015). There is a Court of First Instance and a Court of Appeal. Proceedings are in English. Judgments are published with reasons.

Four features are structurally relevant to a holding layer.

The bench. ADGM recruited internationally from the senior common-law judiciary, with **Lord Hope of Craighead as founding Chief Justice**, and has maintained a bench drawn substantially from England and other senior common-law jurisdictions. **Verify with ADGM counsel:** the current composition of the bench and the current Chief Justice, which has changed since establishment.

Digital procedure. ADGM Courts operate on an electronic filing and case management platform and have run remote and paperless proceedings since early in their existence. For a family holding structure whose participants live in four countries, that is not a gimmick — it is the difference between a governance dispute being heard and a governance dispute being abandoned on cost.

Opt-in jurisdiction. The ADGM Courts' jurisdiction was extended to permit parties with no other ADGM connection to confer jurisdiction by written agreement. This is the same mechanism Chapter 7 described for the DIFC Courts under **Dubai Law No. 16 of 2011**, and it does the same work:

it lets a whole governance layer — a shareholders' agreement, an adviser mandate, a family charter — sit under one court applying one body of law wherever the parties live. **Verify with ADGM counsel:** the instrument and date effecting the opt-in extension, its exact scope, and any conditions or carve-outs.

Enforcement. Two directions, and they behave differently.

Outward into onshore Abu Dhabi and the wider UAE, ADGM Courts judgments are enforceable through a mechanism agreed with the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department. Onward into third countries, the ADGM Courts have entered non-binding **Memoranda of Guidance** with a number of foreign courts. As Chapter 7 said of the DIFC's equivalents, these state how each court understands the other's process. They are not treaties, they create no obligation, and no structure should be built on the assumption that they will produce a particular result.

Verify with ADGM counsel: the current enforcement protocol with the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department, the list of Memoranda of Guidance in force, and — importantly — whether the "conduit" question that Chapter 7 flagged in the Dubai/DIFC context has an ADGM analogue, that is, whether a foreign judgment recognised in ADGM can be enforced onward into onshore UAE. Do not assume the DIFC answer transfers.

Arbitration. ADGM has its own **Arbitration Regulations 2015**, modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law, and hosts arbitral infrastructure including the ADGM Arbitration Centre. **Verify** the current arbitral institutions present in ADGM and their case-administration arrangements; the Gulf arbitral landscape has moved considerably in recent years.

The FSRA, and the boundary a holdco must not cross

The **Financial Services Regulatory Authority** is ADGM's financial regulator, operating under the **Financial Services and Markets Regulations 2015** (FSMR) and a rulebook structure covering conduct, prudential requirements, market rules and anti-money-laundering.

For the purposes of this chapter the FSRA appears mainly as a boundary. A holding company that holds shares in its own group's subsidiaries, receives dividends, and makes intra-group loans is not, in the ordinary case, carrying on a regulated activity. A holding company that begins managing a portfolio for the family, arranging deals for third parties, advising on investments, or operating a collective investment vehicle **is** carrying on regulated activities and needs a Financial Services Permission it does not have.

This boundary is crossed accidentally, constantly, and it is one of the two or three most common ways a perfectly good Gulf structure acquires a regulatory problem. The drift is gradual: the holdco starts placing surplus cash, then places it for a cousin's company too, then takes a fee. Chapter 6's taxonomy is the prophylactic — an entity assigned the HOLDING job that starts doing something else has become the failure mode Chapter 6 names.

Verify with ADGM counsel: the current list of regulated activities under FSMR, the exclusions available to holding companies and to single-family offices, and the current ADGM framework for family offices and family businesses, which has been developed substantially and which may be the correct home for functions a holdco should not perform.

One further FSRA feature bears on where the jurisdiction is going: it published a comprehensive regulatory framework for virtual-asset activity in 2018, early by any international standard, and

has run a supervised regime since. **Verify** the current perimeter and rule references before relying on it; this is the fastest-moving part of the jurisdiction.

The Registration Authority and the company forms

The **Registration Authority** is ADGM's registrar. Company law is ADGM's own — the **ADGM Companies Regulations 2020** are the current principal instrument, replacing the 2015 version. **Verify** the current regulations, their amendments, and the associated rules, because the company-law layer has been revised more than once.

The forms that matter to this book:

```
PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES
  the ordinary vehicle; accounts filed; directors and shareholders
  on the register; the default choice for a real holding company

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV)
  a passive holding vehicle: no requirement for physical premises,
  registered office supplied through a licensed corporate service
  provider, no minimum capital, streamlined filing. Designed for
  holding shares, real estate, IP, or a single financing.

RESTRICTED SCOPE COMPANY (RSC)
  reduced PUBLIC filing, available on defined eligibility grounds
  -- typically subsidiaries of groups whose parent files publicly,
  and family-office vehicles. See the caution below.

FOUNDATION
  ADGM Foundations Regulations 2017; see below

BRANCH of a foreign company; LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP;
GENERAL and LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS; RESTRICTED SCOPE variants
```

Verify with ADGM counsel: the current Registration Authority guidance on SPVs — permitted activities, the requirement for a nexus or a corporate service provider, filing obligations, minimum director and shareholder requirements — and the current eligibility criteria and conditions for a Restricted Scope Company. Registrar practice on both has been adjusted since introduction.

The Restricted Scope Company needs a warning in bold, because it is the one ADGM feature that is routinely mis-sold. An RSC reduces what is *publicly* filed. It does not reduce what the Registration Authority holds, what the beneficial-ownership regime captures, what a competent authority can obtain, or what a CRS report contains. **A structure whose function depends on the RSC's reduced public filing fails CANON §1.1 by construction, and this book does not build one.** An RSC used because a family does not wish its private balance sheet on a public website, while every authority with jurisdiction holds the full picture, passes the test comfortably. The difference is whether the reduction is decorative or load-bearing.

The ADGM Foundations Regime

ADGM introduced foundations under the **ADGM Foundations Regulations 2017**. The regime has the architecture Chapter 7 describes for the DIFC: separate legal personality on registration, a founder, a council, an optional or conditionally required guardian, a charter and by-laws, the capacity to hold assets and shares in its own name, provision for migration in and out, and firewall provisions addressing the application of foreign law.

Chapter 7 owns the foundation as an instrument and this chapter does not redefine it. What it adds is the comparative point, and the comparative point is worth stating precisely because a reader who has just been told ADGM is the strongest piece in the architecture will reasonably ask why the apex is in the DIFC.

Two answers.

One: on the merits the two regimes are close, and closeness is the honest answer. Both confer personality, both permit purpose or beneficiary foundations, both permit reserved powers, both are supervised by a registrar in a UAE financial free zone, both are litigated in a common-law court with an international bench. A family with no prior commitment could build the apex in either. The differentiators are practical rather than doctrinal: the depth of the DIFC's private-client practice, the DIFC Courts' longer track record and larger body of published judgment, the DIFC's wills and probate infrastructure, and — pointing the other way — ADGM's direct application of English law, which answers the residual private-law questions around a foundation's dealings by English authority rather than by a cascade.

Two, and this is the one that is actually load-bearing: the second regime is worth more as a destination than as a domicile. Chapter 7's Failure Mode 4 is single-apex concentration. The answer to it is a live migration path — a place the apex can continue into, on short notice, without the family renegotiating its constitution from scratch. **A DIFC Foundation with a drafted, costed, rehearsed continuation into an ADGM Foundation has an option that a DIFC Foundation without one does not have, and the option is cheap while it is theoretical.**

State its limit at once. Migrating from the DIFC to ADGM moves the apex between two financial free zones of the same federal state. It answers a *legal-regime* risk — an unwelcome amendment to the DIFC Foundations Law, a Registrar practice that becomes unworkable, a court development that makes the DIFC firewall unreliable. **It does not answer a federal or country-level risk, and it does not change `N` by a single point.** The genuine out-of-country continuation options belong to Chapters 20, 22 and 27, and the migration memorandum should name one of those as well.

Beneficial ownership, tax, and substance

Beneficial ownership. ADGM operates its own beneficial-ownership and control regime through the Registration Authority: particulars are filed and maintained, and are available to the Registration Authority and competent authorities rather than being publicly searchable. **Verify with ADGM counsel:** the current beneficial-ownership regulations, their date, the definition of a beneficial owner as applied to a company held by a foundation, the treatment of nominee arrangements, filing deadlines, and the access rights of competent authorities and of foreign authorities. The foundation-holds-company case is exactly the case where the definition question has a real answer that must be obtained rather than assumed.

Corporate tax. This is the largest change to the Gulf proposition in a generation and it applies in

ADGM as it applies everywhere else in the UAE. **Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022** introduced a federal corporate tax applying to financial years beginning on or after 1 June 2023. Free zone entities are within the scope of the law. A **Qualifying Free Zone Person** may access a zero rate on **Qualifying Income**, with other income taxed at the standard rate.

This is a test, not a status, and holding companies are precisely where it bites. Whether a holding company's dividend, interest, capital-gain and service income is Qualifying Income depends on the qualifying-activities and excluded-activities definitions, on de minimis rules, and on substance requirements within the free zone. **Verify with ADGM counsel and a UAE tax adviser:** the current Cabinet and Ministerial Decisions defining qualifying and excluded activities and the de minimis thresholds — the framework was set out in decisions issued during 2023 and subsequently replaced, which is itself the warning — the current registration and filing obligations, the treatment of a foundation as a taxable person or as a transparent or exempt person, and the interaction with the family-foundation provisions of the corporate tax law that Chapter 7's Verification Register already flags.

Add to that the international overlay. The UAE has moved to implement a **domestic minimum top-up tax** aligned with the OECD Pillar Two framework for large multinational groups, with effect announced for financial years from 2025. **Verify** the enacting instrument, the revenue threshold, the effective date and the interaction with the free zone regime. For the carried case, whose groups are well below the multinational-enterprise revenue threshold, this is background. For a reader with a large group, it is foreground, and it is the clearest available evidence that the Gulf's tax proposition is converging with everyone else's — which is Chapter 12's thesis arriving in a place Chapter 12 did not cover.

Economic substance. The UAE economic substance regime applied to relevant activities including holding company business, with a **reduced** substance test for pure holding activity. **Verify with a UAE adviser** the current status of the regime: it has been amended, and the interaction between economic substance reporting and the corporate tax regime's own substance requirements has been the subject of subsequent decisions. Do not carry forward an economic-substance memorandum written before the corporate tax law without having it re-examined.

The Specification

Ten steps to build and hold the ADGM layer in the structure SPINE §6 carries. Each is written to be executed with counsel, not instead of counsel.

Step 1 — Fix the job before the form

Chapter 6's rule is the first gate and it is not a formality. Write down, in one line, which of the three jobs this entity does.

```
INTERMEDIATE HOLDING   own the shares of the operating subsidiaries;
                       receive dividends; grant and take security;
                       be the counterparty to the group's internal
                       agreements. NO trading. NO third-party money.
                       NO payments function.
```

If the answer contains the word "and", stop and split the entity. The bridging job — dual-bloc banking, treasury, multi-currency settlement — belongs to a different vehicle even in the same free

zone, because bridging attracts scrutiny, counterparties and regulatory perimeter that a holding entity should never carry. CANON §2 lists ADGM under bridging as well as holding; that is correct of the jurisdiction and is not a licence to put both jobs in one company.

Step 2 — Choose the form by rule, not by fee

```
IF the entity will hold group subsidiaries, sign real agreements,
   grant security, and possibly be audited by a lender or a
   counterparty
   -> PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES

IF the entity is a single-asset ring-fence beneath the holdco
   (one property, one financing, one IP portfolio)
   -> SPV, per Chapter 30

IF the group's parent already files publicly and the eligibility
   criteria are met, and the reduction in public filing is
   DECORATIVE rather than load-bearing
   -> consider RESTRICTED SCOPE COMPANY, having first written down
      in the file WHY the reduced filing is not doing structural work

IF the vehicle needs to be an ownerless owner rather than an
   owned company
   -> FOUNDATION, and re-read Chapter 7 before doing it
```

The last line of the RSC branch is a discipline, not a formality. Write the reason in the file. A structure whose privacy features cannot be explained in a sentence that survives disclosure is a structure that has drifted from architecture into concealment.

Step 3 — Capitalise it properly

An intermediate holdco with nominal capital and a large intra-group loan account is a standard arrangement and a standard vulnerability: thin capitalisation attracts transfer-pricing attention, weakens the entity in a subsidiary's insolvency, and gives a creditor arguing alter ego a fact to point at. Capitalise defensibly against the value held, document the loans as loans with terms and rates, and keep the intercompany ledger reconciled.

Step 4 — Elect the law and the forum, on purpose, in every document

This is the step that actually monetises the chapter's central claim, and it is the step most often skipped.

```
Governing law     ADGM law
Forum             ADGM Courts (or ADGM-seated arbitration where a
                  counterparty requires arbitration)
Documents         holdco articles; shareholders' agreement; the
                  Foundation's subscription and shareholder
                  arrangements; intra-group loan agreements; security
                  documents; IP licences; management and service
```

```
                    agreements; the family charter
```

An ADGM holding company whose material agreements are governed by the law of somewhere else has paid for English law and then declined to use it. That sounds too obvious to state; it is nonetheless the commonest defect in real Gulf structures, because documents get reused from previous deals and nobody re-papers the governing-law clause.

Two carve-outs are legitimate. Local-law-mandatory matters — Thai employment and land, UK real property, Indian regulatory filings — cannot be pulled under ADGM law. And an external lender may insist on English or New York law and its own forum; losing that negotiation is not a failure of the architecture.

Step 5 — Draft the constitutional documents for the dispute you will actually have

The disputes a family holdco generates are known in advance: removal of a director, deadlock on a disposal, a valuation on exit, an information request from a shareholder who has stopped speaking to the others, a transfer on death or divorce. Draft for those.

```
Articles          reserved matters; board composition and quorum;
                  pre-emption; permitted transfers; drag and tag;
                  valuation mechanism with a named independent
                  valuer and a fallback appointor
SHA               deadlock procedure that terminates rather than
                  loops; information rights defined by document type
                  and frequency; confidentiality; ADGM Courts
Death/divorce     what happens to the shares -- and note that in the
                  carried structure the shares are held by the
                  Foundation, so this clause is about the
                  Foundation's own succession, not the family's
```

Step 6 — Directors, and where they meet

Central management and control is a residence test in a great many jurisdictions, and it is decided on where decisions are actually made rather than on where the minute says they were.

```
Board             at least one director genuinely resident in the UAE
                  with real authority and real involvement
Meetings          held in ADGM, minuted contemporaneously, papers
                  circulated in advance, decisions recorded with
                  reasons
Prohibited        a board of directors resident in the jurisdiction
                  of the family's principal tax exposure, meeting by
                  telephone, approving papers drafted elsewhere
```

A holding company managed from the country you are trying not to be resident in is resident in that country, and the ADGM certificate of incorporation will not change that. This is Chapter 7's Failure Mode 2 one level down, and it is the most expensive routine error in the whole field.

Step 7 — Registered office and service provider, with the concentration checked

An ADGM SPV takes its registered office through a licensed corporate service provider. That is efficient, and it introduces a single point of failure: if the CSP, the DIFC Foundation's registered agent, the auditor and counsel are one firm or one small cluster of firms, the structure carries an operational concentration that no jurisdictional diversity offsets. **Chapter 5's instrument applies to service providers as readily as to jurisdictions, and almost nobody runs it there.**

Step 8 — Banking, with the bridging job kept out

Open accounts sufficient for the holding job: receive dividends, pay costs, service intra-group loans. Expect onboarding to require the Foundation's charter, the beneficial-ownership picture, source-of-wealth documentation and an explanation of the group that a compliance analyst can follow in ten minutes. That explanation is an asset; write it once, well, and keep it current.

Then stop. Multi-currency treasury, dual-rail settlement and counterparty payment flows are the bridging job, and belong in a separate entity with its own account structure, screening and risk appetite, for the reasons Chapters 6 and 38 give. CANON §5 states the governing distinction: a rail is not a holding.

Step 9 — Build the filing calendar as a first-class artefact

The maintenance term `C` in the storage law is not an abstraction; it is a calendar, and structures fail from calendar decay far more often than from legal defect.

```
ANNUAL      RA annual filing and accounts as applicable to the form
            beneficial-ownership confirmation / update on change
            corporate tax registration and return
            economic substance notification/report IF applicable
            data protection registration as applicable
            registered office and CSP renewal
            director and shareholder register maintenance
ON EVENT    change of director, shareholder, beneficial owner,
            registered office, name, articles
GROUP       reconcile the ADGM register against the Thai, UK,
            Bermuda and Indian records ANNUALLY -- they drift
```

That last line is the one nobody does. Registers in five jurisdictions that were consistent on the day the structure was built are not consistent three years later, and the first person to notice the inconsistency will be a compliance officer deciding whether to keep you as a client.

Step 10 — Write the exit before you need it

Two documents, both short, both drafted at formation while everyone is cooperative:

The continuation memorandum. Where this entity goes if ADGM becomes unsuitable: target jurisdiction, statutory mechanism, consents required, tax consequences of migration in each affected country, estimated cost and elapsed time. Review annually. **The value of a migration option is destroyed by discovering at the moment of need that it required a consent nobody had obtained.**

The unwind memorandum. How this entity is wound up, what happens to the subsidiaries, who decides, and the tax consequence where each family member is resident.

The Failure Modes

1. Buying English law and then not using it

The structure is incorporated in ADGM, the brochure quotes the Application of English Law Regulations 2015, and every material agreement in the group is governed by the law of the place the drafting lawyer happened to be sitting. The premium is paid; nothing is bought. Diagnostic: tabulate every agreement over a defined value with its governing law and forum. A thin ADGM column means the proposition was not implemented.

2. Believing ADGM adds a bloc

It does not. **ADGM and DIFC are two financial free zones of one federal state, inside one FATF perimeter, sharing one federal AML regime, one sanctions regime, one CRS reporting arrangement, and one political risk.** In the SPINE §2 measurement the UAE holds 29.1% as a single line, and splitting that line across two emirates changes nothing. This is Chapter 11's Crown Dependency Error with sunshine. What the second free zone buys is legal-regime optionality and a migration destination — both real, neither of which is N.

3. The SPV asked to be an operating company

An ADGM SPV has no premises, staff or substance by design, because a passive holding vehicle does not need them. The failure is asking it to invoice, employ, trade or claim treaty benefits: it will fail a substance challenge, a permanent-establishment analysis and a treaty limitation-on-benefits test simultaneously. The operating job requires an operating entity — here, the Thai BOI company.

4. The Restricted Scope Company mistaken for privacy

Treated above and repeated here because it is the ADGM-specific version of the book's central distinction. Reduced public filing is not non-disclosure. The Registration Authority holds the particulars; competent authorities can obtain them; CRS reports the financial account information regardless. A structure relying on the RSC to keep a fact from an authority with jurisdiction has failed CANON §1.1, and will fail in practice at the first properly framed request.

5. Board resident where the exposure is

Step 6's error, listed again because it costs the most money. The ADGM company managed from Paris, London or Bangkok is exposed to a residence claim there. Board substance is cheap compared with the assessment.

6. Regulated-activity creep

The holdco begins managing money: the family's own surplus, then a relative's company, then a friend's, then a fee for it. Each step is small; the cumulative position is an unlicensed financial

services business in a jurisdiction with a capable regulator. The diagnostic is one annual question put to the board in writing: *has this entity done anything this year for anyone other than its own group, or for value?*

7. Assuming the English answer without checking Limb 3

An adviser reasons from an English company-law authority to an ADGM company-law conclusion. ADGM has its own Companies Regulations, and where ADGM has legislated, ADGM law governs — the same trap exists for insolvency, employment, data protection and financial services. **English law is the residual, not the whole.**

8. The onshore enforcement assumption

A judgment of the ADGM Courts is one thing; enforcement against assets held onshore in the UAE or in a third country is another, and the Memoranda of Guidance are not treaties. Hold the assets that matter where the chosen court's orders bite.

9. The corporate-tax qualifying-income error

A holding company assumed to be at 0% because it sits in a free zone, without the qualifying-income analysis having been done, documented and refreshed. The regime is new, the implementing decisions have already been replaced once, and the analysis is entity- and income-stream-specific. This is a `C` item — pay it annually or expect the position to be wrong.

10. Service-provider and calendar decay

The CSP is acquired, the partner leaves, a filing is missed, the register drifts out of line with the Thai registrar's record, and the structure fails a bank's periodic review three years later. Nothing legal went wrong. The maintenance term was not paid.

11. Treating the holdco as the payments entity

CANON §5. The holding entity's account becomes the group's clearing account because it was convenient, and a passive vehicle acquires transit exposure, screening obligations and a transaction profile no compliance officer can reconcile with its stated function. Two entities, two jobs.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. Every fact below is invented for illustration. No real person, family, entity or transaction is described. Figures are illustrative and are not benchmarks. No sanctions nexus.

The carried case, unchanged from Chapter 7: a dual national, UAE tax resident for eleven years, aged sixty-three; three adult children resident in Singapore, France and the United Kingdom, the French-resident child in a forced-heirship civil-law system; a BOI-promoted manufacturing operation in Thailand; a UAE trading company; an IP portfolio licensed to both; commercial real estate in London; a listed-securities portfolio. Revenue in USD, EUR, CNY, AED and THB.

The apex is the DIFC Foundation built in Chapter 7. This chapter builds the branch immediately beneath it.

The problem this layer solves, stated as a defect in the "as found" position

Before the redesign, the Thai operating company was held by a Jersey company, which was held by a UK holding company, which was owned personally. The defects were four:

1. Every intra-group agreement was governed by English law with the English courts as forum -- which meant every governance dispute in the family was an English proceeding, with English disclosure, against English-resident directors.
2. The UK holdco put the group's ownership on a PUBLIC register with identity verification under ECCTA 2023 -- not itself fatal, but it added Western-perimeter share for no diversification benefit.
3. The Jersey company added a jurisdiction and no bloc: Chapter 11.
4. On the founder's death the UK holdco shares required a UK grant, and the Jersey shares a Jersey grant, before the Thai company's ultimate ownership could move at all.

Note what defect 1 is and is not. The problem was never that English law governed the agreements; English law remains the right law after the redesign. The problem was that the *entity and the forum* came bundled with it.

The layer as built

ENTITY	ADGM private company limited by shares
SHAREHOLDER	DIFC Foundation, 100%, registered holder of record
JOB	intermediate HOLDING. One job. Written in the board charter in one line.
HOLDS	100% of the Thai BOI operating company 100% of an ADGM SPV holding the IP portfolio (Ch 30) 100% of an ADGM SPV holding the intra-group loan book
DOES NOT	hold the UK REIT position (held directly by the Foundation -- Ch 29), the Bermuda captive (Ch 14-15), or the GIFT City vehicle (Ch 24). Those are separate branches by design: no cross-holdings, per Chapter 7 Step 9.
BOARD	3: the founder; a UAE-resident independent professional director with real authority; one non-family industry figure. Quorum 2, one of whom must be the UAE-resident director. Quarterly, in ADGM, minuted, papers in advance.
LAW	ADGM law and ADGM Courts in: articles, the Foundation's shareholder arrangements, all intra-group loans, the IP licences to the Thai and UAE operating companies, the management services agreement, and the family charter.
CARVE-OUTS	Thai employment and land: Thai law, mandatory. UK REIT holding: English law, at the REIT level.

```
            Any external bank facility: as the lender requires.
NOT DONE    no treasury function; no third-party money; no payments;
            no fee income from outside the group. A separate UAE
            entity carries the bridging job -- Chapters 31 and 38.
```

What changed, measured

The concentration measurement does not move, and saying so is the point:

```
AS DESIGNED (SPINE section 2, unchanged by this chapter)
  UAE          29.1%   bloc = BRIDGE
  Thailand     18.2%   bloc = NONALIGNED
  UK           16.4%   bloc = W
  Bermuda      13.6%   bloc = W-lite
  India        11.8%   bloc = NONALIGNED
  Singapore    10.9%   bloc = BRIDGE

  naive HHI = 0.1889  ->  effective jurisdictions = 5.29
  bloc HHI  = 0.3400  ->  EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 2.94
  Western-perimeter exposure = 30.0%
```

The ADGM layer contributes nothing to those numbers and it is not supposed to. The UAE line covers the DIFC Foundation and the ADGM holdco together, because they are one country and one coordination perimeter. What the ADGM layer contributes is on a different axis entirely:

BEFORE	AFTER	
governing law of group agreements	English law (= English common law as it stands from time to time)	ADGM law
forum for governance disputes	English courts	ADGM Courts
entity carrying the group ownership	UK Ltd, public register, ECCTA identity regime	ADGM company, filed BO, not publicly listed
entities between the apex and the opco	2 (Jersey, UK)	1 (ADGM)
probate steps to move the Thai opco on death	UK grant + Jersey grant	none -- the Foundation does not die
Western-perimeter share attributable to the holding chain	included the UK holdco and Jersey company	UK share now reflects only the REIT

The body of law is the same body of law. The bundle around it is gone. That is the whole trade, and it is available to anyone willing to read one set of regulations.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

- The ADGM company's existence, directors, registered office and accounts position are on the Registration Authority's record. Disclosure changes nothing.
- The beneficial-ownership particulars are filed and name the Foundation and, through it, the founder. They agree with the DIFC Registrar's record. Disclosure changes nothing, and the agreement between the two records is itself the asset.
- The Thai registrar's record of the operating company's shareholder names the ADGM company. There is no nominee arrangement of any kind; Chapter 23 states that nominee shareholding is a criminal offence in Thailand and is prosecuted, and this structure does not go near it.
- The intra-group loans are documented, priced, and disclosed in the accounts. Disclosure changes nothing.
- CRS reporting occurs by design and reaches the founder's and the beneficiaries' residence jurisdictions. It is anticipated in the tax planning, not defeated by the structure.
- The corporate-tax position is filed with the UAE Federal Tax Authority on an analysis kept in the file. If the analysis is wrong, disclosure produces an assessment — which is a tax outcome, not a structural collapse.

The structure passes. **Every element has a function that is stated in a document, filed with an authority, and unchanged by being read.**

What it did not solve, stated plainly

- **It did not add a bloc.** The UAE line was already there. A reader who builds an ADGM holdco under a DIFC Foundation and believes he has diversified has misread Chapter 5.
- **It did not answer country risk.** Federal encroachment on the free zone carve-out, a change in UAE policy, or a regional political event affects the DIFC apex and the ADGM branch together. The continuation memorandum names an out-of-country destination for that reason.
- **It did not remove the founder from any court with personal jurisdiction over him.** Chapter 39 carries those cases.
- **It did not pay the maintenance bill.** At the SPINE §2 test parameters the designed structure gives `h = −0.1226` against the conventional structure's `h = −0.5000`. Both are below the build threshold. The redesign improved the position by a factor of four and did not make it positive. **Jurisdictional diversity buys the ability to build; it does not pay for the building.**
- It did not remove the qualifying-income, substance or transfer-pricing questions. Those are annual work, and the annual work is `C`.

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, and gathered for Appendix D:

1. The establishing instruments of ADGM — the federal decree and the Abu Dhabi Founding Law, their numbers and dates — and the amendment history, including the instrument expanding the ADGM's jurisdictional area beyond Al Maryah Island.
2. The current schedule of English statutes applied under the Application of English Law Regulations 2015, the modifications to each, and all changes since 2015.

3. The status of post-2015 English decisions before the ADGM Courts — binding, presumptively followed, or persuasive — and the operation of precedent within the ADGM's own two-tier court.
4. The full title, current text and amendments of the ADGM Courts Regulations 2015; the current bench and Chief Justice.
5. The instrument, date and scope of the ADGM Courts' opt-in jurisdiction for parties with no other ADGM connection, including any conditions or excluded subject matter.
6. The current enforcement protocol between the ADGM Courts and the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department; the list of Memoranda of Guidance in force; and whether a "conduit" question arises for foreign judgments recognised in ADGM and sought to be enforced onshore.
7. The current regulated-activities perimeter under the Financial Services and Markets Regulations 2015, the exclusions available to holding companies, and the current ADGM family-office and family-business frameworks.
8. The current ADGM Companies Regulations, their amendments, and the associated rules.
9. Registration Authority guidance on SPVs: permitted activities, nexus and service-provider requirements, filing obligations, minimum officers.
10. Restricted Scope Company eligibility criteria, conditions, and the precise scope of the reduction in public filing.
11. The ADGM Foundations Regulations 2017: current text and amendments; guardian triggers; council composition; reserved powers; the firewall provisions; and the continuation-in mechanism from a DIFC Foundation, including consents, conditions, timing and cost.
12. The current ADGM beneficial-ownership and control regulations: the definition of beneficial owner where a foundation holds the company, nominee treatment, filing deadlines, and access rights of domestic and foreign competent authorities.
13. Corporate tax: the current Cabinet and Ministerial Decisions defining qualifying and excluded activities and de minimis thresholds under Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022; the treatment of holding-company income streams; registration and filing obligations; and the treatment of a foundation as taxable, transparent or exempt.
14. The UAE domestic minimum top-up tax: enacting instrument, revenue threshold, effective date, and its interaction with the free zone regime.
15. The current status of the UAE economic substance regime, its application to holding-company business, and its interaction with the corporate tax substance requirements.
16. Current ADGM fee schedules for incorporation, renewal, registered office and filings — the C term cannot be estimated without them and no figure in this chapter supplies one.

The Scorecard — ADGM

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	**Common law, by direct application.** The common law of England, including the principles and rules of equity, as it stands from time to time, under the Application of English Law Regulations 2015, together with a schedule of applied English statutes — subject always to ADGM's own enactments, which prevail where they exist. **The only jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom to apply English common law directly.** Distinguish from DIFC's codified-derivation model (Chapter 18) and from reception-date Commonwealth models.
2	**Bloc alignment**	Bridge. UAE maintains working relations across Western, Chinese, Russian and South Asian perimeters simultaneously; outside the EU listing mechanism and outside EU state-aid jurisdiction; not outside regulatory pressure, as the FATF episode in Chapter 18 demonstrates. **Shares the UAE line with the DIFC — this is one bloc position, not two.**

#	Item	Assessment
3	**Court quality**	High. ADGM Courts under the Founding Law and the ADGM Courts Regulations 2015; Court of First Instance and Court of Appeal; internationally recruited bench, with Lord Hope of Craighead as founding Chief Justice; English language; published reasoned judgments; electronic filing and remote hearing as standard; opt-in jurisdiction. ADGM's own case law is younger and thinner than the DIFC's — the counterweight is that on residual private-law questions the applicable authority is the whole English corpus.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Mixed, and the weakest item — as it is for every Gulf centre. Enforcement into onshore Abu Dhabi runs through a protocol with the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department. Outward enforcement rests on non-binding Memoranda of Guidance, which are not treaties and create no obligation. The DIFC "conduit" question has no assumed ADGM answer. Register items 6. **Design so the assets sit where the chosen court's orders bite; do not design on the assumption that a judgment travels.**

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Low for holding and SPV forms by design: registered office through a licensed corporate service provider, filed registers, board meetings in the zone. Two qualifications: board substance is not optional where central-management-and-control tests elsewhere are in play; and the corporate tax regime's own substance requirements for a Qualifying Free Zone Person are separate from, and now more consequential than, the historic economic substance regime. Register items 13 and 15.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	UAE is CRS-participating and ADGM is inside the UAE for that purpose. A holding company is typically a Passive NFE; controlling persons are identified and reported by the financial institutions holding its accounts. FATCA applies through the UAE's intergovernmental arrangement with the United States. **There is no non-reporting configuration and this book does not look for one.**

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Own regime through the Registration Authority: particulars filed and maintained, available to the Registration Authority and competent authorities, not publicly searchable. Federal Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020 governs onshore; the free zones run their own equivalents. **A Restricted Scope Company reduces PUBLIC filing only — it does not reduce regulator access, competent-authority access, or CRS reporting.** Register item 12.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT throughout, with genuine dual-rail optionality at the UAE banking layer treated in Chapter 18 and Chapter 31. The holding entity itself should carry no payment function: CANON §5, a rail is not a holding. An ADGM company's US dollar account is inside the US correspondent perimeter for that account regardless of the jurisdiction of incorporation.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	High by regional standards. Abu Dhabi holds the federal presidency and the largest share of the federation's hydrocarbon wealth and sovereign assets, making ADGM's sponsor the strongest single actor in the federation. Standing caveat: a hereditary federal system can change policy quickly and without a legislative cycle, which cuts both ways. Regional security risk is a country-level exposure shared with the DIFC.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Improving, and improving faster than any comparable centre.** Evidence: establishment in 2013 and direct application of English law from 2015; a foundations regime from 2017; an early virtual-asset framework from 2018; revised Companies Regulations in 2020; expansion of the jurisdictional area beyond the original island; and — counter-intuitively but decisively — the arrival of federal corporate tax under Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022, which *reduced* the jurisdiction's utility as a zero-tax product and *increased* its credibility as a substance and treaty location. **The asset this book is buying is bloc independence combined with institutional quality; both are rising here.** The downside risks are federal encroachment on the free zone civil-law carve-out, single-country political concentration shared with the DIFC, and a qualifying-income regime narrowing to the point where the holding proposition no longer prices.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**HOLDING — intermediate.** The ADGM company owns the operating subsidiaries beneath the DIFC Foundation and is counterparty to the group's internal agreements. **Not operating**: an SPV with no staff is not a substance answer; the operating job belongs to the Thai BOI company in Chapter 23. **Not bridging**: CANON §2 lists ADGM as a bridging jurisdiction, which is true of the jurisdiction and is not a licence to put treasury and holding in one entity.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it as the intermediate holding layer, and elect ADGM law and the ADGM Courts across the group's internal documents.** This is the strongest single piece in the architecture because it decomposes English commercial law from the English entity, and the decomposition is available to anyone. What would change the verdict: repeal or narrowing of the Application of English Law Regulations 2015, particularly the "as it stands from time to time" limb; federal legislation reaching into the free zone carve-out; decisions making ADGM Courts orders unreliable against onshore assets; a corporate-tax development removing the holding proposition; renewed UAE FATF listing (Chapter 18); or de-risking making ADGM entities unbankable in the branch jurisdictions. **What would NOT change it: anything that improves transparency.** Monitor items 2, 6 and 13 annually and keep the continuation memorandum current — including an out-of-country destination, because ADGM and DIFC do not diversify each other.

Chapter 18 turns to the DIFC beyond the Foundation — its own codified statutes, its courts and its regulator — and confronts the fact this chapter has deferred twice: the UAE was on the FATF grey list from March 2022 to February 2024, what that period actually required, and what its removal does and does not prove.

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in the ADGM and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location, and asset situs.

Chapter 18 . DIFC Beyond the Foundation

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* This chapter describes how a jurisdiction works, what it costs, and where it fails. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in the DIFC and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Chapter 7 took one instrument out of the DIFC and built the architecture's apex from it. It said almost nothing about the place. That was deliberate — an apex is chosen on the merits of the instrument — but it leaves three questions unanswered, and all three have to be answered before a family commits its holding structure to a single emirate.

What is the law here when there is no DIFC statute on the point? Chapter 17 showed ADGM's answer: the common law of England, as it stands from time to time, applies directly. The DIFC's answer is different in kind, and the difference matters for how an opinion is written and how a novel dispute is argued.

Is the jurisdiction durable? The honest answer requires confronting the fact this book has deferred twice. **The United Arab Emirates was placed on the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring — the grey list — in March 2022, and was removed in February 2024.** That is roughly two years during which every correspondent bank on earth re-rated every UAE counterparty. It is stated plainly here, with what it required and what its ending does and does not prove.

What does dual-bloc banking access actually give you? This is the claim most often made about the Gulf and most often made carelessly. It is worth something real and it is worth considerably less than the brochures suggest, and the difference between those two statements is a design problem with a specific answer.

This chapter answers those three questions and assigns the DIFC its second job. **Chapter 7 scored the DIFC as a holding jurisdiction and the verdict there stands unchanged; this chapter scores it as a bridging and regulated-activity jurisdiction, which is a different question with a different answer.** Chapter 6's taxonomy is doing exactly what it was built to do: the same place can be excellent at one job and mediocre at another, and a scorecard that does not name the job is not telling you anything.

The claim, stated at its true size

The DIFC is the deepest common-law-derived legal system in the region measured by volume of enacted statute, decided case law, and practising professionals. It has been legislating since 2004, litigating since shortly after, and regulating financial services through an independent authority for the same period. That depth is the asset.

Its weakest point is not its law. It is the correspondent-banking layer, which no jurisdiction on earth controls, and which the FATF episode demonstrated can be turned against a jurisdiction without a single law changing anywhere. That is Chapter 2's coordination mechanism, and the UAE grey-listing is the cleanest worked example of it available anywhere in this book.

The Mechanism

The DIFC as a legislature

The DIFC has enacted a substantially complete private and commercial law. The core of it, with the caution below attached to every citation:

```
APPLICATION      Law on the Application of Civil and Commercial Laws
                 in the DIFC, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004
CONTRACT         DIFC Contract Law, DIFC Law No. 6 of 2004
OBLIGATIONS      DIFC Law of Obligations, DIFC Law No. 5 of 2005
UNFAIR TERMS     Implied Terms in Contracts and Unfair Terms Law,
                 DIFC Law No. 6 of 2005
REMEDIES         Law of Damages and Remedies, DIFC Law No. 7 of 2005
COMPANIES        DIFC Companies Law, DIFC Law No. 5 of 2018, with the
                 Companies Regulations; and the Operating Law,
                 DIFC Law No. 7 of 2018
TRUSTS           DIFC Trust Law, DIFC Law No. 4 of 2018
FOUNDATIONS      DIFC Foundations Law, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2018
                 -- Chapter 7 owns this and it is not re-argued here
INSOLVENCY       DIFC Insolvency Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2019
EMPLOYMENT       DIFC Employment Law, DIFC Law No. 2 of 2019, amended
DATA             DIFC Data Protection Law, DIFC Law No. 5 of 2020
REGULATION       DIFC Regulatory Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2004
                 -- constitutes the DFSA
FUNDS            DIFC Collective Investment Law, DIFC Law No. 2 of 2010
RECENT           a standalone Digital Assets Law and a modernised Law
                 of Security were enacted in 2024
```

Verify with DIFC counsel: every law number, year and amendment above, against the current consolidated legislative index rather than against any secondary description including this one. The DIFC has re-enacted several of its foundational statutes — the 2018 companies and trusts package replaced earlier versions — and the 2024 legislative programme, including the Digital Assets Law and the replacement Law of Security, is recent enough that law numbers and commencement dates should be checked directly rather than recalled. A citation that was correct three years ago may now be to a repealed statute, and in this jurisdiction that is a live risk rather than a theoretical one.

The Digital Assets Law deserves a note because it is unusual. It addresses, as a matter of statute, what a digital asset *is* as an object of property, how control of it is established and transferred, and how it interacts with security interests and insolvency. Most jurisdictions have left those questions to case law and to law-commission reports. **Verify** its number, commencement and scope with counsel; it is the single most-cited and least-read DIFC statute of recent years, and forward links run to Chapter 32.

The cascade — and why it is not ADGM's model

This is the analytic centre of the chapter.

Where a DIFC statute governs a question, the statute is the law. Where no DIFC statute governs

it, the DIFC's Application Law sets an order in which other bodies of law are applied. The order is generally understood as: any DIFC law; then the law of any jurisdiction expressly chosen by a DIFC law; then the law chosen by the parties; then the law of the jurisdiction most closely connected to the facts; and, as the final residual, **the laws of England and Wales**.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the exact wording and current article numbering of that cascade in DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004 — it is commonly cited as Article 8(2), and the numbering should be confirmed against the current consolidated text — together with any judicial gloss on how the steps interact and how "most closely connected" has been applied in practice.

Set that beside Chapter 17's model:

```
ADGM      English common law and equity, AS IT STANDS FROM TIME TO
          TIME, is the law of the place -- displaced only where ADGM
          has legislated.
          => English law is the DEFAULT. The statute is the exception.

DIFC      DIFC statutes are the law of the place. English law is the
          LAST STEP of a cascade that runs when nothing else applies.
          => The statute is the default. English law is the residual.
```

Neither model dominates the other, and a chapter that pretended otherwise would be selling something. The honest comparison:

Where codification wins. On questions the statute covers well — contract formation, the measure of damages, directors' duties, insolvency priorities, employment entitlements — a codified answer in English, in one document, is faster and cheaper to advise on than a doctrine assembled from case law. It is also more accessible to a civil-law counterparty's lawyer, which matters in a group that spans legal families.

Where direct application wins. On questions the statute does not cover — a novel equitable claim, a tracing question through mixed funds, an unjust-enrichment restitution point, a fiduciary argument at the edge of the authorities — ADGM's model delivers the entire English corpus immediately and without an intervening choice-of-law analysis. The DIFC delivers it too, but only after the cascade has been walked, and the walk is itself arguable.

Where the difference is smaller than it looks. The DIFC's statutes were drafted in the common-law tradition and its courts are staffed by common-law judges who read English authority fluently. In practice the outcomes converge far more often than the structural difference suggests. The reason to care about the difference is not that one produces better answers; it is that one produces answers with fewer arguable steps, and arguable steps are what litigation is made of.

And the point Chapter 17 already made, restated because it survives everything in this chapter: holding both models is a legal-regime hedge, not a bloc hedge. **DIFC and ADGM are two financial free zones of one federal state. Together they are one line in the SPINE §2 measurement, at 29.1%, and no rearrangement between them changes N.**

The DIFC Courts

Chapter 7 established the constitutional basis — **Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004**, the Judicial Authority Law, as amended by **Dubai Law No. 16 of 2011**, which permits parties with no other DIFC

connection to opt in by written agreement — and it is not repeated. What Chapter 7 did not cover is the court as an operating institution.

Court of First Instance	general civil and commercial
Court of Appeal	final appellate within the DIFC
Small Claims Tribunal	low-value, expedited, no representation requirement -- unusually effective
Technology and Construction	specialist division
Digital Economy Court	specialist division for technology and digital-economy disputes
Wills Service	registration of wills for non-Muslims over defined UAE assets
Rules	the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), a procedural code in the English tradition

Three institutional points bear on structure design.

Published precedent compounds. Chapter 7 argued that a court which publishes reasoning is a court whose future behaviour can be priced. Two decades of published DIFC judgments is a real asset and it is the DIFC's clearest advantage over younger regional centres — including, on this one measure, ADGM.

The Wills Service is a succession instrument, not a curiosity. It permits non-Muslims to register wills governing defined UAE assets, providing a route to testamentary freedom over those assets that is distinct from the default position under UAE personal-status law. **Verify with DIFC counsel:** the current scope of the service — which emirates' assets are covered, which asset classes, eligibility conditions, and the interaction with federal personal-status legislation, which has been amended. Chapter 9 owns succession and this is a cross-reference, not a treatment.

Enforcement remains the weak item. Chapter 7's Verification Register item 8 — the Judicial Tribunal that resolves conflicts of jurisdiction between the Dubai Courts and the DIFC Courts, and the "conduit" question of whether a foreign judgment recognised in the DIFC can be enforced onward into onshore Dubai — applies with equal force here. The Memoranda of Guidance with foreign courts, beginning with the Commercial Court of England and Wales in 2013, are not treaties and create no obligation. **Nothing in this chapter improves that item, and no structure should be designed on the assumption that it will improve.**

The DFSA

The **Dubai Financial Services Authority** is constituted by the **DIFC Regulatory Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2004**. It is the independent regulator for financial and ancillary services conducted in or from the DIFC — distinct from the Central Bank of the UAE and from the federal Securities and Commodities Authority, which regulate onshore. It operates a rulebook covering conduct of business, prudential requirements for banking, insurance and investment firms, market rules, collective investment funds and anti-money-laundering, and it has a full enforcement toolkit including financial penalties, restrictions and withdrawals of authorisation, with a tribunal route for challenge.

Verify with DIFC counsel: the current rulebook modules and their citations, the prudential categories and their capital requirements, the funds regime under the Collective Investment Law,

and the current perimeter of regulated and ancillary activities. The DFSA rulebook is amended continuously and no structural decision should rest on a remembered rule reference.

For this book the DFSA matters for a reason that has nothing to do with wanting a licence.

A credible independent regulator is a bankability asset. A correspondent bank deciding whether to maintain a relationship, or an onboarding team deciding whether to accept a client, is running a jurisdiction-level risk assessment before it ever looks at the file. Membership of the IOSCO multilateral memorandum of understanding, a published enforcement record, a functioning appeals tribunal, and a supervisor that a foreign regulator can pick up the phone to are the inputs to that assessment. **Regulation is not a cost imposed on the structure; it is the thing that makes the structure bankable** — and a jurisdiction that competes by regulating less is competing itself out of the correspondent system. That proposition is the exact inverse of the traditional haven proposition, and it is why Chapter 1's havens degraded while the Gulf centres grew.

The FATF episode, stated plainly

The UAE was placed on the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring in March 2022 and removed from it in February 2024.

Start with what that is and is not, because the term "grey list" carries more freight than the mechanism warrants.

IT IS	a public statement that a jurisdiction has strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime, together with the jurisdiction's own high-level political commitment to an action plan with agreed items and deadlines, and ongoing reporting to the FATF until completion.
IT IS NOT	a sanction. A prohibition. A finding that transactions with the jurisdiction are unlawful. A call for counter-measures -- that is the separate "high-risk" black list, which is a different instrument and did not apply.

Now the part that matters to this book: **the FATF cannot fine anyone, and the FATF did not need to.** The effect of a listing travels through two automatic channels and one discretionary one.

Channel one: linked official listings. The European Union maintains its own list of high-risk third countries for anti-money-laundering purposes, and the UAE was added to it during the listing period. The consequence under EU anti-money-laundering legislation is that EU obliged entities — every bank, insurer, fund administrator and professional firm in the bloc — must apply enhanced due diligence to business relationships and transactions involving the listed country. That is not a recommendation. It is a legal requirement with supervisory consequences for the EU firm. The United Kingdom operates an equivalent listing mechanism and made an equivalent change. **Verify with counsel:** the specific EU delegated act adding the UAE, its date, the corresponding removal instrument and its entry into force, and the equivalent UK instruments. These are dateable regulations and they should be cited precisely or not at all.

Channel two: private risk models. Every large correspondent bank runs a country-risk model. A FATF listing is a hard input to those models. The output is not a refusal; it is a re-rating, which produces additional documentation requirements, senior sign-off for new relationships, periodic-review triggers, and — at the margin — exits from relationships that were already thin. This is precisely the de-risking mechanism Chapter 2 identified, and it is the reason the practical effect of a listing is felt by small legitimate businesses long before it is felt by anyone the listing was aimed at.

The discretionary channel: individual institutions, regulators and counterparties making their own judgments, at their own pace, with no obligation to explain.

This is the single cleanest demonstration in the book of the coordination mechanism. A standard-setting body with no enforcement power, no treaty, and no court produced an effect across every major financial system on earth within weeks, because its determinations are wired into other people's binding rules and into thousands of private risk models. That is what a coordination perimeter is, and it is why CANON's thesis is about perimeters rather than about secrecy.

What the listing period required

The critical fact, and the one most commentary misses: **the UAE's problem was not primarily its statute book.** Federal anti-money-laundering legislation was already in place — the **Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018** on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, with **Cabinet Decision No. 10 of 2019** as its implementing regulation — and the beneficial-ownership regime had been established by **Federal Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020** on the procedures of the real beneficiary, cited in Chapter 7. The FATF methodology assesses technical compliance *and* effectiveness, against immediate outcomes. The deficiencies were substantially on the effectiveness side: supervision, investigation, prosecution, confiscation, international co-operation, and the handling of the designated non-financial businesses and professions.

What the period produced, in outline:

COORDINATION	an Executive Office for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism as the national coordinating body, with a national strategy and a national risk assessment cycle
REPORTING	mandatory registration of financial institutions and of designated non-financial businesses and professions on the national reporting platform, with sharply increased suspicious-transaction reporting volumes
UBO	enforcement of the real-beneficiary regime, with penalties, licence consequences and strike-offs for non-filing entities
SANCTIONS	mandatory registration on the targeted-financial-sanctions notification system, with obligations to screen and to freeze without delay
DNFBPs	supervision built out for the sectors FATF flagged: real estate, dealers in precious metals and stones, corporate service providers, auditors and lawyers
ENFORCEMENT	supervisory penalties by the Central Bank on banks and exchange houses; Ministry of Economy penalties and

```
                licence suspensions on non-financial sectors
JUSTICE         specialised money-laundering court capacity;
                increased mutual legal assistance, extradition and
                asset-confiscation activity
```

Verify with UAE counsel: each item above, the instruments that effected it, the current obligations of a DIFC entity and its service providers under the federal AML regime and the DFSA AML module, and the current national risk assessment findings. The published activity counts for this period are government-sourced and should be treated as such — the FATF's own assessment of whether the action plan was completed is the independent datapoint, and it is what removal represents.

What removal proves, and what it does not

Removal in February 2024 proves that an agreed action plan was completed to the FATF's satisfaction and that implementation was verified. It does not prove that the underlying risk went away.

The UAE remains a very high-volume hub for trade, gold, real estate, and remittance — four of the highest-inherent-risk sectors in the FATF's own typology — sitting at the junction of South Asia, the Gulf, East Africa and the wider region. High inherent risk is a permanent structural feature of the jurisdiction's geography and economy, not a defect that was corrected.

Two consequences follow, and they point in opposite directions.

The optimistic one, and it is genuinely available: a jurisdiction that has just completed a FATF action plan under supervision has a fresh, externally validated AML regime, a supervisor with recent enforcement experience, and institutions whose compliance functions were rebuilt within the last three years. That is a materially stronger position than a jurisdiction that has never been examined, and the structures built after the remediation are being built on the new regime rather than the old one.

The pessimistic one, and it is the one to plan around: correspondent banks' internal models and institutional memory do not reset on the day of delisting. Relationship managers who exited UAE counterparties in 2022 do not re-enter in 2024 because a plenary concluded. The lag is real, it is measured in years at some institutions, and the practical residue outlasts the formal listing.

Verify with counsel: the current status of the UAE on the EU high-risk third-country list and the UK equivalent, including the instrument and date of any removal, and the current position of the major correspondent banking groups' published country-risk classifications where these are available. The listing status is the single most consequential external variable for a Gulf structure and it should be monitored annually, not assumed.

CRS, FATCA, and what actually gets reported

The UAE is a CRS-participating jurisdiction and the DIFC is inside the UAE for that purpose; Chapter 7's scorecard said so and it is repeated here only to attach the consequences. The UAE also operates a Model 1 intergovernmental arrangement with the United States for FATCA purposes. **Verify with counsel:** the implementing UAE instruments for CRS and their current versions, the DIFC-level guidance and the supervisory role of the DIFC Registrar and the DFSA as applicable, the FATCA arrangement's date and text, and each group entity's classification.

What CRS reports is financial account information: the identity of the account holder, the identity of controlling persons where the holder is a passive entity, balances, and gross proceeds — transmitted to the account holder's and controlling persons' jurisdictions of tax residence. It does not report the Foundation's charter, the group's structure, its commercial rationale, or its governance arrangements.

The design consequence is the whole of CANON §1 in one line: **because account information reaches the residence jurisdictions automatically, the structures in this book are built to be correct in those jurisdictions rather than invisible to them.** A structure whose function survives the CRS report is a structure that passes the disclosure test. A structure whose function depends on the report not arriving has already failed, and will fail at a specific, predictable, calendared moment.

One forward note. The OECD has developed a Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework extending automatic exchange to crypto-asset transactions, with first exchanges scheduled for the second half of this decade. **Verify** the UAE's commitment status, the implementing instrument and the commencement date. Chapter 32 carries the substance; the point here is that the reporting perimeter expands, and any structure premised on a currently unreported asset class is premised on a schedule.

Dual-bloc banking access — what it does and does not give you

Here is the claim, stated fairly, and then dismantled to its true size.

The claim. UAE banks maintain US dollar correspondent relationships and simultaneously maintain relationships and settlement arrangements with Chinese, Indian and other non-Western institutions. There are CIPS participants in the UAE. A local-currency swap arrangement exists between the UAE and Chinese central banks. The UAE participated in a multi-CBDC cross-border settlement experiment with the Bank for International Settlements' Innovation Hub, the People's Bank of China's digital currency institute, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Bank of Thailand, and the BIS subsequently announced its exit from that project. **Verify** the swap arrangement's current terms and renewal status, the current UAE participation in CIPS, and the status and governance of the CBDC project — all three have moved and all three are frequently misdescribed.

What it genuinely gives you. Optionality at the account level: the ability to receive and hold CNY, INR, AED, EUR and USD without every flow passing through a single correspondent chain; a counterparty base whose members are not all subject to the same national supervisor; and a real, measurable reduction in single-correspondent concentration, which is a quantity this book knows how to measure.

What it does not give you. Four hard limits, and this is the honest core of the chapter.

One. A US dollar account is a US dollar account. Dollar payments settle through the US correspondent system, are screened under US sanctions law, and are subject to US jurisdiction over that settlement regardless of where the account is booked or where the account holder is incorporated. Nothing about a DIFC address changes the law of the currency. Chapter 38 treats the compliance-engineering consequences; the design consequence here is that "outside the Western perimeter" is a statement about the *entity*, never about the *dollar*.

Two. CIPS is a clearing system, not a replacement for SWIFT. CANON §4 states it and this chapter restates it because the error is so common: many CIPS participants still use SWIFT for

the messaging layer. **"CIPS replaces SWIFT" is false, and any structure built on that premise will fail.** Chapter 31 owns the mechanics.

Three. The bank's risk appetite is not the jurisdiction's policy. This is the limit that surprises people. A UAE bank values its dollar correspondent relationships more than it values any individual client, and it makes its own decisions accordingly — as many UAE institutions demonstrably did from 2022 onward with respect to certain client categories. **A dual-bloc jurisdiction does not deliver a dual-bloc counterparty; it delivers a market in which such counterparties exist and must be found, onboarded and maintained one at a time.**

Four. A rail is not a holding. CANON §5. The optionality described here is *transit* optionality. Its parameters are hop size, exposure duration, counterparty pre-screening and mid-transit failure handling. Treating a UAE bank account as a store of value because the jurisdiction is neutral confuses an exposure-window problem with a custody problem, and the two have nothing in common.

With those four limits attached, what remains is still worth having — and it is worth having because it is measurable. Correspondent concentration is exactly the kind of quantity Chapter 5's instrument was built for, and the Worked Application measures it.

The Specification

Step 1 — Decide what goes in the DIFC and what goes in ADGM

```
DIFC          the Foundation (apex, Chapter 7)
              any DFSA-regulated activity the family actually needs
              the Wills Service registration, if applicable
              the family's professional and advisory relationships
ADGM          the intermediate holdco and the SPVs (Chapter 17)
              the group's internal contracting law and forum
NEITHER       anything that needs substance, staff or trade -- that
              is the operating job and belongs elsewhere entirely
```

The rule underneath: put the *instrument* where the instrument is best, and put the *contracts* where the law is best. Those are not always the same free zone, and there is no penalty for the split beyond a second set of registered-agent fees.

Step 2 — Confirm bankability before, not after

Build the legal layer against a bank that has already indicated it will take it. The sequence that fails is: incorporate, endow, restructure, then discover that no institution will onboard the resulting shape at an acceptable cost.

```
BEFORE INCORPORATION
  identify two candidate institutions, not one
  walk them through the intended structure in outline
  confirm the entity types, the ownership chain and the
    source-of-wealth narrative are acceptable in principle
  confirm the currencies and the counterparty geographies
  ask what would cause a periodic review to escalate
```

A structure that is legally perfect and cannot be banked has not been built; it has been drafted.

Step 3 — Write the compliance file as a product

Chapter 38 owns compliance engineering. The DIFC-specific instruction is narrow and concrete: maintain a single current document that answers, in under ten minutes of reading, who owns this, where the money came from, what each entity does, why each entity exists, and who to call. Keep the beneficial-ownership picture in it consistent with what is filed in every register.

A bridge structure that cannot answer a compliance question gets de-risked out of existence. The answer has to exist before the question is asked, because the question arrives with a deadline.

Step 4 — Build correspondent diversity deliberately, and measure it

Two or more banking relationships whose settlement chains are genuinely independent. Then measure with Chapter 5's instrument — and measure at the level of the **terminal clearing system**, not at the level of the bank, because two banks clearing dollars through the same US correspondent are one exposure wearing two names.

```
WRONG   count banks
RIGHT   apportion settled value by terminal clearing system, square
        the shares, sum, invert
```

Step 5 — Classify every entity for CRS and FATCA once, properly, and review it

Financial Institution or Passive NFE; who the controlling persons are; which jurisdictions receive the report. Do it entity by entity, record the reasoning, and review when the structure changes. The commonest defect is a classification made at formation and never revisited after the group acquired a fund vehicle.

Step 6 — Register the will if the personal assets warrant it

The DIFC Wills Service for non-Muslim testators, over the assets within its scope. Cross-reference Chapter 9, verify the current scope with counsel, and note that this addresses *personal* assets — the Foundation already removes the group holdings from the probate problem.

Step 7 — Corporate tax, once, across both free zones

Chapter 17 sets out the qualifying-free-zone-person analysis under **Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022** and it is not repeated. Do it once for the whole UAE footprint, DIFC and ADGM together, because the analysis is entity-specific and income-stream-specific and the two zones are inside one federal regime.

Step 8 — Write the relisting contingency

This is the specification item that distinguishes a Gulf structure built after 2024 from one built before 2022, and almost nobody has it.

```
TRIGGER    UAE placed on the FATF increased-monitoring list, or added
           to the EU or UK high-risk third-country lists
IMMEDIATE  notify all banking counterparties proactively, with the
           compliance file attached, before they ask
30 DAYS    confirm each correspondent chain is intact; identify
           which relationships are at risk of exit
90 DAYS    activate the pre-identified alternative relationship in a
           jurisdiction outside the affected perimeter
STANDING   maintain ONE dormant but live banking relationship
           outside the UAE at all times, for exactly this reason
NOT DONE   do not migrate the apex on a listing. A listing is a
           banking event, not a legal-regime event, and the apex
           migration path exists for legal-regime events.
```

That last line is the discipline. **Structures are destroyed as often by panic migration as by the event that triggered the panic, and the two failure modes have different answers.**

Step 9 — The annual monitoring register

```
ANNUAL, IN WRITING, TO THE COUNCIL AND THE BOARD
  FATF status of the UAE and of every jurisdiction in the structure
  EU and UK high-risk third-country list status
  each correspondent chain, and the concentration measurement
  DIFC legislative changes affecting the Foundation or the entities
  corporate tax position and any change in the qualifying rules
  CRS/FATCA classification of each entity
  register consistency across all jurisdictions
```

The Failure Modes

1. Reading delisting as "the risk is gone"

The action plan was completed; the inherent risk profile of a trade, gold, real estate and remittance hub was not altered, and could not be. Structures should be built to be defensible against a future examination, not to celebrate a past one.

2. Treating DIFC and ADGM as diversification

Chapter 17's failure mode 2, restated because it is the region's characteristic error. One country, one FATF perimeter, one federal AML regime, one line in the measurement at 29.1%.

3. Building on "CIPS replaces SWIFT"

CANON §4. The premise is false; a structure resting on it fails on contact with a settlement instruction. Chapter 31.

4. Assuming a UAE bank will bank anything

The jurisdiction's bloc position and the institution's risk appetite are different variables. Banks in bridge jurisdictions are frequently *more* conservative than banks in the Western perimeter, precisely because their correspondent relationships are the thing they most need to protect.

5. Assuming a DIFC entity is outside US jurisdiction

It is outside US jurisdiction as an entity, in the ordinary case, and inside it for every dollar it settles. Those are compatible statements and confusing them is expensive.

6. The unbanked structure

Legal layer built first, banking sought afterwards, at which point the structure has to be redesigned or abandoned. Step 2 exists to prevent it.

7. Confusing the DFSA with the Central Bank

A DIFC entity is regulated by the DFSA; an onshore UAE entity is regulated by the Central Bank or the Securities and Commodities Authority. Applying the wrong regime's rulebook produces confident, wrong advice — and the federal AML regime applies across both, which is where the confusion usually starts.

8. Assuming the cascade delivers English law the way ADGM does

It delivers it as a residual, after a walk that is itself arguable. Where the availability of the full English corpus is the point, the ADGM contracting layer is the answer, and Chapter 17's Step 4 is where that decision is made.

9. Relying on the DIFC Courts to reach onshore assets

Chapter 7's Verification Register item 8. Unresolved, movable, and not to be assumed in either direction.

10. CRS classification made once and never revisited

Classifications change when the structure changes. A group that adds a fund vehicle, a captive or a managed portfolio may have converted a Passive NFE into a Financial Institution without anyone noticing until a bank's periodic review notices for them.

11. The compliance file nobody maintains

Written at formation, accurate for eighteen months, then progressively wrong until it is worse than useless — because an out-of-date file presented to a compliance officer reads as a discrepancy, and a discrepancy reads as a risk indicator.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. Every fact below is invented for illustration. No real person, family, entity or transaction is described. Figures are illustrative and are not benchmarks. No sanctions nexus.

The carried case, unchanged: the dual national, UAE tax resident, three heirs in Singapore, France and the United Kingdom; the Thai BOI manufacturing operation; the UAE trading company; the IP portfolio; the London commercial real estate converted to a REIT position under Chapter 29; the listed-securities portfolio. Revenue in USD, EUR, CNY, AED and THB.

The apex is the DIFC Foundation of Chapter 7. The intermediate holdco is the ADGM company of Chapter 17. This chapter addresses what else sits in the DIFC, and how the group settles money.

What went into the DIFC, and what did not

```
IN THE DIFC
  the Foundation (Chapter 7)
  the founder's registered will over personal UAE assets, through
    the Wills Service -- scope confirmed with counsel
  the family's principal banking relationship
  the family's counsel and the registered agent

NOT IN THE DIFC
  the holdco and SPVs -- ADGM, for the reasons in Chapter 17
  any regulated activity -- the family has no need of a licence and
    deliberately did not create one. The single most common
    unnecessary cost in Gulf structures is a licence acquired
    because it was available.
  any operating substance -- Thailand, Chapter 23
```

The banking architecture, measured

As found, before the redesign, the group settled essentially everything through one UAE bank into one US dollar correspondent chain:

```
AS FOUND -- settled value by terminal clearing system
  US dollar system        100.0%

  HHI = 1.0000  ->  EFFECTIVE CLEARING SYSTEMS = 1.00
```

One number, and it is the same number Chapter 5 produced for the conventional jurisdictional structure. **A group with six jurisdictions and one clearing system has diversified its lawyers and not its exposure.**

As designed, settled value is apportioned across the systems the business actually touches:

```
AS DESIGNED -- settled value by terminal clearing system
  US dollar system         55.0%     (USD sales, London REIT
                                      distributions, securities)
  CNY / CIPS               15.0%     (Chinese supplier and customer
```

```
                                        settlement)
EUR / European systems   12.0%     (European customers)
INR / Indian systems     10.0%     (GIFT City vehicle, Chapter 24)
AED domestic              8.0%     (UAE trading company, costs)
                        ------
                        100.0%

HHI = 0.55^2 + 0.15^2 + 0.12^2 + 0.10^2 + 0.08^2
    = 0.3025 + 0.0225 + 0.0144 + 0.0100 + 0.0064
    = 0.3558

EFFECTIVE CLEARING SYSTEMS = 1 / 0.3558 = 2.81

IMPROVEMENT: 1.00 -> 2.81
```

Now the honest part, which is the reason this measurement is worth running rather than asserting.

The dollar share of 55% dominates the result and cannot be engineered away, because it is set by the currency of the revenue and not by the structure. To reach an effective count of 4.00, the dollar share would have to fall to roughly one third of settled value. The business sells in dollars; the London REIT distributes in sterling converted through dollar markets; the securities portfolio is dollar-denominated. **No amount of jurisdictional cleverness changes the currency a customer pays in, and a structure that pretends otherwise is optimising the wrong variable.**

What the redesign did achieve is specific and defensible:

```
dollar-chain dependence      100.0%  ->  55.0%
effective clearing systems     1.00  ->   2.81
banking relationships             1  ->        4 (two UAE, one
                                               Singapore, one India)
independent correspondent
  chains for USD                  1  ->        2
standing relationship outside
  the UAE                      none ->        1, live and dormant,
                                               per Step 8
```

That last line has no effect on the HHI and may be the most valuable item in the table. It is the relisting contingency, and its value is entirely in existing before it is needed.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

- The Foundation's charter is on the DIFC public register; the by-laws would be produced on a properly framed request; the beneficial-ownership particulars are filed. Disclosure changes nothing.
- Every banking relationship holds the same source-of-wealth narrative and the same ownership chain. Disclosure changes nothing — and consistency across four institutions is itself the asset, because inconsistency is the thing compliance functions actually detect.

- CRS reports reach Singapore, France, the United Kingdom and the UAE by design. They are anticipated in the tax planning in each of those countries, not defeated by the structure.
- The settlement architecture is a set of ordinary commercial banking relationships in currencies the business genuinely transacts in. There is no routing whose purpose is to obscure a party, and the book contains no such guidance — CANON §6.
- The corporate tax position across both free zones is filed on a documented analysis.

The structure passes. **Every element is filed somewhere, and disclosure of all of it to all of them changes the function of none of it.**

What it did not solve

- **The dollar.** 55% of settled value clears through a single system whose law is not the UAE's. That is a permanent feature of a business that sells in dollars.
- **The country line.** The DIFC apex and the ADGM branch are one jurisdiction at 29.1%. This chapter did not diversify anything; it measured and improved the *rail* layer, which is a different exposure from the *entity* layer, and the two must not be netted against each other.
- **The relisting risk.** It is managed by a contingency plan, not eliminated. The plan reduces the cost of the event; it does not change its probability.
- **The maintenance bill.** At the SPINE §2 test parameters the designed structure gives $h = -0.1226$ against the conventional structure's $h = -0.5000$. Both remain below the build threshold. Four banking relationships cost more to maintain than one, and that cost lands in C. **Diversity buys the ability to build; it does not pay for the building.**

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, and gathered for Appendix D:

1. Every DIFC law number, year and amendment listed in "The DIFC as a legislature", against the current consolidated legislative index — in particular the 2018 companies and trusts package and the 2024 Digital Assets Law and replacement Law of Security, including their numbers and commencement dates.
2. The exact wording and current article numbering of the application-of-law cascade in DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, commonly cited as Article 8(2), and any judicial gloss on how its steps interact.
3. The current DIFC Courts divisions, the Rules of the DIFC Courts, and the scope and eligibility conditions of the Wills Service, including which emirates' assets and which asset classes are covered and the interaction with federal personal-status legislation.
4. The Judicial Tribunal and the conduit question — carried forward from Chapter 7, Register item 8, unresolved and applicable here.
5. The current DFSA rulebook modules and citations, prudential categories, the funds regime under the Collective Investment Law, and the current regulated-activities perimeter.
6. The FATF listing and delisting: the precise plenary dates, the action plan items, and the assessment documents recording completion.
7. The EU high-risk third-country listing instrument adding the UAE and the instrument removing it, with dates and entry into force; and the equivalent UK instruments.
8. The federal AML instruments and their current versions: Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018, Cabinet Decision No. 10 of 2019, Federal Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020, and any amendments; the current obligations of a DIFC entity and its service providers.

9. The UAE CRS implementing instruments and current guidance; the DIFC-level guidance and the supervisory allocation between the DIFC Registrar and the DFSA; the FATCA intergovernmental arrangement's date and text; and each group entity's classification.
10. The UAE's commitment status, implementing instrument and commencement date for the OECD Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework.
11. UAE participation in CIPS; the terms and current status of the UAE–China local-currency swap arrangement; and the status and governance of the multi-CBDC settlement project following the BIS's announced exit.
12. Current DIFC fee schedules for registration, renewal and filings, and current DFSA fees where a licence is contemplated — the C term cannot be estimated without them.

The Scorecard — DIFC as a bridging and regulated-activity jurisdiction

Chapter 7 scored the DIFC as a HOLDING jurisdiction and that verdict stands. This scorecard asks a different question about the same place, and the answers differ in items 4, 8, 10 and 11. **That divergence is Chapter 6's taxonomy working as designed.**

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Codified common-law-derived, with English law as the residual step of the application-of-law cascade in DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004 — **not direct application, which is ADGM's model (Chapter 17)**. A near-complete private and commercial statute book enacted from 2004, drafted in the common-law tradition, in English. Deepest enacted body of law in the region.
2	**Bloc alignment**	Bridge, shared with ADGM as one UAE line at 29.1% in the SPINE §2 measurement. Outside the EU listing mechanism and EU state-aid jurisdiction; inside the FATF perimeter, as the 2022–2024 episode proved. **Bridge means relations across blocs, not immunity from any of them.**

#	Item	Assessment
3	**Court quality**	High, and the strongest in the region on published-precedent depth. DIFC Courts under Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004 as amended by Dubai Law No. 16 of 2011; international bench; English language; two decades of reasoned judgments; specialist divisions including a Digital Economy Court; an unusually effective Small Claims Tribunal; opt-in jurisdiction for unconnected parties.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	**Weak, and weaker for a bridging entity than for a holding entity** — a bridge exists to transact with counterparties abroad, and those counterparties will want a judgment that travels. DIFC judgments enforce into onshore Dubai through the Judicial Authority Law protocol. Outward, the Memoranda of Guidance beginning with the Commercial Court of England and Wales in 2013 are not treaties. The conduit question sits with the Judicial Tribunal and has moved. **Where enforceability against a foreign counterparty is the point, arbitrate under the New York Convention rather than litigate.**

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Low for a passive vehicle; real for a DFSA-regulated entity, which requires premises, staff, a compliance officer, a money-laundering reporting officer and capital by category. **A bridging entity that carries payment flows should expect to look like a real business, because a bridge with no substance is the profile that attracts the de-risking decision.**
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	UAE is CRS-participating; the DIFC is inside the UAE for that purpose; FATCA applies through the UAE's Model 1 arrangement. Account information — holder, controlling persons, balances, gross proceeds — reaches residence jurisdictions automatically. **There is no non-reporting configuration and this book does not look for one.** Register items 9 and 10.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Own UBO regime through the DIFC Registrar: filed and maintained, available to the Registrar and competent authorities, not publicly searchable. Federal Cabinet Resolution No. 58 of 2020 governs onshore and its enforcement was a central element of the FATF remediation. Charter public; by-laws private but discoverable.

#	Item	Assessment
8	**Rail access**	**The item this chapter exists to qualify.** SWIFT throughout; genuine multi-currency and multi-counterparty optionality at the UAE banking layer; CIPS participation in the market. But: a dollar account settles under US law wherever it is booked; **CIPS is a clearing system and many participants still use SWIFT for messaging — "CIPS replaces SWIFT" is false**; the bank's risk appetite is not the jurisdiction's policy; and CANON §5 governs — a rail is not a holding. Measure at the terminal clearing system, not at the bank. Chapters 31 and 32.
9	**Political stability**	High by regional standards, with the standing caveat that a hereditary federal system changes policy quickly and without a legislative cycle. Regional security risk is a country-level exposure shared with ADGM. Dubai's economy is more leveraged to trade, tourism and real estate than Abu Dhabi's is to hydrocarbons, which is a different risk profile within the same federation.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Improving, from a base that measurably worsened and then recovered — and the round trip is the evidence.** FATF increased monitoring from March 2022 to February 2024, with the EU and UK high-risk listings that followed automatically from it; remediation across supervision, reporting, beneficial ownership, sanctions implementation and non-financial-sector oversight; delisting after verified implementation. Alongside it: federal corporate tax under Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022, a domestic minimum top-up tax aligned to Pillar Two, a UBO regime built out from 2020, continuing legislative modernisation including the 2024 digital assets and security package. The direction is toward a well-regulated, taxed, transparent centre, and that is not degradation of the asset this book buys — **the asset is bloc independence with institutional quality, and both rose across the episode.** The genuine downside risks: relisting; correspondent-bank memory outlasting the delisting; federal encroachment on the free zone civil-law carve-out; and single-country concentration shared with ADGM.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**BRIDGING, and regulated activity where genuinely required. Not the same answer as Chapter 7's.** The DIFC is where the apex sits because of one statute, and where the group banks because of the market. It is **not** the intermediate holding layer — that is ADGM, Chapter 17 — and it is **not** an operating jurisdiction. The bridging function belongs in an entity separate from the Foundation: CANON §5, and Chapter 6's rule that one entity does one job.

#	Item	Assessment
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it for the apex, for banking, and for a regulated activity only if one is genuinely needed — and never acquire a licence because it is available.** The DIFC's law is deep, its court is the best-precedented in the region, and its regulator is the reason its entities can be banked. Its exposure is the correspondent layer, which it does not control. What would change the verdict: renewed FATF listing, or an EU or UK high-risk listing arising independently; a de-risking cycle making DIFC entities unbankable in the branch jurisdictions; federal legislation reaching into the free zone civil-law carve-out; a Judicial Tribunal line making DIFC orders unreliable; or a corporate tax development that removes the free zone proposition without replacing it with treaty access. **What would NOT change it: further tightening of AML supervision or transparency, which strengthens the asset rather than eroding it.** Monitor items 4, 7, 8 and 10 of the Verification Register annually, and keep the Step 8 relisting contingency live and rehearsed.

Chapter 19 leaves the UAE for the other two Gulf centres that matter — the Qatar Financial Centre and Saudi Arabia's Regional Headquarters programme — and applies the same measurement to both, including the question this chapter has raised and not answered: what happens to a Gulf structure when the Gulf states act against one of their own.

Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in

the DIFC and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location, and asset situs.

Chapter 19 . Qatar and Saudi Arabia

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice.* This chapter describes how two jurisdictions work, what they cost, and where they fail. It is a map, not a permission. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in Qatar and in Saudi Arabia and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location and asset situs. All worked cases are **CONSTRUCTED** and labelled as such.

The Position

Chapters 17 and 18 built the Gulf leg of the architecture out of two financial free zones in one country, and both chapters ended on the same warning: the Emirates are one line in the measurement, and no rearrangement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai changes N.

This chapter asks the obvious next question. If the UAE is one line, does adding Qatar or Saudi Arabia add another?

The answer, worked in full below, is **no — and the arithmetic is worse than "no", because adding Gulf jurisdictions raises the naive count while lowering the honest one.** That result is exactly Chapter 11's Crown Dependency Error transplanted to a hotter climate, and it is the single most important thing this chapter has to say.

The proof is not theoretical

Chapter 2 defined a coordination perimeter as a set of jurisdictions that share a mechanism and therefore fail together. The Gulf Cooperation Council states share several: the FATF and MENAFATF assessment process, the OECD Global Forum, an effectively common exposure to United States correspondent-banking policy, dollar pegs, hydrocarbon revenue correlation, and a regional security environment that no member can opt out of.

But the demonstration that matters is not any of those. It is this:

On 5 June 2017 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and closed their land, sea and air links to it. The rupture lasted until the Al-Ula Declaration of 5 January 2021.

Read that as a structural fact rather than as a news item. For three and a half years, a GCC-resident family with a Doha holding company and an Abu Dhabi operating company held two parts of one structure in states that had closed their borders to each other. Flights stopped. Some banking relationships were curtailed. The offshore Qatari riyal traded away from its peg for a period. **Verify** the specific banking and currency effects with counsel and with contemporaneous market data before relying on any characterisation of them, including this one — the qualitative fact of disruption is well established; the quantitative detail is not something to assert from memory.

The event is doing two different pieces of work in this chapter and they must not be conflated.

```
CO-VARIANCE RISK   GCC states respond TOGETHER to external
                   coordination -- FATF, OECD, US correspondent
                   policy. This is Chapter 2's mechanism and it is
                   why they are one bloc for measurement purposes.
```

INTRA-BLOC RISK	GCC states have acted AGAINST one another, within the last decade, at speed, with physical closure of borders. This is a failure mode the Western perimeter does not have in the same form.

A structure spread across the Gulf carries both risks at once: it does not diversify against external coordination, and it acquires an internal fracture risk that a UAE-only structure does not have. That is a genuinely unusual combination and it is why this chapter's conclusions are narrower than the marketing.

So what are these jurisdictions for?

Not diversification. Two other things, and they are quite different from each other.

Qatar offers a common-law-based financial centre with a structural feature neither the DIFC nor ADGM has: **the Qatar Financial Centre is not territorially confined.** A QFC-licensed entity may operate anywhere in Qatar. That converts the QFC from a legal enclave into a legal *regime*, and it means a QFC company can be a genuine operating entity in the domestic economy — something a DIFC company cannot be in Dubai. For a family with real Qatari business, that is not a footnote.

Saudi Arabia offers the largest economy in the region and a programme that makes physical presence a precondition of access to a specific and very large customer: the state itself. **The Regional Headquarters programme is not a tax incentive with a substance requirement attached; it is a market-access requirement with a tax incentive attached, and the difference determines whether it belongs in your structure.**

Neither is a holding jurisdiction. Both are scored honestly below, and one of them scores badly on an item that this book cares about more than almost any other.

The Mechanism

Qatar: the QFC and its legal framework

The **Qatar Financial Centre** was established by **QFC Law No. 7 of 2005**. **Verify with QFC counsel:** the law's number and date and its amendments, which are cited inconsistently in secondary sources.

The institutional structure runs on four bodies:

QFC AUTHORITY (QFCA)	commercial and strategic body; licensing of non-regulated firms; companies registry function
QFC REGULATORY AUTHORITY (QFCRA)	independent financial regulator for QFC-authorised firms
QFC CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL COURT	the court, sitting within the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre (QICDRC)
QFC REGULATORY TRIBUNAL	appeals from regulatory decisions

The legal regime. The QFC has enacted its own regulations across contract, companies, employment, trusts, foundations, data protection, insolvency and tax, drafted in the common-law

tradition and applied by a common-law court. **Verify with QFC counsel:** the current titles, years and amendment status of the QFC Contract Regulations, Companies Regulations, Employment Regulations, Trust Regulations, Foundation Regulations, Data Protection Regulations, Insolvency Regulations and Tax Regulations. The QFC introduced foundations during the last decade and has built out a family-office framework more recently; both should be confirmed directly rather than assumed to mirror the DIFC's.

The court. The QFC Civil and Commercial Court has an internationally recruited bench and was founded under the presidency of **Lord Woolf**, formerly Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. It hears civil and commercial disputes involving QFC entities and, by agreement, others. **Verify** the current bench and President, the court's current jurisdictional scope including any opt-in mechanism for unconnected parties, and its enforcement arrangements with the Qatari state courts.

The distinguishing feature. State it precisely, because it is the reason the QFC is worth a section rather than a sentence. The DIFC and ADGM are geographically defined enclaves: their entities are established in a defined area and their own law governs within it. **A QFC-licensed entity may conduct its permitted activities anywhere in the State of Qatar while remaining under QFC law, QFC regulation and the QFC Court.** That is a structurally different proposition. It permits a common-law-governed entity to hold Qatari operating assets and employ people across the country without leaving the regime.

Verify with QFC counsel: the exact scope of that permission, the activities to which it extends, any sectoral carve-outs, and the interaction with onshore Qatari law for matters such as real property, employment of Qatari nationals, and public procurement. The general principle is well established; the boundaries are what a structure actually lives on.

Tax. The QFC operates its own tax regime under the QFC Tax Regulations, generally described as a corporate tax on locally-sourced profits at a rate of 10%, with 100% foreign ownership permitted and no restriction on profit repatriation. Onshore Qatar operates its own income tax law. **Verify with Qatari tax counsel:** the QFC rate and its base, the source rules, the treatment of holding and investment income, the current onshore income tax law and its number, and — importantly — the status of Qatar's implementation of the OECD Pillar Two global minimum tax and any domestic minimum top-up tax, which is recent and materially changes the position for large groups.

Transparency and standards. Qatar is a CRS-participating jurisdiction and operates a FATCA intergovernmental arrangement. It has been assessed through the FATF/MENAFATF mutual evaluation process. **It has not been placed on the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. Verify** the date and outcome of the most recent mutual evaluation and follow-up reports, the CRS and FATCA implementing instruments, and the QFC-level beneficial-ownership regime and its access rules.

Rails and stability. The riyal is pegged to the US dollar; the banking system runs on SWIFT under Qatar Central Bank supervision, with a central bank digital currency project in development — **verify** its status and scope. Qatar's fiscal position rests on liquefied natural gas, with the North Field expansion programme extending it, and on the Qatar Investment Authority.

Politics, stated fully. Qatar occupies the most genuinely cross-bloc position of any Gulf state: it hosts a major United States military installation and has been designated a major non-NATO ally of the United States; it shares the world's largest gas field with Iran; it maintains close relations with Türkiye; and it has repeatedly acted as a mediator in disputes involving parties that do not speak to each other. **Verify** the designation date and the current status of each of those relationships.

For a book about bridging blocs, that profile is genuinely interesting — and it is precisely the profile that made Qatar's neighbours close their borders to it in 2017. **The same characteristics that make a state a bridge make it a target for the bloc it bridges from.**

Saudi Arabia: a different animal entirely

Start with the fact that most treatments bury.

Saudi Arabia has no common-law financial free zone with its own private law and its own English-language court. There is no Saudi DIFC, no Saudi ADGM, no Saudi QFC. Saudi commercial law is Saudi law: derived from Sharia, supplemented by an expanding body of codified regulation issued by Royal Decree, and applied by the Saudi courts.

That is not a criticism. It is a category difference, and structures fail when the category is misread. Everything else in this section follows from it.

The codification wave, which is real and recent. Saudi Arabia has enacted, in a short period, a body of commercial legislation that materially improves contractual predictability:

CIVIL TRANSACTIONS LAW	the Kingdom's first codified civil code, issued by Royal Decree in 2023 and in force from late 2023. Codifies contract, obligations, property and related doctrine.
COMPANIES LAW	issued by Royal Decree in 2022, effective 2023; modernised corporate forms and governance
INVESTMENT LAW	a replacement investment law approved in 2024 with effect from 2025
BANKRUPTCY LAW	enacted in 2018, with implementing regulations
COMMERCIAL COURTS LAW	specialised commercial court procedure
ENFORCEMENT LAW	judgment and award enforcement

Verify with Saudi counsel: the Royal Decree number (M-number) and Hijri and Gregorian dates for every instrument above, its implementing regulations, and its commencement and transitional provisions. **Do not cite any of these by number from memory or from a secondary source** — this is the highest-risk citation area in this chapter and the numbering conventions make errors easy and consequential.

The Civil Transactions Law deserves particular attention. Before it, a commercial party's principal uncertainty in Saudi Arabia was not the substantive rule but the *predictability of its application*: outcomes depended significantly on the interpretation of the individual court, and there was no binding doctrine of precedent in the common-law sense. Codification addresses that directly. But a code is only as predictable as the case law under it, and the case law under this one is a matter of a few years. Predictability improved; it has not yet been demonstrated over a cycle.

Arbitration. Saudi Arabia is a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the **Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration** was established in 2014 with rules revised in recent years. **Verify** the accession date, the current SCCA rules and their date, the operation of the SCCA Court, and the enforcement record of foreign awards through the Saudi Enforcement Courts. For a commercial counterparty, arbitration under

an institutional rule set with a seat outside the Kingdom, enforceable under the New York Convention, is the standard and correct answer — and it remains the correct answer notwithstanding the codification wave.

The Regional Headquarters programme. This is what most readers come to Saudi Arabia for, and it is worth stating exactly.

The programme was announced in February 2021. Its operative mechanism is a procurement rule: **from 1 January 2024, Saudi government agencies and state-owned entities ceased contracting with companies that do not have their regional headquarters in the Kingdom**, subject to a contract-value threshold below which the rule does not bite. It is administered by the Ministry of Investment together with the Royal Commission for Riyadh City. An RHQ licence requires the entity to perform defined mandatory strategic-management activities plus a minimum number of optional activities, and to employ a minimum number of full-time staff within a defined period, including a minimum number of executives.

Incentives were announced in December 2023: a package described as running for thirty years from the date of licence, comprising a zero rate of corporate income tax and of withholding tax on RHQ-eligible activities, together with relief from national-employment quota requirements for a period and facilitation of work visas.

Verify with Saudi counsel and a Saudi tax adviser, without exception: the instrument establishing the procurement rule and its exact terms; the contract-value threshold and whether it has moved; the mandatory and optional activity lists; the employee and executive minimums and the period within which they must be met; the instrument granting the tax incentives, its precise scope, the definition of RHQ-eligible income, and the consequences of earning non-eligible income; and the current licence count and programme status. Every number in the preceding paragraph is a number this chapter has deliberately not stated, because stating it wrongly would be worse than not stating it.

Now the honest reading, which is the part that determines whether the programme belongs in a structure at all.

This is not a tax haven. It is a market-access toll with a rebate. The incentive exists because the requirement is coercive: the Kingdom is not competing for headquarters on quality of law or neutrality of forum, it is conditioning access to a very large state customer on physical presence, and then reducing the tax cost of that presence so the condition is bearable. A group that does not sell to the Saudi state, or to entities that require an RHQ counterparty, has no reason to be in the programme at all.

That makes the RHQ decision an OPERATING decision under Chapter 6's taxonomy, driven by revenue, not a HOLDING decision driven by jurisdictional quality. Read it that way and it becomes easy to evaluate: does the addressable government and state-linked revenue exceed the fully loaded cost of a real Riyadh headquarters with real executives in it? If yes, do it. If no, do not, and no incentive package changes the answer.

KAFD. The **King Abdullah Financial District** in Riyadh is the physical home of the Kingdom's financial sector build-out and has been designated for special-zone treatment for financial services. **Verify with Saudi counsel:** the constituting instrument, its date, the precise scope of the designation, which activities and which entities it covers, and — decisively — whether it creates a distinct legal or regulatory regime or a tax-and-licensing package within Saudi law. That distinction is the whole question, and it is described loosely almost everywhere. Do not conflate

KAFD with the separate special economic zones announced for other sites, which have different constituting instruments and different purposes; confirm which designation applies where.

Regulators and tax. The Saudi Central Bank supervises banking and insurance; the Capital Market Authority regulates securities and the Tadawul exchange; the Zakat, Tax and Customs Authority administers tax and zakat. The tax system distinguishes between corporate income tax on the non-GCC-owned share of a company and zakat on the GCC-owned share, with withholding taxes on defined payment types and a value added tax. **Verify every rate, base and threshold with a Saudi tax adviser, together with Saudi Arabia's Pillar Two implementation status.** The zakat/income-tax split is unfamiliar to most international advisers and is a common source of error.

Transparency and standards. Saudi Arabia became a full member of the Financial Action Task Force in 2019 — the first Arab state to do so — and has not been placed on the increased-monitoring list. It is a CRS-participating jurisdiction and operates a FATCA arrangement. **Verify** the membership date, the most recent mutual evaluation and follow-up outcomes, and the CRS and FATCA implementing instruments.

Saudi Arabia: political and concentration considerations, stated directly

This book exists to protect against arbitrary action — expropriation, immobilisation, and de-risking without process, as distinct from lawful process, which is Chapter 32's problem. **Any assessment of Saudi Arabia that does not deal directly with the events of November 2017 is not an assessment.**

In November 2017 a large number of businessmen, senior officials and members of the royal family were detained at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh in the course of an announced anti-corruption campaign. Releases were widely reported to have been conditioned on financial settlements transferring assets to the state.

Handle the evidence honestly. **The detentions are established fact.** The aggregate settlement figures reported at the time were government-sourced and have not been independently audited; treat the amount as unestablished and the event as established. No figure is stated here for that reason. **Verify** with primary reporting and with counsel before relying on any characterisation of scale.

What the event establishes for the purposes of this book is narrow and severe:

```
IT HAPPENED TO    wealthy, well-connected, locally resident principals
                  -- not to foreigners, not to outsiders, not to
                  people who lacked access
IT HAPPENED VIA   detention outside ordinary criminal procedure, with
                  asset transfer as the reported condition of release
IT HAPPENED IN    the jurisdiction itself, within the last decade
NO STRUCTURE      no holding company, no foundation, no choice of law
  DEFENDS         and no arbitration clause protects a principal who
  AGAINST IT      is physically present and personally detained
```

That last line is the one to sit with, and it connects directly to Chapter 39. Every failure in the recorded case law that actually destroyed a structure worked the same way: a power with personal reach over the principal compelled the principal, and the structure followed. Cook Islands

non-recognition failed against United States contempt power in *In re Lawrence* and *FTC v. Affordable Media* for exactly this reason. The mechanism is identical; only the procedural wrapper differs.

Two further items belong in an honest political assessment, stated factually and briefly. The 2018 killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul had a documented and durable effect on Western institutional and investor risk appetite toward the Kingdom. And regional security exposure is real: Saudi oil-processing facilities were attacked in 2019, and the Kingdom has been a party to the conflict in Yemen. **Verify** dates and current status of each.

Now the counterweight, stated just as fairly, because a one-sided assessment is as useless as an absent one:

- The Vision 2030 programme has produced a genuine and sustained legislative reform effort — the civil code, the companies law, the investment law, the bankruptcy regime, arbitration infrastructure — over a short period. That is not cosmetic.
- The Public Investment Fund's scale makes the Kingdom a counterparty and co-investor of global consequence rather than a regional one.
- Capital market opening, index inclusion and foreign-ownership liberalisation have moved substantially in one direction.
- **The rule-of-law trajectory is improving.** It is improving from a low base on the specific axis this book measures, which is predictability of state action against private wealth, and improving trajectories do not retroactively insure the period before they arrive.

Saudi Arabia is an OPERATING and MARKET-ACCESS jurisdiction. It is not a holding jurisdiction and it is not a bridging jurisdiction, and the disqualifying item is number 9, not number 3. The courts and the codification are improving. The concentration of decision-making, and its demonstrated willingness to act against private wealth without ordinary process, is the item that governs.

The measurement: what adding Gulf jurisdictions actually does

Run Chapter 5's instrument. The designed structure carried through this book, per SPINE §2:

```
AS DESIGNED
  UAE 29.1  Thailand 18.2  UK 16.4  Bermuda 13.6
  India 11.8  Singapore 10.9

  effective jurisdictions = 5.29
  EFFECTIVE BLOCS         = 2.94
```

Now the tempting variant. The family is offered a Saudi RHQ and a QFC family-office vehicle, and funds them by trimming the UAE, UK and Singapore allocations. Eight jurisdictions instead of six:

```
AS TEMPTED
  UAE        20.0   bloc = BRIDGE (GCC)
  Thailand   18.2   bloc = NONALIGNED
  Bermuda    13.6   bloc = W
  UK         12.2   bloc = W
  India      11.8   bloc = NONALIGNED
  Saudi       9.1   bloc = BRIDGE (GCC)
```

```
  Qatar       8.2   bloc = BRIDGE (GCC)
  Singapore   6.9   bloc = BRIDGE
            -----
            100.0

  naive HHI = 0.20^2 + 0.182^2 + 0.136^2 + 0.122^2
            + 0.118^2 + 0.091^2 + 0.082^2 + 0.069^2
            = 0.140194
  effective jurisdictions = 1 / 0.140194 = 7.13

COLLAPSED TO BLOCS
  BRIDGE      44.2   (UAE + Saudi + Qatar + Singapore)
  NONALIGNED  30.0   (Thailand + India)
  WEST        25.8   (Bermuda + UK)

  bloc HHI = 0.442^2 + 0.300^2 + 0.258^2 = 0.351928
  EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 1 / 0.351928 = 2.84
```

Set the two side by side:

	DESIGNED	TEMPTED	CHANGE
jurisdictions held	6	8	+2
naive effective count	5.29	7.13	+34.8%
EFFECTIVE BLOCS	2.94	2.84	−3.4%

Two more jurisdictions, a naive resilience count a third higher, and the honest count went down. The structure looks more diversified on every measure a brochure would use and is fractionally less diversified on the only measure that predicts failure.

The mechanism is Chapter 5's, unchanged: the Gulf additions were funded partly out of Singapore, which is a *different* bridge position, so the BRIDGE bloc concentrated even as the jurisdiction count rose. **Rearranging inside a bloc does not change `N`; funding an intra-bloc addition out of an extra-bloc position makes `N` worse.**

And then the second risk, which the HHI does not capture at all. The tempted structure holds 37.3% of its exposure across three GCC states that closed their borders to one another between 2017 and 2021. **A concentration measure assumes the members of a bloc fail together;** it does not model the members of a bloc failing against each other, and in the Gulf that is a live, dated, recent scenario. Note it as a qualitative overlay on item 9 of both scorecards.

The Specification

Step 1 — Set the Gulf ceiling before you look at entities

Write down, before evaluating any Qatari or Saudi proposal, the maximum share of total exposure the structure will hold across all GCC states combined. Treat it as a budget.

```
GCC EXPOSURE CEILING: ______%  of total structure exposure,
counting the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman
as ONE line, because for external-coordination purposes they are.
```

A ceiling set after the entities have been chosen is not a ceiling; it is a description.

Step 2 — Apply the entry test, which has exactly one question each

For Saudi Arabia:

> *Is there addressable Saudi government or state-linked revenue whose expected value exceeds the fully loaded cost of a real Riyadh headquarters — executives, premises, payroll, tax compliance and management time — over the horizon we can forecast?*

If yes, the RHQ is an operating decision and proceeds to Step 3. If no, stop. The incentive package is not a reason; it is a discount on a cost you would not otherwise incur.

For Qatar:

> *Is there real Qatari operating activity — customers, contracts, assets, people — that requires a Qatari entity, and does the QFC's ability to operate anywhere in Qatar under common-law regulation solve a problem that an onshore Qatari company would not?*

If yes, proceed. If no, stop — and in particular, do not establish a QFC vehicle as a second Gulf holding or family-office layer, because it duplicates the DIFC's function inside the same bloc at additional cost. That is Chapter 11's error and Chapter 17's failure mode 2 in a third country.

Step 3 — Build Saudi substance as substance, not as documentation

An RHQ that exists on paper fails the programme's own conditions and fails a substance analysis everywhere else at the same time.

```
REQUIRED, AS FACT NOT AS FILING
  executives who genuinely live and work in Riyadh
  the mandatory strategic-management activities actually performed
    there, with decisions minuted where they are taken
  headcount met within the required period and maintained
  premises that a visit would find occupied
  a payroll, a tax registration and a filing calendar
VERIFY
  every threshold, list and period with Saudi counsel -- this
  chapter states none of them
```

Step 4 — Contract out of Saudi litigation, not out of Saudi law

Two separate decisions, routinely conflated.

```
GOVERNING LAW    Saudi law will govern some things whatever the
                 contract says: employment of staff in the Kingdom,
                 real property there, public procurement, regulatory
                 licensing. Accept that and paper it properly.
FORUM            For commercial disputes with counterparties,
                 arbitrate. Institutional rules, a seat chosen
                 deliberately, an award enforceable under the New
                 York Convention. VERIFY the enforcement record of
```

```
                foreign awards through the Saudi Enforcement Courts
                with counsel before relying on it.
```

Step 5 — Keep the principal's physical exposure as a named risk

This is the specification item that follows from the political assessment, and it applies to any jurisdiction with concentrated executive power, not only to this one.

```
RECORD IN THE RISK REGISTER
  which individuals travel to which jurisdictions, how often, and
    with what authority to bind the group
  which of them hold reserved powers under the Foundation
  what happens to governance if any one of them is unreachable for
    ninety days
DESIGN CONSEQUENCE
  a founder who holds reserved powers and travels frequently to a
    jurisdiction with concentrated executive power is a single
    point of failure that no choice of law addresses
  Chapter 7's Guardian and successor-appointor architecture is the
    mitigation, and it only works if it was drafted BEFORE it was
    needed
```

No structure defends against a power with personal reach over the principal. The only available mitigations are governance continuity and physical presence management, and both must be built in advance.

Step 6 — One tax analysis across the whole Gulf footprint

UAE corporate tax under **Federal Decree-Law No. 47 of 2022** and the qualifying-free-zone-person analysis (Chapter 17); QFC tax under the QFC Tax Regulations; Saudi corporate income tax and zakat, withholding and VAT; and the Pillar Two position in each. Do them together, once, because the group's Gulf entities will transact with each other and transfer pricing does not respect the chapter structure of a book.

Step 7 — Register consistency, extended

Chapter 17's Step 9 discipline applies across every additional jurisdiction: the beneficial-owner particulars filed in the DIFC, ADGM, Qatar and Saudi Arabia must agree with each other and with the Thai, UK, Bermudian and Indian records. Every jurisdiction added multiplies the reconciliation work, and reconciliation failure is what compliance functions actually detect. That cost belongs in the entry test at Step 2, not discovered afterwards.

Step 8 — The intra-Gulf fracture contingency

Distinct from Chapter 18's relisting contingency, and needed for the same reason.

```
TRIGGER    diplomatic rupture, border closure or transport
           suspension between GCC states in which the structure
           holds entities
```

```
IMMEDIATE  confirm each entity can be administered without physical
           travel between the affected states -- registered agents,
           local directors, electronic filing
STANDING   never place the sole director, the sole signatory or the
           sole registered agent of an entity in a GCC state
           different from the entity's own
STANDING   maintain at least one banking relationship outside the
           GCC entirely -- this is the same standing relationship
           Chapter 18 Step 8 requires, and it serves both events
```

The Failure Modes

1. Counting Gulf jurisdictions instead of Gulf blocs

The chapter's central arithmetic. Eight jurisdictions, a naive count of 7.13, and an effective bloc count that fell. Anyone reporting the first two numbers without the third is reporting the wrong thing.

2. Assuming the 2017 rupture cannot recur

It was resolved by declaration, not by structural change. The conditions that produced it — divergent foreign policy among neighbours with the capacity to act quickly and without a legislative cycle — are unchanged.

3. Treating the Saudi RHQ as a holding vehicle

It is an operating entity in a jurisdiction with real substance requirements, real tax filings, and the political profile assessed above. Putting group holdings under it inverts every conclusion in this chapter.

4. Assuming a QFC entity delivers the DIFC's case law

Different regime, different regulations, different court, different and much smaller body of decided authority. The QFC's common-law character is real; its precedent depth is not comparable, and the assumption that a DIFC answer transfers is unfounded.

5. Assuming Saudi contractual outcomes from the code

The Civil Transactions Law is a major improvement in the *statement* of the law. The body of decided authority applying it is a few years old. Predictability is a function of both, and the second one takes time that has not yet elapsed.

6. Litigating in the Kingdom instead of arbitrating

For a commercial dispute with a counterparty, the New York Convention route exists, is established, and should be the default. Verify enforcement practice; do not assume it, in either direction.

7. Discounting the Ritz-Carlton class of risk because it happened to locals

The commonest and most expensive rationalisation. The detainees were the best-connected people in the country. Being foreign is not a protection; it removes the one form of leverage — domestic political standing — that some of them had.

8. RHQ substance built as documentation

An RHQ with no executives actually resident fails the programme's conditions, fails a permanent-establishment analysis, and fails a substance test in every other jurisdiction that looks at it — simultaneously, on the same facts.

9. Assuming KAFD is a legal enclave

Until the constituting instrument has been read, KAFD's designation should be treated as unverified in scope. There is a large difference between a tax-and-licensing package and a distinct legal regime with its own court, and only one of those is what DIFC, ADGM and the QFC provide.

10. Confusing zakat with corporate income tax

The Saudi split between zakat on the GCC-owned share and income tax on the non-GCC-owned share is unfamiliar to most international advisers and produces confident, wrong modelling of the effective rate on a mixed-ownership entity.

11. Building a Gulf-only structure

The most fundamental error and the easiest to make, because everything in the region is convenient, proximate and well-marketed to everything else in the region. A structure whose entities are all in GCC states has an effective bloc count approaching 1.00 no matter how many countries it touches, and `ln(1.00) = 0`.

Worked Application

CONSTRUCTED CASE. Every fact below is invented for illustration. No real person, family, entity or transaction is described. Figures are illustrative and are not benchmarks. No sanctions nexus.

The carried case, unchanged: the dual national, UAE tax resident; three heirs in Singapore, France and the United Kingdom; the DIFC Foundation apex (Chapter 7); the ADGM holdco (Chapter 17); the Thai BOI operating company; the UAE trading company; the London REIT position; the Bermuda captive; the GIFT City vehicle.

Two Gulf propositions arrive in the same quarter.

Proposition A. The Thai manufacturing operation's product line has been specified into a Saudi infrastructure procurement. The counterparty is a state-owned entity, the contract value is well above any threshold, and the counterparty requires a Saudi regional headquarters. Forecast addressable Saudi government and state-linked revenue over five years is material relative to the group's existing turnover.

Proposition B. A Doha adviser proposes a QFC single-family-office vehicle to sit alongside the DIFC Foundation, citing the QFC's foundations regime, its 10% tax rate, and "Gulf diversification".

Applying the entry tests

Proposition A passes Step 2 and is taken. There is real, forecastable, contracted revenue that is unavailable without the RHQ; the cost of a genuine Riyadh headquarters is exceeded by the expected value of the access; and the decision is correctly classified as **OPERATING** under Chapter 6, sitting beside the Thai company rather than above it.

Proposition B fails Step 2 and is declined. There is no Qatari operating activity — no customers, no contracts, no assets, no people. The vehicle would duplicate the DIFC Foundation's function, inside the same bloc, at additional annual cost, with a second set of registers to reconcile. The "Gulf diversification" in the pitch is precisely the error this chapter measures, and the measurement says the pitch makes the structure worse.

Note what the rejection is *not*. It is not a judgment that the QFC is a poor regime — the QFC's ability to operate anywhere in Qatar is a genuine structural advantage and would be decisive for a family with real Qatari business. The proposition fails on the family's facts, not on the jurisdiction's merits, and a scorecard that could not distinguish those two things would be useless.

The structure as varied

```
UNCHANGED
  DIFC Foundation (apex)          Chapter 7
  ADGM holdco                     Chapter 17
  Thai BOI opco                   Chapter 23
  UK REIT position, Bermuda captive, GIFT City vehicle

ADDED
  Saudi RHQ entity                job = OPERATING / market access
    sits BESIDE the Thai opco under the ADGM holdco, not above it
    three resident executives, premises, payroll, tax registration
    mandatory activities performed and minuted in Riyadh
    commercial contracts: arbitration, institutional rules, seat
      chosen deliberately, award enforceable under the New York
      Convention
    no group holdings placed under it, ever

DECLINED
  QFC family-office vehicle
```

The measurement after

The Saudi entity is funded from the group's operating allocation rather than by trimming the extra-bloc positions, which is the specific error the tempted variant made:

```
AFTER, with the Saudi RHQ funded from the Thai/operating allocation
  UAE        29.1   BRIDGE (GCC)
```

```
  Thailand   13.2   NONALIGNED
  UK         16.4   WEST
  Bermuda    13.6   WEST
  India      11.8   NONALIGNED
  Singapore  10.9   BRIDGE
  Saudi       5.0   BRIDGE (GCC)
             -----
             100.0

  naive HHI = 0.291^2 + 0.132^2 + 0.164^2 + 0.136^2
             + 0.118^2 + 0.109^2 + 0.050^2
             = 0.084681 + 0.017424 + 0.026896 + 0.018496
             + 0.013924 + 0.011881 + 0.002500
             = 0.175802
  effective jurisdictions = 5.69

COLLAPSED TO BLOCS
  BRIDGE      45.0   (UAE + Singapore + Saudi)
  WEST        30.0   (UK + Bermuda)
  NONALIGNED  25.0   (Thailand + India)

  bloc HHI = 0.45^2 + 0.30^2 + 0.25^2
           = 0.2025 + 0.0900 + 0.0625 = 0.3550
  EFFECTIVE BLOCS = 2.82
```

Compare all three:

	DESIGNED	TEMPTED	AS BUILT
jurisdictions	6	8	7
naive effective	5.29	7.13	5.69
EFFECTIVE BLOCS	2.94	2.84	2.82

The honest result: taking the Saudi RHQ cost 0.12 of effective bloc count, and it was taken anyway, because it was justified by revenue and not by resilience. That is the correct way to make the decision and it is worth stating explicitly. Chapter 5's instrument is a measurement, not a veto. A structure exists to hold a business, and a business that wins a large contract has done something the concentration measure cannot price.

What the instrument does is make the cost visible and force it to be paid consciously. The family knows it gave up 0.12 of N and knows what it received. The tempted variant gave up 0.10 of N and received nothing but a brochure.

The disclosure test, applied in print

Would this structure still do its job if every element were disclosed to every authority with jurisdiction over any part of it?

- The Saudi RHQ is licensed, staffed, premised and filed. Its whole function is to be visibly present in the Kingdom — it is the only entity in this book whose *entire purpose* is to be seen. Disclosure is the point.

- The RHQ's ownership chain runs to the ADGM holdco and up to the DIFC Foundation, filed consistently in every register. Disclosure changes nothing.
- The tax position — Saudi income tax and zakat treatment, the RHQ incentive scope, the transfer pricing on intra-group flows — is filed on a documented analysis prepared with Saudi advisers.
- The declined QFC vehicle does not exist, which is the cheapest possible way to pass any test.
- CRS reporting reaches the residence jurisdictions of the founder and the three heirs by design.

The structure passes. The Saudi addition is the clearest illustration in Part VI of CANON §1: substance that is real, filed and visible is not a compliance burden attached to the strategy — in this case it IS the strategy, because the market access being purchased is conditioned on exactly that visibility.

What it did not solve

- **It did not diversify.** The effective bloc count fell. The decision was made on revenue and the cost was accepted.
- **It did not address the political item.** The Saudi entity, its executives and any travelling principal remain exposed to the risk assessed above. Step 5's governance-continuity architecture is the mitigation, and it is partial.
- **It did not remove the intra-Gulf fracture risk.** The structure now holds entities in two GCC states. Step 8's contingency exists for that and reduces the cost of the event, not its probability.
- **It did not pay the maintenance bill.** At the SPINE §2 test parameters the designed structure gives $h = -0.1226$ against the conventional structure's $h = -0.5000$, both below the build threshold, and a Riyadh headquarters with three executives is a substantial addition to C. **Diversity buys the ability to build; it does not pay for the building — and this chapter's addition did not even buy diversity.**

Verification Register

Marked for confirmation rather than cited, and gathered for Appendix D:

1. QFC Law No. 7 of 2005 — number, date and amendment history.
2. Current titles, years and amendment status of the QFC Contract, Companies, Employment, Trust, Foundation, Data Protection, Insolvency and Tax Regulations; the QFC family-office framework.
3. The QFC Civil and Commercial Court: current bench and President; jurisdictional scope and any opt-in mechanism; enforcement arrangements with the Qatari state courts and outward.
4. The exact scope of a QFC entity's permission to operate anywhere in Qatar: covered activities, sectoral carve-outs, and the interaction with onshore law on real property, employment of nationals, and public procurement.
5. QFC tax: rate, base, source rules, treatment of holding and investment income; the onshore Qatari income tax law and its number; Qatar's Pillar Two and domestic minimum top-up tax status.
6. Qatar's FATF/MENAFATF mutual evaluation and follow-up outcomes and dates; CRS and FATCA implementing instruments; the QFC beneficial-ownership regime and its access

rules.

7. Qatar Central Bank digital currency project status and scope; the current status of Qatar's major-non-NATO-ally designation and its date.
8. The 2017–2021 rupture: contemporaneous banking, correspondent and currency effects, verified against primary market data rather than characterisation.
9. Saudi Arabia: Royal Decree numbers and Hijri and Gregorian dates for the Civil Transactions Law, Companies Law, Investment Law, Bankruptcy Law, Commercial Courts Law and Enforcement Law, with implementing regulations, commencement and transitional provisions.
10. Saudi Arabia's New York Convention accession date; current SCCA rules and date; the SCCA Court; and the enforcement record of foreign awards through the Saudi Enforcement Courts.
11. The RHQ programme: the instrument establishing the government-procurement requirement and its terms; the contract-value threshold; mandatory and optional activity lists; employee and executive minimums and the period for meeting them; the instrument granting the tax incentives and the precise definition of RHQ-eligible income; the consequences of non-eligible income; and the current licence count.
12. KAFD: constituting instrument, date, scope, covered activities and entities, and whether it creates a distinct legal or regulatory regime or a tax-and-licensing package within Saudi law. Separately, which other Saudi special-economic-zone designations exist and where they apply.
13. Saudi tax: corporate income tax and zakat rates and bases, the mixed-ownership apportionment, withholding rates by payment type, VAT, and Pillar Two implementation status.
14. Saudi Arabia's FATF full-membership date; most recent mutual evaluation and follow-up outcomes; CRS and FATCA implementing instruments.
15. The November 2017 detentions: primary reporting, the legal basis relied upon, and the status of any published settlement figures. Treat aggregate amounts as unestablished.
16. Current QFC and Saudi fee schedules and RHQ establishment and running costs — the C term cannot be estimated without them and no figure in this chapter supplies one.

The Scorecard — Qatar and the QFC

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Hybrid, split by regime. Onshore Qatar is civil-law with Sharia influence. The QFC operates its own common-law-based regulations applied by a common-law court — a codified-derivation model closer to the DIFC's than to ADGM's direct application. Register items 1 and 2.

#	Item	Assessment
2	**Bloc alignment**	Bridge, and the most genuinely cross-bloc position in the GCC: a major United States military presence and non-NATO ally designation, the shared gas field with Iran, close relations with Türkiye, and a repeated mediation role. **For measurement purposes it is nonetheless the same GCC line as the UAE — a bridge is not an independent perimeter.**
3	**Court quality**	Good, and structurally sound. QFC Civil and Commercial Court within the QICDRC, internationally recruited bench, founded under the presidency of Lord Woolf, English language, published judgments. The body of decided authority is materially smaller than the DIFC's, which is a real limitation on predictability rather than a reputational one.
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Mixed and under-tested. Enforcement arrangements exist between the QFC Court and the Qatari state courts; outward recognition of QFC judgments abroad rests on the general position of each receiving jurisdiction. **Arbitrate where enforceability against a foreign counterparty is the point.** Register item 3.

#	Item	Assessment
5	**Substance requirements**	Moderate, and this is where the QFC differs usefully from its neighbours. Because a QFC entity may operate anywhere in Qatar, substance is a genuine and available option rather than a fiction — a QFC company can hold real Qatari operations with real staff. Verify the activity scope: Register item 4.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	CRS-participating, with a FATCA arrangement. Account information reaches residence jurisdictions automatically. **No non-reporting configuration exists and this book does not look for one.** Register item 6.
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Own regime at QFC level, filed with the registry, available to competent authorities rather than publicly searchable, alongside the onshore Qatari regime. Verify scope, definitions where a foundation or trust is in the chain, and access rules: Register item 6.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT, with the riyal pegged to the US dollar under Qatar Central Bank supervision and a CBDC project in development. The 2017–2021 rupture is the item that matters here: correspondent and currency access were disrupted by a political event among neighbours, and CANON §5 governs — a rail is not a holding. Register items 7 and 8.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	High internally; the external exposure is the recorded one. Deep LNG revenue and a large sovereign fund support fiscal stability. The 2017–2021 severance by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, resolved by the Al-Ula Declaration of 5 January 2021, is a dated demonstration that a GCC state can be isolated by its neighbours within the life of an ordinary holding structure. It was resolved by declaration, not by structural change.
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Improving, steadily and without drama.** Evidence: a common-law regime and court operating since 2005; a foundations regime and a family-office framework added over the last decade; CRS and FATCA participation; no FATF increased-monitoring listing; the 2021 restoration of GCC relations; and an expanding hydrocarbon revenue base funding institutional build-out. The trajectory is positive on legal quality and on transparency alike, which is the direction this book counts as improvement. The downside risks are not legal: they are renewed intra-GCC rupture, and the small size of the decided-authority base if a novel governance question has to be litigated.

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING, for a family with genuine Qatari business.** The QFC's freedom from geographic confinement makes it unusually good at that job. **Not holding**: it duplicates the DIFC inside the same bloc. **Not bridging in the portfolio sense**: adding it to a structure that already holds the UAE raises the naive count and lowers the effective bloc count. Chapter 6's rule governs.
12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Use it if you have real Qatari activity. Do not use it as a second Gulf holding layer.** The regime is sound, the court is credible, and the ability to operate anywhere in Qatar is a structural advantage the DIFC and ADGM do not have. What would change the verdict: nothing about Qatar — what would change it is a change in *your* facts, specifically the arrival of genuine Qatari operations. What would change it *downward*: renewed intra-GCC rupture; a FATF listing; or a de-risking cycle affecting Qatari counterparties. **What would NOT change it: further transparency, which strengthens the asset.**

The Scorecard — Saudi Arabia

#	Item	Assessment
1	**Legal family**	Sharia-based, with a rapidly expanding body of codified regulation issued by Royal Decree: the Civil Transactions Law of 2023 (the first codified civil code), the Companies Law of 2022, the Investment Law of 2024, the Bankruptcy Law of 2018. **No common-law free zone with its own private law and its own English-language court exists — there is no Saudi DIFC, ADGM or QFC.** Register item 9, and every decree number must be verified.
2	**Bloc alignment**	GCC — the same line as the UAE and Qatar for measurement purposes. Strategically, an increasingly multi-aligned posture: a long-standing United States security relationship alongside deepening Chinese commercial and energy ties and OPEC+ coordination with Russia. Multi-alignment at the state level does not create an independent perimeter for a private structure.
3	**Court quality**	Improving and under-tested. Specialised commercial courts, an enforcement-court regime, and a codified civil law since 2023. A code is only as predictable as the case law under it, and that case law is a few years old. The Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration, established 2014 with revised rules, is a genuine institution. Register items 9 and 10.

#	Item	Assessment
4	**Foreign judgment recognition**	Foreign *awards* are the workable route: Saudi Arabia is a New York Convention party and awards are enforced through the Enforcement Courts. Foreign *judgments* are materially harder. Arbitrate, with institutional rules and a deliberately chosen seat — and verify the enforcement record rather than assuming it in either direction. Register item 10.
5	**Substance requirements**	**High, deliberately, and that is the product.** The RHQ programme requires resident executives, defined strategic-management activities actually performed in the Kingdom, headcount minimums within a defined period, premises and payroll. This is not a jurisdiction offering a low-substance vehicle and does not pretend to be. Register item 11 — every threshold must be verified.
6	**CRS / FATCA status**	CRS-participating, with a FATCA arrangement; a full FATF member since 2019, the first Arab state to become one, and never on the increased-monitoring list. Register item 14.

#	Item	Assessment
7	**Beneficial-ownership regime**	Commercial-registry and regulatory disclosure obligations apply, with beneficial-ownership requirements developed alongside the AML framework. Verify the current regime, the definitions where a foreign foundation sits in the chain, and access rights — it is less internationally documented than the free zone regimes and should not be assumed to mirror them.
8	**Rail access**	SWIFT throughout, with the riyal pegged to the US dollar under Saudi Central Bank supervision and a deep domestic payment system. Dollar dependence is high and structural, given hydrocarbon revenue. CANON §5 applies: a rail is not a holding.

#	Item	Assessment
9	**Political stability**	**Stable in the sense of continuity of regime and unstable in the sense this book measures, and the two must not be netted.** Decision-making is concentrated and policy can reverse without a legislative cycle. In November 2017 businessmen, officials and members of the royal family were detained at the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh in an announced anti-corruption campaign, with releases widely reported as conditioned on financial settlements to the state; the detentions are established, the aggregate figures are government-sourced and unaudited. That is CANON's first row — arbitrary action against private wealth — occurring to well-connected local principals within the last decade, and **no structure defends against a power with personal reach over the principal.** Add the documented effect of the 2018 Khashoggi killing on institutional risk appetite, and regional security exposure including the 2019 attacks on oil-processing facilities and the Yemen conflict. Register items 15 and 9.

#	Item	Assessment
10	**DEGRADATION TRAJECTORY**	**Improving materially, from a low base, on a short record.** Evidence for improvement: the Civil Transactions Law of 2023; the Companies Law of 2022; the Investment Law of 2024; the Bankruptcy Law of 2018; arbitration infrastructure since 2014; full FATF membership since 2019; capital-market opening and index inclusion; and the RHQ programme's exceeding of its own 2030 target years early. Evidence against complacency: the reform record is shorter than one economic cycle, the codified law has little decided authority under it, and item 9's demonstrated willingness to act against private wealth outside ordinary process has not been superseded by any of the reforms listed. **The correct reading is a genuinely improving commercial-law environment inside an unchanged political-risk environment, and the second governs for a wealth-protection structure.**

#	Item	Assessment
11	**Job**	**OPERATING and MARKET ACCESS. Nothing else, ever.** The RHQ decision is a revenue decision under Chapter 6: does addressable Saudi state and state-linked revenue exceed the fully loaded cost of a real Riyadh headquarters? **Not holding**: item 9 disqualifies it, and the disqualifying item is 9, not 3. **Not bridging**: it concentrates the GCC line and adds no independent perimeter.

12	**Verdict + what would change it**	**Enter only for revenue, never for structure. Put operations there; put nothing you are trying to protect there.** The commercial-law reforms are real and the market is the largest in the region; the incentive package is a discount on a cost you would not otherwise incur, not a reason to incur it. What would change the verdict *upward*: a decade of decided authority under the Civil Transactions Law; a demonstrated record of state action against private wealth running through ordinary judicial process; and — decisively — the establishment of a genuine common-law enclave with an independent court, which does not currently exist. What would change it *downward*: a repetition of the 2017 pattern; renewed intra-GCC rupture; or a reversal of the foreign-investment liberalisation. Monitor Register items 11, 12 and 15 annually.

Part VI closes here. Part VII moves east to Singapore, Hong Kong and the AIFC in Astana — the last of which applies English common law with its own court and English judges, and is the only jurisdiction in this book that offers a genuine Russia–China–West bridge with a legal system a London lawyer can read.

> *Not legal, tax, or investment advice. Confirm every element with qualified counsel in Qatar and in Saudi Arabia and in each jurisdiction of residence, beneficiary location, and asset situs.*